THE TRINITY AND GOD THE CREATOR
Garrigou-Lagrange
PREFACE

IN his motu proprio, <Doctoris Angelici>, of June 29, 1914, Pope 
Pius X commanded that the universities and institutions of 
learning which were empowered to grant academic degrees and the 
doctorate in sacred theology should use the <Summa theologica> of 
St. Thomas as their text.

On March 7, 1916, the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and 
Universities interpreted this decree as follows: "The <Summa 
theologica> of St. Thomas must be accepted as the text for the 
lectures inasmuch as they treat of the scholastic part of the 
questions. The method to be followed is this: the <Summa 
theologica> is to be consulted frequently and explained together 
with some other text which presents the logical order of the 
questions and the positive teaching" (<Acta Apost. Sedis>, VIII, 
157).

To meet this demand, we have already published three treatises: 
<De revelatione ab Ecclesia proposita, De Deo uno, De 
Eucharistia>. The first part of this present work treats of the 
Trinity. After presenting the testimony of the Scriptures and the 
Fathers, we explain the questions in St. Thomas' <Summa 
theologica>, article by article, comparing his doctrine with the 
teaching of earlier and later theologians.

We have laid great stress on St. Thomas' concept of relation 
because from it flow all the other conclusions in this treatise, 
and these conclusions will appear to be in accord with the 
fundamental thesis of the Thomistic treatise on the one God which 
establishes that God is self-subsisting Being and that 
consequently there is but one nature in Him although the real 
relations in God are really distinct from one another.

In this way we shall show how St. Thomas perfected St. Augustine's 
teaching on the Trinity. As St. Augustine solved many difficulties 
remaining in the doctrine of the Greek Fathers on the Trinity, so 
St. Thomas explained many of St. Augustine's doubts about the 
processions, relations, and persons. This will become abundantly 
clear as we proceed to the different parts of the present 
treatise. We shall give particular attention to the indwelling of 
the Holy Trinity in the souls of the just.

With regard to the questions on creation, the distinction of 
things, their preservation, and on evil, we shall explain each 
article because they are all of great importance. In the treatises 
on the angels, corporeal creatures, and man, we shall study only 
the more important questions, laying special emphasis on the 
principles which throw light on the whole matter. It is well to 
descend from these principles to the conclusions and then rise 
from the conclusions to the principles, so that the unity of our 
science will become clear and that our study may dispose to a 
contemplation of divine things and to a true union with God.

We hope that in some degree at least we shall attain the goal 
envisaged by the Vatican Council: "Human reason illumined by 
faith, when it inquires diligently and piously and sincerely, will 
with God's help attain to a most fruitful understanding of the 
mysteries both from the analogies of those things which it knows 
naturally and from the interconnection between the mysteries 
themselves and between the mysteries and man's ultimate end."

THE TRINITY
INTRODUCTION

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS TREATISE

IF we read the Fathers of the Church and the ancient theologians, 
I we shall see that for them the dogma of the Trinity, however 
obscure it may have been for them, was of the greatest importance. 
Thus Tertullian [1] asked: "What is the substance of the New 
Testament, except that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, 
believed to be three, are one God?" The words of St. Hilary [2] on 
this mystery, expressed in the sign of the cross, with which 
Christians sign themselves, have been quoted many times; "This is 
what the Church understood, what the synagogue did not believe, 
what philosophy could not grasp. " The dogma of the Trinity, 
therefore, is that fundamental truth by which believing Christians 
are distinguished from the Jews and pagans.

Both the Greek and the Latin Fathers wrote long treatises on the 
Trinity, at first as positive and apologetic theology and later as 
speculative theology. Among the Greek Fathers we find St. 
Athanasius, [3] St. Basil, [4] St. Gregory Nazianzen, [5] St. 
Gregory of Nyssa, [6] Didymus, [7] Cyril of Alexandria, [8] St. 
John Damascene; [9] and among the Latin Fathers, St. Hilary, [10] 
St. Ambrose, [11] St. Augustine, [12] St. Fulgentius, [13] and 
Boetius. [14]

Among the Scholastics, all the great theologians and their 
commentators wrote speculative treatises on the Trinity; among 
modern positive theologians, Petau and Thomassin wrote at length 
on this dogma. Finally, the more recent theologians have accorded 
this dogma the same importance, as Franzelin, Scheeben, [15] Kuhn, 
Billot, Buonpensiere, de Regnon [16] (who wrote four volumes, 
1892-98), and J. Lebreton. [17] Father Jugie's recent work is 
based on the sources of revelation and the teachings of the 
dissident Oriental Churches. [18] A. d'Ales wrote his <De Deo 
Trino> in 1934; P. Galtier wrote <De SS. Trinitate in se et in 
nobis> in 1933; L. Choppin, <La Trinite chez les Peres, 
Apostoliques> in 1925; F. Cavalerra, <Les premieres formules 
trinitaires de S. Augustin> in 1925, and M. Schmaus, <Die 
Psychologie Trinitatslehre des hl. Augustinus> in 1927. [19]

In view of this theological activity it is surprising that toward 
the end of the last century the question of the importance of this 
dogma should have arisen. [20] With regard to this question three 
positions may be distinguished.

Certain Protestants, holding that this mystery is 
incomprehensible, declared that God revealed it as an enigma to 
humble human reason, which seeks to measure all things according 
to its own principles, and not in order to perfect our intellects 
by sublime and fruitful knowledge.

This position, which is in opposition to the whole tradition of 
the doctors, exaggerates and distorts a truth. It is indeed true 
that in the revelation of this mystery God shows us that His 
intimate life and His divinity transcend even our highest and most 
universal analogical concepts, the concepts of being and unity. 
For the Deity as such, naturally unknowable, is in a sense above 
the being and unity which are naturally knowable, as Cajetan said 
so well. [21] The revelation of the mystery of the Trinity shows 
that the Deity is also above the absolute and the relative for, as 
we shall see, the Deity as it is in itself is not really distinct 
from the divine relations, from paternity, filiation, and 
spiration. Thus it is not something merely absolute nor merely 
relative, but something above these, the supreme enigma. But must 
we conclude that the manifestation of this enigma was intended 
solely to humble our reason and not also to perfect and illuminate 
it?

Many other Protestants during the nineteenth century, and some 
Catholics too, like Hirscher, declared that this dogma indeed 
illuminated our minds, but only in an extrinsic manner. They 
thought that for us the Trinity had no intrinsic importance, but 
that it served only to obviate contradictions in the other 
mysteries of the incarnation of the Son of God and the sending of 
the Holy Ghost, which in themselves are of great value to us.

The basis of this position, as its authors declared, is that the 
dogma of the Trinity taken intrinsically, prescinding from the 
other truths with which it is connected, cannot perfect our inner 
life, our faith, hope, and charity. They argue as if it mattered 
not to our interior life whether we believe that there are four 
divine persons, or that the divine persons are not really distinct 
from one another. Since, according to these men, God did not 
reveal this mystery because of its intrinsic validity, any 
theological attempt to penetrate it is futile, and therefore the 
treatise on the Trinity is merely an introduction to the treatises 
on the redemptive Incarnation and the mission of the Holy Ghost, 
which perfect our faith, hope, and charity.

Such an introduction, they said, is necessary to prevent any 
contradiction between the essential truths intrinsically necessary 
for the Christian life: between 1. the unity of God, which is the 
fundamental truth of the Old Testament; 2. the divinity of Jesus 
Christ, the Son of God, who, according to the Gospels, is not 
entirely identified with His Father; and 3. the divinity of the 
Holy Ghost, the Paraclete and Sanctifier, sent by the Father and 
the Son. These are the essential dogmas of Christianity, which 
cannot be reconciled without the distinction and the 
consubstantiality of the three divine persons, as is clear from 
the first centuries, when Sabellianism denied the real distinction 
between the three divine persons, and when Arius and others denied 
the consubstantiality of the Son and the Holy Spirit. According to 
this position the dogma of the Trinity was revealed to illuminate 
our minds but solely in an extrinsic manner to prevent 
contradictions in the other mysteries.

The Modernists, however, like Le Roy, extended this position in a 
pragmatic sense, declaring, "The dogmas of faith are to be 
accepted only in a practical sense, that is, only as preceptive 
norms of action and not as rules of faith. " [22] Thus, for the 
Modernists the formula of the dogma of the Trinity was introduced 
into the professions of faith to prevent such heresies as oppose 
the Christian life.

This position is similar to Locke's Nominalist philosophical 
position. Locke taught that the principle of contradiction is a 
solemn futility, in itself of slight importance but necessary 
nonetheless to obviate absurdity in our thought and speech.

If a principle is necessary to avoid error, is it without all 
intrinsic value? Certainly contradictions are not eliminated from 
our thinking without some positive illumination, and the principle 
of contradiction precludes all absurdity only because it is a 
fundamental law of real being and of thought. Thus, ontology is 
not a solemn futility but an important part of metaphysics which, 
in opposition to absolute evolutionism, defends the validity of 
the principles of contradiction and identity, which was denied by 
Heraclitus when he said, "All things are becoming and nothing 
exists and in the becoming itself being and non-being are 
identified."

So also in the spiritual order, charity dispels all discord 
because it is the supreme virtue uniting the soul with God and 
also uniting souls to one another. Similarly, the mystery of the 
Trinity would not exclude every contradiction in the other 
mysteries of the incarnation of the Son and the sending of the 
Holy Spirit unless it were the expression of the intimate life of 
God in the most sublime aspect of that life.

The third position is the traditional view of those who hold that 
the dogma of the Trinity possesses intrinsic value of the greatest 
importance for us. This position was defended during the 
nineteenth century by Kleutgen (<Theologie der Vorzeit>) and 
Scheeben, whose fundamental reasoning may here be stated briefly 
and later developed during the course of this treatise. This dogma 
1. perfects our natural knowledge of God the Creator, 2. it gives 
us supernatural knowledge of the intimate life of God, and 3. it 
throws light from above on other supernatural mysteries.

The first reason is found in St. Thomas: "The knowledge of the 
divine persons was necessary for right thinking about the creation 
of things. For when we say that God made all things by His Word we 
avoid the error of those who say that God made all things 
necessarily because of His nature. But when we discover in God the 
procession of love we see that God produced creatures not because 
of any need, nor because of any extrinsic cause, but because of 
the love of His goodness. " [23] This is to say, as Scheeben 
points out, that the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity 
perfects and confirms our natural knowledge of God the Creator and 
of creation as an entirely free act of God <ad extra>. This will 
be all the more apparent when we remember that many philosophers 
denied the freedom of creation because of the Platonic and 
Neoplatonic principle that the good is essentially diffusive of 
itself. But God is the highest good. Therefore God is essentially 
and to the greatest degree diffusive of Himself even as the sun 
radiates its light and heat everywhere by its very nature.

Reply. That good is diffusive of itself according to its 
particular aptitude, I concede; that it is always so because of 
its actuality, I deny. On this principle St. Thomas [24] showed 
that creation was fitting and proper, but in his following article 
he went on to say that, although creation is fitting it is 
entirely free because "the goodness of God is perfect and is able 
to be without other beings since nothing of perfection accrues to 
it from other beings. " Some obscurity remains, however; for if 
God had created nothing, how would the principle that good is 
diffusive of itself be verified in God? In the first place how 
could there be an end eliciting the action of creation, and 
secondly how would creation be effected? Here Leibnitz erred by 
saying that creation is not physically but morally necessary, and 
that God would not be perfectly wise and good if He had not 
created, and moreover if He had not created the best of all 
possible worlds. Such was also the teaching of Malebranche. This 
obscurity is clarified by the revelation of the mystery of the 
Trinity, for, even if God had created nothing, there would still 
be in Him the infinite fecundity of the generation of the Son and 
the spiration of the Holy Ghost. Thus the principle that good is 
diffusive of itself is perfectly verified in God. Indeed the 
highest good is necessarily diffusive of itself within itself but 
not by causality; by a communication which is not only a 
participation in its nature but a communication of His entire 
indivisible nature, of His entire intimate life in the generation 
of His Son, who was not made, and in the spiration of the Holy 
Ghost.

Thus from a higher plane comes confirmation that creation is an 
entirely free act by which God communicates without Himself a 
participation of His being, His life, and His knowledge. Thus also 
it is more evident that God is not the intrinsic cause but the 
extrinsic cause of the universe, the end for which it was created, 
the being that created, conserves, and keeps it in motion.

If, therefore, God created actually, it was through love, to show 
in an entirely free act His goodness, and not in any way by a 
necessity of His nature, as St. Thomas taught in the passage cited 
above against the pantheists and against that absolute optimism 
which is found in the teaching of Leibnitz and Malebranche.

The second reason supporting the traditional view is that the 
revelation of the Trinity has intrinsic value for us and is of the 
greatest importance for the supernatural knowledge of God in His 
intimate life and immanent operations. No created intellect by its 
own natural powers is able to know the formal object of the 
uncreated intellect which is the Deity in its own proper aspect of 
Deity; the created intellect knows God only according to the 
common and analogical terms of being, unity, truth, goodness, and 
so on. For if any created intellect, human or angelic, could 
attain even confusedly and vaguely to the formal object of the 
uncreated intellect, it would then be of that same nature as are 
the intellects of the ignorant man and the greatest philosopher. 
Then we would have that pantheistic confusion of the uncreated and 
created natures which, like sanctifying grace, would be a 
participation in the formal nature of God. This is profoundly 
explained by St. Thomas: "It is not by his natural knowledge that 
the angel knows what God is, because the very nature of the angel 
by which he attains to the knowledge of God is an effect not 
commensurate with the power of the cause that made it." [25]

The angel, and especially man, by his natural knowledge cannot 
attain to God except by those perfections in which he can share in 
the natural order, such as being, unity, goodness. But God as He 
is in Himself cannot be shared in the natural order; such 
participation can be only in the supernatural order by sanctifying 
grace. Thus even an angel in his natural knowledge is related to 
God as He is in Himself as the eye that perceives all the colors 
of the rainbow but would not perceive white light from which the 
colors are derived as inadequate effects. St. Thomas taught: 
"Revelation most properly defines God inasmuch as He is the 
highest cause, teaching not only that which is knowable by 
creatures but also communicating how He is known to Himself alone 
and to others in revelation." [26] This is primarily the Godhead 
Himself, or the intimate life of God, which is properly made known 
by the revelation of the Trinity.

In the Trinity we see the infinite and eternal fecundity of the 
divine nature, which is communicated by the Father to the Son, and 
to the Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son. The Protestant 
theologians mentioned above say that the mystery of the Trinity is 
an enigma without meaning for our interior life, but the 
traditional theologians say that in this mystery of the Trinity we 
come to some knowledge of the most perfect intellectual life, that 
is in the three persons, who in the same divine truth live by the 
same act of pure intelligence which is subsisting intelligence 
itself.

So also in this mystery there is some manifestation of the supreme 
life of charity in the love of the three divine persons, who in 
the same infinite goodness live by the same act of pure love, 
which is subsisting love itself.

Here we have the supreme model of our supernatural life, the love 
of the three divine persons, since our adoptive sonship is the 
image participating in the eternal filiation of the only-begotten 
Son. [27] For so Christ prayed for us to the Father: "That they 
may be one, as We also are" (John 17:11); and St. Paul writing to 
the Romans said: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be 
made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the 
first-born among many brethren. " [28]

By its own powers the created intellect could not know this 
essentially supernatural mystery, and without some revelation, 
more or less obscure, there would be no explicit knowledge of the 
intimate life of God in itself. Some implicit knowledge of the 
intimate life of God, however, is obtained when we believe that 
God is and that He is the rewarder, for we know Him not only as 
the author of nature but also as the author of grace and the 
remunerator in the order of salvation. The intimate life of God, 
therefore, is known from the effects of grace and salvation, but 
this life is known explicitly in itself in the mystery of the 
Trinity, although not with that clarity with which it will be seen 
in heaven.

This is clearly expressed by Alexander of Hales [29] and still 
more clearly by St. Thomas, who says: "Only this can be known 
about God by natural reason, that He necessarily possesses being 
inasmuch as He is the principle of all beings. God's creative 
power is common to the entire Trinity and pertains therefore to 
the unity of essence and not to the distinction of persons. " [30]

Objection. This knowledge of the intimate life of God remains so 
obscure that it does not of itself throw any positive light on the 
human mind.

Reply. Clearly even a very imperfect knowledge of the intimate 
life of God is of the utmost importance for us in this life since 
it is an anticipation of eternal life. This knowledge will 
correspond to our natural inefficacious and conditional desire of 
seeing the essence of the first cause and the intimate 
conciliation of the divine attributes; it corresponds also to our 
supernatural and efficacious desire which proceeds from infused 
hope and especially from infused charity, which is the true 
friendship between God and the just man. Any friendship 
presupposes a union of the friends and strives for a more intimate 
union between them.

To say, therefore, that the revelation of the mystery of the 
Trinity is without real value for us is to look at the matter from 
a naturalistic viewpoint. We recall here the words of Aristotle: 
"Man should be attracted to divine and immortal things as much as 
he is able, and however little he may see of these things, that 
little is to be loved and desired more than all knowledge he has 
of inferior substances. " [31]

Christ our Lord pointed out the importance of the mystery of the 
Trinity when He said: "But I have called you friends; because all 
things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to 
you, " [32] and "Father, I will that where I am, they also whom 
Thou hast given Me may be with Me; that they may see My glory 
which Thou hast given Me, because Thou hast loved Me before the 
creation of the world. " [33] These words refer primarily to the 
eternal generation of the Word.

Indeed the act and the fruit of charity is that rejoicing in God 
because God is infinitely perfect in Himself. [34] This joy, 
however, is greatly increased by the knowledge of God's inner life 
and His infinite fecundity. This is what St. Paul meant, writing 
to the Colossians: "That their hearts may be comforted, being 
instructed in charity, and unto all riches of fullness of 
understanding, unto the knowledge of the mystery of God the Father 
and of Christ Jesus: in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom 
and knowledge. " [35]

When theologians abandon the contemplation of divine things, they 
say that the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity is of no 
intrinsic value for us, that it is useful only to prevent 
contradictions in the enunciation of other mysteries. And because 
of this trend theology gradually became anti-contemplative. Men 
began to write books of theology devoid of contemplation and 
piety, just as if they were to write books of piety devoid of 
doctrine. The Fathers of the Church and the great doctors, on the 
contrary, looked on the mystery of the Trinity as having the 
greatest importance for us. The tract on the Trinity, of course, 
was not purely practical like the tracts on penance and matrimony, 
but it afforded the greatest help in attaining the higher stages 
of contemplation and union with God.

Amid his tribulations, St. Hilary, writing of the Trinity, said: 
"The persecution of men is a small thing because the persecutors 
cannot touch the divine persons nor diminish their joy. " A friend 
rejoices in the joy of his friend, and the just man rejoices in 
the beatitude of God.

All the great doctors who wrote about the Trinity, from St. 
Athanasius to St. Thomas, were true contemplatives, deeply 
concerned not only with purely practical human affairs but also 
with divine things, with the divine life itself, the knowledge and 
love of which is the beginning of eternal life. By the revelation 
of the Trinity we are given the supernatural knowledge of God, as 
distinct from natural knowledge; and immediately the distinction 
of the two orders of knowledge becomes clearer. This was the great 
argument against Baius, who denied the essential distinction 
between nature and grace, as if grace were something owing to 
nature. [36] This distinction between the two orders stood out so 
clearly in the revelation of the dogma of the Trinity that some 
rationalists taught that the tract on the one God contained all 
that could be said about God. Consequently the Protestant 
liberals, who are rationalists in a sense, no longer mention the 
Trinity, speaking exclusively of the unity of God, and therefore 
came to be known as Unitarians.

Finally, the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity not only 
serves to obviate contradictions in the teaching of the other 
mysteries, but also throws a positive light from above on all the 
other supernatural mysteries, on the redemptive Incarnation, the 
sending of the Holy Ghost, and the life of grace. All this will be 
clear to us in heaven, but even now we can see that the visible 
and invisible missions of the divine persons presuppose the 
internal processions, because no one is sent by himself, but the 
Son is sent by the Father, and the Holy Spirit is sent by the 
Father and the Son. Again, our adoptive sonship is the image and 
participation in the sonship of the eternal Son, since the only-
begotten Son is "the first-born among many brethren. " [37] 
Adoption is attributed to the Father as to its author, to the Son 
as to the model, and to the Holy Ghost as to Him who imprints the 
character. So also the friendship between the saints and the just 
is an image participating in the friendship of the divine persons, 
according to our Lord's words, "That they may be one, as We also 
are. " The life of grace is, as it were, a reflected light, 
manifesting God's inner life and the divine processions.

Thus St. Thomas taught: "The knowledge of the divine persons was 
necessary for us,. . . especially that we might think correctly 
about the salvation of the human race, which is accomplished by 
the incarnate Son and the gift of the Holy Spirit. " [38] He says 
it was necessary for correct positive thinking, not only to avoid 
contradiction negatively. The reason is that a truth which 
excludes equivocation and absurdity in any teaching is a higher 
truth, such as those eminent principles of being and reasoning and 
ontology itself in the philosophical sphere. This will stand out 
most clearly after we have attained the light of glory; when we 
see the Trinity clearly, the other supernatural mysteries will be 
lucidly evident.

We see, therefore, that the revelation of the mystery of the 
Trinity has not only an extrinsic value, but an intrinsic worth in 
illuminating our minds, for it makes manifest to us the principal 
and supreme object of our faith, which according to the 
arrangement of the Apostles' Creed is the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Ghost and those things attributed to them in the order of 
salvation.

Lastly, we should point out that the just here on earth, until 
that time when they reach the height of perfection which is called 
the transforming union, described by St. Theresa in the seventh 
mansion, enjoy the contemplation of the mystery of the Trinity 
amid the darkness of faith, which is really the highest exercise 
of the theological virtues and of the gift of understanding and 
wisdom.

Looking at the matter from this exalted viewpoint, those opinions 
which hold that the mystery of the Trinity is of no intrinsic 
value appear not as the dicta of wise men but rather as the fruit 
of spiritual stupidity and ignorance in the scriptural sense of 
the word. St. Paul said: "Although we speak wisdom among the 
perfect; yet not the wisdom of the world,. . . but we speak the 
wisdom of God in a mystery,. . . that eye hath not seen, nor ear 
heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things 
God hath prepared for them that love Him. " [39]

2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH ON THE TRINITY

The Catholic doctrine on the Trinity is expressed in the various 
creeds and definitions, such as the Apostles' Creed, the 
Athanasian Creed, the Nicene Creed, and many others of later date, 
and in Denzinger. [40] Finally, the Catholic belief in the Trinity 
was summed up by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) in that famous 
chapter, <Firmiter>: "Firmly we believe and simply we confess that 
one alone is true God, the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, three 
persons, but one essence, one substance, and one nature entirely 
simple. The Father is from no one, the Son from the Father alone, 
and the Holy Ghost equally from both. . . consubstantial, co-
equal, co-omnipotent, and co-eternal. . . . We confess and believe 
with Peter Lombard that it is one supreme being, incomprehensible 
and ineffable; this supreme being is truly the Father and the Son 
and the Holy Ghost, three persons together and each one singly; 
and therefore in God there is only a Trinity, not a quaternity, 
because each of the three persons is that thing, that substance, 
that essence, that divine nature. " [41]

Again, "No real distinction exists between the essence and the 
persons, but a real distinction exists between the persons among 
themselves. " [42]

Again, the three persons are one principle of operation without, 
because the divine operation without proceeds from the divine 
omnipotence, which is common to the three divine persons. [43]

This definition of the Fourth Lateran Council was amplified by the 
Council of Florence (1439) in the dogmatic decree of the union of 
the Greeks: "We define that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the 
Father and the Son and that He has His essence and His subsisting 
being simultaneously from the Father and the Son, and that He 
proceeds eternally from both as from one principle and by one 
spiration. " [44] Other definitions about each person in 
particular may be found here.

The mystery of the Trinity may be more briefly stated as the 
mystery of one God in three divine persons. But in opposition to 
the pseudo-synod of Pistoia it should be said that it is not one 
God divided into three persons but one God in three distinct 
persons, since there is no real distinction in the Godhead 
Himself, as the Eleventh Council of Toledo declared: "The Godhead 
is not reduced to single persons and is not increased into three 
persons. " [45]

THE TRADITIONAL SYMBOL OF THE TRINITY

The equilateral triangle is commonly proposed as a symbol 
expressive of this mystery, and the symbol expresses more than is 
sometimes thought. It very tangibly expresses an outline of the 
mystery with respect to the distinction between the persons and 
those things that flow from it.
(a) The three angles are really distinct from each other although 
they are not really distinct from the area of the triangle, which 
is numerically the same for all three angles. Thus the three 
divine persons are really distinct from each other but not from 
the divine essence, which is numerically the same in all three 
persons. Further, the three angles are really distinguished from 
each other by opposite relations but not from the area to which 
they are in no way opposed; so also it is with the three divine 
persons.
(b) The three angles are equal and, as it were, consubstantial 
because they are constituted by the same surface which is no 
greater in the three than it is in one. Thus there is one surface 
in three distinct angles but not distinguished into three angles.
(c) Each angle renders the surface incommunicable in its own way, 
nevertheless when the first angle is formed it does not cause the 
surface of the other angles although it communicates its surface 
to the second angle, and through the second angle to the third. 
Thus the first angle, although not really distinct from its 
surface, communicates that surface without communicating itself. 
In the Trinity the Father communicates the divine nature but not 
Himself; likewise the Son with respect to the Holy Ghost.
(d) Lastly, even though the angles are equal, there is among them 
an order of origin without causality: the first angle once formed 
becomes the principle of the second, and both of these are the 
principle of the third. At the same time the second and third are 
not caused by the first because their surfaces are not caused, but 
it is the surface of the first which is communicated to them. This 
analogy will become clearer when the principal definitions of the 
Church on the Trinity are reduced to the following propositions, 
which are often written around an equilateral triangle as below.

(diagram page 15)



The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, and yet 
the Father is not the Son, because He does not generate Himself; 
nor is the Father the Holy Ghost, or the Son the Holy Ghost, 
because those who spirate are distinguished from that which is 
spirated as he who generates is distinguished from that which is 
generated. In the statement of this mystery we see the profound 
meaning of the word "is" and of the negation "is not. " As St. 
Thomas says: [46] In every affirmative proposition about some 
reality the word "is" expresses the real identity of the subject 
and predicate. Here it expresses the real identity of the three 
divine persons with the divine essence, and the negation "is not" 
expresses the real distinction of the persons from each other. In 
this statement of the mystery the apparent contradiction is 
explained, that contradiction arising if God would be said to be 
one and three under the same aspects, e. g., nature.

In the Catholic Catechism, written by Cardinal Gasparri, this 
mystery is defined as:
(a) "God is one in the unity of nature in three really distinct 
persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, who constitute 
the Holy Trinity. " [47] Thus the Father is the Godhead but He is 
not the Trinity.
(b) How are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost distinguished 
from one another?

Answer. By the opposite relations of the persons, inasmuch as the 
Father generates the Son, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from both. 
(The Father does not generate Himself.)
(c) How are the three divine persons one God?

A. Because they are consubstantial, that is, they have one and the 
same divine nature and therefore the same attributes or 
perfections and operations <ad extra.> (The operations <ad extra> 
proceed from omnipotence, which is common to the three persons.)
(d) Is not power usually attributed to the Father, wisdom to the 
Son, and goodness to the Holy Ghost in the Scriptures?

A. Although all the attributes of divinity are common to the three 
divine persons, the Scriptures usually attribute power to the 
Father because He is the font of origin, wisdom to the Son because 
He is the word of the Father, and goodness and holiness to the 
Holy Ghost because He is the love of the other two. [48]

We will spend no more time in the simple statement of this 
mystery; the explanation of the terms nature, person, and so on 
will be found in St. Thomas' articles.

3. TRINITARIAN ERRORS

We are here not concerned with atheists and pantheists, who deny 
God the Creator Himself, nor with the rationalists, who simply 
reject every supernatural mystery. The errors about the Trinity 
can be easily divided into those which attempt to safeguard the 
unity of the divine nature by denying either the real distinction 
between the persons (Monarchians and Sabellians) or the 
consubstantiality of the persons (Subordinationists, Arians, 
Macedonians). Opposed to these are the Tritheists who say there 
are three natures in God in order to safeguard the Trinity of 
persons. [49]

We see how divine providence permits errors and heresies that the 
truth made stand out more clearly, just as it permits sin for a 
greater good. With regard to the Trinity, God permitted errors to 
appear which are opposed to one another as early as the first 
three centuries. During that time all the principal aspects of 
this supreme mystery were speculatively considered and this 
supreme dogma stood forth in the clearest light. In the East 
particularly the chief speculative heresies, those of the 
metaphysical order, preceded the Pelagian heresy, which is of the 
moral order and originated in the West.

The Trinitarian errors can be so classified as to support the 
axiom that erroneous systems often are true in what they affirm 
and false in what they deny because the reality with which they 
deal is higher and broader than the heresies themselves.

(diagram page 17)
Denial
Trinity of persons
With respect to their real distinction - Monarchians & Modalists
With respect to their consubstantiality - Arians and Macedonians
Unity of nature - The Tritheism of Roscelline (11th cent.) and of 
Abbot Joachim (12th Cent.)

It would be difficult to imagine any other errors, unless we 
include the errors of modern rationalists, such as Kant.

These errors can also be presented in a way to show the opposition 
existing between them. Between Unitarianism (Monarchists, 
Modalists, and Arians) and Tritheism, the Catholic dogma of the 
Trinity appears as the highest point of truth, like the apex of a 
pyramid rising from errors opposed to one another. The errors thus 
opposed to one another appear false in what they deny, e. g., the 
denial of the Trinity or of the divine unity, and true in what 
they affirm, because the divine reality is infinitely broader than 
the limited concepts of the human mind. As we shall see, the 
medieval conflict between nominalism and realism had considerable 
influence on these theological questions.

ERRORS DENYING THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PERSONS

In the second century the Monarchians, believing in only one 
divine principle, declared that Christ was only man endowed with 
some divine power (Paul of Samosata) or that Christ was the Father 
who became incarnate and suffered (Patripassians). Chief among the 
Patripassians were Noetus, who was opposed in the East by 
Hippolytus, and Praxeas, whom Tertullian refuted in the West. 
Noetus and Praxeas argued that the Father and the Son were not 
really distinct but merely different names for the same person.

In the third century Sabellius proposed his Modalism, so called 
because in God he did not admit distinct persons but only 
accidental modes. Later the Modalists taught that in God there was 
but one person, who manifested Himself in three modes: as the 
lawgiver in the Old Testament (the Father), as the Redeemer in the 
New Testament (the Son), and finally as the sanctifier or Holy 
Spirit. The Sabellians and Modalists were opposed by Tertullian, 
St. Dionysius of Alexandria, St. Zephyrinus, and Callistus. [50]

In the seventh century Modalism was revived by the Mohammedans. 
Mohammed admitted the existence of only God the Creator, Allah, 
who alone was to be adored, excluding the Trinity of persons. The 
Islamic formula of prayer, "There is no God but Allah, and 
Mohammed is His prophet, " was in Mohammed's mind a negation of 
the Trinity and contained within it the total apostasy from the 
Christian faith, denying at the same time the dogmas of the 
incarnation and redemption by Christ, who was no more than one of 
the prophets. Those who now write about the mysticism of Islam, 
should note this essential difference between Islam and 
Christianity.

In the Middle Ages, Modalism was again revived by the Waldensians 
and the Socinians, and later by the Unitarians, who constitute the 
liberal wing of Protestantism. It appears again in the theology of 
Kant, where God the Father is called the lawgiver, the Son the 
ruler, and the Holy Spirit the judge. Modern theosophists also are 
Unitarians, teaching that there is one eternal, infinite being, 
which manifests itself in three ways: as the first <logos> or the 
root of being, the second <logos> or the primitive duality, and 
the third <logos> or the universal intelligence. [51] Others say 
in God there is intelligence, without real distinction from the 
object and the union of these two, and that these three may be 
called, in the Hegelian sense, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
All these errors are revivals of the Modalism of the third 
century.

ERRORS DENYING THE DIVINITY OF THE PERSONS

Most famous of these heresies was that of Arius, a priest of 
Alexandria, who was addicted to the Gnostic principle that God by 
reason of His excellence could not immediately produce inferior 
creatures but required some superior creature to mediate between 
Him and His creation. Following the leadership of the Ebionites 
and Gnostics, Arius denied the divinity of the Son, declaring that 
the Son was only the most perfect of creatures, made out of 
nothing in time, and thus subordinate to God. Hence the name 
Subordinationism. According to Arius, God the Father alone is 
eternal; the Father created the Son, not of His own substance but 
out of nothing, and then God made use of the Son as an instrument 
to create the universe and redeem men. According to Arius the Holy 
Ghost also is a creature, inferior not only to the Father but also 
to the Son. Hence Arius, at least in the beginning, held that the 
Son was entirely different from the Father in nature. This error 
was attacked by Alexander, the bishop of Alexandria, who called a 
synod attended by almost a hundred bishops, and excommunicated 
Arius. Best known among the opponents of Arius was St. Athanasius, 
who valiantly defended the Catholic teaching and the words of St. 
John, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God. " [52]

To restore peace to the Church, a general council was called in 
325 at Nicaea in Bithynia, which defined against Arius that the 
Son is consubstantial with the Father, homoousion two patri ("of 
the same substance with the Father"). [53] The Council's formula 
of faith was: "We believe in one God, the Father almighty maker of 
heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible. And in 
one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only-begotten born of 
the Father, that is, out of the substance of the Father [not out 
of nothing], God of God, light of light, true God of true God, 
born, not made, of one substance with the Father, which in Greek 
is called <homoousion>, by whom all things were made. And in the 
Holy Ghost. . . . " After Arianism was thus condemned by the 
Church as a heresy, the Arians tried to dissimulate their error 
and said that the Son was similar in nature to the Father, 
<homoiousion> or <homoion>, but they refused to say that He was 
consubstantial or <homoousion>. Such was the teaching of Basil of 
Ancyra and Auxentius of Milan, who are called Semi-Arians. 
Arianism lasted into the sixth century, when it completely 
disappeared. [54]

St. Athanasius' defense of the dogma may be briefly summed up as 
follows: The Word is called God in St. John's prologue, "And the 
Word was God"; His divinity is often affirmed in the epistles of 
St. Paul and by Christ Himself when He said, "I am the way, the 
truth, and the life. " Further, the Word deifies us, making us 
gods by participation, and for this it is necessary that the Word 
be God essentially, consubstantial with the Father, although 
distinct from Him as His Son. Similarly the Holy Ghost who 
vivifies us is essentially God, and therefore is mentioned with 
the Father and the Son in the formula of baptism. [55]

Following the principles that misled Arius, Eunomius concluded 
that the Holy Ghost was not God but a creature made by the Son of 
God, inferior to Him and similar to the angels. At about the same 
time, the Macedonians like the Semi-Arians denied the divinity and 
consubstantiality of the Holy Ghost. Eunomius was refuted by St. 
Gregory of Nyssa, St. Basil of Caesarea, and St. Ambrose. 
Macedonianism was condemned by St. Damasus in the fourth Council 
of Rome (380) and in the following year by the second ecumenical 
Council of Constantinople. [56] The most important definition of 
the Council is: "If anyone shall say that the Holy Ghost is not 
truly and properly of the Father, like the Son, of the divine 
substance, and true God, let him be anathema. " Thus in the fourth 
century, opposing these heresies, the Church explicitly taught a 
Trinity of distinct persons, upheld their divinity and 
consubstantiality, and so preserved the unity of essence together 
with the distinction of persons. In the earliest centuries, 
therefore, the Church explicitly condemned that Unitarianism which 
the liberal Protestants have recently revived.

TRITHEISM

Tritheism as such did not appear until the Middle Ages. In the 
sixth century, however, John Philoponus, a philosopher of 
Alexandria, prepared the way for Tritheism when he identified 
person with nature and taught that there were three natures in God 
and that there were still three persons in one God. In other 
words, the three divine persons participate in the divine nature 
as three men participate in human nature. He was condemned as a 
heretic in the Second Council of Constantinople (the fifth 
ecumenical council). [57]

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the controversy about 
universals affected questions about the Trinity in various ways. 
Roscellinus, the celebrated doctor of Nominalism, taught that the 
divine essence could not be common to three persons and that the 
three divine persons were three distinct realities or substances, 
in much the same way that three souls or three angels differ. 
Nevertheless, he said, the three divine persons form a certain 
unity inasmuch as they are endowed with one will and the same 
power.

Roscellinus arrived at this conclusion because of his Nominalism, 
according to which the universals have not even a fundamental 
existence in things, that is to say, the universals have no 
objective reference but are merely words adopted into our speech. 
Positivists and modern empiricists have returned to this view, 
refusing to admit any essential difference between intellectual 
and sensitive knowledge and reducing the idea to a composite image 
of the phantasm to which a common name has been joined. According 
to pure Nominalism, therefore, the universals do not exist in 
things even fundamentally; the only things that exist are the 
individuals. Thus humanity designates the aggregate of men and not 
human nature, which is specifically one. If, therefore, according 
to revelation, there are three divine persons, the Nominalists 
cannot conceive how they can have the same divine nature, 
especially a divine nature which is numerically one, nor do they 
admit one specific nature for all men. St. Anselm attacked the 
Nominalism of Roscellinus, and in 1092 it was condemned by the 
Synod of Soissons. [58]

In the eleventh century Gilbert Porretanus, who although he is 
often called a Nominalist is really a realist, inclined to 
Tritheism in another way by teaching that the divine relations are 
really distinct from the divine essence. Extreme realism believes 
that the universal exists formally apart from the thing, and 
consequently Gilbert placed real distinctions where they do not 
exist, for example, in man between the metaphysical grades of 
being, substantiality, corporeity, life, animality, rationality, 
unmindful of the fact that all these things are reduced to one 
comprehensive concept of man.

Similarly this extreme realism places a certain real distinction, 
or at least more than a virtual distinction, between the divine 
attributes, and also between the divine essence and the divine 
persons. It thus inclines to Tritheism because the "<esse in>" is 
multiplied in the divine persons and in the divine relations 
opposed to one another, while St. Thomas has shown that the "<esse 
in>" in the divine persons is not accidental but substantial and 
therefore is not multiplied. [59]

Gilbert Porretanus was condemned by the Council of Reims in 1148. 
6 [60] From his doctrine it would have followed that the divine 
relations would be accidents in God. St. Thomas' reply [61] is 
that in God, who is pure act, no accident is found, and the 
relations thus really distinguished from the divine substance like 
accidents cannot constitute persons. As we shall see below, the 
"<esse in>" of the relations in God is something substantial and 
therefore not really distinguished from the substance.

Thus Roscellinus and Gilbert Porretanus by different routes 
reached Tritheism by placing in God real distinctions which are 
not there. Finally, in the twelfth century Abbot Joachim of 
Calabria fell into Tritheism in an effort to correct Peter 
Lombard, whom he had misunderstood. He feared that the teaching of 
Peter Lombard would lead to a kind of quaternity inasmuch as the 
divine essence was neither the Father nor the Son nor the Holy 
Ghost. Trying to avoid this error he fell into another: he taught 
that between the three divine persons only a moral unity existed, 
arising from the consent of the will, a unity such as exists 
between a group of Christians. Consequently the divine nature 
would not be unique or one numerically, but it would be 
multiplied. This error of Abbot Joachim was condemned by the 
Fourth Lateran Council: "We, however, with the approbation of the 
sacred council, believe and confess with Peter Lombard that the 
supreme entity is one, incomprehensible and ineffable indeed, 
which is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the three 
persons together and singly each of the three persons. Therefore 
in God only a Trinity is found and not a quaternity, since each of 
the three persons is that entity, namely, the divine essence. " 
[62] In this definition the word "is" in the statement, "the 
divine essence is the Father, " indicates, as in every affirmative 
proposition, the real identity of the subject and the predicate. 
The divine essence is the Father without any real distinction; on 
the contrary the Father is not the Son and between the two persons 
is found a real distinction, a distinction which is antecedent to 
any consideration of the mind and based, as was more clearly 
expressed by the Council of Florence, on the opposition of 
relation. [63] In the Council of Florence, called to reconcile the 
schismatic Greeks to the Church, was formulated the principle 
which illumines the whole doctrine of the Trinity: "In God all 
things are one and the same where no opposition of relation 
exists. " This opposition of relation exists between the divine 
persons themselves but not between the persons and the divine 
substance. The doctrine of the Church thus appears as the apex of 
a pyramid rising above the heresies opposed to each other which 
either deny the Trinity of the divine persons or the numerical 
unity of the divine nature. According to the judgment of the 
Church, these heresies are false in what they deny, whereas 
something of the truth remains in what they affirm. Whatever these 
false teachings affirm positively, such as the unity of nature and 
the Trinity of persons, is also affirmed by the Church.

It should be noted that in the nineteenth century, Gunther 
inclined to Tritheism when he defined personality as the 
consciousness of oneself. He thought that if God were conscious of 
Himself by His divine essence only one person would be in God. 
Accordingly he placed three distinct consciousnesses in God, 
distinguishing between the subject of the consciousness (the 
Father), the object of the consciousness (the Son), and the 
equality of both conscious of itself (the Holy Ghost). He arrived 
in this way at three intelligences. This error was condemned by 
Pius IX. [64]

Among the errors about the Trinity we must mention the theory of 
the Modernists, who declare that the dogma of the Trinity, like 
other dogmas, is a human invention, achieved by laborious effort 
and subject to continuous change and evolution. [65]

From this brief enumeration of the errors about the Trinity, we 
see not only the revealed truth as taught by the Church standing 
forth more clearly, preserving both the unity of the divine nature 
and the Trinity of the divine persons, but by reason of these 
errors the distinction between nature and person is greatly 
clarified. As has often been said, the great difficulty in 
determining this distinction arose from the difference between the 
Latin and Greek terms. In the Western Church, the Latin word 
persona (prosopon) at first meant a theatrical mask, worn by 
actors when impersonating famous individuals; later the term was 
used for those who held some dignified position (a personage), and 
finally it designated all men who are of their own right, that is, 
capable of rights, and thus persons were distinguished from 
things. More philosophically Boethius in the sixth century defined 
a person as "an individual substance with a rational nature. " 
[66] Today we define a person as a free and intelligent subject.

In the Eastern Church, however, in the first centuries the terms 
<ousia> and <<hypostasis>> were used indiscriminately to designate 
substance and essence. This was the cause of many controversies 
and at the same time it was realized that <prosopon>, with its 
etymological meaning of a theatrical mask, did not clearly express 
the real distinction between the divine persons. The Arians 
understood the term <<hypostasis>> to refer to the substance and 
declared that there were in God three subordinate substances. At 
length, at St. Athanasius' urging, the word <ousia> was accepted 
to mean nature and the word <<hypostasis>> to mean person. From 
this time the Greek <<hypostasis>> was equivalent to the Latin 
<persona>, hence the expression hypostatic union to designate the 
union of two natures in the one person of the incarnate Word; 
similarly three <hypostases> in one nature were said to be in God. 
Later, among the Greek Fathers, St. Basil further determined the 
meaning of these words. He taught that <ousia> designated what was 
common (<to koinon>) to individuals of the same species. [67] Even 
then the meaning was not clear because the nature assumed by the 
Word, although it is individual, is not a person. Therefore 
Leontius of Byzantium, to avoid confusing the individual humanity 
of Christ with His divine person, defined <<hypostasis>> as a 
substance not only individual but also separately existing of 
itself and truly incommunicable. [68]

St. Thomas perfected the definition of person when he said that a 
person is an individual substance with a rational nature, that is, 
incommunicable, existing of itself separately and operating 
separately of itself, of its own right. [69] Today commonly, as we 
have said, a person is defined as a free and intelligent subject, 
and this definition (analogically, yet properly) applies to the 
human person, the angelic person, and the divine persons, as will 
be seen more clearly below.

We find two tendencies among the Catholic doctors and theologians. 
The Greek Fathers and theologians, when explaining this mystery, 
generally began with the Trinity of persons as explicitly revealed 
in the New Testament, rather than with the unity of nature. The 
Latins, on the other hand, especially after the time of St. 
Augustine, generally started with the unity of nature, as stated 
in the tract on the one God, and went on to the Trinity of 
persons. Thus the two groups began from either extreme of the 
mystery and proceeded to the other and therefore they were met 
with opposing difficulties: the Greeks found difficulty in 
safeguarding the unity of nature, and the Latins had to be careful 
to safeguard those things which are proper to the persons.

Among the Latin Scholastics we find a notable difference caused by 
the controversy about universals, since some, like Scotus, placed 
between the divine essence and the persons a formal distinction, 
actual on the part of the thing, whereas the Nominalists made the 
distinction only verbal, such as exists between Tully and Cicero. 
The Thomists, however, and many other theologians called it a 
virtual distinction.

4. SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY ON THE TRINITY

State of the question. It is better to speak of the testimony of 
the Scriptures than to say that the existence of the Trinity is 
proved from the Scriptures, for the Trinity is not proved, nor is 
it a theological conclusion, but it is believed. To say that it is 
proved from the Scriptures is to insinuate that faith is the 
conclusion of this syllogism: Whatever God has revealed is true 
and is to be believed. But in the Scriptures God had revealed the 
mystery of the Trinity. Therefore I believe this mystery. The real 
conclusion of this syllogism, however, is that the Trinity is 
believable and should be believed. This is a judgment of 
credibility, but not an act of faith which is simply an 
essentially supernatural act, above discursive reasoning, and 
never the result of a syllogism, because it is based immediately 
on the authority of God the revealer, inasmuch as I believe in God 
revealing and God revealed by one and the same act. [70]

This statement, that the existence of the Trinity is proved by the 
Scriptures, can be accepted in the sense that this truth is proved 
to be of faith by the Scriptures. It was in this sense that many 
Thomists used the formula.

It is not necessary that every dogma be proved as revealed by the 
Scriptures, since a dogma may be contained implicitly in the 
Scriptures and more clearly be found in tradition, which preceded 
the Scriptures in the preaching of Christ and the early preaching 
of the apostles, which were not completely recorded in writing.

With regard to the origin of the dogma of the Trinity, the 
rationalists, the Protestant liberals, and the Modernists say that 
Christ in no way taught that God was triune, but only that God was 
the Father of all. They say further that in the beginning the 
apostles indeed believed in God the Father and in Jesus Christ, 
the man, the divine legate, and in the spirit, power, and 
operation of God, but that they did not accept these terms as 
referring to three distinct persons. About A.D. 80 we find in the 
Gospel of St. Matthew the formula of baptism, in which the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are enumerated but not as distinct 
persons. Shortly thereafter certain Christians, influenced by the 
philosophy of Philo, concluded that Christ was the Logos, that 
intermediary being between God and men. Others, because of their 
addiction to certain Hellenic theories, concluded that Christ was 
the Son of God in a literal and proper sense, and therefore equal 
to the Father. After long controversy this theory was defined by 
the Council of Nicaea. For the rationalists, therefore, the dogma 
of the Trinity is nothing more than a Judae-Hellenistic theory, 
slowly elaborated during the first four centuries.

Against this rationalist interpretation, it can be shown from the 
testimony of the Scriptures that this mystery was adumbrated in 
the Old Testament and more fully revealed in the New Testament. In 
a course of dogmatic theology, however, it is better to follow a 
regressive method by first explaining the texts of the New 
Testament and then indicating how the mystery was adumbrated in 
the Old Testament, just as we would regressively follow the course 
of a stream in order to discover its source. In explaining the 
doctrine of the New Testament it is more desirable to follow the 
order in which the revelation was proposed by Christ and the 
apostles, considering first the texts about the three persons 
together and then those about each person in particular. [71]

NEW TESTAMENT TESTIMONY ON THE THREE PERSONS

Presupposing a course in exegesis, our explanation of this 
doctrine of faith ought to point out the theological sources. As 
great rivers come down from the mountains, so sacred theology 
descends from the heights of doctrine as expressed in Sacred 
Scripture and in tradition, and then, in the end, theology should 
ascend to the heights and dispose us to a contemplation of divine 
things. [72]

We shall first consider the New Testament testimony on the three 
divine persons together as found: 1. in the Synoptic Gospels, the 
first expression of Christian preaching; 2. in the epistles of the 
apostles, the first of which were written about A.D. 53; 3. in the 
Gospel of St. John, written about A.D. 80 against those who denied 
the divinity of Christ. First we shall cite the clear texts and 
then point out the difficulties arising from the more obscure 
passages.

The Synoptic Gospels. The first text, sufficiently clear to show 
the mystery of the Trinity, is found in Luke 1:30-35, where the 
incarnation of the Word is announced to Mary by the archangel 
Gabriel, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of 
the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy 
which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God."

The Trinity of persons is clearly enunciated in this text, for the 
angel is sent by God the Father, who is often referred to as the 
Most High, and the Holy Ghost and the Son of the most high God are 
distinguished from the Father. That which was to be born of the 
Virgin Mary was not the Father or the Holy Ghost, but the Son of 
God. The consubstantiality of the persons is also implied in the 
text especially since the term "Son of God" is not used in the 
broad sense but in the proper sense, inasmuch as farther on (Luke 
1:43) Mary is called the mother of the Lord. Finally, the Holy 
Ghost, to whom the work of the Incarnation is attributed is not 
less than the Father and the Son. This is the first manifestation 
of the Trinity in the New Testament before the Incarnation.

The second text of the Synoptic Gospels is Matt. 3:16 and Luke 
9:34 (cf. II Pet. 1:17), before the beginning of Christ's public 
ministry at the time of His baptism. In Matthew we read: "And 
Jesus being baptized, forthwith came out of the water: and lo, the 
heavens were opened to Him: and He saw the Spirit of God 
descending as a dove, and coming upon Him. And behold a voice from 
heaven, saying: This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. 
" These words were spoken by God the Father in this solemn 
theophany.

More clearly than in the first text we see the distinction of the 
persons, since the Father speaks from heaven and the Son by this 
personal appellation is opposed to the person of the Father. The 
Holy Ghost is distinguished from both the Father and Son, for 
while the Father speaks from heaven the Holy Ghost in the form of 
a dove descends upon Christ, who is called the Son of God.

It is sufficiently clear that the Father is not the Son, for no 
one is ever called the father of himself, and that the Father and 
the Son are not the Holy Ghost. If the Father, antecedent to all 
consideration of our minds, is not the Son, then they are really 
distinct; and if the Father and the Son are not the Holy Ghost, 
they are really distinct from Him.

In this text, too, there is some manifestation of the divinity of 
the Son, since He is called <ho huios>, with the article, that is, 
son not in the wide but proper sense, and the Father added, "in 
whom I am well pleased, " that is, beloved above all others. As 
Father Ceuppens remarks, "It should be noted that the three 
Synoptic Gospels use the same expression, <ho agapetos> (beloved), 
and this term is never used in the New Testament for an adoptive 
son and seems to have the meaning of <ho monogenes> ("only, or 
only-begotten"). [73]

In this text the Holy Ghost is called the Spirit of God (Matt.) 
and is therefore not any divine spirit, such as an angel, but a 
well defined Spirit, to pneuma. And lest there be any further 
doubt, St. Luke added <to pneuma to agion> (3:22), that divine 
person who throughout the New Testament is called the Holy Ghost 
and who together with the Father and the Son constitutes the Holy 
Trinity. [74]

The third text of the Synoptic Gospels is Matt. 28:19 and Mark 
16:13, the formula of baptism, which Christ, before He ascended 
into heaven, transmitted to the apostles while He was 
commissioning them to preach the gospel. This is at the end of the 
whole Gospel, as the first manifestation was at the beginning 
prior to the Incarnation. In the text from St. Matthew we read: 
"Going therefore, teach ye all nations; baptizing them in the name 
of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. " The personal 
distinction is clearer in the Greek, where the conjunction kai and 
the article are repeated before the name of each person. This 
emphatic repetition of the article cannot be explained except by 
the real distinction between the persons. Moreover the Father is 
not the Son, since these are personal nouns and not impersonal 
nouns, like truth, goodness, wisdom, which indicate divine 
attributes pertaining to the divine nature. Thus Father and Son 
designate distinct persons, and if this is true then the third 
term ought also to designate a distinct person.

Lastly, the text implies that the divinity of these three persons, 
like the baptismal grace bestowed in their name, cannot be 
conferred except in the name of God, and thus in this formula the 
same worship of latria is given to the three persons. In the 
formula, then, the Son and the Holy Ghost are equal to the Father; 
if they are not God, they would be infinitely below the Father.

The rationalists and liberals, acknowledging the force of this 
text, have tried to impugn its genuineness because Eusebius gives 
the words of Christ as, "baptizing them in My name. " The 
objection is futile, however, since all the codices give the 
received text, and almost all the Fathers before Eusebius, among 
them St. Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and Origen. Eusebius 
himself sometimes gives the received text and sometimes the short 
form. [75]

The Epistles. In the Epistles we find three witnesses to the three 
persons. The first is II Cor. 13:13 (according to Harnack, A.D. 
53): "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God 
and the communication of the Holy Ghost be with you all. " Here 
St. Paul attributes to three persons the granting of sanctifying 
grace; but God alone is the author of grace, of the remission of 
sin, and of salvation. We refer the reader to Job 14:4: "Who can 
make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not Thou 
who only art?"; and to Ps. 83:12: "The Lord will give grace and 
glory"; and Jas. 4:6: "God. . . giveth grace to the humble. " The 
second testimony is Eph. 4:4 ff. (according to Harnack, A.D. 57-
59), where the Apostle is speaking of the mystical body of Christ, 
"One body and one Spirit,. . . one Lord (namely, Christ), one 
faith, one baptism. One God and Father of all, who is above all, 
and through all, and in us all. " The equality of the persons is 
inferred from the fact that the three together confer grace, of 
which God alone is the author. This was St. Athanasius' great 
argument: God alone deifies.

The third testimony is I Pet. 1:1 f.: "Peter, an apostle of Jesus 
Christ. . . according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, unto 
the sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of 
the blood of Jesus Christ. Grace unto you and peace be multiplied. 
" As in the other texts, the three persons are presented as the 
highest source of grace.

The Gospel of St. John (according to Harnack and Zahn, written 
between 80 and 110) clearly affirms the Trinity of persons and 
their equality. We quote only the two principal texts referring to 
the three persons.

The first is John 14:16 and 26, concerning the promise of the Holy 
Ghost made by Christ at the Last Supper: "And I will ask the 
Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide 
with you forever,. . . but the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the 
Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things. " Here 
we see a clear distinction between the Father who sends the 
Spirit, and the Son who asks the Father to send the Spirit, and 
the Spirit who is sent by the Father in the name of the Son. 
Certainly the one who sends is distinct from him who is sent, 
antecedent to our thinking the sender is not the one who is sent, 
and thus the Father is not the Son, for the one who generates is 
not the one who is generated. If we rightly understand the meaning 
of the verb "is" and the negation "is not, " the real distinction 
between the persons will be clear, a distinction which is 
antecedent to our mind's consideration. Although those things 
which the Scripture speaks of here are intimately united, they are 
really distinct; the substance of bread is not its quantity, but 
they are intimately united. So, in this text and in the context 
the consubstantiality of the three persons emerges, for a little 
earlier (John 14:9-11) Christ said: "He that seeth Me seeth the 
Father also. . . . Do you not believe, that I am in the Father, 
and the Father in Me?" Again John 10:30: "I and the Father are 
one"; John 15:26: "the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the 
Father"; John 16:13: "But when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, 
He will teach you all truth."

The second text of St. John referring to the three persons 
together is the famous Johannine comma: "And there are three who 
give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy 
Ghost. And these three are one" (I John 5:7). A great controversy 
has arisen about the genuineness of this text. Those who attack 
the text argue from the fact that it is not found in any Greek 
codex of any authority, nor in many Latin codices and versions. 
From this they conclude that this "comma" was originally a 
marginal note which in the course of time was incorporated into 
the text. Consequently the text would enjoy only the force of 
tradition. The defenders of the text say that it was always in the 
Latin version, which is more ancient than the Greek codices, for 
it is found in many Latin codices and is cited by many of the 
Fathers, by Tertullian, St. Cyprian, and St. Augustine. The 
omission of this verse in the Greek codices is explained by the 
fact that the seventh and eighth verses begin and end in the same 
way and thus the scribes could easily have omitted the seventh 
verse. In the Latin version the seventh verse is: "And there are 
three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Ghost. And these three are one. " The eighth verse is: "And 
there are three that give testimony on earth: the spirit, and the 
water, and the blood: and these three are one."

On this matter the Holy Office has issued two declarations. [76] 
In the first, dated January 13, 1927, we read: "The authenticity 
of this text of St. John cannot be safely denied or called into 
doubt. " Later, on June 2, 1927, the Holy Office declared: "This 
decree has been issued to repress the temerity of those private 
teachers who have attributed to themselves the right of completely 
rejecting this 'comma' of St. John or at least by their final 
judgment of calling it into doubt. . . . It is in no way intended 
to deter Catholic writers from investigating the matter more 
fully,. . . or from adopting an opinion opposed to the genuineness 
of the text, as long as they profess to be willing to submit to 
the judgment of the Church, to whom has been committed by Jesus 
Christ the duty not only of interpreting the Sacred Scriptures but 
also of guarding them faithfully."

We proceed now to the testimonies in the New Testament about the 
individual persons of the Trinity.

SPECIAL TESTIMONIES ABOUT GOD THE FATHER

In the Sacred Scriptures God is called Father in a threefold 
sense: 1. in the broadest sense by reason of the creation, thus He 
is called the "father of rain" (Job 38:28); 2. in the broad sense 
by reason of the adoption of men as His sons, thus He is called 
our Father in the Lord's Prayer; 3. in the strict and proper sense 
by reason of the generation of His only-begotten Son. Thus Christ 
Himself, of whom it was said, "This is My beloved Son" (Matt. 
3:17), said, not "our Father, " but "My Father": "It is My Father 
that glorifieth Me" (John 8:54); "Come, ye blessed of My Father" 
(Matt. 25:34); "I must be about My Father's business" (Luke 2:49); 
"No one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father" (John 
10:29); "They have both seen and hated both Me and My Father" 
(John 15:24); "I ascend to my Father and to your Father" (John 
20:17). God is not the Father of Jesus Christ in the same way as 
He is the Father of His adopted sons, for in the prologue of St. 
John's Gospel we read: "The only begotten Son who is in the bosom 
of the Father, He hath declared Him" (John 1:18). Frequently St. 
Paul speaks of God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, for 
instance, "That. . . you may glorify God and the Father of our 
Lord Jesus Christ" (Rom. 15:6); and "Blessed be the God and Father 
of our Lord Jesus Christ" (II Cor. 1:3 and Eph. 1:3). Thus the 
Father is represented as a person and moreover as a divine person; 
no one has called this into doubt. The Father is called the Lord 
of heaven and earth and living God, as for instance, "Thou art 
Christ the Son of the living God. " Throughout the seventeenth 
chapter of St. John's Gospel, Christ invokes the Father as God, 
and it is clear that the Father is a person distinct from the Son 
from the fact that he who generates is distinct from him who is 
begotten. This will appear more clearly when we speak of the Son.

SPECIAL TESTIMONIES ABOUT GOD THE SON

In Sacred Scripture the term son of God is used in a twofold 
sense: in the broad sense for adoptive sons, and in the proper 
sense for the only-begotten Son both before and after the 
Incarnation. References to the Son of God are to be found 1. in 
the Synoptic Gospels, 2. in the Epistles, 3. in the Gospel of St. 
John.

In the Synoptic Gospels Christ is described as the incarnate Son 
of God, not only distinct from the Father but also equal to Him. 
The principal text is: "All things are delivered to Me by My 
Father. And no one knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither doth 
anyone know the Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall 
please the Son to reveal Him" (Matt. 11:27). From various codices 
and from the Fathers it appears that this text is authentic, and 
its authenticity is admitted by almost all critics, not only 
Catholics but also the Protestant liberals. In this text is 
expressed the distinction between the Father and the Son as well 
as the equality of knowability and knowledge which presuppose an 
equality of nature and the identity of the divine nature.

"No one knoweth the Son, but the Father, " and therefore the Son 
is above natural created knowledge and cannot be known naturally 
by anyone but God. From this it follows that He is God. To this 
text we may add all the texts in the Synoptic Gospels, in 
Christian apologetics, and in the tract on the Incarnation, which 
demonstrate the divinity of Christ. These texts may be grouped 
together as follows:

1. Jesus, according to His own testimony, is greater than all 
creatures, greater than Jonas, Solomon, David, who called Him 
lord, greater than Moses and Elias, who appeared beside Him at the 
Transfiguration, greater than St. John the Baptist, greater than 
the angels "who ministered to Him" (Mark 1:13), and of whom He 
said, "The Son of man shall send His angels" as His servants 
(Matt. 13:41).

2. Jesus speaks as the supreme lawgiver, complementing and 
perfecting the divine law in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 10:21-
48).

3. He vindicates for Himself the prerogative of forgiving sins, 
which according to the Jews was a divine attribute (Matt. 9:2).

4. He assumed the right of judging the living and the dead, and of 
raising the dead to life (Mark 14:62; 8:38; 13:26).

5. He promised to send the Holy Ghost, to whom He is therefore not 
inferior (Luke 24:49), and He accepted the adoration which the 
apostles had rejected (Matt. 8:2; 28:9, 17).

6. He is called the Son of the living God by St. Peter (Matt. 
16:16).

7. In the parable of the vineyard He is called the Son of the lord 
of the vineyard (Mark 12:1-12; also in Matthew and Luke). In this 
parable we are told that the lord of the vineyard first sent his 
servants, who were put to death by the workers in the vineyard. 
"Therefore having yet one son, most dear to him; he also sent him 
unto them last of all,. . . and laying hold of him, they killed 
him. " Of the Pharisees who heard this parable, we read: "And they 
sought to lay hands on Him, but they feared the people. For they 
knew that He spoke this parable to them. " From all these texts of 
the Synoptic Gospels it is clear that Jesus' utterances about His 
eminent dignity imply more than a simple Messiahship and express a 
divine filiation entirely proper to Him, constituting Him above 
all creatures, equal to God and God Himself, although distinct 
from His Father.

In the epistles of the apostles and in their preaching, the 
divinity of Christ is still more explicitly expressed.

In the Acts of the Apostles (3:13, 15), St. Peter declared: "The 
God of our fathers hath glorified His Son Jesus, whom you indeed 
delivered up. . . . But the author of life you killed. " The 
author of life is none other than God. Again in the Acts of the 
Apostles, St. Peter said: "Neither is there salvation in any 
other. For there is no other name under heaven given to men, 
whereby we must be saved, " that is, Jesus is the Savior of the 
world, the author of grace and salvation. Of no prophet and of no 
angel were similar words spoken. Again, "Him hath God exalted with 
His right hand, to be Prince and Savior, to give repentance to 
Israel, and remission of sins" (Acts 5:31). But only God can be 
the Savior, forgiving sins. Similarly St. Peter calls Jesus "the 
Lord of all, appointed by God judge of the living and of the dead" 
(Acts 10:36, 42).

Since St. Peter uttered these words immediately after Pentecost, 
the argument of the rationalists that a process of idealization 
intervened, transforming the original preaching of Christ, has no 
validity. These words represent the confirmation by the Holy Ghost 
of those things that Christ, during His public ministry, said 
about His divine filiation. It should be remembered that the Acts 
of the Apostles in its entirety is attributed to St. Luke, who was 
St. Paul's co-worker, and this not only by all Catholic and 
conservative Protestant critics but also by many rationalists, 
among them Renan, Reuss, and Harnack, and that it was most 
probably written about A.D. 63-64. [77]

In the epistles of St. Paul we find the following references to 
the divinity of the Son, as distinct from the Father. These texts 
are important since St. Paul, beginning in the year 53, speaks of 
the divinity of Christ as a dogma already received in the various 
churches before there was sufficient time for any process of 
idealization.

1. St. Paul speaks of the Son of God in the strictest sense: "God 
sending His own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom 8. 3)

"He that spared not even His own Son, but delivered Him up for us 
all" (Rom. 8:32); "God sent His Son. . . that He might redeem them 
who were under the law: that we might receive the adoption of 
sons" (Gal. 4:4 f.). In the last text the adopted sons are clearly 
distinguished from God's own Son, and the only-begotten Son is 
represented as the Savior of the world.

2. St. Paul affirms the pre-existence of the Son of God before the 
Incarnation: "Giving thanks to God the Father. . . who hath 
delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us 
into the kingdom of the Son of His love, in whom we have 
redemption through His blood, the remission of sins. Who is the 
image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature. For 
in Him were all things created in heaven, and on earth, visible 
and invisible, whether thrones or dominations or principalities or 
powers: all things were created by Him and in Him. And He is 
before all, and by Him all things consist" (Col. 1:12-17). These 
attributes belong to God alone, and at the same time the Son of 
God is distinguished from the Father. A little farther on we read: 
"Because in Him, it hath well pleased the Father that all fullness 
should dwell; and through Him to reconcile all things unto 
Himself" (w. 19 f.). Here the Son of God is clearly called the 
Creator and the Savior.

Again, St. Paul says: "For in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the 
Godhead corporeally; and you are filled in Him, who is the head of 
all principality and power" (Col. 2:9 f.). Writing to the 
Philippians, while exhorting them to humility he casually says 
these sublime words: "For let this mind be in you, which was also 
in Christ Jesus: who being in the form of God, thought it not 
robbery to be equal with God: but emptied Himself, taking the form 
of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit 
found as a man" (Phil. 2:5 ff.). In this text, the expression "in 
the form of God" (qui in forma Dei esset) signifies the essence 
and nature of God, and this interpretation is confirmed by the 
following words, "to be equal with God. " We could have no clearer 
statement of the pre-existing glory of the Son of God before the 
Incarnation.

Writing to the Romans, St. Paul said: "For I wished myself to be 
an anathema from Christ, for my brethren,. . . and of whom is 
Christ, according to the flesh, who is over all things, God 
blessed forever. Amen" (Rom. 9:3 ff.). Some controversy exists 
whether the punctuation mark before the phrase "who is over all 
things" is a comma or a period, but most critics, even those who 
are considered liberal, admit the comma, and thus this phrase 
refers to Christ.

Lastly, we read in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "In these days 
[God] hath spoken to us by His Son, whom He hath appointed heir of 
all things, by whom also He made the world. Who being the 
brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance, and 
upholding all things by the word of His power, making purgation of 
sins, sitteth on the right hand of the majesty on high" (1:2 f.). 
In this text the Son of God, distinct from the Father, is declared 
to be the Creator, the Preserver, and the Savior, "upholding all 
things by the word of His power. " In this Epistle also the Son of 
God is said to be superior to Moses and the angels, the mediator 
and the high priest for all eternity. Speaking in this manner, St. 
Paul intended to affirm, not something new, but that which had 
been held by the different churches before this time. No time had 
intervened, therefore, to permit any progressive idealization of 
the primitive preaching.

In the Gospel according to St. John the divinity of Christ and the 
distinction of the Son from the Father is so clearly enunciated 
that the rationalists themselves have had to admit it, but they 
argue that this Gospel, written against those who denied the 
divinity of Christ, was composed only in the second century. Renan 
places it about A.D. 125, and Holtzmann between 100 and 123. The 
later rationalists however have had to acknowledge that it was 
written toward the end of the first century: B. Weiss placing its 
composition in the year go; Harnack between 80 and 110. The theory 
of the intervening process of idealization is excluded by the fact 
that as early as 54 and 58 St. Paul speaks of the eternal pre-
existence of the Son of God.

With regard to the texts of the Fourth Gospel, we present first 
the words of our Lord Himself and then the words of St. John the 
Evangelist in the prologue of his Gospel, thus observing the order 
of revelation.

The words of our Lord referring to His divinity and His 
distinction from the Father are the following.

"The Jews sought the more to kill Him, because He. . . said God 
was His Father, making Himself equal to God. Then Jesus said to 
them. . . the Son cannot do anything of Himself, but what He seeth 
the Father doing: for what things soever He doth, these the Son 
also doth in like manner. . . . For as the Father raiseth up the 
dead, and giveth life; so the Son also giveth life to whom He 
will. For neither doth the Father judge any man, but hath given 
all judgment to the Son. That all men may honor the Son, as they 
honor the Father. . . . For as the Father has life in Himself, so 
He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself" (5:18-26). 
This thought will be more clearly presented below In this text the 
same works <ad extra> of the Father are attributed to the Son, 
particularly miracles and the sanctification of souls, of which 
God alone is the author.

"Not that any man hath seen the Father; but He who is of God, He 
hath seen the Father" (6:46); "You are from beneath, I am from 
above. You are of this world, I am not of this world" (8:23); "For 
from God I proceeded, and came" (8:42), that is, I proceeded from 
eternity and came in time; "Amen, amen, I say to you, before 
Abraham was made, I am" (8:58), is a clear declaration of the pre-
existence of the Son of God; "I and the Father are one" (10:30), 
whereupon the Jews took up "stones to stone Him."

"As the Father knoweth Me, and I know the Father" (10:15), is an 
affirmation of the equality of knowledge and nature, already 
expressed in St. Matthew, "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father" 
(11:27); "I am the way and the truth and the life" (14:6), that 
is, I not only possess life and truth, but I am life and truth, 
and since truth and life are identical, He alone is truth itself 
who is being itself by His essence, that is, subsisting being. 
Such is the profound meaning of the verb "is" as distinguished 
from "have" in the sentence, "I am truth and life, " that only He 
who can say, "I am who am, " could utter these words.

"All things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine. Therefore I 
said, that He shall receive of Mine, and show it to you" (16:15). 
These words clearly state that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the 
Father and the Son.

"And now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory 
which I had, before the world was, with Thee,. . . because Thou 
hast loved Me before the creation of the world" (17:5, 24).

Lastly, the revelation of this doctrine is enunciated by way of 
synthesis in the prologue of St. John's Gospel, especially in the 
first four verses: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word 
was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning 
with God. All things were made by Him: and without Him was made 
nothing that was made. In Him was life, and the life was the light 
of men" (John 1:1-4). These words contain the statement of two 
fundamental truths: 1. the distinction of the Word from the 
Father, 2. the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father. From 
these truths others follow in the prologue. [78]

1. The distinction of the Word from the Father is enunciated in 
the words, "the Word was with God, " for, as is commonly remarked, 
no one is said to be with himself. One difficulty, however, arises 
from the fact that it is not clearly stated that the Word is a 
person; it might be understood as similar to the word of our mind 
which is in our intellect and "with" the intellect. This 
difficulty, however, is removed by what is said later of the Word, 
especially by the words, "And the word was made flesh, and dwelt 
among us, and we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-
begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth" (1:14); and "No 
man hath seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son who is in the 
bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him" (1:18).

From these verses it is clear that the Word mentioned in the first 
verse is the only-begotten Son who became incarnate and before 
this was in the bosom of the Father, or "with Him, " in the words 
of the first verse. From this we may infer a real distinction 
between the Father and the only-begotten Son, for apart from any 
consideration of the mind the Father is not the Son, and he who 
begets does not beget himself. Father and Son, as has been said, 
are personal nouns and not impersonal nouns like truth, goodness, 
and intelligence, which designate the attributes of the divine 
nature. Therefore, apart from any consideration of the mind, it is 
true to say that the Father is not the Son.

On the other hand, as theologians point out, we cannot say that, 
apart from the consideration of the mind, the essence of God is 
not His intellect, for His essence is subsisting being itself and 
subsisting intelligence itself; no real distinction exists in God 
between His being and His essence, nor between His essence, 
faculties, and operation. Therefore this proposition is false: God 
is not His own being, as is also the following: God is not His own 
intelligence. From revelation, however, we infer that the 
following is true: God the Father is not the Son, for he who 
begets does not beget himself. If therefore, apart from any 
consideration of our mind, the Father is not the Son, He is really 
distinct from the Son.

2. The consubstantiality of the Word with the Father is expressed 
in the same first verse, in the words, "the Word was God. " 
According to the generally accepted interpretation, for instance, 
that of St. Thomas in his commentary on St. John's Gospel, in this 
phrase the term "Word" (<ho logos>) is the subject and "God" is 
the predicate. This is evident from the context, which refers to 
the attributes of the Word, and from the Greek article <ho>, which 
precedes the term "Word" (<ho logos>).

Moreover, in this sentence the predicate "God" retains its proper 
meaning, as is evident from the parallel statements, "the Word was 
with God, " and "the Word was God, " and from the second verse, 
"The same was in the beginning with God. " Thus, the word "God" is 
used three times in its proper meaning, designating not God by 
participation, but God Himself. The sense of the text is, 
therefore, that the Word is no less God than He with whom He was 
from the beginning. There is, therefore, a perfect equality 
between the Word and the Father. Moreover, since the most simple 
and infinite divine nature cannot be multiplied, and since, as is 
clear from the Old Testament and from philosophy, there cannot be 
many gods, it follows that the Word and the Father are 
consubstantial. This consubstantiality was more explicitly stated 
later at the Council of Nicaea. The words "in the beginning" at 
the opening of the prologue mean first of all before the creation 
of the world, as is clear from the context, and also from 
eternity, since God is eternal and immutable, since before the 
creation no change took place.

From these two truths others follow.

1. The Word together with the Father is the Creator. "All things 
were made by Him: and without Him was made nothing that was made" 
(v. 3), that is, nothing whatsoever was made without the Word. 
This follows from the fact that the Word is God.

2. The Word is the author of both the natural and the supernatural 
life. "In Him was life" (v. 4); thus He is the author of life 
equally with the Father, since He is God. Jesus expressed this 
later on in the words, "For as the Father has life in Himself, so 
He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself" (5:26), and 
this life is essential and subsisting life and the cause of 
participating life, the life He spoke of when He said, "I am the 
life. " Further, the Word is the author of supernatural life, as 
is clear from the words, "and the life was the light of men, " 
which are explained in verse 9, "That was the true light, which 
enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world. " Later on 
this is expressed still more clearly, especially in verse 18, "No 
man hath seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son who is in the 
bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him, " and by our Lord's 
words to Nicodemus, "For God so loved the world as to give His 
only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not 
perish, but may have life everlasting" (3:16).

In his commentary on the fourth verse of the prologue, "And the 
life was the light of men, " St. Thomas says: "This life may be 
explained in two ways: first, as an infusion of natural knowledge; 
secondly, as the communication of grace. It should be especially 
understood in the second way, because of what follows, namely, 
'And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness did not 
comprehend it. . . . (John) came for a witness, to give testimony 
of the light, that all men might believe through Him'" (w. 5, 7), 
believe, that is, to attain salvation.

3. The Word is the author of our redemption. In verse twelve we 
read: "But as many as received Him, He gave them power to be made 
the sons of God, to them that believe in His name, " that is, by 
the Word we are made adopted sons of God, as St. Paul said, " 
[God] who hath predestined us unto the adoption of children 
through Jesus Christ unto Himself" (Eph. 1:5), and "that we might 
receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. 4:5).

The five following truths, then, are announced in the Prologue of 
St. John's Gospel: the Son of God is 1. distinct from the Father, 
2. equal and consubstantial with the Father, 3. the Creator, 4. 
the author of both the natural and the supernatural life, 5. the 
Redeemer and the author of salvation. In this way the divinity of 
the Word is proclaimed.

Objection. The rationalists and liberals say that this doctrine of 
the Word apparently stems from Philo, an Alexandrian Jew, born 
about 20 B. C., who tried to conciliate the monotheism of the Jews 
with the Neoplatonism in vogue at the time in Alexandria. Relying 
on the Old Testament, Philo admitted the existence of one personal 
God, the Provider, but in accord with the Greek philosophers of 
Alexandria he held that the most high God could not produce this 
finite world except through some intermediate being, which he 
called the <logos.> As a Jew, Philo tried to reconcile two 
contradictory teachings, namely, monotheism and free creation with 
the pantheistic doctrine of necessary emanation. Thus, when he 
considers the <logos> under the Neoplatonic aspect he speaks of 
him as an intermediate being, but when he considers the <logos> in 
the light of the New Testament and Jewish monotheism he speaks of 
him as a divine attribute.

Reply. The Catholic reply to this difficulty is the following. A 
great difference exists between the <logos> of Philo and the Logos 
of St. John. The Logos of St. John is neither a being beneath God 
nor a divine attribute, but He is properly the Son of God the 
Father, at the same time God, the Creator, and the Redeemer in the 
strict sense. Philo's <logos>, however, is in no way the Redeemer. 
St. John's teaching, therefore, is not derived from Philo, but 
from Christ's preaching, as explained by him, and as understood by 
the other apostles, as we see in the preaching of St. Peter and in 
the epistles of St. Paul. St. John could have found an adumbration 
of this mystery in the Old Testament, especially in the Book of 
Wisdom, "For she is a vapor of the power of God, and a certain 
pure emanation of the glory of the almighty God: and therefore no 
defiled thing cometh into her. For she is the brightness of 
eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty" (7:25 
f.).

As to the word "Logos" itself, St. John could have taken it from 
revelation, but it would not be derogatory to admit, as many do, 
that he derived it directly from Philo, for when the Evangelist 
was writing in Ephesus, Apollo was preaching there, and Apollo was 
widely versed in Alexandrian philosophy. Quite probably also the 
earliest heretics misused the word "<logos>" to designate a being 
midway between God and the world. St. John may have used the term 
to correct the current false interpretation, when he said, "The 
Word [Logos] was God. " [79]

We must add here that the Logos of St. John has no connection with 
the teaching of Plotinus, who in the third century spoke of three 
subordinate <hypostases>, of different rank, in his system of 
pantheistic emanationism. Plotinus posited: 1. the One-Good, 
corresponding to Plato's idea of the good; 2. the primal 
intelligence, or the <logos>, proceeding, not by a free creation, 
but by a necessary emanation from the supreme good, to whom it was 
inferior. Here the <logos>, according to Plotinus, resembled 
Aristotle's god, who is "<noesis noeseos noesis>". In his primal 
intelligence Plotinus tried to discern the duality of the subject 
and the object known, besides a multitude of ideas for things that 
were to be produced. Plotinus' third <<hypostasis>> was the soul 
of the universe, corresponding to the god of the Stoics, from 
which, by a pantheistic emanation, the seminal ideas of all things 
proceeded (<logoi spermatikoi>).

The difference between Plotinus' <hypostases> and the Trinity of 
Christian revelation is evident. These three <hypostases> are 
distinctly unequal, and in this pantheistic emanation a multitude 
of beings proceeds from the supreme being not by free creation but 
by a necessary emanation, or by a necessity of nature. As in all 
kinds of pantheism, the supernatural order of the life of grace is 
denied; for here our human nature would be a participation of the 
divine nature and could not be elevated to a higher order, and 
human reason would be the seed of eternal life.

Lastly, the doctrine of the Word proclaimed in St. John's Gospel 
has no resemblance to the Indian trinity, called Trimourti. In 
this system Brahma is god, the producer of all things; Siva is god 
the destroyer, the destructive force; and Vichnu was many times 
born in the flesh for the defense of the good.

The differences are obvious: 1. In the Trinity as revealed by 
Christ none of the divine persons can be called the destroyer. 
This idea is an expression of the pessimism and fatalism of the 
Indians. 2. In the Indian trinity, the three manifestations of 
God, the producer, the destroyer, and the conserver, are adopted 
with respect to the things of this world, and they seem rather to 
be three aspects of the same supreme power; indeed it is often 
said that there is no distinction in God except in appearance. 3. 
The Indian system does not transcend pantheism and fails to 
preserve the idea of a free creation.

SPECIAL TESTIMONIES ABOUT THE HOLY GHOST

1. In the Synoptic Gospels the Holy Ghost is less frequently 
mentioned than the Son of God, because He was not incarnate, and 
sometimes in Sacred Scripture the expression "Spirit of God" does 
not clearly designate a special person. Nevertheless, as we 
pointed out in gathering the testimonies about the three divine 
persons together in the Synoptic Gospels, the Holy Ghost appears 
as a divine person, distinct from the others, in the formula of 
baptism (Matt. 28:19; Mark 16:13). In this formula Father and Son 
are personal nouns, and therefore the third term should also 
designate a distinct divine person. This truth appears, although 
not so clearly, in the words of the archangel Gabriel at the time 
of the Annunciation, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee" (Luke 
1:35), and in the solemn theophany after Christ's baptism when 
Jesus "saw the Spirit of God descending as a dove, and coming upon 
Him" (Matt. 3:16; Luke 9:34).

Father Ceuppens distinguishes the texts in which it is clear from 
the context that reference is made to the third person of the 
Blessed Trinity from those in which there is rather reference to 
some divine virtue and not explicitly to the Third Person. [80]

St. John the Baptist, St. Elizabeth, and St. Zachary are said to 
be filled with the Holy Spirit (Luke 1:15, 41, 67).

Simeon is said to have "received an answer from the Holy Ghost. . 
. and came by the Spirit into the temple (Luke 2:26 f.).

St. John the Baptist announced a higher baptism to be conferred 
"in the Holy Ghost" (Matt. 3:11), and "Jesus was led by the Spirit 
into the desert" (Matt. 4:1).

Christ said: "Whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, 
it shall be forgiven him: but he that shall speak against the Holy 
Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him" (Matt. 12:32). "In view of 
the context, " says Father Ceuppens, "we do not think that the 
Holy Ghost here can be explained as referring to the Third Person 
of the Trinity. [81]

Announcing to the apostles their imminent persecution, Jesus said: 
"It shall be given you in that hour what to speak. For it is not 
you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in 
you" (Matt. 10:19 f.). He who speaks is a person and not a divine 
attribute, and this promise was fulfilled by the sending of the 
Holy Ghost, the Third Person of the Trinity, on Pentecost (Acts 
2:1, 4).

Thus the Synoptic Gospels reveal the Holy Ghost as a distinct, 
divine person, to whom are attributed divine operations, in 
particular prophecy (the prophecy of Simeon), and the 
sanctification of souls (the sanctification of St. John Baptist). 
All this will become clearer in the Acts of the Apostles and in 
the epistles of St. Paul.

2. In the Acts of the Apostles the Holy Ghost speaks as the person 
who sanctifies men, who in the past inspired the prophets and now 
inspires the apostles, who directs and rules them and constitutes 
them bishops. Thus we read: "Now there were in the church which 
was at Antioch, prophets and doctors,. . . and the Holy Ghost said 
to them: Separate me Saul and Barnabas, for the work whereunto I 
have taken them. . . . So they being sent by the Holy Ghost, went 
to Seleucia: and from thence they sailed to Cyprus" (Acts 13:1-4); 
"The Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the Church of 
God" (Acts 20:28); "Have you received the Holy Ghost since ye 
believed?" (Acts 19:2.) St. Paul says: "And now, behold, being 
bound in the spirit, I go to Jerusalem, not knowing the things 
which shall befall me there: save that the Holy Ghost in every 
city witnesseth to me, saying that bands and afflictions wait for 
me at Jerusalem" (Acts 20:22 f.); and St. Peter said: "Men, 
brethren, the scripture must needs be fulfilled, which the Holy 
Ghost spoke before by the mouth of David concerning Judas" (Acts 
1:16). In all these instances the Holy Ghost appears as a person. 
Again, St. Peter said that to lie to the Holy Ghost is to lie to 
God: "Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart, that thou 
shouldst lie to the Holy Ghost?. . . Thou hast not lied to men, 
but to God" (Acts 5:3 f.).

On this point the entire second chapter of the Acts of the 
Apostles about the coming of the Holy Ghost can be cited: "And 
they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak 
with divers tongues according as the Holy Ghost gave them to 
speak" (v. 4). Here, as in the other texts, the Holy Ghost speaks 
as a divine person for only God sanctifies souls.

Father Ceuppens [82] says that the personal character of the Holy 
Ghost cannot be inferred from some of the texts of the Acts of the 
Apostles in which He is mentioned, for example, 1:5, 8; 2:4, 41; 
8:12; 9:7; but that the Holy Ghost appears explicitly as a person 
in the following: "And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, 
and they began to speak with divers tongues according as the Holy 
Ghost gave them to speak" (2:4). This was the fulfillment of 
Christ's promise to send the person of the Holy Ghost. His 
personal character is clear when He is said to rule the apostles 
(5:3, 9); also in the text, "For it hath seemed good to the Holy 
Ghost and to us" (15:28); "The Holy Ghost said to them: Separate 
me Saul and Barnabas" (13:2), and when He prevented St. Paul from 
going to Bithynia (16:7), when He foretold St. Paul's sufferings 
(20:22 f.), and when He "placed you bishops to rule the church of 
God" (20:28).

3. In the epistles of St. Paul many passages show the Holy Ghost 
to be a distinct person and true God. He appears as a person when 
such properties and actions are predicated of Him as pertain only 
to a person and not to a divine attribute. The Holy Ghost is said 
to have an intellect, "For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, 
the deep things of God" (I Cor. 2:10). To Him are also attributed 
a will and operations, "But all these things one and the same 
Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He will" (I Cor. 
12:11); graces <gratis datae>, like prophecy and the word of 
wisdom, are conferred by Him.

The person mentioned here is also true God for He is said to have 
all knowledge of divine things, "For the Spirit searcheth all 
things, [comprehends them], yea, the deep things of God" (I Cor. 
2:10). Only God can know future free things and reveal them to the 
prophets. To the Holy Ghost are also attributed the works of 
regeneration and sanctification and these are proper to God, as in 
"You are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are justified in 
the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Spirit of our God" (I 
Cor. 6:11).

Lastly, according to St. Paul, the worship of latria is to be 
given to the Holy Ghost, dwelling in the just soul: "Or know you 
not, that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in 
you?" (I Cor. 6:19); but temples are built for God. Therefore St. 
Paul added, "Glorify and bear God in your body" (v. 20). Father 
Ceuppens [83] remarks, "Some of these texts, taken alone, might be 
understood as referring to a poetical personification, as was said 
above about wisdom, but to comprehend the full meaning of these 
texts we must keep in mind the Trinitarian formulas in St. Paul's 
writings in which the Holy Ghost is placed on the same level with 
the Father and the Son."

4. In St. John's Gospel the Holy Ghost clearly appears as a divine 
person distinct from the other divine persons as was shown above 
in treating of the three divine persons together: "And I will ask 
the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete. . . . But the 
Paraclete, the Holy Ghost [to pneuma], whom the Father will send 
in My name, he [ekeinos] will teach you all things" (John 14:16, 
26). [84] No one sends himself, and therefore the Holy Ghost, who 
is sent, is distinct from the Father, who sends Him, and from the 
Son, who asks the Father to send the Holy Ghost, because the Son 
was already sent in the Incarnation. Here too (15:26) the Holy 
Ghost is called the Spirit of truth, that is, the source of truth, 
and He is said to possess perfect knowledge so as to illuminate 
the apostles and perfect sanctity for the sanctification of souls: 
"But when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all 
truth" (John 16:13). In all these passages the Holy Ghost is 
revealed as a divine person.

We may conclude, therefore, that the books of the New Testament 
explicitly reveal the mystery of one God in three distinct and 
perfectly equal divine persons. This doctrine is completely at 
variance with the Stoics' pantheistic concept of the <logos>, the 
world soul; from Neoplatonism, in which the <logos> is a secondary 
<<hypostasis>> subordinate to the One-Good; and from Philonism, in 
which the <logos> is either a creature or a divine attribute, 
depending on whether Philo was speaking as a Jew or as a 
Neoplatonist. We see, then, that the doctrine of Christ was not 
altered by the Greek philosophers, but that it is an explicit 
manifestation of higher truth, which in an obscure manner was 
already revealed in the Old Testament, as we shall show 
immediately.

Objections. It has been pointed out before that the Arians and 
after them the Socinians adduced certain texts of the New 
Testament to deny the divinity of the Son and the Holy Ghost, for 
example, "I go to the Father: for the Father is greater than I" 
(John 14:28). To this we reply that going to the Father was not 
predicated of Christ according to His divine nature, for in His 
divine nature He is always in the Father.

I insist. In I Cor. 15:28 we read: "And when all things shall be 
subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto 
Him that put all things under Him."

Reply. Here St. Paul is speaking of the resurrection of Christ, 
which is attributed to Christ in His human nature.

I insist. In Matt. 24:36 we read: "But of that day and hour no one 
knoweth, no not the angels of heaven, but the Father alone."

Reply. St. Thomas, [85] St. John Chrysostom, and many other 
Fathers say that these words are to be understood of Christ as 
man, for as man Christ is said to be ignorant of the day of 
judgment; not absolutely, for St. Peter said, "Lord, Thou knowest 
all things" (John 21:17), but He was ignorant of the time with 
regard to revealing it to us. [86]

I insist. In I Thess. 5:19 we read: "Extinguish not the spirit."

Reply. The meaning of these words is: Do not place obstacles in 
the way of the manifestations of the spirit, such as prophecy and 
the gift of tongues; do not resist grace.

I insist. The spirit of an individual is not a person distinct 
from that individual; but the Holy Ghost is often called the 
Spirit of God; therefore He is not a distinct person.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if the word "spirit" is used to 
denote an individual's essence or part of his essence or his 
manner of judging, this I concede; otherwise, this I deny.

Thus, for instance, the spirit of an angel designates his whole 
essence, and spirit of a man designates his manner of judging. 
Sometimes, however, spirit is used to denote a person distinct 
from him of whom it is said to be the spirit; for instance, the 
angels are called the spirits of God (Apoc. 3:1 ff.). No 
repugnance arises, therefore, when we say that "Spirit of God" 
means a distinct person, and from the context it is often clear 
that such is the case; for instance, when it is said that the 
"Father sends His spirit, " and when this Spirit is said to be 
another Paraclete, distinct also from the Son.

THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

The mystery of the Trinity is obscurely expressed in the Old 
Testament. We give here certain passages that have a meaning more 
clearly understood after the revelation of the New Testament.

1. A certain plurality in the one God is indicated, sometimes in 
the words of God and again in the theophanies.

God's words seem to express a council between several persons in 
Gen. 1:26, "Let Us make man to Our image and likeness. " It might 
be said that this is the plural of majesty, but this 
interpretation seems to be excluded by God's words to Adam after 
the Fall, "Behold Adam is become as one of Us" (Gen. 3:22). The 
expression "one of Us" indicates more than the plural of majesty. 
We may also cite God's words, provoked by the pride of the 
builders of the tower of Babel, "Come ye, therefore, let Us go 
down, and there confound their tongue" (Gen. 11:7). [87]

The mystery of the Trinity sheds some light on why the seraphim 
cried to one another: "Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God of hosts, 
all the earth is full of His glory" (Isa. 6:3). Another triple 
invocation of God is found in the Book of Numbers in the formulas 
of benediction (6:24 ff.).

Something similar is found in the theophanies. In the opinion of 
St. Augustine and St. Ambrose, Jahve appeared to Abraham in the 
guise of three men to adumbrate the Trinity: "And the Lord 
appeared to him in the vale of Mambre. . . and when he had lifted 
up his eyes, there appeared to him three men standing near him: 
and as soon as he saw them he ran to meet them from the door of 
his tent, and adored down to the ground" (Gen. 18:1 f.). The Roman 
Breviary in explanation says, "He saw three and adored one. " [88] 
This was also the interpretation of St. Augustine and St. Ambrose, 
but others, among them St. Hilary, understood this passage in a 
different sense.

In these words of God and in the theophanies, therefore, a certain 
plurality is implied as existing in the one God, but it is not 
expressed so explicitly that the Jews could understand it.

2. The person of the Messias is more explicitly revealed in the 
Messianic prophecies, 1. as the Son of God, distinct from the 
Father, 2. as God, 3. when He is called wisdom. [89]

In the psalms we read: "The Lord hath said to me: Thou art My son, 
this day have I begotten thee" (2:7). This psalm is Messianic in 
the literal sense, for the power that is promised to the new king 
is universal domination, extending over the universe, and the 
concept of any universal dominion is essentially Messianic. 
Therefore the king who is here proclaimed and who is to assume 
this dominion is the Messias.

To this Messianic king Jahve said, "Thou art My son, this day have 
I begotten thee. " This sentence may be taken in the literal sense 
as referring to the only-begotten Son, or in a metaphorical sense 
as referring to a son by adoption. From the text alone it would be 
difficult to prove that this statement is to be taken in its 
literal sense as referring to the divine generation and to the 
eternal Messias. This passage merely states that the Messias is 
formally constituted a king, but such election as king gave any 
Oriental king and especially the king of the Jewish theocracy the 
title of "son of God" in the metaphorical sense. From the text and 
from the context as well it is difficult to affirm the divinity of 
the Messias with any certainty, but we can easily conclude that 
the Messias would be a universal king and in some very special way 
the son of God.

In the light of a new inspiration, the author of the Epistle to 
the Hebrews determined the meaning of this psalm verse (2:7) when 
he said: "For to which of the angels hath He said at any time, 
Thou art My son, today have I begotten thee?" that is, the Son of 
God is above the angels. Thus the Epistle to the Hebrews teaches 
us in what sense that most special filiation of the Messias is to 
be understood: not as some metaphorical or adoptive filiation, but 
as actual filiation. The argument here is theological, based on 
the New Testament. [90]

In Psalm 109 (V. I, 3), which the Biblical Commission attributes 
to David, we read: "The Lord said to my Lord: Sit thou at My right 
hand;. . . with thee is the principality in the day of thy 
strength: in the brightness of the saints: from the womb before 
the day star I begot thee. " David is speaking of a colloquy 
between Jahve and some person whom David calls his Lord. Who is 
this person?

In order that David could call him his lord (Adonai), this person 
must be someone greatly superior to David; he must have dominion 
over the whole universe; and he must be a priest for all eternity 
according to the order of Melchisedech. The two last qualities are 
verified only in the Messias. With regard to the first quality, 
the superiority over David, we may ask whether this superiority is 
one of degree only, as when both are human beings and one is 
higher than the other, or a superiority of nature, as when the 
Messias is not only a man but God also, the only-begotten Son of 
God. The point is not clear either from the text or the context. 
Sometimes the expression, "Sit thou at my right hand, " is used to 
indicate the divinity of the Messias, but it is also an Oriental 
figure of speech implying that an individual has been raised to 
some special dignity, generally to the royal state. From the text 
and the context alone we can conclude merely that the promised 
Messias would be greatly superior to David; but what this 
superiority actually was is not clearly stated. In the second 
century before Christ the Septuagint version interpreted this 
superiority over David as one of nature, that is, they understood 
it as referring to the divinity of the Messias, and later Christ 
Himself in His disputations with the Pharisees argued His divinity 
from this text. [91]

In St. Matthew's Gospel we read: "The Lord said to my Lord. . . . 
If David then call him Lord, how is he his son? And no man was 
able to answer him a word" (22:44 ff.). The full meaning of the 
text appears from Christ's interpretation in the New Testament. 
[92] As St. Augustine pointed out, [93] in the expression, "Today 
have I begotten thee" the word "today" signifies the permanent 
present moment of eternity, where there is no past or future. Thus 
this eternal generation of the Son is above time. St. Thomas, too, 
says that the generation is eternal; it is not a new begetting but 
one that is eternal. "The 'today' designates what is present; and 
that which is eternal is always. " [94]

In Isaias we read: "For a child is born to us, and a son is given 
to us, and the government is upon his shoulder: and his name shall 
be called Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the 
world to come, the Prince of Peace" (9:6). The expression "God the 
Mighty" (El Gibbor) is found in Isa. 10:21, Deut. 10:17, Jer. 
32:18, Neh. 9:32 and always refers to Jahve. It is never used with 
reference to a creature, even the highest, and therefore Catholic 
exegetes accept this expression as designating the divine quality 
of the Child. [95]

In these texts we see illustrated what was later said of Wisdom in 
the Sapiential Books. In Prov. 8:22-31, Wisdom itself says, "The 
Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made 
anything from the beginning. I was set up from eternity, and of 
old before the earth was made. The depths were not as yet, and I 
was already conceived,. . . before the hills I was brought forth,. 
. . I was with Him forming all things: and was delighted every 
day, playing before Him at all times."

This text is illuminated by Ps. 2:7, "Thou art My Son, this day 
have I begotten Thee, " and Ps. 109:3, "Before the day star I 
begot Thee, " and it proclaims what St. Paul will say to the 
Hebrews (1:3) concerning the Son, who is "the brightness of His 
glory, and the figure of His substance. " In this text from 
Proverbs, we find a certain distinction between the persons in the 
words, "The Lord possessed Me, " for no one properly possesses 
himself. The pronoun "me" also designates a person, and not a 
divine attribute, for later we read, "I was with Him forming all 
things and was delighted, " that is, affected by joy, and only a 
person would be affected by joy, not a divine attribute. In this 
text also we find some indication that the principle of 
distinction between the two persons is the fact that one is 
begotten by the other, begotten not made: "I was conceived, I was 
brought forth. " We find even some indication of the order of 
procession, and nothing of inequality: "I was set up from 
eternity."

Thus this text, considered alongside the analogy of faith, or when 
it is compared with other earlier and later texts, contains much 
that does not appear at first sight. Gradually the contemplative 
mind is able to penetrate its full meaning with the aid of the 
gift of understanding. For all these texts can be studied in two 
ways: superficially with whatever aid comes from grammar and 
history, or more profoundly in the light of faith and the gifts of 
the Holy Ghost. Thus we search out the meaning of the word of God, 
understanding it in that supernatural light in which it was 
originally written under the guidance of the Holy Ghost. In this 
way it was that the Fathers read these texts. In our churches the 
stained-glass windows can be looked at in two ways: from the 
outside, where the figures cannot be discerned; and from within 
the church, where all the design of the window can be seen in the 
light intended by the artist.

Here, too, we should read the text of the Book of Ecclesiasticus 
(chap. 24): "I [Wisdom] came out of the mouth of the Most High, 
the first-born before all creatures. I made that in the heavens 
there should rise light that never faileth. . . . In me is all 
grace of the way and of the truth. " In this text, the procession 
is indicated in the words, "I came out of the mouth of the Most 
High": on the day of the Annunciation the archangel Gabriel called 
God the Father the Most High and, Jesus the Son of the Most High. 
The text also declares that Wisdom is begotten not made: "the 
first-born of all creatures. " Finally we find some indication of 
the order of procession in the words: "there should rise light 
that never faileth. . . in which is all grace of the way and of 
the truth."

It might be raised in objection that verse 14 refers to creation, 
"From the beginning,. . . was I created. " Father Lebreton replied 
that this verse is to be explained from the context, in which, a 
little earlier, it is said that Wisdom "came out of the mouth of 
the Most High, the firstborn before all creatures. " Therefore 
when we read, "From the beginning,. . . was I created, " the word 
"create" is to be understood for the production of a thing, as 
when it is said that children are procreated. [96]

Lastly, we read in the Book of Wisdom (7:25-30) that Wisdom is "a 
vapor of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the 
glory of the almighty God: and therefore no defiled thing cometh 
in to her. For she is the brightness of eternal light, and the 
unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness. 
. . . She can do all things,. . . and conveyeth herself into holy 
souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets. . . . Being 
compared with the light, she is found before it. For after this 
cometh night, but no evil can overcome wisdom."

In the light of the preceding texts, this passage insinuates very 
probably the existence of a person distinct from the Father, the 
same as that person referred to in the psalms: "Thou art My son, 
this day have I begotten Thee" (2:7), and "The Lord said to my 
Lord: Sit thou at My right hand" (109:1). Here Wisdom, as "the 
certain pure emanation of the glory of the almighty God, appears 
as God from true God and as light from light. Here Wisdom is 
called "the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror 
of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness, " that is, His 
adequate image, not an imperfect representation like the angels 
and men, who are created to the image of God. Of this perfect and 
adequate image we read that it "can do all things, " because it is 
God Himself, and that it sanctifies souls, which is an attribute 
proper to God. It is, therefore, the uncreated light, without spot 
or blemish.

Many of the Fathers have compared this text with the beginning of 
the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, who, at sundry times and in 
divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the 
prophets, last of all, in these days hath spoken to us by His 
Son,. . . who being the brightness of His glory [Wisdom was called 
'the brightness of eternal light'] and the figure of His substance 
[Wisdom was called 'the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the 
image of His goodness'], and upholding all things by the word of 
His power [Wisdom was said to be able 'to do all things'], making 
purgation of sins, sitteth on the right hand of the majesty on 
high [Wisdom was said to 'make friends of God and prophets']."

Lebreton, speaking of this chapter 7 of the Book of Wisdom, says: 
"Wisdom has not all the features of a living personality,. . . yet 
in this book we find the most precise presentiment of the 
Christian dogma. Soon the authentic interpretation of the Epistle 
to the Hebrews will show in full light that theology of the Word 
which we have been able to perceive there only obscurely. " [97]

In this passage of the Book of Wisdom, the Holy Ghost delineated 
what was to appear more brilliantly in the prologue to the Fourth 
Gospel: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God. " In opposition to all this, Philo's logos 
was either a creature, when he spoke as a Neoplatonist, or a 
divine attribute, when he spoke as a Jew.

The Old Testament contains only obscure references to the Holy 
Ghost. Often, indeed, the Spirit of God is mentioned, and He is 
represented as the principle of life by which the face of the 
earth is renewed (Ps. 103:30), and as the distributor of heavenly 
gifts (Isa. 11:2), the classic text concerning the gifts of the 
Holy Ghost. But the personal distinction of the Holy Ghost from 
God the Father can be hardly inferred from these texts of the Old 
Testament. This is not surprising, since the Old Testament was to 
announce the coming of the Messias, or of the Son, whereas the New 
Testament was to bring the Son's announcement of the mission of 
the Holy Ghost.

We find, however, some indication of this distinction in the Book 
of Wisdom (9:1 f., 17): "God of my fathers, and Lord of mercy, who 
hast made all things with Thy word, and by Thy wisdom hast 
appointed man. . . . And who shall know Thy thought, except Thou 
give wisdom, and send Thy Holy Spirit from above?"

Some light is thrown on this passage by the words of Isaias: "And 
there shall come forth a rod from the root of Jesse, and a flower 
shall rise up out of this root. And the spirit of the Lord shall 
rest upon him: the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the 
spirit of counsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge, and 
of godliness. And he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear 
of the Lord" (Isa. 11:1 ff.). Joining these two texts from the Old 
Testament, we see what Christians understand by the words, "And 
who shall know Thy thought. . . except Thou send Thy Holy Spirit 
from above?" On the feast of Pentecost the Church repeats the 
words of the Psalmist, "Send forth Thy spirit, and they shall be 
created" (Ps. 103:30). It should not be surprising that the first 
lineaments of the mystery of the Trinity should be obscure. Some 
features of the mystery were announced in the beginning, but that 
which was to be more fully revealed later on could not then be 
known. In the natural order the whole river is virtually known in 
the initial spring of a great stream, but from that spring alone 
the whole course of the river cannot be known. So also the 
extraordinary talents of a great genius are virtually found in the 
mind of the child, but they are not explicit in the beginning.

Conclusion. All that was revealed in the Old Testament about the 
Messias, Wisdom, and the Holy Spirit is the primitive delineation 
of the mystery of the Holy Trinity. The Jews, however, apparently 
were not able to understand these things or to unite them into one 
body of doctrine, as is evident from the rabbinical and apocryphal 
writings. Thus it often occurs that the father and the mother of a 
child who later becomes a great thinker are not able to appreciate 
the acumen of the child, although later when the child has grown 
to manhood they can discern his unusual gifts in the light of a 
maturer mind. It is said of St. Thomas that when he was five years 
old he often asked his teachers, "Who is God?" Most of his 
teachers were not able to foresee what would become of the child. 
St. Albert the Great, however, seems to have foreseen the child's 
future.

Doubt. In the Old Testament what kind of faith was necessary for 
salvation with regard to God?

Reply. The answer is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11:6): 
"But without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that 
cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them 
that seek Him. " As St. Thomas explained, [98] it was always 
necessary to believe something above reason, that is, not only the 
existence of God as the author of nature but also the existence of 
God as the author of grace and salvation. Faith in the Trinity is 
implicitly contained in this supernatural belief. Explicit faith 
in the Trinity was not necessary for salvation in the Old 
Testament. "Before Christ the mystery of the incarnation of Christ 
was explicitly believed by the majority, while a minority believed 
it implicitly and vaguely; the same was true of the mystery of the 
Trinity. " [99] It was in this sense that St. Thomas says in the 
same place, "Therefore from the beginning it was necessary for 
salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity, " at least for the 
leaders, among whom were the prophets. In the same article in the 
reply to the first objection, St. Thomas says: "It was necessary 
at all times and for all to believe explicitly these two truths 
concerning God (that God is and that He is the rewarder). But 
these two truths were not sufficient at all times for all."

5. THE BLESSED TRINITY IN TRADITION

The testimony of tradition on the Holy Trinity is extensively 
treated in the history of dogma. Here we shall discuss only the 
more important questions relating to the difference between 
tradition in the ante-Nicene and post-Nicene periods. These 
questions have at all times been discussed in the Church, and St. 
Thomas himself wrote of them at length in his <Commentary on the 
Prologue of the Fourth Gospel>, where he speaks of Origen's error 
about the Word, the Son of God, and in the <Summa>, where he says, 
"The Arians, for whom Origen was the source, taught that the Son 
was different from the Father by a diversity of substance, " and 
that the Word is said to be divine only metaphorically and not 
properly. [100]

At the outset it should be noted, as is evident from the New 
Testament, that from the beginning the Church believed explicitly 
in the mystery of the Trinity, professing in concrete terms that 
God the Father sent His only-begotten Son into the world and then 
the Holy Ghost came to sanctify men. This is the substance of the 
Apostles' Creed itself. In defining this mystery the Church did 
not yet make use of such abstract terms as nature, person, and 
Trinity, but it was already clear that the words "Father" and 
"Son" were personal nouns. This should be kept in mind lest the 
earlier sublime simplicity of contemplation, which transcends the 
later technical terminology, be confused with a later attempt to 
debase this doctrine by a superficial and spurious simplicity. 
Some say that at first the faith of the Church was proposed in a 
popular manner and later more scientifically; it would be better 
to say that in the beginning the faith was expressed in a concrete 
manner, which in its sublimity surpassed the abstract technicality 
of a later age. In the transition from this concrete expression of 
the faith, particularly in the earliest Creeds, to the abstract 
expression as formulated against Arianism in the Council of Nicaea 
in 325, certain difficulties arose which were solved by the Nicene 
Council itself. Thus in this matter we distinguish two periods: 
the ante-Nicene and the post-Nicene periods. We see here how 
slowly man learns to abstract, how he slowly attains to the third 
stage of abstraction divorced from all matter, how at first his 
metaphysical notions are confused, and only later become clarified 
and distinct. Then the danger of the abuse of abstraction arises 
as in the decline of Scholasticism, when the mind receded too far 
from the concrete, from the documents of revelation, and from the 
vital contemplation of divine things.

ANTE-NICENE TESTIMONIES

In this period the documents which express the faith of the Church 
can easily be reconciled with the later definitions of the Council 
of Nicaea, which state the doctrine of the Trinity more 
explicitly. The writings of many ante-Nicene Fathers, however, 
with their mingling of faith and philosophical theory, are correct 
in their statement of the substance of the mystery, but the 
explanations they offer often contain inexact expressions, some of 
which seem to incline to Subordinationism, and others seem to 
favor Sabellianism or Modalism. We see here how the evolution of 
dogma is the progressive unfolding of the same truth, from the 
indistinct and concrete concepts to the more defined and distinct 
concepts.

We should not be surprised to learn that the early Fathers used 
such inexact expressions since they were confronted with the 
problem of refuting heresies which were mutually opposed; to show 
the real distinction between the persons against the Modalists 
they sometimes made use of expressions tainted with 
Subordinationism, and when they were intent on safeguarding the 
unity of God they sometimes weakened the distinction between the 
persons. Theologians have at all times carefully distinguished 
between the documents of faith proposed by the Church, in which 
tradition is found without any admixture of philosophical theory, 
and the writings of the Fathers which were more or less exact in 
their use of abstract and philosophical terminology.

The faith of the early Church about the Trinity was expressed 
chiefly in three ways: 1. in the manner of baptizing, 2. in the 
various Creeds, 3. in the doxologies.

1. Baptism was conferred by a triple immersion and with the 
invocation of the three divine persons. The manner of baptizing is 
given in the Didache (VII, I ff.): "Baptize in this manner: after 
you have said all these things, baptize in the name of the Father 
and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost with living water. Pour water 
on the head three times in the name of the Father and of the Son 
and of the Holy Ghost. " The same instruction is found in 
Tertullian, writing against Praxeas. [101] Praxeas was a 
Patripassian, admitting the existence of only one person, the 
Father, who had become incarnate. In his reply to Praxeas, 
Tertullian wrote: "We immerse not once but three times at each of 
the names and for each of the persons. " Further, the sign of the 
cross expresses three mysteries: the Trinity, the Incarnation, 
when the hand descends to the breast at the words "and of the Son, 
" and the Redemption by the form of the cross.

2. The faith of the Church in the Trinity is expressed in various 
creeds. St. Irenaeus tells us that in the second century the 
catechumens before they were baptized read or recited a certain 
rule of faith or profession of faith in the Trinity, which 
declared, "in one God, the almighty Father, who made heaven and 
earth and sea, and all that are in them; and in Jesus Christ, the 
Son of God, incarnate for our salvation; and in the Holy Ghost, 
who by the prophets preached the ordinances of God. " [102] This 
belief was developed in later creeds which can be found in 
Denzinger. [103]

3. The faith of the primitive Church in the Trinity is also 
enunciated in the doxologies, which were in use from the earliest 
times. Many of them are found in the epistles of St. Paul, who in 
the beginning or at the conclusion invokes and glorifies the three 
persons of the Trinity. [104]

Later, we read in the Acts of the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp, the 
disciple of St. John, that at his execution St. Polycarp 
exclaimed: "Lord God almighty, Father of Thy blessed and beloved 
Son Jesus Christ, I bless Thee,. . . I glorify Thee through the 
heavenly and eternal high priest Jesus Christ, Thy beloved Son, 
through whom there is to Thee with Him and the Holy Ghost glory 
now and in future ages. Amen. " [105]

As early as the second century the Church used the lesser 
doxology, "Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy 
Ghost, " still recited in the Divine Office at the end of each 
psalm, and the greater doxology, "Glory to God in the highest, " 
in which the Church's faith in the Trinity is expressed in greater 
detail. In the greater doxology we have an example of that sublime 
contemplation which assuredly will dispose us to an intimate union 
with the Blessed Trinity no less than many scholastic treatises on 
the Trinity. Often when celebrating Mass the priest recites this 
doxology in a mechanical manner as something prescribed by the 
rubrics. It is, however, an instance of profound contemplation of 
the mystery of the Trinity of great antiquity, for Pope St. 
Telesphorus (128-39) commanded that the Gloria be recited on the 
feast of the Nativity of our Lord. [106]

The greater doxology begins with the song of the angels, "Glory to 
God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will"; then 
the one God is adored, "We adore Thee, we glorify Thee"; the, n we 
adore, "God the Father almighty, " our "Lord Jesus Christ, the 
only-begotten Son; O Lord God, Lamb of God, Son of the Father, " 
and finally the Holy Ghost, "together with the Holy Ghost, in the 
glory of God the Father. Amen."

Many contemplative minds have not found a more beautiful 
expression of this mystery, and yet it is often recited 
mechanically as something already well known and worthy of no 
further consideration or contemplation. The result is a kind of 
materialization of divine worship. The great antiquity of this 
greater doxology shows how vivid was the early Christian's faith 
in the Trinity, even though he spoke rather inexactly when he 
treated of the mystery in abstract and philosophical language.

In spite of some inexact expressions, the teaching of the ante-
Nicene Fathers can easily be reconciled with the later definitions 
of the Council of Nicaea. At all times they held fast to the 
doctrine expressed in the earliest creeds concerning one God in 
three persons. Among the apostolic Fathers, St. Clement of Rome in 
his two letters to the Corinthians [107] says that the Father is 
the Creator, the Son is more excellent than the angels and is God 
Himself, and that the Holy Ghost spoke through the prophets. We 
find like expressions in the epistles of St. Ignatius Martyr to 
the Ephesians and to the Magnesians. [108] All the Fathers 
believed in one God in three persons, and those Fathers who 
opposed Modalism clearly asserted the real distinction between the 
persons. Thus St. Hippolytus, [109] wrote: "It is necessary that 
we confess that the Father is God almighty, and Jesus Christ the 
Son of God, God made man, and the Holy Ghost, and these are really 
three."

Tertullian (213-25) [110] asserts the unity of substance no less 
clearly than the Trinity of persons. He says: "We should guard the 
sacredness of the economy (i. e., the sacred doctrine) which 
teaches that there is unity and trinity, three directing, the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Three, however, not in status 
but in degree. . . of one substance and one power, for it is one 
God from whom these degrees, these forms and species, in the name 
of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, are derived. " 
It was difficult to find the proper abstract terms; the words 
"degree, form, species" are quite inadequate to express abstractly 
the distinction between the persons.

In asserting the distinction between the persons, the ante-Nicene 
Fathers generally avoided the language of the Subordinationists. 
Some, however, like Origen (202-54), leaned somewhat to 
Subordinationism, saying that the Son was in some manner inferior 
to the Father, and the Holy Ghost was inferior to the Son. [111] 
Misled by his philosophy, Origen seems to have come under the 
influence of Philo, and in his attempt to confute the Modalists he 
made use of inaccurate expressions and merited the criticism of 
later writers. [112]

Similarly St. Dionysius of Alexandria, Origen's disciple, fought 
Modalism with such zeal that some thought he had fallen into 
Subordinationism, but in his Apologia addressed to the Supreme 
Pontiff he stated his position more clearly. On other occasions 
these Fathers taught that the Son was begotten and not made: 
Origen speaks of the Son as eternal and homoousios, consubstantial 
with the Father. [113] They did not, however, at all times avoid 
the use of Neoplatonic expressions which implied a necessary 
emanation and some subordination, something between eternal 
generation in equality of nature and free creation out of nothing. 
Therefore Pope St. Dionysius in 260, condemning the Modalists and 
Subordinationists, wrote: "Neither is the admirable and divine 
unity to be divided into three divinities, nor by the language of 
division is the dignity and supreme greatness of the Lord to be 
diminished. " [114]

POST-NICENE TESTIMONIES

In 325 the Council of Nicaea defended the true tradition against 
Arius, who taught that the Father alone was truly God, that the 
Word was the most excellent of creatures, created in time out of 
nothing, and that the Holy Ghost was also a creature, inferior to 
the Son. After long discussion it was defined that the Word was 
consubstantial with the Father, homoousion: "We believe in one God 
the Father almighty, maker of all things, visible and invisible. 
And in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only-begotten 
Son of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father, God of 
God, light of light, true God of true God, begotten, not made, of 
one substance with the Father, as the Greeks say, homoousion, by 
whom all things were made. And in the Holy Ghost. " [115]

After this condemnation the heretics tried to cover up their error 
by teaching that the Son was not properly homoousion or 
consubstantial with the Father, that is, of the same essence, but 
that He was similar in nature, or homoiousion. Such was the 
teaching of the Semi-Arians; the Acacians said the Son was 
homoion, that is, similar with regard to form and accidents. These 
teachings were refuted by St. Alexander, the bishop of Alexandria, 
and by St. Athanasius. [116]

Note on the evolution of dogma or the progressive understanding of 
dogma.

The definition of the Council of Nicaea on the consubstantiality 
of the Word is clearly nothing more than an explanation or more 
explicit statement of the proposition contained in the prologue of 
St. John's Gospel: "The Word was God. " The consubstantiality is 
not arrived at by an objectively illative process which deduces a 
new truth from another, as, for example, when we conclude that man 
is free from the fact that he is rational. To arrive at the 
knowledge of this consubstantiality an explicative process is 
sufficient, or at the most a subjectively illative process, by 
which the mind proceeds to the deduction of a new truth. By the 
simple explicative process the second statement is shown to be 
equivalent to an earlier simpler proposition.

The explicative process is most easy: God is one, but the 
indivisible and infinite divine nature cannot be multiplied. This 
monotheism is manifestly based on faith, for we read, "Hear, O 
Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" (Deut. 6:4); "See ye that I 
alone am, and there is no other God beside Me" (Deut. 32:39); "And 
Jesus answered him:. . . the Lord thy God is one God" (Mark 
12:29); "We know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that 
there is no God but one" (I Cor. 8:4).

On the supposition of monotheism, we read further, "And the Word 
was God, " or, the Word, the only-begotten Son of God, is God, 
like the Father. Therefore the Father and the Son are 
consubstantial, that is, they are not distinct with regard to 
essence and substance but only by reason of paternity and 
filiation, which is the opposition of relation. Again, Jesus said, 
"I am the truth and the life. " This process does not attain to a 
new truth deduced from that revealed truth, "And the Word was God, 
" but it explains it on the supposition that monotheism is 
established. Therefore, in spite of what has been said by recent 
students, the divine consubstantiality is not a theological 
conclusion sanctioned by definition.

St. Athanasius, from another approach, proves the 
consubstantiality by a proper illative process from two revealed 
premises. [117] St. Athanasius declared: Only God deifies, or 
makes divine by participation. But the Word of God deifies us. 
Therefore He is God, and consequently homoousios with the Father, 
from whom He proceeds not by creation but by generation in the 
identity of nature.

Father Marin Sola teaches: "The consubstantiality defined by the 
Council of Nicaea was a revealed truth. But where and how was it 
revealed? It was revealed in other truths, which contained it 
implicitly and from which it was deduced by reasoning. These other 
truths are: 1. Jesus Christ is truly the Son of God; 2. in God 
there is simple unity and there can be no division of substance. " 
[118]

At this point we depart from Sola and Batiffol, holding that 
consubstantiality is not really a theological conclusion but a 
truth of faith more explicitly stated.

Having posited the revealed proposition, "The Word was God, " no 
objectively illative process is required to understand 
consubstantiality. This consubstantiality does not express a new 
truth, but the same truth in a more explicit manner, as when we 
proceed from the nominal definition of man to the real and 
explicit definition, namely, man is a rational animal. If certain 
theologians, like Bellarmine, [119] say that consubstantiality is 
deduced, it is deduced by the explicative process, or perhaps, as 
we have said, by an illative process from two premises already 
revealed. Here we must also keep in mind the transition from 
concrete knowledge to abstract knowledge. Abstract knowledge is 
already contained implicitly, and not only virtually, in the 
concrete knowledge of the same thing, and the transition is made 
without any objectively illative process.

In this way St. Athanasius argued to prove the divinity of the 
Holy Ghost against the Arians and the Macedonians: inasmuch as the 
Holy Ghost sanctifies us, that is, deifies us by a participation 
in the deity. Furthermore, St. Athanasius said: "The Father begets 
necessarily and at the same time freely; and He does not create 
necessarily but freely. " In explanation he said that the Father 
necessarily and freely loves Himself but not as a matter of 
choice. It follows that in God generation is eternal since God was 
always the Father, and similarly spiration is eternal, otherwise 
neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be God, because they 
would not then be eternal. In refuting the Arians, St. Athanasius 
concluded: "Nothing created can be found in the Trinity, since it 
is entirely one God. " [120] After the Nicene Council many other 
councils confirmed this teaching against the Macedonians, who had 
denied the divinity of the Holy Ghost, particularly the Fourth 
Council of Rome (380) and the Council of Constantinople, which 
expressly defined that the Holy Ghost was God. With this we 
conclude the testimony of tradition, for after the Nicene Council 
the Church clearly taught the mystery of one God in three distinct 
persons.

6. ST. AUGUSTINE AND ST. THOMAS ON THE TRINITY

In his commentaries on the Gospel of St. Matthew and that of St. 
John and on the epistles of St. Paul, St. Thomas examined all the 
texts of the New Testament in which the Holy Trinity is mentioned 
explicitly or implicitly. In his consideration of this subject, he 
clearly understood how much St. Augustine was able to contribute 
toward the understanding of these texts. His debt to St. Augustine 
will become evident from a comparison of the works of St. 
Augustine with the writings of the Greek Fathers.

1. The method of the Greek Fathers. In their refutation of 
Sabellius, who had denied the real distinction between the divine 
persons, and of Arius and Macedonius, who had denied the divinity 
either of the Son or of the Holy Ghost, the Greek Fathers began 
with the affirmation of the three persons, as found in Sacred 
Scripture, and then they tried to show that this Trinity of 
persons could be reconciled with the unity of nature by reason of 
the consubstantiality of the persons. This idea of 
consubstantiality was more and more explicitly stated and then 
defined in the Council of Nicaea. [121]

Thus the Greek Fathers, especially St. Athanasius, showed that, 
according to revelation, the Father begets the Son by 
communicating to Him not only the participation of His nature but 
His whole nature, and from this it followed that the Son was 
consubstantial with the Father and true God from true God. This 
also explained how the incarnate Son of God was able to redeem us 
from the servitude of sin, because His merits had infinite value. 
[122] In the same way the Greek Fathers showed that according to 
Sacred Scripture the Holy Ghost, proceeding from the Father and 
the Son, was God and therefore was able to sanctify our souls. 
Indeed these processions were looked upon as donations and 
communications rather than as operations of the divine intellect 
and will: the Father, in begetting the Son, gave Him His nature. 
Similarly, the Father and the Son gave or communicated the divine 
nature to the Holy Ghost, who proceeded from them. But in this 
concept, the manner in which the first and second processions took 
place remained inscrutable. [123] In their explanations of this 
mystery, the Greek Fathers followed the order of the Apostles' 
Creed, in which the Father is called the Creator, the Son the 
Savior, and the Holy Ghost the Sanctifier. The explanations 
proposed by the Greek Fathers contained, it must be said, many 
obscurities.

2. The difficulties of the Greek Fathers. Why are there two 
processions and only two? How does the first differ from the 
second, and why is the first procession called generation? In 
other words, why is the Son of God only-begotten, and why does the 
Holy Ghost, although not begotten, receive the whole divine 
nature?

One other doubt arises: Why, in the Apostles' Creed, is the Father 
alone called the Creator, whereas in the prologue of St. John's 
Gospel and in the epistles of St. Paul all things are said to have 
been made by the Word? The creative omnipotence is an attribute of 
the divine nature and therefore it is something common to the 
divine nature and pertains to the three divine persons. The Greek 
Fathers did not explain in what sense the Father alone is called 
the Creator in the Creed.

To solve this difficulty, St. Augustine and his successors adopted 
the theory of appropriation, which is found only implicitly in the 
Greek Fathers. The Latins explained that the Father is called the 
Creator, not because He alone created, but by appropriation, that 
is, by a similitude of propriety, for "the creative power contains 
the idea of principle and therefore has a resemblance with the 
heavenly Father, who is the principle in the divinity. " [124] In 
the same way wisdom has a resemblance with the Son inasmuch as He 
is the Word.

3. St. Augustine's solution of these difficulties. To arrive at a 
solution of these problems, St. Augustine labored long in the 
writing of his great work, De Trinitate, in fifteen books; the 
first seven books explain the biblical texts referring to the 
Trinity, and the other eight treat of the mystery speculatively, 
proposing analogies taken from the human soul, inasmuch as the 
word of the mind proceeds from it by intellection as well as love, 
which is the inclination or weight of the soul drawing it to the 
good as loved. St. Augustine laid great emphasis on the fact that 
according to the Fourth Gospel the Son proceeds from the Father as 
the Word; "And the Word was with God and the Word was God. The 
same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him. . 
. ."

The Son, who is called only-begotten (v. 18), proceeds therefore 
from the Father as the Word, not as the Word produced and 
delivered exteriorly, but as the Word of the divine mind, for it 
is said, "The Word was with God, and the Word was God. " The Word, 
then, is God, not the supreme creature, and "all things were made 
by Him. " In the Epistle to the Hebrews, we read, "who being the 
brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance [of God 
the Father], and upholding all things by the word of His power."

St. Augustine explains the intimate manner of the generation of 
the eternal and only-begotten Son, while the Greek Fathers said 
that the manner of His begetting was inscrutable. Explaining the 
prologue of St. John's Gospel, St. Augustine showed that the 
Father from eternity begets His Son by an intellectual act just as 
our mind conceives the mental word: in the soul we find the mind, 
knowledge, and love; in the soul, which is the image of the 
Trinity, there are memory, intelligence (the act of intellection), 
and the will. This helps us to understand the fecundity of the 
divine nature. [125]

But while our word is only an accident of our minds, remaining 
very imperfect and limited, and multiple to express the diverse 
nature of things, the divine Word is something substantial, most 
perfect, unique, perfectly expressing the divine nature and all 
that it contains. It is therefore truly "light of light, God of 
God, true God of true God. " Thus, by the analogy of our 
intellectual word, by its similarity and dissimilarity, the 
intimate manner of the first procession is explained. The manner 
of the second procession, which appears as the procession of love, 
is also explained. From our souls, which according to the 
Scriptures are created in the likeness of God, proceeds not only 
the word but also love. The human mind not only conceives the 
true-good but also loves it. If therefore the only-begotten Son 
proceeds from the Father as the mental Word, the Holy Ghost is to 
be considered as proceeding from them as love.

Thus it is that there are in God two processions and only two, and 
the manner of each is explained. St. Augustine, however, did not 
understand why the first procession is called generation. St. 
Thomas explains: "The Word proceeds by intellectual action, which 
is a vital operation, conjoined to the principle, and after the 
manner of a likeness, because the intellectual concept is an image 
of the thing understood. " [126] The concept of our minds, 
however, does not deserve the name of generation, because in us 
the concept is only an accident of our minds, whereas in God the 
Word is substantial inasmuch as intellection in God is subsisting 
being. Thus the Father, in producing the Word, begets a Son like 
to Himself, and does not produce an accidental mental word.

St. Thomas further perfected the doctrine of St. Augustine by 
showing why the procession of love should not be called 
generation: "the will is in act, not because some likeness of the 
thing willed is in the will, but because the will has a certain 
inclination toward the thing willed. " [127] In St. Augustine's 
words, "My love is my weight."

In the doctrine proposed by St. Augustine we also find an 
explanation of why the Holy Ghost proceeds not from the Father 
alone, but also from the Son, because in our souls love proceeds 
not only from the soul itself but from the knowledge of the true-
good, since nothing is loved unless it is also known.

From this it appears that in his thinking about the Trinity, St. 
Augustine did not begin with the three persons as did the Greek 
Fathers but rather with the unity of the divine nature, which was 
already demonstrated by reason, just as he began with the soul 
itself in his demonstration of its faculties and superior 
operations.

In these two approaches opposing difficulties arise: in the Greek 
approach it is difficult to safeguard the unity of nature, while 
in the Augustinian approach, starting with the unity of nature, it 
is difficult to safeguard the distinction between the persons and 
those things which are proper or appropriated to the persons. It 
is, after all, a transcendent and indemonstrable mystery. But by 
these two approaches, the first of which is the more concrete and 
the second is more abstract, the mystery is contemplated under two 
aspects. And finally, the abstract principles serve to advance a 
better understanding of what is known beforehand in a concrete 
manner.

St. Augustine and his followers easily explained what the Greek 
Fathers were not able to show: why the Father alone is not the 
Creator, but also the Son and the Holy Ghost, because the creative 
power is a property of the divine nature, common to the three 
persons. Gradually was unfolded the meaning of the traditional 
principle: the three persons are one principle in the operations 
<ad extra>. This principle was formulated in the condemnations by 
Pope Damasus in 380, and later councils defined it more 
accurately. [128] Great progress was thus made in the elucidation 
of this dogma.

When, in the Apostles' Creed, only the Father is called the 
Creator, the predication is not proper and exclusive; it is rather 
by a kind of appropriation, inasmuch as the creative power 
contains the notion of principle <ad extra> just as the Father is 
the principle <ad intra.> In the same way, wisdom has a 
resemblance with the Word, and our sanctification has a 
resemblance to the Holy Ghost, since it proceeds from God's love 
for us, and thus the Holy Ghost is called the Spirit of love or 
personal love.

Therefore, while consubstantiality was the terminus toward which 
the Greek Fathers tended, beginning with the three persons, whose 
names are found in Scripture, St. Augustine, on the other hand, 
began with the unity of the divine nature to arrive at the three 
persons, just as he began with the unity of the soul to determine 
its superior operations and the various manifestations of its 
life.

In the Augustinian doctrine, gradually that principle which 
illumines the whole treatise on the Trinity and was formulated by 
the Council of Florence in 1441, came to light, "In God all things 
are one and the same unless there is opposition of relation, " 
that is, where there is no relative opposition between the 
persons, all things are one and the same because the divine nature 
is numerically one with all its attributes. [129]

4. The difficulties of the Augustinian teaching solved by St. 
Thomas. Two difficulties remained in the Augustinian doctrine. The 
first arose from the fact that the generation of the Word takes 
place after the manner of intellection; but the three divine 
persons have intellect; therefore the three divine persons ought 
to beget, and then there would be a fourth person, and so on to 
infinity. This difficulty is solved by the distinction between 
intellection and the expression of the notional idea inasmuch as 
the three persons all have intelligence but only the Father 
expresses the intellection. He alone expresses because the Word is 
adequate and the most perfect expression of the divine nature and 
no other Word need be enunciated. Just as in a classroom while the 
teacher is teaching, both he and the pupils understand, but the 
teacher alone enunciates. Similarly a difficult question may be 
proposed to a number of persons; then one discovers and expresses 
the correct solution, while all the others immediately understand 
it. This distinction between intellection and enunciation is 
offered by St. Thomas. [130]

The second difficulty is similar: the second procession takes 
place after the manner of love; but the three persons love; 
therefore the three persons ought to spirate another person, and 
so on to infinity.

The solution of this difficulty depends on the distinction between 
essential love, which is common to the three persons, and notional 
love, which is active spiration and corresponds to the enunciation 
of the Word. It is called notional because it denotes the third 
person. Thus the three persons all love, but only the first two 
spirate. We have then three kinds of love in God: essential, 
notional, and personal. Personal love is the Holy Ghost Himself, 
who is the terminus of active spiration just as the Word is the 
terminus of generation and enunciation. [131] According to a 
rather remote analogy: a saintly preacher loves God and inspires 
his audience with this love, and the hearers also love God but 
they do not inspire others with this love. These two distinctions 
are not explicitly found in St. Augustine, but after his time 
great progress was made in elucidating the traditional doctrine of 
the Trinity.

5. The preference of St. Augustine's doctrine over that of the 
Greek Fathers.

The Augustinian teaching prevailed for three reasons.

1. Because by beginning with the unity of the divine nature, St. 
Augustine began methodically with what was better known to us. The 
divine nature was already demonstrated by reason, and from this he 
proceeded to the supernatural mystery of the Trinity. When the 
Greek Fathers were writing, the treatise on the one God had not 
yet been set up as the way to an understanding of the Trinity.

2. Because the Augustinian approach solved those difficulties 
remaining in the Greek concept, explaining the number and 
character of the processions after the manner of intellection and 
love. It also explained the <Filioque>, inasmuch as love 
presupposes intellection; and finally it explained the distinction 
between the natural order, of which God as one and the Creator is 
the efficient principle, and the supernatural order, whose supreme 
mystery is the divine processions within God.

3. Because whatever difficulties still remained were attributable 
not to deficiencies of method but to the sublimity of the mystery. 
Moreover, the Augustinian concept offered whatever was positive in 
the Greek concept, perfecting it, and thus itself was more 
perfect. The Greek Fathers began with the concrete; the Latin 
Fathers and theologians arrived at a more abstract consideration 
and at the knowledge of principles which cast light both on the 
whole treatise and on those things known concretely in the 
beginning.

6. The theory of Richard of St. Victor. [132] This theory is 
dominated by the Victorine voluntarism, according to which the 
good is prior and more important than being, and the will and love 
are more important than the intellect. According to this concept, 
God would better be defined as the supreme Good rather than as 
subsisting Being. To which St. Thomas replied that that which 
first comes to the attention of our intellect is being, and that 
the notion of good presupposes the more universal and simpler 
concept of being; good is nothing more than the plenitude of 
being, desired because it is perfective. [133] We should not be 
surprised to see these two tendencies among philosophers and 
theologians, the primacy of being and intellect, and the primacy 
of good and love, nor is it surprising that two theories should 
have been proposed by Latin theologians about the Trinity. We will 
briefly consider here Richard's theory because it was adopted in 
some form by Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, and is quoted 
by St. Thomas. [134] Indeed, St. Thomas, developed his own 
doctrine by correcting the theory of Richard of St. Victor, which 
should therefore be explained first.

Richard, like the Greeks, first considered in God the person and 
then the nature. He demonstrated the existence of a personal God, 
possessing all perfections, especially the supreme perfection, 
which for Richard was the love of benevolence and friendship, or 
charity.

Charity, however, declared Richard, is not the love of oneself, 
but the love of friendship, the love of another person, according 
to the classical passage from St. Gregory the Great: "Charity 
cannot exist unless there are two persons, for no one can properly 
be said to have charity toward himself. " [135] Hence Richard 
concluded: "It is fitting that love should tend toward another in 
order that it be charity. Where there is not a plurality of 
persons, charity cannot be said to be present. " [136] In God, 
according to Richard, love (good diffusive of itself) begets a 
second beloved person, without whom the love of friendship cannot 
come into being. The most perfect love of friendship gives to the 
other not only something belonging to the lover but the whole 
nature of the lover. The love of the lover gives whatever it can.

Finally, Richard in order to prove that the most perfect charity, 
such as is found in God, is most pure without any love of 
concupiscence, concluded that it not only tolerates but most 
freely desires a third person, equally beloved by the other 
persons. When envy appears sometimes in human friendship, it is a 
sign that the love is not pure. Hence there are in God three 
persons, who love one another equally without any selfish love or 
self-interest, and the three loves are identified with subsisting 
love itself, which is the definition of God Himself.

Objection. But the love of the Holy Ghost is not freely given as 
is the love of the Father and the Son.

Reply. Richard's reply was that, by reason of His supreme 
benevolence, the Holy Ghost wishes rather to receive than to give 
in order that what is more glorious might be attributed to the 
other two persons.

Such is the brief outline of this theory by which Richard wished 
to demonstrate the mystery of the Trinity from the fact that God 
is the most perfect personal love.

Criticism. [137] St. Thomas replied that the theory does not 
demonstrate that God is infinitely fecund ad intra, for the love 
of the most perfect person does not require the association of 
another person for his happiness. Further, what becomes of the 
Word of God in Richard's theory? It seems to disappear, since the 
first procession is by love and not by intellection. [138] For 
Richard, as for the Greeks, the Word was something spoken to 
another person rather than a mental concept of a person. In 
Richard's mind the Father speaks, the Son is the utterance, and 
the Holy Ghost hears. Thus the intimate life of God is an intimate 
conversation, and the same is intellection in the three persons. 
Briefly, Richard does not understand by the Word or by His 
production a formal mode of divine generation, for he explains 
divine generation not by the analogy of intellection but of love.

Hence another objection arises: Richard omits the concept of 
intellection, but nothing can be loved unless it is known 
beforehand. As we see from his writings, Richard responded to this 
objection on the basis of his metaphysical and psychological 
principles.

1. Metaphysically speaking, according to Richard, the good is 
superior to being and diffusive of itself by love, as Plato and 
the Neoplatonists taught. According to the Neoplatonists, the 
first <<hypostasis>> is the one-good, which by its own 
diffusiveness and by love generates the second <<hypostasis>>, 
intelligence, whose object is being, something inferior to the 
supreme Good.

2. Psychologically speaking, Richard contended that the highest 
vital activity is not immobile intellection, which is quiescent in 
itself, but love, especially the love of friendship, which is 
diffusive of itself. For Richard knowledge was subordinate to 
love, as a previous condition for a higher perfection. This 
opinion is continued in Scotism, which is a form of voluntarism. 
For St. Thomas, on the other hand, the dignity of love is derived 
from the dignity of knowledge by which love is directed, and the 
heavenly beatitude is constituted formally by the vision of God. 
This vision of God is necessarily followed, as by its complement, 
by the love of God above all things.

Another objection against Richard's theory arises from the 
difficulty of safeguarding the unity of the divine nature. [139] 
It is the same difficulty as beset the Greeks; like the Greeks, 
Richard began with the notion of divine person rather than with 
the notion of the divine nature. Therefore in his mind the divine 
nature was rather the act of love, rather a dynamic unity than a 
static entity. For Richard the same love was identical in the 
three divine persons, although some special property of this love 
is found in each person. The matter is left in mystery. The main 
criticism of Richard's theory is that he seems to lose sight of 
the teaching of St. John's Gospel, that the Son of God proceeds as 
the Word, that is, after the manner of intellection.

Alexander of Hales made some improvements on Richard's theory. 
[140] Alexander was more intent on the metaphysical aspect of the 
problem; he considered the principle that good is diffusive of 
itself, rather than the psychological aspect, that the love of 
charity requires several persons. Thus Alexander and St. 
Bonaventure, who followed him, looked on the divine processions as 
the fecundity of the infinite living being, relying on the axiom 
that good is diffusive of itself, and the higher the nature the 
more intimate and complete will be this diffusion. But the highest 
kind of diffusion is the communication of ideas and of love, as 
when God makes creatures in His own likeness and loves them, and 
also the communication of His entire divine nature. Whereas we, 
the adopted sons of God, have received only the participation of 
the divine nature, the only-begotten Son has received the entire 
divine nature without any division or multiplication; and this is 
the supreme diffusion and fecundity of the supreme Good.

As we shall see, this concept was retained by St. Thomas, but a 
part of Alexander's theory was discarded by him. Alexander had 
taught, [141] "In God to beget after the manner of intellection is 
hardly the same as to understand. " After lengthy examination, 
under the title, "Whether begetting is the same as intellection in 
God, " St. Thomas assigns supporting reasons: "God lives the 
noblest kind of life, which is intellection"; "Intellection is 
nothing else than generating a species within oneself. " These 
arguments had already been presented by St. Augustine and St. 
Anselm, and St. Thomas perfected them.

Yet Alexander concluded: "Begetting in God is not the same as 
intellection. " [142] For this he gives two reasons: 1. No one 
begets himself, and yet he understands himself; the Son of God 
understands but does not beget. Therefore in God begetting is not 
the same as intellection. " St. Thomas replied that begetting is 
the same as intellectual enunciation. 2. Begetting implies the 
duality of the begetter and the begotten, but such is not the case 
in intellection, since anyone can understand himself without this 
duality. A study of this theory reminds us of Leibnitz's dictum: 
"In general, systems are correct in what they affirm and false in 
what they deny. " Why? Because reality is more solid than the 
systems; especially is this true of the supreme reality.

Richard's theory was also accepted by Peter Bles, [143] by William 
of Auxerre, [144] and partly by St. Bonaventure, [145] but it was 
refuted by St. Thomas. [146]

St. Bonaventure's theory is mixed because it proceeds from two 
sources, from Peter Lombard, who gave St. Augustine's doctrine on 
the Word, and from Richard of St. Victor through Alexander of 
Hales. Hence we find a difference between St. Bonaventure and St. 
Thomas. [147] The principal difference seems to be this: for St. 
Thomas, God is pure act, in the sense of pure actuality; for St. 
Bonaventure, God is pure activity or the supreme activity. For St. 
Bonaventure, therefore, the supreme unity is active, rather 
dynamic than static, and goodness especially is essentially 
diffusive of itself. Therefore the supreme active unity is not 
only absolute but it also implies a certain relation to something 
else by reason of the notion of diffusion or fecundity of a living 
being.

According to this principle, St. Bonaventure, like Alexander, 
conceived the first procession as "the fecundity of the divine 
nature, " and the second procession as "the fecundity of the will. 
" [148] St. Bonaventure looked on the Second Person rather as the 
Son of God than as the Word of God, and he considered the Word, or 
Logos, mentioned by St. John in his prologue, as a comparison to 
help us understand who the Son of God is. [149] With Alexander, 
St. Bonaventure conceded that there must be begetting in God since 
every nature is communicable and every living being begets 
specifically like itself. Such fecundity is a noble quality or 
perfection which must be attributed to God. St. Bonaventure 
pointed out that there is a notable difference between divine and 
human generation. In divine generation alone, the communicated 
nature remains numerically the same with the first nature because 
it is infinite and cannot be divided. In human generation, man 
begets in order to preserve the species after the death of the 
begetter; thus man begets both because of his fecundity and his 
need.

God the Father almighty begets only because of His fecundity. St. 
Bonaventure's theory joins the classic theory of St. Augustine 
with Richard's theory as modified by Alexander of Hales. It is a 
dynamic concept in which the concept of the good is dominant; the 
theory is greatly influenced by Dionysius' principle: good is 
diffusive of itself. This principle, it should be noted, serves to 
illustrate the fitness of creation, but not that of the 
Incarnation or of the Holy Eucharist. In all these mysteries God 
diffuses His goodness.

The question arises whether St. Thomas retained the principle that 
good is diffusive of itself. In making use of this principle St. 
Thomas distinguished between the end and the agent. "Good, " he 
said, "is said to be diffusive of itself in the sense that the end 
is said to move or elicit. " [150]

Every agent acts on account of an end, and therefore the good is 
first of all diffusive of itself as an end, and then effectively 
it is diffusive through the mediation of the agent. "It pertains 
to the idea of the good, " says St. Thomas, [151] "that it 
communicate itself to others; and it pertains to the idea of the 
supreme good that it communicate itself in the highest way to the 
creature. " This takes place ad extra in the Incarnation. Again, 
under the question: "Whether God wills other things besides 
Himself, " St. Thomas taught: "The natural thing. . . has a 
natural inclination to diffuse its own good to others as much as 
is possible. Hence we see that every agent, so far as it is in act 
and perfect, makes something like itself. . . . Much more it 
belongs to the divine will to communicate its own good to others 
by means of a likeness as far as is possible. " [152] In the 
following article, against the Neoplatonists, he says that the 
divine will most freely wills other things besides itself, "since 
nothing accrues to the divine goodness from creatures. " St. 
Thomas also points out the fitness of the Holy Eucharist, which is 
the sacrament of love. [153]

Thus we see that St. Thomas retains the principle of Dionysius so 
often quoted by Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, although 
sometimes he proposes it differently in the questions on the 
Trinity, where the good is not properly speaking the final cause, 
nor the efficient cause, but the principle. In the <Contra Gentes> 
in the famous eleventh chapter, he offers this principle to 
explain the divine generation of the Word: "By how much a nature 
is higher, by that much what emanates from it is more intimate. " 
Thus, from fire fire is generated, from the plant another plant, 
and a vital operation is the more vital the more it is immanent, 
as, for example, sensation, and intellection is still higher since 
from it proceeds the word. "That which proceeds ad extra is 
properly diverse from that from which it proceeds; but that which 
proceeds ad intra by the process of intellection is not properly 
diverse, for the more perfectly it proceeds the more it will be 
one with that from which it proceeds. Thus the Word of God 
proceeding from the Father, proceeds from Him without any 
numerical diversity of nature. " [154] Even if there had been no 
creation, the principle, good is diffusive of itself, would be 
verified in God, and so the revelation of the mystery of the 
Trinity confirms the dogma of a free creation, in no way 
necessary.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Thomists in explaining 
the teaching of St. Thomas frequently make use of that principle 
so often invoked by St. Bonaventure, that the good is essentially 
diffusive of itself; although on this point there is some 
difference between the two doctors. In his treatise on the 
Trinity, Scheeben also makes use of this principle.

THE DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS' TREATISE ON THE TRINITY

IN the prologue (question 27), St. Thomas lays down the order for 
the whole treatise and the fitness of his distribution of the 
matter is immediately apparent. He explains: "Since the divine 
persons are distinguished by the relations of origin (inasmuch as 
the Son is denominated by His origin from the Father, and the Holy 
Ghost by His origin from the Spirators), we shall follow the order 
indicated by the matter itself when we first consider origin or 
procession, secondly the relations of origin, and thirdly the 
divine persons."

The treatise, therefore, is divided as follows:

1. Concerning the divine processions (Question 27).

2. Concerning the divine relations (Question 28).

3. Concerning the divine persons (Questions 29 to 43).

Of persons absolutely:

In common: the idea of person, the plurality of persons, the 
similarities and dissimilarities of the persons, and their 
knowability by us.

Individually: the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Ghost.

Of the persons comparatively: with regard to their essence, their 
properties and relations, their notional acts (generation and 
active spiration); the comparison of the persons with one another 
with regard to their similarity and equality and their respective 
missions.

St. Thomas, we see, proceeds according to the genetic method, from 
that which is better known to that which is less known. For in the 
Scriptures we read of processions, indicated by the name of the 
Son, proceeding from the Father, and of the Holy Ghost, proceeding 
from the spirators, but we do not find the word "person, " only 
the personal nouns, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. In this way St. 
Thomas gradually shows that the relations are founded in the 
processions (for example, filiation is based on passive 
generation), and that the persons are constituted by subsisting 
relations. Beginning with what is explicitly revealed, the 
processions, he finds something that is implicitly revealed and 
gradually progresses from the indistinct knowledge of subsisting 
relations and related persons to a defined and distinct idea. 
These are, as we shall see, explicative processes, or at least 
subjectively illative, and not objectively illative processes, 
except in those instances where a new truth is deduced. In general 
in these first questions the same truth, which is formally 
revealed, is extensively explained and unfolded. [155]

In the division of this treatise it should be noted that the first 
two parts are discussed in Questions 27 and 28: the third part, 
treating of the divine persons, is treated in Questions 29 to 43.

This third part is subdivided into two parts:

1. The persons considered absolutely: a) in common; b) 
individually.

2. The persons considered comparatively: a) with regard to their 
essence; b) their properties; c) their notional acts (active 
generation and active spiration); d) their equality, similarity, 
and missions.

At first sight it will appear that in Questions 39, 40, 41, St. 
Thomas seems to begin the treatise anew, treating of the persons 
in common with regard to their essence, properties, and notional 
acts; he seems to be repeating what was already said in Questions 
27, 28, and 29, about the processions, the relations of origin, 
and the persons in common.

He is not, however, repeating himself; for what he said earlier in 
an analytical exposition he explains later in a synthetical 
exposition, comparing one truth with another and penetrating more 
profoundly into the matter of the treatise. Many of St. Thomas' 
commentators, because of the similarity of the matter treated, 
explain in their commentary on Question 27 the doctrine offered by 
St. Thomas in Question 39. They follow this procedure for the sake 
of clarity and brevity, but the more profound and preferable 
presentation, we think, is that given by St. Thomas.

CHAPTER I: QUESTION 27 THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

THIS question contains five articles: 1. whether there is a 
procession in God; 2. whether any procession in God can be called 
generation, and what is the intellectual manner of this 
generation; 3. whether besides generation another procession is 
found in God; 4. whether this other procession can be called 
generation (the answer will be in the negative); 5. whether there 
are more than two processions in God.

In general these five articles are simple explanations of the 
dogma by a conceptual analysis of the terms of the revealed 
propositions before any new truths are deduced, that is, before 
any theological conclusions are drawn. Some students have tried to 
see in these treatises an illative process where there is only an 
explicative process which is merely the progressive understanding 
of one and the same revealed truth.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE IS ANY PROCESSION IN GOD

State of the question. The question is proposed in the form of 
three difficulties. 1. It appears that there are no processions in 
God because a procession implies motion without; but in God there 
is no motion, since He is the prime immovable mover and pure act. 
2. He who proceeds differs from Him from whom He proceeds, but in 
God there can be no such difference. 3. To proceed from another is 
to depend upon another, but this is repugnant to the idea of a 
first principle. If the Son depends upon the Father, He is not 
God. Such are the principal difficulties. [156]

Reply. In God the processions are not by local motion, nor by 
transitive action, but by the intellectual emanation of an 
intelligible word from Him who enunciates. At the end of the body 
of the article, St. Thomas says, "And thus Catholic faith holds 
that there is a procession in God. " From this last line it is 
evident that we are concerned here with an explanation of faith 
and not with a deduction of a theological conclusion.

Proof. It is clear from the Scriptures that it is of faith that 
there are processions in God. In his argument St. Thomas quotes 
the words of our Lord, "For from God I proceeded" (John 8:42). In 
the <Contra Gentes> St. Thomas quotes other texts: Jesus said, 
"The Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father" (John 
15:26). Besides this, in the Scriptures the Son of God is called 
"His own Son, " that is, of God the Father (Rom. 8:32), and "the 
only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father" (John 1:18). 
It is the Son who is truly "His own" who proceeds from the Father 
and not the son who is only adopted. Again we read, "The Father 
loveth the Son: and He hath given all things into His hands" (John 
3:35), and the only-begotten Son of the Father is called "the 
Word, " by whom "all things were made,. . . and without Him was 
made nothing that was made" (John 1:3; Heb. 1:1). From this it is 
clear that the Son proceeds from the Father from all eternity.

This truth is explicitly contained in the creeds. In the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan Creed we read: "Begotten of the Father, God of 
God, light of light, true God of true God"; and of the Holy Ghost: 
"who proceeds from the Father. " In the Athanasian Creed: "The Son 
is from the Father alone, not made, not created, but begotten; the 
Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, not created, 
not begotten, but proceeding."

Procession (<ekporeusis, probole>) is the origin of one from 
another, as light proceeds from the sun and a son from his father.

St. Athanasius [157] and St. Augustine [158] explained that the 
imperfections inherent in human generation are not found in the 
divine processions. In the divine processions, for example, there 
is no diversity of nature (the nature remains numerically the 
same) but only a diversity of persons according to the opposition 
of relation.

In the body of the article, St. Thomas intended only to explain 
this truth of faith by a conceptual analysis of the word 
"procession, " discarding at the same time any false 
interpretations. His process, therefore, is not illative but 
explicative. This is clear from the first words of the paragraph, 
in which he explains the idea of procession, as used by the 
Scriptures, and from the following article, in which St. Thomas 
explains the idea of generation.

The body of the article has three parts.

1. Against Arius, it is shown that in God there is no procession 
of effect from cause, otherwise it would follow, against the 
Scriptures, that neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be God. 
The Scriptures declare of the Son, "This is the true God, " (I 
John 5:20), and the same is said of the Holy Ghost in I Cor. 6:19.

2. Against Sabellius, it is shown that in God procession is not 
understood as though there were different effects flowing from one 
and the same person of the Father: as though the Father were 
called the Son as incarnate and the Holy Ghost in the 
sanctification of souls. This would be contrary to the Scriptures 
which make it clear that the Son is not the Father, for example, 
"The Son cannot do anything of Himself" (John 5:19). Furthermore, 
no one begets himself.

3. St. Thomas explains the root of these two errors: these 
heretics erred because they understood procession as being <ad 
extra>. He then explains that in God procession is ad intra. As 
often occurs in the body of the article, the major is given after 
the minor. If the major were given before the minor, this 
explicative process would be somewhat as follows:

Since God is above all things, those things which are predicated 
of God are to be understood in their resemblance to intellectual 
and not corporeal substances. But in corporeal substances 
procession is in the manner of action <ad extra>, whereas in 
intellectual substances it is after the manner of action ad intra, 
as the concept of a thing or the mental word proceeds from the 
intellect. Therefore the procession predicated of God is 
procession ad intra, like that of the intelligible word in him who 
enunciates. "And in this manner Catholic faith understands 
procession in God" as opposed to Arius and Sabellius.

This process therefore only explains the true idea of procession 
in God as it is found in the Scriptures, excluding any false 
interpretations and giving the analogy of the word which is 
indicated in the prologue of St. John's Gospel and explained at 
great length by St. Augustine. [159]

We should note that many commentators, such as Billuart, prove 
from Question 33, article 4 ad 4, that there are processions in 
God from the fact that it is of faith that there are several 
really distinct persons in God. Such was also the method of the 
Greek Fathers.

The article should be read.

1. The doctrine is confirmed by the divine fecundity which, since 
it IS a perfection without imperfection, cannot be denied to God. 
("Shall not I that make others to bring forth children, Myself 
bring forth, saith the Lord? Shall I, that give generation to 
others, be barren, saith the Lord thy God?" Isa. 66:9.)

2. The reply is also confirmed by the solution of the objections.

Reply to first objection. Procession would imply motion in God if 
it were after the manner of transitive action, but not if it is 
immanent action, which is in the predicament of quality and not of 
action.

Reply to second objection. Similarly there would be numerical 
diversity if the procession were <ad extra>, as when by human 
generation the son proceeds from the father with consequent 
multiplication of human nature. But such is not the case with 
procession <ad intra>. As St. Thomas explains: "That which 
proceeds <ad intra> by an intelligible process need not be 
diverse; indeed the more perfect the procession the more that 
which proceeds will be one with that from which it proceeds. It is 
clear that the more profoundly a thing is understood the more 
intimate the intellectual concept will be to him who understands 
and so much greater will also be the union of both. For the 
intellect inasmuch as it understands in act will be united with 
what it understands. Therefore, since the divine intellection is 
the acme of perfection, as we said above in Question 14, a. 2, it 
follows necessarily that the divine Word is perfectly united with 
Him from whom He proceeds, without any diversity, " that is, 
without any numerical diversity so that there is only a 
distinction of persons. [160]

This teaching is developed in the second chapter of the fourth 
book of the <Contra Gentes>, in which St. Thomas illustrates this 
principle: The higher any particular nature is the more anything 
that emanates from it will be intimate with it. Thus St. Thomas 
preserves under another form Dionysius' principle, so frequently 
enunciated by Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure: "Good is 
essentially diffusive of itself, and the higher the nature is the 
more fully and intimately it will be so. " Good, however, is 
primarily predicated of a final cause; but the Father is not 
properly the end or the efficient cause of the Son. Therefore St. 
Thomas' formula is more acceptable because it rises above both 
final and efficient causality, although the formula about the 
diffusion of good could be understood as referring to things above 
the order of causality. [161] This principle, however, is arrived 
at inductively.

Thus fire is generated from fire, a plant by another plant, an 
animal from another animal in the manner of action <ad extra> and 
the numerical multiplication of nature. But in the higher spheres, 
life is more and more immanent, for sensation remains in the 
subject, intellection in the one who understands, as does also the 
mental word. Human intellection, however, has its beginning from 
without, that is, from sensible things. In a still higher sphere, 
"the intellection of the angels does not proceed from something 
exterior, but knows itself through itself. But the life of the 
angels does not attain to the ultimate perfection for, whereas the 
angelic intellection is entirely intrinsic to the subject, the 
intellectual concept or intention is not identical with the 
subject's substance because intellection and being are not the 
same. " In order to know himself, the angel requires an accidental 
mental word because the angel's substance is intelligible of 
itself in act although it is not actually understood of itself in 
act. And further, the substance of the angel as it is understood 
in act and represented in the accidental word is not the angel's 
substance according to its physical being but only according to 
the angel's intentional or representative being. The mental word 
of Michael is not Michael himself because it is an accident and 
not his substance.

On the other hand, as we read in this chapter of the <Contra 
Gentes>, "since in God being and intellection are the same, " He 
does not require an accidental word to know Himself. But if from 
the divine superabundance there is a Word, as we learn from 
revelation alone, then "the being of the Word, interiorly 
conceived, is the same as the divine intellection, " God's being 
itself, not only according to His intellectual being but according 
to His physical being. Thus the divine Word is not only God as 
understood, but "true God, " as we-learn from the Creed: "true God 
of true God. " Contrariwise the accidental word by which Michael 
the archangel knows himself is indeed Michael according to his 
intellectual being but not the actual Michael according to his 
physical being, because it is an accident and not a substance 
[162]

Intellectual generation, therefore, when it is most perfect 
produces not only an accidental mental word but also a substantial 
word, and it is therefore true generation, because it communicates 
the entire nature of the generator, as we shall see in article 2.

Our mental word can be called the offspring of our minds only 
metaphorically. Such is the solution of the second objection: in 
God He who proceeds is not different in nature from Him from whom 
He proceeds, but has a nature numerically the same.

Reply to third objection. The third objection was that to proceed 
from another was repugnant to God as the first principle. In reply 
we distinguish "proceed" as above, namely, to proceed as something 
extraneous and diverse, I concede; to proceed as something within 
and without numerical diversity of nature, I deny. Thus the Son of 
God is God of God, light of light; He is in some manner like the 
word in the mind of the artificer with relation to some external 
artifact.

First doubt. Is it not at least virtually revealed and 
theologically certain that in God procession is after the manner 
of an intelligible concept uttered by an enunciator, and that the 
procession is intellectual?

We are not asking whether the Son of God is rightly called the 
Word of God, for we know from the Prologue of St. John's Gospel, 
written under divine and infallible inspiration, that it is of 
faith that the Son of God is the Word, and that the Word is 
consubstantial with the Father, as was explicitly defined by the 
Nicene Council. But we are asking whether these words of the 
Prologue formally reveal, or at least virtually reveal, the formal 
manner of the first procession, that is, by intellectual 
enunciation.

Durandus did not admit this but contended that the Son proceeded 
from the Father's nature as pre-understood, antecedent to any 
consideration of intellect and will.

The reply is in the affirmative. It is at least virtually revealed 
and theologically certain that the Word, or the Son, proceeds from 
the Father by intellectual generation, from the intellect of the 
Father. Indeed many recent theologians hold that this proposition 
is proximately definable. [163] D'Ales gives this proposition as 
proximately of faith: "The Son proceeds from the Father according 
to intellectual generation, " and he gives the following 
proposition as common doctrine: "The Holy Ghost proceeds from the 
Father and the Son according to mutual love. " And this seems to 
be true.

Proof. In the Scriptures, He who is called the Word is also called 
the Son. But this is not a question of a word enunciated 
exteriorly but of an immanent word, as is clear from the context. 
An immanent word, however, is conceived by the intellect, it is 
the concept expressed by the intellect, as the Fathers taught. 
[164]

This doctrine is confirmed by the fact that in the Scriptures the 
Son of God is called not only the Word, but Wisdom, the image of 
the Father, and the splendor of His glory and the figure of His 
substance. [165]

In the reply it was stated that this doctrine is theologically 
certain because it is at least virtually revealed, but it is more 
probable that it is implied in a formal revelation, for the 
required process is explicative rather than discursive when we 
have a clear understanding of the idea of a mental word. This will 
become clearer below.

Second doubt. In the body of the article, does St. Thomas intend 
to say that a word is produced in every intellection?

The reply is in the negative, for manifestly St. Thomas holds that 
the Son and the Holy Ghost understand and still do not produce a 
word. The three divine persons understand by the same numerically 
one essential intellect, but only the Father enunciates, just as 
in a classroom both the teacher and the pupils understand but only 
the teacher enunciates. Moreover, St. Thomas holds that in heaven 
the blessed, seeing God immediately, do not express an accidental 
word, which would be intelligible by participation and would not 
be able to represent God as He is in Himself since He is 
essentially subsisting intelligence itself. [166] St. Thomas did 
not intend to exclude these instances when in the body of the 
article he states: "Whenever anyone understands, by the very fact 
that he understands he produces something within himself, which is 
the concept of the thing which is understood. " But such is the 
case in every created intelligence of the natural order, as when a 
man or an angel understands himself and other things besides 
himself. We still have sufficient analogy here to conceive what 
the divine Word is as mentioned in the prologue of St. John's 
Gospel. It is still true to say, therefore, that whoever 
understands, by the fact that he is an intellectual nature, 
produces a word in some intellectual act. The analogy offered by 
St. Thomas is based on the fact that it is a property of an 
intellectual nature to produce a word. Further, it is a perfection 
that can be purged of imperfections and can be attributed to God 
as the highest intelligence.

Objection. In the created intellect a word is required to know an 
object which is not understood of itself in act. But God is 
subsisting intelligence itself and therefore He is not only 
intelligible of Himself in act, but actually understood in act. 
Therefore no word is required in God.

Reply. I distinguish the major: that an accidental word because of 
a natural indigence is so required, I concede; that a substantial 
word is required, I deny. I concede the minor and distinguish the 
conclusion: therefore in God an accidental word because of a 
natural indigence is not required, I concede; that a substantial 
Word because of the divine fecundity is not required, I deny.

I insist. Now the analogy between an accidental word produced 
because of a natural indigence and the substantial word produced 
from divine fecundity or superabundance is destroyed.

Reply. . Although the comparison is not univocal, the analogy 
remains for in creatures the accidental word is not required only 
because of a natural indigence (inasmuch as the thinking subject 
is not of itself understood in actu secundo) but because it 
pertains to the fecundity and perfection of the created intellect 
to speak vitally and interiorly by expressing a concept. Thus the 
philosopher rejoices when after a long and difficult search he 
finally gives birth to the word that solves his difficulty; now he 
can die for he has found the truth.

I insist. But why do not the Son and the Holy Ghost produce a word 
by their intellection?

Reply. This is part of the mystery and cannot be explained 
entirely. But we can say and should say, as do the Thomists, one 
intellection will have one word when that word is adequate. But in 
God intellection is infinite, and also the same for the three 
divine persons. Therefore in God there is one, infinite, and 
adequate word and no other word need be produced. The three 
persons understand but only the Father enunciates because He 
enunciates adequately, or because the Word already enunciated is 
perfect and without any imperfection. Nothing more need be 
enunciated in God nor would anything more be needed in the case of 
men if the teacher would be able adequately to say all that 
pertained to the matter under discussion. At first sight this 
distinction between intellection and enunciation may seem too 
subtle, but it is not without some foundation. Many men, even 
after years of laborious study, cannot express interiorly and 
exteriorly the solution of some difficult problem; but when some 
great genius discovers the solution and gives birth to the word or 
notion interiorly and expresses it exteriorly others are able 
often to understand without difficulty. They may not be able to 
enunciate the solution but they are able to understand without 
much difficulty. Indeed, if some great mind were to discover the 
perfect and adequate solution of a question, he would express it 
in a definitive statement that would need no further emendation or 
amplification, whereas we are continually obliged to perfect our 
imperfect and inadequate statements of solutions.

Finally, it is often remarked that loquacious people use 
innumerable words without reason, whereas wise people, especially 
in their later years, use few words, words that are effective and 
almost adequate, like the confident and clear statements of the 
saints and great doctors, which others are generally able to 
understand although they would never have been able to discover 
them. In this way we can understand analogically and without too 
much subtlety that in the Trinity the three persons understand, 
but the Father alone enunciates because the Word is adequate. We, 
on the other hand, make use of many inadequate words.

Objection. In his reply to the second objection, St. Thomas says: 
"The divine Word is perfectly one with Him from whom He proceeds 
and without any diversity"; and in the <Contra Gentes> [167] he 
says: "The being of the Word is the intellect of God itself. " But 
then the Word would not proceed as a distinct person. Therefore 
the analogy is not valid.

Reply. I deny the minor and the consequent. St. Thomas denies 
numerical diversity of nature between the Father and the Word, but 
the diversity of persons as revealed still remains. This diversity 
is only relative and inasmuch as it is real arises from the 
procession, for procession, inasmuch as it is real, requires 
extremes that are really distinct, at least with regard to their 
mode of being. Such is the reasoning of many Thomists, among them 
Billuart. Thus the word in our minds is diverse from our intellect 
both knowing and known, not indeed according to intelligible and 
intentional being but according to real and entitative being, for 
the word in us is an accident of our intellects.

I insist. If the Word is a distinct person as a person, if not as 
a nature, He still depends on the Father. But God cannot depend on 
another; this is an obvious imperfection. Therefore the Word is 
not a divine person or God.

Reply. I distinguish the major: He would depend on the Father if 
He proceeded as from a cause and freely, I concede; if He proceeds 
from the Father solely as from a principle because of the 
necessary and infinite fecundity of the divine nature, I deny. 
Thus, the Father in His intellection is not able not to produce 
the Word. We have here a communication of nature without efficient 
causality; this communication is the transmission of something 
pre-existent without losing it. In the equilateral triangle the 
first angle constructed does not cause but communicates its own 
surface area to the other two equal angles, and these two angles 
are not less perfect than the first. Indeed, the geometrical 
figure can be inverted so that one of the two angles at the base 
is placed on top.

I insist. But the necessary and intimate dependence still remains.

Reply. I deny the consequent, because for true dependence it is 
required that only one of the two in question depend upon the 
other. But the Father cannot be more without the Son than the Son 
is without the Father, and yet the Father is not said to depend on 
the Son. Thus in the equilateral triangle all the angles are 
equal, and one angle cannot exist without the other.

On the other hand, a human son depends on his father, as from a 
cause; and the man who is a father is able to be without the son, 
because he is able not to be a father, since he freely begets. But 
God the Father is not able to be without being the Father and He 
is not able to be without the Son.

Wherefore, in order that anything depend on another it is not 
enough that it cannot be without the other. God the Father is not 
able to be without the Son and yet He does not depend on the Son, 
nor is omnipotence able to exist without the possibility of 
creatures and still it does not depend on this possibility. It 
follows therefore that, although the Son cannot be without the 
Father, He does not depend on the Father, since the Father is not 
the cause but only the principle of origin. It is repugnant to God 
to derive from another as from a cause, this I concede; that it is 
repugnant to derive as from a principle of origin, this I ask you 
to disprove. The possibility of the mystery, therefore, is not 
disproved or proved; it is merely presented as plausible.

I insist. But the Son receives from the Father, therefore He is 
passive and in some need.

Reply. I distinguish the consequent: if at any time the Son lacked 
or could lack anything He has, I concede; otherwise, I deny. 
Whereas a creature is able not to be, the Son of God is not able 
not to be, nor is He able to lack the divine perfections.

I insist. Each of the divine persons is the first principle; 
therefore each excludes the principle of origin.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: each of the divine persons is 
the first principle <ad extra>, I concede; ad intra, I deny. Thus 
the Father alone is not from a principle of origin. As St. Thomas 
says, "to oppose the things that are said against faith, either by 
showing that it is false or by showing that it is not necessary, " 
it is sufficient to show that the impossibility of the mystery is 
not definitively proved, for example, the dependence of the Word 
of God with respect to the Father is not definitively proved. At 
least these objections are not cogent and therefore they do not 
destroy faith. The impossibility of the procession of the Word, 
who is "true God of true God, " cannot be proved.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER ANY PROCESSION IN GOD CAN BE CALLED 
GENERATION

State of the question. As the first article was a conceptual 
analysis of the idea of procession, without any illative process, 
so this second article is a conceptual analysis of the idea of 
divine generation as found in the Scriptures. We have here a 
beautiful example of the transition from a confused concept to a 
distinct concept. This transition takes place by eliminating the 
false interpretations, from which arise the three difficulties, 
formulated in the beginning of this article: 1. generation is a 
change from non-being to being and therefore a divine person 
cannot be generated; 2. in God procession is after the manner of 
intellection, but in us such intellectual procession is not called 
generation; 3. the being of anything begotten is accepted and 
received and therefore is not divine.

Reply. This is of faith: the procession of the Word in God is 
called generation, and the Word that proceeds is called the Son.

We prove that it is of faith from Ps. 2:7: "The Lord hath said to 
Me: Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee. " Today, as 
St. Augustine says, is the ever-present now of eternity, which is 
above time, above past and future. This text of the Old Testament 
is illustrated by the New Testament, especially by the prologue of 
St. John's Gospel. Further proof comes from Ps. 109:1-3: "The Lord 
said to my Lord:. . . from the womb before the day star I begot 
thee, " although this text is less clear in the Hebrew than the 
preceding text; from Isa. 53:8, in the prophecy of Christ's 
passion: "who shall declare His generation?"; from Acts 8:33 and 
John 1:18: "No man hath seen God at any time, the only-begotten 
Son. . ., He hath declared Him"; from John 1:14: "and we saw His 
glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father"; 
from John 3:18: "But he that doth not believe, is already judged: 
because he believeth not in the name of the only-begotten Son of 
God"; and from John 3:16: "For God so loved the world, as to give 
His only-begotten Son."

Similarly the creeds and councils defined that the Son of God was 
not created (against Arius), not made, but begotten from the 
nature or substance of the Father, and is therefore called the 
natural Son and not the adopted son of the Father. [168]

In the body of the article St. Thomas makes a conceptual analysis 
of the notion of generation, purifying it of every imperfection so 
that it can be applied to God not only by a metaphorical analogy 
but also by an analogy of proper proportionality. Thus the idea of 
generation, found in revelation, passes from a confused state to 
one more distinct. We do not arrive at a new truth, but the same 
truth is explained in this manner.

Generation is the origin of one living being from a conjoined 
living principle in the likeness of nature, as when a man begets a 
man. But the procession of the Word is the origin of a living 
being from a conjoined living being, yet without transition from 
potency to act or to new being. Therefore the procession of the 
Word is properly generation and not only metaphorically so.

Explanation of the major. The generation of everything that can be 
generated in the natural order is a change from non-being to 
being, as when non-living fire is generated from fire. But that 
generation which is proper to living beings is the origin of a 
living being from a conjoined living being, that is, from the 
father and not from the grandfather, through the active 
communication of the nature of the generator in the likeness of at 
least the specific nature. The angels therefore cannot properly be 
called the sons of God because they did not receive the divine 
nature from God.

Explanation of the minor. The procession of the Word after the 
manner of intellection is the origin of a living being from a 
conjoined living being and in the likeness of nature because the 
concept in the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood. 
Indeed, in God, since God the Father understands and enunciates 
Himself, a nature numerically the same is communicated, because in 
God being and intellection are the same. Thus the Word is not only 
God as understood according to intentional being but true God 
according to physical and entitative being, as will be explained 
more fully in the solution of the second objection.

The theory of the Latins, then, based on the fact that the Son of 
God is called the Word in St. John's Gospel, explains how the 
eternal generation of the only-begotten Son is without any 
imperfection and without transition from potency to act or from 
non-being to being. This is the correct interpretation of our 
Lord's words: "For as the Father has life in Himself, so He hath 
given to the Son also to have life in Himself" (John 5:26), and "I 
and the Father are one" (10:30). We refer the reader to the 
article.

This article, therefore, does not deduce a theological conclusion, 
but explains this truth of faith, that the Son is generated by the 
Father because He proceeds from the Father intellectually as the 
Word. And in this generation we see the infinite fecundity of the 
divine nature, so often mentioned by Alexander of Hales and St. 
Bonaventure.

The reply is confirmed by the solution of the objections.

1. The first difficulty was: Generation implies the transition 
from potency to act. But such transition cannot be in God who is 
pure act. Therefore there is no generation in God.

Reply. I distinguish the major: generation implies the transition 
from potency to act in the created mode of generation, I concede; 
in the formal mode of generation, I deny, because formally it is 
required only that generation be the origin of a living being from 
a conjoined living being in the likeness of nature. I concede the 
minor. I distinguish the conclusion: therefore there is no 
generation in God according to the created mode, I concede; 
according to its formal mode, I deny. The analogy is one of 
proportionality, not only metaphorical, but it is an analogy that 
reason by itself could not have discovered. God has revealed it to 
us.

2. The second difficulty was: Procession in God is after the 
manner of intellection. But in us such intellectual procession is 
not generation; we speak only metaphorically of the parturition of 
a word in ourselves.

Reply. I concede the major and the minor, but I deny the parity. 
The disparity arises from the fact that in God alone and not in us 
to understand is substantial intellection itself. In God alone 
understanding and the mental concept are something substantial and 
not accidental, as in us. In us the word proceeds as an accident 
in which is represented the substance of that which is understood. 
In God, on the other hand, the Word proceeds as the subsistence of 
the same nature and therefore He is properly said to be begotten 
and the Son. The divine Word, therefore, is not only God as 
understood, or God in a representative or intentional manner, but 
true God from true God. This matter is explained at greater length 
in the <Contra Gentes.> [169]

John of St. Thomas explains that our intellect forming within 
itself a concept of itself or a representation of itself 
assimilates this term to itself, at least imperfectly. An 
imperfect intellect, human or angelic, assimilates its word 
imperfectly, only intentionally, and in a representative or 
intelligible manner. The perfect intellect, however assimilates 
its Word most perfectly, not only intentionally, but really in 
nature and in a nature that is numerically one, so that the divine 
Word is not accidental but substantial, at the same time living 
and understanding, because in God being and understanding and 
being understood are the same. Revelation affirms that this 
substantial Word is the person of the Son of God. This is true 
generation, which primarily deserves the name generation; other 
kinds of generation are generation by participation and 
secondarily, although they are prior in our knowledge. Therefore 
St. Paul said, "For this cause I bow my knees to the Father of our 
Lord Jesus Christ, of whom all paternity in heaven and earth is 
named" (Eph. 3:14 f.). [170]

Our word is called a concept, not something generated. Conception 
is the initial formation of a living being; generation is its 
perfect production, including the evolution of the embryo. Our 
intellection goes as far as the intellectual conception of the 
word but not as far as the intellectual generation. Thus we speak 
of our faculty of conceiving, but not of generating 
intellectually. So also it is with the angels. In God alone, in 
His intimate life, known only by revelation, conception is at the 
same time intellectual generation, properly so called.

CONCEPTION AND GENERATION ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS 
[171]

In every (animal) conception, according to St. Thomas, "the matter 
of what is conceived is prepared by the generative power of the 
mother; the formative force, however, is in the seed of the 
father. " [172] Then follows the development of the embryo, 
terminating in the generation of the animal. Conception, 
therefore, is the beginning of animal generation.

The word "conception" was then transferred to signify intellectual 
conception because our intellect as a passive potency is 
fecundated by the object or by the impressed species derived from 
the object, and then our intelligence, fecundated and informed, 
conceives its mental word to express to itself some extramental 
thing or the mind itself. And indeed it is a great accomplishment 
to profoundly conceive something, like a book that we are about to 
write or the order observed in the Summa theologica. But this 
intellectual conception in us does not go as far as intellectual 
generation, because our word is only an accident in our minds and 
not a living substance like the understanding mind itself. On the 
contrary, in God, whose intellect is subsisting intellection 
itself and subsisting being itself and subsisting life itself, the 
Word, mentioned in revelation, cannot be an accidental word but is 
the substantial Word, living and understanding. Therefore in God 
conception, which is the initial step in generation, attains to 
the perfect generation of the Word, who is true God from true God, 
not only God as conceived but really God of true God.

John of St. Thomas says, and in this he agrees with Ferrariensis, 
"the procession of the word, standing precisely in the line of 
intellection and by the force of its formality,. . . purified of 
every imperfection. . . becomes substantial and generative. " 
[173] This follows not only materially because of the divine 
subject but also formally because of the procession of the word 
when it is purged of every imperfection. This helps explain the 
joy of a great thinker who has found the answer to some great 
problem and gives birth to a word; in its highest sense this 
parturition of the word would be generation, not corporeal but 
spiritual. The reason given by St. Thomas is that, "since the 
divine intelligence is of the highest perfection, it is necessary 
that the divine Word be perfectly one with Him from whom it 
proceeds without any diversity of nature. " [174] In the highest 
state of perfection the procession of the word is substantial and 
generative whereas in us it is accidental. The word in us, called 
rather a concept than something generated, is not a living and 
intelligent person but only an accident; in God the Word is 
substantial, living, and intelligent, and, as we shall see, a 
person relative to the Father. We cannot converse with our word or 
have communion with it- man remains alone with his ideas. But the 
Father has communion and lives in society with the Son.

First corollary. We see how the notions of generation and 
intellectual procession mutually illuminate each other. It is more 
certain that there is in God a procession after the manner of 
generation than that there is in God a procession which is 
properly intellectual. The first is manifestly of faith; the 
second is at least theologically certain. But without an 
intellectual procession it would be very difficult to conceive of 
generation in God and to show that this generation is actual and 
not simply metaphorical. For this reason St. Thomas speaks in his 
first article of intellectual procession and in his second article 
of generation, although the latter is more certain. This is one 
reason among others on account of which the Latin concept of the 
Trinity, sometimes called the psychological theory of St. 
Augustine based on revelation, prevailed over other concepts.

Second corollary. Since this divine generation of the Word is 
eternal (above the continuous time of men and the discrete time of 
the angels), it follows that in the ever-present now of eternity 
the Father always begets and the Son is always born, or as St. 
Augustine says, the divine generation takes place without any 
newness of being. [175]

Third corollary. A great joy rises from this eternal generation. 
Vestiges of this joy are found in the mother when a child is born 
to her, and in a great scholar when after long labor he perfects 
his work of making some truth manifest.

Fourth corollary. In God to be begotten, like the begetting, 
implies no imperfection, nor is it less perfect to be begotten 
than to beget, nor does it produce less joy, for it is impossible 
to beget without someone being begotten, and being begotten 
eternally and necessarily is not a transition from potency to act. 
[176] But we do not say that paternity or the begetting is a 
simple perfection properly so called, for although it does not 
imply any imperfection it is not simply better to have paternity 
than not to have it. If this were so, some simple perfection 
properly so called would be denied to the Son, and the Son would 
not be God. [177] The essence and dignity of the Father and the 
Son are the same; in the Father we have the relation of the giver, 
in the Son the relation of the receiver. Here is the mystery, but 
we see that the divine relations by reason of their concepts do 
not add any relative perfection that would be virtually distinct 
from the absolute perfection of the divine essence. Such is the 
thought of most Thomists, as we shall see below.

We are still confronted with the difficulty proposed in the third 
objection: "The being of anyone who is begotten is accepted and 
received, " and therefore it is not divine, for the divine being 
is self-subsisting and not received.

In his reply to the third objection, St. Thomas says that the 
being of anyone who is begotten is accepted indeed but not 
received always in some subject. Thus the entire substance of 
created things is accepted by God but it is not received in some 
receptive subject. So also the being of the Word is accepted but 
not received; it is self-subsisting being itself.

In the perfection of the divine being itself there is contained 
both the intelligibly proceeding Word and the principle of the 
Word as well as the other things which pertain to its perfection. 
From these words of St. Thomas it appears, in the opinion of many 
Thomists, that the relations in God do not by reason of their 
concepts add any new relative perfection that is virtually 
distinct from the absolute divine perfection.

On the other hand, in several places St. Thomas says that the 
being of any created being is not only accepted from God but also 
received in the created essence, or more correctly in the created 
suppositum. "It should be said, " says St. Thomas, "that at the 
same time that God gives being He produces that which receives the 
being; and thus fittingly He does not act in dependence on some 
pre-existing being. " [178]

This text and many others are quoted against Suarez and his 
followers to show that for St. Thomas a real distinction exists 
between the created essence and the created being. For the created 
being is not only accepted from God, as Suarez admits, but it is 
also received and therefore limited by the essence in which it is 
received. The divine being, however, is not received, no more in 
the Son and the Holy Ghost than in the Father.

Another objection. By reason of the procession the Word proceeds 
as understood and not as understanding, for it proceeds as the 
term of the paternal intellection. Therefore because of the 
procession the Word does not proceed as like to the Father, and 
therefore this procession is not generation.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the Word by reason of the 
procession proceeds as understood and not as understanding 
notionally or as enunciating, I concede; not as understanding 
essentially, I deny. Likeness of nature is not dependent on the 
notional qualities or notional acts like active generation and 
active spiration, but on essentials. Analogically in men, although 
the son does not proceed as generating but as generated, the son 
nevertheless proceeds like the father in nature. So it is 
proportionally in God.

Doubt. How does the enunciation of the Father differ from the 
essential intellection which is common to the three persons, as in 
the statement, "the three persons understand but the Father alone 
enunciates"?

Reply. The enunciation of the Father differs only by reason from 
the essential intellection and it is not actually different from 
the relation of paternity, which in turn is not really distinct 
from the divine essence. [179] St. Thomas offers a profound 
explanation: "The origin of motion inasmuch as it begins with 
another. . . is called action. If we remove the motion, the action 
implies no more than the order of origin according to which the 
action proceeds from some cause or principle to that which is from 
the principle. Since in God there is no motion, the personal 
action which produces a person is nothing else than the relation 
of a principle to the person who is from the principle. These 
relations are the actual divine relations or notions. " [180] No 
difference exists between them except in the manner of speaking 
inasmuch as we speak of divine things in the manner of sensible 
things.

Certain difficulties have been proposed by Durandus and Scotus 
concerning St. Thomas' first and second articles; but rather than 
adding anything to the matter they tend to obscure it. We shall 
not delay in considering them here but content ourselves with a 
few words about these difficulties at the end of this question. 
They are all solved by St. Thomas later when he comes to speak of 
the comparison of the persons with the essence, relations, and 
notional acts.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE IS IN GOD ANOTHER PROCESSION BESIDES 
THE GENERATION OF THE WORD

State of the question. According to revelation expressed in the 
Scriptures and divine tradition there is a third divine person, 
who is often called the Holy Ghost, as in the formula of baptism, 
and sometimes the Paraclete from the words para and kaleo, 
parakletos that is, advocate, intercessor, and consoler. As we 
see, this is not a simple divine operation, like essential love, 
but a person to whom are attributed divine operations and divine 
perfection according to our Lord's words: "And I will ask the 
Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete" (John 14:16), and 
"The Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, He shall 
give testimony of Me" (John 15:26).

In this article St. Thomas makes a conceptual analysis of this 
second procession. In stating the question he proposes three 
difficulties: 1. If a second procession is found in God, why not a 
third and so to infinity? 2. In every nature we find only one mode 
of communicating that nature, namely, generation. 3. The 
procession of love cannot be distinguished from the intellectual 
procession even in God because in God the will is not different 
from the intellect.

Reply. The reply is nevertheless that it is of faith that "besides 
the procession of the Word there is another procession in God, " 
and we add that this is the procession of love, although this does 
not appear to be of faith but the common opinion.

1. This first part is proved from the Scriptures: "I will ask the 
Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete" (John 14:16); and 
"But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the 
Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, He 
shall give testimony of Me" (John 15:26).

2. The second procession is explained theologically.

In God procession takes place according to immanent and not 
transient action. But in an intellectual nature immanent action is 
twofold: intellection and volition, or love. Therefore, in God, an 
intellectual agent, it is proper that besides the intellectual 
procession there be another procession, which is the procession of 
love.

First doubt. Did St. Thomas intend to demonstrate the existence of 
the second procession strictly from the first? Even if the second 
procession were not revealed and if the existence of the Holy 
Ghost were not revealed, could the second procession be certainly 
known by a theological process.

Reply. This does not seem to have been St. Thomas' intention, 
although he uses the words, "in evidence of this. " According to 
his custom, whenever he was treating of essentially supernatural 
mysteries, St. Thomas wished to show that the mystery is not 
opposed to reason. He then offers reasons of propriety, which 
while they are profound, especially to those who contemplate the 
mystery, are not demonstrative, for this progressive contemplation 
does not lead to the evidence of demonstration but to the higher 
evidence of the beatific vision. Such reasons of propriety belong 
to a sphere that is above demonstrability. If we were to offer 
these reasons as demonstrative, we would minimize rather than 
appreciate their force. His argumentation, therefore, does not 
strictly prove that there is a second procession or that there is 
the existence of a third person, unless this were revealed.

We may ask, on the supposition that the existence of the third 
person and of the second procession are revealed, can we strictly 
prove that this second procession is the procession of love, 
because it is at least theologically certain that the first 
procession is after the manner of intellection? The argument could 
be supported with some difficulty because it is less certain that 
love has an immanent term than that intellection or enunciation 
has as its term the expressed word.

The immanent term of love is exceedingly mysterious, for love 
tends toward the good which is in things outside the mind, whereas 
the intellect tends to the truth, which is formally in the mind in 
the likeness of the extramental thing.

In an article entitled <A propos de la procession d'amour en 
Dieu>, [181] which agrees with Father Chevalier, [182] Penido 
proposes this correction of St. Thomas' text in <De veritate>: 
"The operation of the will terminates with things in which there 
is good and evil, but the operation of the intellect terminates in 
the mind, in which there are truth and falsehood, as we read in 
<VI Metaph.>, chap. 8; and therefore the will does not have 
anything proceeding from itself that is in it, except after the 
manner of operation; but the intellect has something in itself 
that proceeds from it not only after the manner of operation but 
also after the manner of a thing accomplished. Therefore 'the 
word' signifies a thing that proceeds but 'love' signifies an 
operation that proceeds. " [183] In many editions the word 
"except" is omitted and the passage appears unintelligible. In the 
<Contra Gentes>, [184] St. Thomas says: "That which is loved is in 
the will of the lover (not in the likeness of its species), but as 
the term of motion in the proportionate moving principle. " That 
which is loved exists in the will of the lover as something that 
inclines and in a way interiorly impels the lover toward the thing 
itself that is loved.

It should be said, therefore, that the argument proposed in this 
article is at least an argument of propriety, explaining the 
nature of the second procession as the procession of love. This 
argument is very profound and sublime; it shows that the 
psychological theory of the Trinity proposed by St. Augustine is 
in accord with revelation. When we speak of the Word, however, 
revelation itself indicates the analogy in the prologue of St. 
John, "In the beginning was the Word. . . . " But with regard to 
the second procession we do not find in Scripture a similar 
indication; the Holy Ghost is not called love even by the Greek 
Fathers. He is indeed called sweetness and benignity, and the word 
"spirit" has an allusion to the will. At the present time it is 
the common opinion that the Holy Ghost proceeds as personal love. 
[185]

Second doubt. What is the relation of the Holy Ghost to this 
second procession?

Reply. The Holy Ghost is the terminus of the procession of love as 
the Word is the terminus of the intellectual procession. Therefore 
St. Thomas, in the body of the article, says: "In the second 
procession that which is loved is in the lover, as in the 
conception of the Word the thing enunciated or understood is in 
him who understands."

The terminus of love has no special name. Cajetan offers the 
following explanation. "What is loved is not in the lover except 
as the affection of the lover for that which is loved. " We have a 
certain difference here between intellection and love, for a 
likeness of that which is loved is not produced in the lover like 
the likeness of the thing understood which is produced in him who 
understands. In the lover, however, there is a certain impulse and 
propensity of the will toward that which is loved, and this 
impulse is in the lover as the unnamed terminus of love. St. 
Augustine said, "My love is my weight. " In this sense the second 
procession is to be understood as the procession of love. [186]

Solution of the objections. The first objection is: Therefore we 
must admit a third procession and so to infinity.

Reply. In the divine processions it is not necessary to go on to 
infinity, for that procession in intellectual natures which is 
within is terminated by the procession of the will. Here the 
psychological theory is in accord with revelation and corroborates 
it. This theory assigns a reason why there are no more and no less 
than two processions, and thus offers a reason of propriety, not a 
demonstration, because we are dealing with an essentially 
supernatural mystery. That this is not a strict demonstration will 
appear in the second objection.

Second objection. In every nature we find only one mode of 
communicating that nature, namely, by generation. Therefore in the 
divine nature there should be but one mode of communicating the 
divine nature, that is, by intellection and not by the will.

Reply. We deny the parity between the nature of corruptible things 
and the divine nature. The disparity arises from the fact that 
whatever is in God is God, and this is not true of other natures. 
Therefore the divine nature is communicated by any procession that 
is not <ad extra>. Hence the divine nature is communicated even in 
the procession of love, because whatever is in God is God and not 
a part of God.

In his reply, based on faith, St. Thomas shows that the objection 
has no force, but he did not intend to prove the second procession 
from the first so that the second procession would be certain even 
if it had not been revealed.

I insist. The entire nature is adequately communicated by the 
first procession, and therefore it is no longer communicable. As 
there is only one Word, so there should be but one procession.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the entire nature is 
totally communicated in the first procession, that is, in every 
way that it is communicable, I deny or I ask you to prove it: that 
it is communicated entire but not totally, that is, in every 
communicable manner, I concede. For according to revelation we 
know that not only the Son but the Holy Ghost also proceeds from 
the Father. According to St. Augustine's theory it appears that 
the divine nature is communicable and fecund in two ways: by the 
intellect and by love. Indeed, Richard of St. Victor emphasized 
this second way to such an extent that he seemed to neglect the 
first mode by intellection. Neither should be neglected.

I insist. Whatever is infinite is unique and excludes all else. 
But the first procession is infinite. Therefore it excludes a 
second procession.

Reply. I distinguish the major: whatever is infinite is unique in 
its own order and excludes others of the same order, I concede; 
that it excludes things of another order, I deny. Thus the mercy 
of God is infinite and excludes another infinite mercy, but it 
does not exclude infinite justice. The same is true of the 
processions.

Third objection. In God intellect and will are not distinct. 
Therefore neither is the procession of love distinct from the 
intellectual procession.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the intellect and the 
will in God are not really distinct, I concede; that they are not 
distinct by reason and virtually, I deny; and I distinguish the 
consequent in the same way. The two processions are not really 
distinct except with regard to the mutually opposed relations. 
Thus active spiration is not really distinct from the active 
generation by the Father, nor from the passive generation of the 
Son, but it is distinct from the passive spiration of the Holy 
Ghost.

Moreover, as St. Thomas notes in the same place, "while in God the 
will and intellect are not different, nevertheless because of the 
nature of the intellect and will the processions according to the 
action of each follow a certain order. " For nothing is loved 
unless known beforehand, and therefore there is no procession of 
love unless there is a process of intellection. Here again we see 
the propriety of the psychological theory, and an indication that 
an image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul.

Third doubt. Whether the two divine processions differ in species 
and number?

Reply. There is a quasi-difference in species, that is, they 
differ not only in number, otherwise both processions would be 
generation or spiration. They do not, however, differ in the 
proper sense in species because in God genus and species do not 
exist in the strict sense. Speaking analogically with reference to 
creatures, we can say that the processions differ in a certain 
sense according to species, not by reason of a diversity of 
natures but by reason of the personal properties, which are 
diverse in the one nature. This is not true of creatures. It does 
not follow from this that the three persons differ in species, for 
their nature is one not only in species but also in number.

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER IN GOD THE PROCESSION OF LOVE IS 
GENERATION

The reply is in the negative.

1. Because of faith. The Athanasian Creed tells us: "The Holy 
Ghost is of the Father and of the Son, not made, not created, not 
begotten, but proceeding."

2. Further explanation is found in the psychological theory, which 
on this point is sufficiently in accord with the teaching of 
faith. The Greek Fathers and St. Augustine declared that they were 
not able to discover a reason why the second procession was not 
generation like the first procession.

St. Thomas offers the following reason.

Generation, in its formal concept, takes place after the manner of 
assimilation of the begotten to the begetter, who produces 
something like himself in nature. But such assimilation is found 
in procession from the intellect, when the Father knows Himself 
and enunciates, but it is not found in the procession of the will. 
Therefore the procession of love cannot be called generation.

The major is evident. The minor is proved from the fact that the 
intellect assimilates a thing to itself when the truth is in the 
intellect by the likeness of the thing known. But the will by its 
nature is not an assimilative faculty or power; it is inclining 
and tends to a thing because the thing is good; it tends to the 
good as it is in things and not as it is represented in the mind. 
Thus the will does not produce by its own power a terminus like to 
itself or to the object; it produces an inclination and a tendency 
to the thing that is loved.

3. The procession which is not generation remains without a 
special name; it may be called spiration because it is the 
procession of the Spirit.

FIFTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE ARE MORE THAN TWO PROCESSIONS IN GOD

The reply is in the negative and it is of faith.

1. This is known from the Scriptures and from the definitions of 
the Church, according to which there are only three persons, one 
that does not proceed and two others that proceed, and hence there 
are but two processions.

2. This truth is also explained by the psychological theory, which 
more and more appears as a concept based on revelation; because in 
every intellectual nature there are only two immanent actions, 
intellect and will.

The divine nature as good is diffusive of itself and it is 
diffusive in a twofold manner: through the intellectual procession 
and through the procession of love, "inasmuch as God understands 
and loves His essence, truth, and goodness. " Thus St. Thomas, 
even in this treatise, preserves the principle frequently quoted 
by St. Bonaventure: good is essentially diffusive of itself, and 
the higher the nature the more intimately and abundantly is it 
diffusive of itself. But within God this diffusion is not through 
final or efficient causality but above the order of causality. Yet 
there is a completely intimate and superabundant diffusion in the 
communication of the entire and infinite divine nature through 
generation and spiration.

Doubts about this whole question.

First doubt. What is the <principium quod> of each procession, 
considered actively, that is, what is the principle that generates 
and the principle that spirates?

Reply. It is the Father that generates, and the Father and the Son 
that spirate. "The divine nature does not beget, is not begotten, 
and does not proceed; but it is the Father who begets, the Son who 
is begotten, and the Holy Ghost who proceeds. " [187] With regard 
to the second procession, it has been defined: "The Holy Ghost 
proceeds from the Father and the Son. " [188] If the divine nature 
generated, the generation would be in the three persons and the 
three persons would generate, and so the Holy Ghost would generate 
a fourth person and so to infinity. Again, if the divine nature 
were begotten, the three persons would be begotten; if the divine 
nature proceeded, the three persons would proceed.

Second doubt. What is the principle through which (<principium 
quo>) each procession takes place actively considered?

Reply. According to revelation each procession terminates with one 
person who proceeds not from the divine nature taken in itself, 
but the Son proceeds from the divine nature as it is of the Father 
(because it is the Father who generates), and the Holy Ghost 
proceeds from the divine nature as it is of the Father and the 
Son, since these two spirate.

Therefore we say that the <principium quo> (the principle through 
which) of each procession actively considered is the intellect and 
the will in the divine nature as modified by the relations of 
paternity and active spiration. It is important to add "as 
modified" because essential intellection and essential love are 
common to the three persons and thus are not processions. Such is 
the common teaching of the Thomists. The psychological theory, 
although it wishes to pluck out the persons from the processions, 
to a certain extent must suppose the persons and relations in 
order fully to define the processions. This is part of the 
obscurity of this theory, and we should not be surprised at it 
because these notions of procession, relation, and person mutually 
illustrate each other just as in ontology the notions of being, 
unity, truth, goodness, and beauty throw light on one another. 
[189]

From these passages from St. Thomas we see that the <principium 
quo> of the divine processions implies something absolute and 
something relative: it is absolute in recto as form, and relative 
in obliquo as mode. Thus we say that the proximate <principium 
quo> of the processions is the intellect and the love in the 
divine nature, but as modified by the relations of paternity and 
active spiration. The three persons know, but only the Father 
enunciates by generating or generates by enunciating; the three 
persons love, but only the Father and the Son spirate. This is 
sufficiently clear in spite of the obscurity of the mystery.

Third doubt. Is the power of generating in God a perfection?

Reply. The difficulty arises from the fact that this perfection 
would be lacking in the Son and the Holy Ghost, belonging only to 
the Father, and thus the three persons would not be equally 
perfect.

The reply is based on the fact that the power of generating 
directly

(in recto) signifies the divine nature, but indirectly (in 
obliquo) the divine relation, as will be more clearly explained 
below. [190] This is to say that the power of generating pertains 
to the divine nature as it is in the Father. Wherefore the power 
of generating in God is a perfection with respect to that which it 
signifies directly, namely, the absolute, which is the divine 
nature; but it is not a perfection with respect to that which it 
signifies indirectly (in obliquo), namely, the relation of 
paternity, which according to its relative being (<<esse ad>>) 
abstracts from perfection and imperfection, because it does not 
involve imperfection nor is it a new perfection superadded to the 
infinite perfection of the divine nature. Something similar is 
taught concerning the free act of creation, which is virtually 
distinct from the necessary act of love, since the act of creation 
does not involve an imperfection nor does it add a new perfection. 
Thus God was not improved by the fact that He freely willed to 
create the universe.

Fourth doubt. Whether the divine processions, actively considered, 
are true and proper actions or only emanations, like the faculties 
that emanate from the essence of the soul.

Reply. In their reply the Thomists oppose Suarez. They say that 
the processions are true actions, but actions that are merely 
immanent because they are the act of the intellect ad intra, 
namely, enunciation, and the act of the will, namely, active 
spiration. This immanent action can be purified of every 
imperfection, as is indeed the creative act, an immanent action 
which is virtually transient and transitive.

But we do not say that God the Father as begetting is truly and 
properly acting, but only truly and properly understanding and 
enunciating; so also the Father and the Son in active spiration 
are not properly acting, because in common usage the expression 
"acting" is taken to mean an efficient cause and not a principle 
alone. The Father is not the cause of the Son, and the Son is not 
an effect. Indeed although the Father is the principle of the 
Word, the Son is not said to be principled, because, as St. Thomas 
points out, [191] to be principled or derive from a principle 
implies an imperfection that cannot be attributed to the Son.

The Word is not principled, but He is a principle from a 
principle. Therefore there is no other distinction between the 
Father and the Son except the distinction of origin; no 
distinction exists with regard to nature, dignity, omnipotence, 
and the like: "All things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine" 
(John 16:15). For this reason it is better to speak of quasi-
active generation and quasi-active spiration, and especially of 
quasi-passive generation and quasi-passive spiration, for 
passivity, properly speaking, corresponds to transitive action. 
Generation and spiration, however, are simply immanent actions 
above the order of causality; through them the divine nature is 
not caused but communicated.

Fifth doubt. How does the divine Word differ from our word?

Reply. It differs in many ways. [192] 1. The Word of God is 
something substantial, living, and intelligent; it is, moreover, a 
person, but our word is only an accident of our minds. God alone 
is subsisting intellect. 2. The divine Word exists, not like ours 
because of a need, but from the infinite abundance and fecundity. 
3. The divine Word is co-eternal with the Father, it is immutable, 
and is begotten perpetually, all of which is not verified in our 
word. 4. The divine Word is unique because it is adequate; our 
word is inadequate and therefore multiple, indeed it is more 
multiple in the inferior created intellects.

Nevertheless an analogy remains between the two words, because 
both are termini of the enunciating intellect or enunciation, and 
both are images or representations of the thing that is known; 
both are conceived by the mind, but only in God does this 
conception deserve the name of generation in its proper sense; 
both are simply spiritual, intrinsically independent of matter and 
the corruption of material things. But, according to the 
declaration of the Fourth Lateran Council, "the similarity between 
the Creator and the creature is never so great that the 
dissimilarity is not always greater. " [193] These declarations 
might serve as a definition of analogy, for, as we have often 
shown with St. Thomas, [194] things are analogous when they have 
the same name, but what is signified by the name is the same 
<secundum quid> and proportionately but simply different in these 
analogous things.

RECAPITULATION

In this question 27 we have seen that in God there are processions 
ad intra, why there are two and only two processions, and why the 
first procession alone is called generation.

In the first article, in the light of revelation, we saw that in 
God there is a procession after the manner of intelligible 
emanation of an intelligible Word from one who enunciates. It is a 
procession ad intra, not <ad extra>; it is not a procession like a 
being of the mind, but a real procession.

In the same article we saw that the Word has the same nature as 
the Father from whom He proceeds. The perfection and propriety of 
this procession <ad intra> became manifest in the light of the 
following principle: "that which proceeds <ad intra> by an 
intellectual process should not be diverse in nature from him from 
whom it proceeds; indeed the more perfectly it proceeds the more 
it will be one with that from which it proceeds, like the 
intellectual concept with the intellect. Thus the Word understood 
and enunciated by the Father is one with Him in nature; nor is the 
Word an accidental word- it is substantial, just as the divine 
intellect is not an accident, since it is subsisting intellect 
itself.

As St. Thomas says in the <Contra Gentes>, "The higher any nature 
is, the more intimate with it will be that which proceeds from it. 
" [195] Thus the Angelic Doctor safeguards the principle that good 
is essentially diffusive of itself, and the higher the nature the 
more intimately and fully will it be diffusive of itself. In God 
there is, then, a diffusion <ad intra> transcending the order of 
efficient and final causality.

In the second article we saw that the procession of the Word is 
rightly called generation because it is the origin of a living 
being from a conjoined living being in the likeness of its nature. 
The concept of the intellect is a likeness of the thing 
understood; so also the Word is the likeness of the Father knowing 
Himself, existing in the same nature, since in God intellect and 
being are the same. That knowledge which is had by means of an 
expressed likeness of the thing known is essentially assimilative.

In the third article, in addition to the procession of the Word, 
we learned of the procession of love, inasmuch as the love of the 
good follows the conception of the good.

In the fourth article it was explained why the procession of love 
is not generation; because it is through the will, which by its 
own power is not assimilative and does not assimilate a thing to 
itself, but inclines toward the thing that is willed, like a 
weight, in the words of St. Augustine, "My love, my weight."

As a complement to this teaching on the processions, we shall 
explain below that the three persons understand (by essential 
intellection), but that the Father alone enunciates and enunciates 
adequately; as when three persons are confronted by a difficult 
problem, one discovers an adequate solution and all three equally 
understand what is enunciated by one of the three. [196] In the 
same way we shall explain proportionally that, although the three 
persons love (with essential love), only the Father and the Son 
spirate the Holy Ghost, who is the terminus of this active 
spiration. [197]

In this present question, St. Thomas did not intend as yet to 
solve these various doubts because their solution will be much 
more patent later on. [198] The holy doctor proceeds without 
haste, passing gradually from the confused concept to a more 
distinct concept of the same thing. His commentators, however, are 
obliged at times to examine these doubts earlier because they are 
sometimes proposed as objections against the articles under 
questions 27 and 28.

CHAPTER II: QUESTION 28 THE DIVINE RELATIONS

Prologue. "Next in order we consider the divine relations. " St. 
Thomas says "next in order" because according to faith these 
relations are the relations of origin or procession, inasmuch as 
the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from 
the Father and the Son. Therefore the processions are the 
foundation of really distinct relations which, as we shall see in 
the following question, formally constitute the persons. Hence we 
are now speaking implicitly of the persons although they are not 
yet explicitly mentioned. [199]

This question on the divine relations is of the greatest 
importance because, as we shall see below, [200] the persons are 
constituted by subsisting relations opposed to one another, which 
are in God not only virtually but also formally. Since these 
relations are in God, they cannot involve any imperfection so 
that, for example, filiation will not involve any dependence. This 
concept of relation is the philosophical idea developed by 
Aristotle and it is applied to the divine persons, who are called 
by relative terms in the Scriptures: the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Ghost. In this fundamental question, therefore, we are still 
concerned rather with an explanation of the principles of faith 
than with the deduction of theological conclusions. We are to 
explain why the Father is so called relative to the Son, why the 
Son is so called relative to the Father, and the Holy Ghost 
relative to the Father and the Son. Consequently we consider here 
the real distinction of the divine persons as revealed and as 
founded on the opposition of relations. In these articles we shall 
study the basis of that principle which throws light on the entire 
treatise of the Trinity and by which the principal objections are 
answered: "In God all things are one and the same when there is no 
opposition of relation. " [201]

Division of the question. In this question we ask four things:

1. Are there real relations in God?

II. What are these relations? Are they the divine essence itself. 
or something extrinsically attached to the essence?

III. Can there be in God several relations really distinct from 
one another?

IV. How many relations are there?

PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES ON THE IDEA OF RELATION AND ITS DIVISION

These notes are briefly recalled by St. Thomas in the body of the 
first article, and it is suggested that the reader consult the 
first part of the body of the article.

The category of relation is distinguished by Aristotle from the 
categories of substance, quantity, quality, transitive action, 
passion, etc. Thus a man is called relatively a father of another 
and a son of another. Aristotle calls relation <to prosti>, or the 
<ad aliquid>, or the "to something"; it is also called the 
reference (to something else), the order (to something else) or 
the habitude.

Many Nominalists declare that there are no real relations in 
creatures; that all the relations are relations of reason. On the 
other hand, moderate realism sees real relations in creatures, for 
apart from anyone's thinking about it a man is really the father 
of the son he begets. So also two white things are really alike 
apart from any consideration of the mind. Paternity and likeness, 
however, are merely relations; therefore there are real relations 
in things. St. Thomas explains that the good of the universe, 
which is something real, consists mainly in relation, namely, in 
the order of things to themselves and to God, and if this order is 
removed, all things will be in confusion as when an army is 
without any coordination and subordination of the soldiers. [202]

Relation is twofold: real and of reason. Real relation is the 
order in things themselves. Thus, for example, an effect is 
related to the cause on which it depends, a part to the whole, 
potency to act, and an act to its object. A relation of reason is 
the order cogitated by the mind, as the order of the predicate to 
the subject, and of species to genus. From various texts of 
Aristotle and St. Thomas [203] we present the following synopsis 
of the division of relation.

(diagram page 111)
Real relation
transcendental or essential, such as essence to existence and 
matter to form, and the relation of faculties, habits, and acts to 
the specific object.

predicamental or accidental,
according to quantity, as equal, unequal, twofold, threefold
according to quality, as like and unlike
according to action, as paternity
according to passion, as filiation

Relation of reason
between things not really distinct
as predicate to the subject in a judgment
as the relation of real identity of one thing with itself
between things really distinct
as the knowable to knowledge
as God to the creature
Real relations are divided into transcendental and predicamental. 
A transcendental relation is the order included in the essence of 
a thing as, for example, the soul's transcendental order to the 
body, that of matter to form, essence to being, accident to the 
subject, science to its object, etc. All these things have these 
relations by their very essence, and the transcendental relation 
perdures even when the term disappears. Thus a separated soul 
continues to be individuated by its relation to the body which is 
to rise again. It is called transcendental because it transcends 
the special predicament of relation and is found also in other 
categories, for example, in substance and quality; indeed there is 
scarcely anything that is not ordered to something else by its 
nature.

Predicamental relation, which is also called relation according to 
being (secundum esse), is defined by Aristotle as a real accident 
whose whole being is to be ordered to something else. [204] This 
relation is not included in the essence of the thing, but it comes 
to the essence as an accident. It is pure order or reference to a 
term, as, for example, paternity, filiation, the equality of two 
quantities, likeness.

The real existence of these relations is certain, for, antecedent 
to any consideration of the mind and apart from anyone's thinking, 
two white things are really alike and this man is really the 
father of another. On the contrary, the relation of the predicate 
to the subject in a sentence is a relation of reason, which does 
not exist until after the consideration of the mind and as the 
result of the mind's activity.

The predicamental relation requires a real basis in the subject 
and a real terminus really distinct from this basis in the 
subject; this relation does not perdure after the terminus 
disappears, and in this it differs from the transcendental 
relation. The basis of the predicamental relation is the reason 
for the reference or ordering. Thus, in the relation of paternity 
the man who begets a son is the subject, the son is the terminus, 
to whom the father has a reference, and generation is the basis of 
the relation, since the reason why the father is referred to the 
son is the fact that he begot him. [205]

WHETHER THE PREDICAMENTAL RELATION IS REALLY DISTINCT FROM ITS 
BASIS OR FOUNDATION

For example, whether the likeness of two white things is really 
distinct from their whiteness, and paternity from generation.

Many Thomists, among them Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, John 
of St. Thomas, and Goudin, admit at least a modal real distinction 
between the relation and its foundation or basis; Suarez denies 
the distinction and thus aligns himself with the Nominalists. The 
Thomists prove their stand in the following way. The predicamental 
relation is an accident whose whole being is to be referred to 
something else. But the entity of the foundation is not pure order 
to another but something absolute, as, for example, quantity, 
quality, and action. Therefore the entity of the foundation of the 
relation is really distinct from the predicamental relation. For 
this reason, Aristotle conceived of quantity, quality, action, and 
relation as distinct predicaments.

Confirmation. The predicamental relation disappears with its 
terminus whereas the entity of the foundation of the relation 
survives. When one of two similar things, for instance, is 
destroyed, the relation to the other also disappears. Moreover, 
even after the generation of the son, he remains the son of his 
father.

WHETHER EXISTENCE BELONGS TO A PREDICAMENTAL RELATION FORMALLY 
ACCORDING TO ITS BEING IN THE SUBJECT OR ITS BEING WITH REFERENCE 
TO ITS TERMINUS

The relation's being in the subject (<esse in>) is not the 
foundation of the relation but it is the relation itself in the 
general nature of an accident and not under the special aspect of 
a relation. The reply of the Thomists is that existence does not 
belong formally to a predicamental relation according to its being 
with reference to its terminus (<<esse ad>>) because according to 
this being with reference to another (<<esse ad>>) the relation 
abstracts from existence and could be a relation of reason. 
Existence, however, belongs to a predicamental relation according 
to its being in a subject, that is, its "<inesse>," or its 
inherence in the subject. Since, however, as we shall see below, 
in God the <esse in> cannot be an accident, but must be the divine 
substance, it follows, according to St. Thomas, that there is one 
being in the Trinity for the different divine relations. Suarez, 
on the contrary, thought that a relation had its own proper 
existence and therefore he taught that there were three relative 
existences in God. Similarly he taught that there were two beings 
in Christ because he denied the real distinction between the 
created essence and being. For St. Thomas there was but one being 
for the three divine persons and one being in Christ.

This distinction between the <esse in> of a relation and its 
<<esse ad>> is clearly explained by St. Thomas: "The relation 
itself, which is nothing else than the reference of one creature 
to another, has one kind of being inasmuch as it is an accident 
and another being inasmuch as it is a relation or order to 
another. Inasmuch as it is an accident it has its being in a 
subject, but not as it is a relation or an order, for as a 
relation it has being exclusively with reference to another, a 
something passing over to another and in some way assisting the 
thing to which it is related. " [206] Thus the <esse in>, which is 
something the relation has in common with all accidents, gives 
title to reality to the relation's <<esse ad>.> [207]

From various examples, especially in the supernatural order, we 
shall see that this concept of relation is of great importance. In 
Christ the hypostatic union is the real relation of the dependence 
of the humanity of Christ on the person of the divine Word. "The 
hypostatic union is that relation which is found between the 
divine and human natures. . . . This union is not really in God 
but is only a relation of reason; but it really is in the human 
nature, which is a kind of creature. Therefore it is proper to say 
that it (the hypostatic union) is something created. " [208]

Similarly, in the Blessed Virgin Mary the divine maternity is a 
real relation to the person of the incarnate Word, and because of 
its terminus this real relation belongs to the hypostatic order 
and transcends the order of grace. Hence it is commonly held that 
the Blessed Virgin Mary was predestined to the divine maternity 
before she was predestined to the fullness of glory and grace. It 
should be noted, however, that the person of the Word does not 
acquire a real relation to the Blessed Virgin but only a relation 
of reason because the relation of God to creatures is only a 
relation of reason. So also St. Joseph's great dignity of foster-
father of the incarnate Word is a relation. Finally, our adoptive 
sonship is a relation to God the author of grace; it is a 
participation in the likeness of the eternal filiation of the 
only-begotten Son.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE ARE REAL RELATIONS IN GOD

State of the question. It seems that there are no real relations 
in God and that there are only relations of reason like the 
relation of identity between a thing and itself, because the terms 
are not really distinct. Moreover, if a real relation were found 
in God, it would be the relation of a principle to the principled. 
But the relation of God to creatures as their principle is not a 
real relation but one of reason, whereas the relation of creatures 
to God is real. Neither does that relation which is founded on the 
intellectual procession of the Word seem to be real since it does 
not precede the operation of the intellect but follows it.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is in the affirmative and is defined 
as of faith. This is evident from the condemnation of Sabellius. 
According to the Sabellian heresy, God is not really the Father 
and the Son, but only according to our way of thinking. Against 
this heresy the Church has declared that God is really the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Ghost in such a way that the Father is not 
the Son but is really distinct from Him. [209] The Father is so 
called only because of His paternity, which is a relation; the Son 
is so called because of filiation, which is also a relation, as is 
also spiration. Therefore in God we find the real relations of 
paternity, filiation, spiration, and, as we shall see below, of 
active and passive spiration.

The major of this argument from authority is the affirmation of 
the dogma against Sabellius. The minor is an analysis of the 
words, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. As found in the Scriptures 
these nouns are relative: the Father is so called with relation to 
the Son, and the Son with relation to the Father, and in this way 
these two persons are really distinguished by the opposition of 
relation.

This idea of relation was gradually developed by the Fathers; 
their teaching became more and more explicit on the point that the 
divine persons are distinguished among themselves by relations 
alone. [210] St. Gregory Nazianzen said, "Father is not the name 
of the essence or of an action but it indicates the relation which 
the Father has to the Son, or that which the Son has to the 
Father. " [211] Among the Greeks, St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. 
John Damascene, and among the Latins, St. Augustine, St. 
Fulgentius, Boetius, St. Isidore, and St. Anselm, employ similar 
language. [212]

In his work on the Trinity, [213] St. Augustine had already 
evolved a theory of relations, as Tixeront points out, [214] 
explaining that the divine persons are relations which are not 
something absolute like the divine essence and which are not 
accidents. St. Augustine wrote: "These things are not said 
according to the substance, because each one does not refer to 
Himself, but these things are said mutually and to each other; 
they are not said according to accidents, because that which is 
said to be the Father and what is said to be the Son is something 
eternal and incommunicable. These things are said not as of 
substances but as something relative, but the relative thing is 
nevertheless not an accident, because it is not changeable. [215] 
Thus the Father is so called with regard to the Son, the Son with 
regard to the Father, and the Holy Ghost with regard to the Father 
and the Son.

This doctrine of the divine relations was clearly defined by the 
Eleventh Council of Toledo in 675: "By the relative names of the 
persons, the Father is referred to the Son, the Son to the Father, 
and the Holy Ghost is referred to the other two persons, and when 
the three persons are spoken of in a relative sense, we 
nevertheless believe in one nature and one substance. . . . For 
that which is the Father is not referred to Himself but to the 
Son; and that which is the Son is not referred to Himself but to 
the Father. . .; with reference to themselves each person is said 
to be God. " 18 In the Council of Florence particularly the famous 
dogmatic principle, "In God all things are one where there is no 
opposition of relation, " was proclaimed. [216] At this council, 
John, the theologian for the Latins, declared: "According to both 
Greek and Latin doctors, it is relation alone that multiplies the 
persons in the divine production, and it is called the relation of 
origin, which has two characteristics: that from which another is 
and that which is from another. " [217] At this same council, the 
learned Cardinal Bessarion, archbishop of Nicaea, declared: "No 
one is ignorant of the fact that the personal names of the Trinity 
are relative. " [218]

St. Thomas treated this question in several of his works. [219] 
From a study of these various works it is clear how his 
understanding of the matter became more sublime and more simple as 
he approached the pure intuition of truth. Later, however, in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the thinking of many 
theologians, among them Durandus and others, became excessively 
complicated so as to impede the contemplation of divine things.

This and the following articles can be reduced to this simple 
truth: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are God; but the 
Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Father, and the Holy 
Ghost is neither the Father nor the Son. In this article St. 
Thomas proves from the processions that there are real relations 
in God. His argument may be reduced to the following.

When anything proceeds from a principle of the same nature it is 
necessary that both, namely, that which proceeds and that from 
which it proceeds, should concur in the same order and have real 
references to each other. But the processions in God take place in 
the identity of nature (preceding question). Therefore it is 
necessary that according to the divine processions we accept real 
relations, namely, of the Father to the Son, of the Son to the 
Father. . . . On the other hand, when anything proceeds from God 
ad extra, such as a creature, that which proceeds is not in the 
same order as God Himself, the two are not mutually ordered to 
each other, and the creature alone depends on God, but God does 
not depend on the creature nor is He ordered to the creature. 
Hence only the creature has a real relation to God; and God in no 
way has a real relation to the creature.

Reply to first objection. These real relations, however, do not 
inhere in God as an accident inheres in a subject. This will be 
explained in the following article, where it will be shown that in 
God the "being in" (<esse in>) of the relations is substantial and 
not accidental.

Reply to second objection. Boetius merges the relations in God 
with the relation of identity (a relation of reason alone) 
inasmuch as the divine relations do not diversify the divine 
substance; but Boetius continued to accept as true that the Father 
is not the Son and that they are opposed by the opposition of real 
relation. [220]

Reply to third objection. God the Creator does not have a real 
relation to creatures because the Creator and creatures are not in 
the same order and are not ordered to each other. Creatures indeed 
are ordered to God upon whom they depend, but God is not ordered 
to creatures. It is in the nature of the creature to depend on 
God, but it is not in God's nature to produce creatures, since He 
produced them most freely. On the other hand, the Father and the 
Son are of the same order and are ordered to each other, just as 
in men active and passive generation are in the same order and 
thus are the basis for real mutual relations.

Reply to fourth objection. The relation of filiation in God 
follows the operation of the divine intellect, but not as a 
logical entity such as the distinction between the subject and 
predicate; it follows as something real, namely, as the expressed 
word, which as the terminus of mental enunciation is something 
real in the mind.

First doubt. Is the <<esse ad>> of a relation always real? The 
reply is in the negative. The reason is that many relations are of 
reason only and each of these relations has its <<esse ad>>; 
consequently the <<esse ad>> as such is not necessarily a real 
being or a being of the mind but may be either, depending on 
whether the foundation of the relation and its <esse in> are real 
or beings of the mind only.

Second doubt. Are the relations in God real not only according to 
their <esse in> but also according to their <<esse ad>?> The reply 
is in the affirmative. The reason is that when the <esse in> is 
real the <<esse ad>> is also real. Thus in man the relation of 
paternity to the son is a real accident, existing in the father 
antecedent to the consideration of our minds. If in God the <<esse 
ad>> were not real, the real distinction between the persons, 
which is founded on the opposition of real relation, would be 
destroyed. It is the reference to (respectus ad) alone that causes 
the relative opposition. [221] The reason why the <<esse ad>> is 
real is because the relation really exists in some subject in 
accord with the real foundation of the relation independently of 
the consideration of our mind. The <esse in> is the title to 
reality of the <<esse ad>.> In the <De potentia>, St. Thomas gives 
the following explanation. "The relation itself, which is nothing 
more than the order of one creature to another, is one thing 
inasmuch as it is an accident and something else inasmuch as it is 
a relation or an order. Inasmuch as it is an accident it has its 
being in a subject, but not inasmuch as it is a relation or an 
order, for as a relation it is order to another, as if passing 
over to another and in some way assisting the related thing. " 
[222]

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER A RELATION IN GOD IS THE SAME AS HIS 
ESSENCE

State of the question. After asking the question whether a thing 
is we ask the question what it is. The difficulty arises from the 
fact that the relative element, the "to another, " is not 
understood as something substantial, for then the essence of God 
would not be something substantial but relative.

The reply, however, is affirmative and of faith, namely, the 
relations in God are actually the same as His essence, although 
they are distinguished by reason from the essence. This truth was 
defined in the Council of Reims against Gilbert Porretanus: "When 
we speak of the three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Ghost, we say that they are one God and one substance. Conversely, 
we confess that the divine substance is three persons. " [223] "We 
believe that there are no relations in God that are not God. " 
[224]

In these propositions, as in every affirmative proposition, the 
verb "is" affirms the real identity of the subject and the 
predicate, as, for example, the Father is God and the paternity is 
the deity, because God is His own deity and the Father is His own 
paternity. [225] The same teaching was defined by the Fourth 
Lateran Council, [226] and the following proposition of Eckard was 
condemned, "In God there can be no distinction and none can be 
conceived. " [227]

The most common opinion of theologians is that the divine 
relations are distinguished from the divine essence only by reason 
with a foundation in reality, that is, only virtually. To this the 
Thomists generally add that the distinction is a minor virtual 
distinction after the manner of that which is implicit and 
explicit inasmuch as our concept of the divine essence implicitly 
contains the relations. Before considering St. Thomas' argument, 
we will briefly explain the meaning of these terms.

A virtual distinction, or a distinction of reason with a 
foundation in reality, may be minor or major. A major virtual 
distinction is after the manner of that which excludes and that 
which is excluded. Such a distinction exists between the genus and 
the differences extrinsic to it which the genus contains, not 
implicitly, but only virtually. Thus animality may be without 
rationality, and with regard to rationality it has a foundation in 
actuality as something potential and perfectible.

A minor virtual distinction, however, is after the manner of those 
things that are implicit and explicit. Thus subsisting being 
itself, according to our concept, implicitly contains the divine 
attributes, but it does not have a foundation in actuality for 
these attributes as something potential, or as something imperfect 
and perfectible by the divine attributes, because subsisting 
being, according to our concept, is pure act. For when we speak of 
subsisting being we do not yet speak explicitly of mercy and 
justice. It must be noted, however, that this minor virtual 
distinction is more than the verbal distinction between Tullius 
and Cicero. We cannot equivalently use the names, divine essence, 
divine mercy, or divine justice in the same way that we 
equivalently use the names Tullius and Cicero. We cannot say, for 
instance, that God punishes by His mercy and pardons by His 
justice.

Lastly, it may be recalled that Scotus held that the distinction 
between the divine essence, the attributes and the relations was 
formal actual from the nature of things, because the distinction, 
in his view, is not real since it is not between one thing and 
another but between two formalities of the same thing.

To this the Thomists reply that this formal actual distinction 
based on the nature of the thing either antecedes the 
consideration of our minds and then, however small it is, it is 
real; or it does not antecede the consideration of our minds, and 
then it is a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing 
or a virtual distinction. There is no middle point in the 
distinction between what antecedes and what does not antecede the 
consideration of our minds.

After these preliminaries we shall consider how St. Thomas proved 
the commonly accepted doctrine that the real relations in God are 
not really distinct from the divine essence but are distinguished 
from it only by reason.

St. Thomas explained this proposition by two arguments: by the 
indirect argument (sed contra) and the direct argument.

The indirect argument. Everything that is not the divine essence 
is a creature. But the relations really belong to God. If 
therefore they are not the divine essence, they are creatures; and 
the worship of latria cannot be offered to the divine relations.

The direct argument. Whatever in created things has an accidental 
being in another (<esse in>), when transferred to God has a 
substantial being in another (<esse in>), because no accidents are 
found in God. But in created things a relation is really 
distinguished from its subject solely because it has an accidental 
being in another (<esse in>) from which it derives the reality of 
its <<esse ad>> or reference to another. Therefore in God a 
relation is not really distinct from its subject inasmuch as its 
<esse in>, or being in another, is substantial from which is 
derived the reality of its reference to another, its <<esse ad>.> 
The major is evident from the fact that in God, who is pure act, 
there can be no accident perfecting something potential and 
perfectible. [228] The minor is explained by the fact that in 
creatures a relation places nothing real in the subject except so 
far as it places in the subject that which is common to all 
accidents, namely, the <esse in>, which is an accidental being 
really distinct from substance. According to its own peculiar 
structure, a relation is not properly in a subject, as are 
quantity and quality, but it is a reference to something else.

If therefore, for example, the relation of paternity is 
transferred to God where the <esse in> will be substantial, the 
relation will not be really distinct from the divine essence; it 
will be distinguished only by reason since it expresses a 
reference to something else, namely, of the Father to the Son. 
Therefore neither by the divine relations nor by the divine 
attributes is the divine essence something potential and 
perfectible because of a foundation in its nature. Hence the 
divine essence, as it is conceived by us, implicitly contains the 
divine relations, from which it is distinguished by a minor 
virtual distinction. By this latter term the Thomists have 
epitomized this present article.

It must be carefully noted that what is the peculiar feature of a 
relation, namely, the <<esse ad>>, does not properly inhere in the 
subject as does the peculiar feature of the accident of quality. 
If the <<esse ad>> properly inhered in the subject, there could be 
no relative opposition between the real relations without there 
being at the same time opposition in the very essence of God, 
which is impossible. This entire article is reduced to this simple 
thought: the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, 
and the paternity is the deity because God is His own deity and 
the Father is His own paternity. In all these statements the verb 
"is" expresses the real identity of the subject and the predicate.

The difference between St. Thomas and Suarez. [229] The principle 
that "in God all things are one and the same except where there is 
opposition of relation" is not understood in the same way by St. 
Thomas and by Suarez since they do not understand relation in the 
same way. For St. Thomas being (esse) does not formally belong to 
accidental or predicamental relation (paternity, for instance) 
according to its <<esse ad>,> because the <<esse ad>> prescinds 
from existence; it is found also in a relation of reason (in the 
relation of God to creatures, for example). Being, however, 
belongs formally to an accidental relation according to its <esse 
in>, namely, as it is an accident inhering (at least 
aptitudinally) in a real subject. If the <esse in> is real, then 
the <<esse ad>> is real, but it takes its title to reality not 
from itself but from the <esse in.> [230]

But in God the <esse in> cannot be an accident, since God is pure 
act and no accident is found in Him. Therefore in God the <esse 
in> of the divine relations is identified with the one existence 
of the divine substance; it is identified with subsisting being 
itself. [231] From this it follows that in the Trinity the divine 
relations have the same <esse in> since they exist by the one 
existence of the divine essence itself. [232] "Since a divine 
person is the same as the divine nature, in the divine persons the 
being of the person is not different from the being of the divine 
nature. Therefore the three divine persons have but one being. " 
Similarly in Christ there is one being for the two natures because 
Christ is one person, and this presupposes a real distinction 
between created essence and being.

Suarez, on the contrary, did not admit this real distinction and 
held that there were two existences in Christ and three relative 
existences in the Trinity. For Suarez the relations have their own 
proper existence even according to their <<esse ad>.> He found it 
difficult to solve the objection arising from the axiom that two 
things that are the same as a third are also the same as each 
other. But the divine persons are the same as a third, namely, the 
divine essence. Therefore they are the same as each other.

Suarez did not know how to solve this objection except by denying 
the major with respect to God. [233] He was aware of St. Thomas' 
reply that those things which are the same as a third are the same 
as each other unless there is present the opposition of relation. 
But because he had a different concept of relation he held that 
this convenient answer did not solve the difficulty since nothing 
like this is found in creatures. Therefore he concluded that this 
axiom taken in its most universal extension, prescinding from 
created and uncreated being, is false for, while it is true in 
certain cases, that is, in creatures, it cannot be inferred for 
the entire extension of being.

This is the same as saying that this axiom does not apply to God. 
But this axiom is directly derived from the principle of 
contradiction or identity, which patently must be applicable to 
God analogically because it is the law of being as being, the most 
universal law therefore, apart from which there is nothing but 
absurdity, which would be unthinkable.

The principal difference between Suarez and St. Thomas is that for 
Suarez the <<esse ad>> of a relation is real by reason of itself, 
just as he held that the created essence is actual by reason of 
itself and is therefore not really distinct from its existence. 
Suarez did not conceive being other than that which is, not as 
that by which a thing is. He did not admit a real distinction 
between essence, either of a created substance or accident, and 
being. This is the foundation of the difference. Whether he wished 
it or not, Suarez multiplied the absolute in God, and therefore 
the objection based on the principle of identity remained 
unanswerable. [234]

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS

1. What did St. Augustine mean when he contended that the <ad 
aliquid> of the relation was not intended to refer to the 
substance?

Reply. St. Augustine's meaning was that the <ad aliquid> is not 
predicated of God as something absolute but as something relative, 
but he did not say that the divine relations are really distinct 
from the substance. In several places he declared that in God the 
relations are not accidents. [235] St. Thomas points out that in 
God there are only two predicaments, substance and relations, and 
the <esse in> of the relations is substantial. We are dealing here 
not with a transcendental relation but with a predicamental 
relation (paternity, filiation, etc.), whose <esse in> or "being 
in" in God, however, is substantial.

2. The term, "minor virtual distinction, " is the happiest 
expression for the relations as they are in God, because the Deity 
as conceived by our minds actually and implicitly contains the 
relations.

3. In reply to the third objection, St. Thomas shows that it does 
not follow from the preceding that the divine essence is something 
relative. [236]

First doubt. Whether the Deity, not as conceived by us but as it 
is in itself and is seen by the blessed, contains the relations 
explicitly or only implicitly.

Reply. The Deity contains the relations explicitly because the 
virtual distinction is a distinction of reason subsequent to the 
consideration of our minds, and this distinction is not found in 
the divine essence so as to be seen by God and the blessed. 
Similarly the divine nature as imperfectly conceived by us 
contains the divine attributes implicitly, since we gradually 
deduce the attributes from the divine essence; but as it is in 
itself, the Deity explicitly contains the attributes. The blessed 
in heaven have no need of deduction to know the divine attributes; 
they see them intuitively as they are formally and eminently in 
God, not only as virtually eminently, as is the case with the 
mixed perfections.

In rejecting Scotus' formal actual distinction between the Deity 
and the relations, Cajetan explains: "There is in God actually, or 
in the order of reality, only one being, which is not purely 
absolute or purely relational, neither mixed nor composite, or 
resulting from either of these, but most eminently and formally 
possessing that which is relational and that which is absolute. So 
in the formal order, or the order of formal reasons, in Himself, 
not in our mode of speaking, there is in God only one formal 
reason or essence. This is neither purely absolute nor purely 
relational, neither purely communicable nor purely incommunicable, 
but most eminently and formally containing both that which is 
absolutely perfect and that which the relational Trinity demands. 
We are in error, however, whenever we proceed from the absolute 
and relational to God because we imagine that the distinction 
between the absolute and the relational is prior to the divine 
nature. The complete opposite is true, for the divine essence is 
prior to all being and all of its differences; it is above being, 
above one, etc. " [237]

And yet the Deity as an essence is really communicated to the Son 
and the Holy Ghost without any communication of paternity or 
filiation, just as in the triangle the first angle constructed 
communicates its whole surface to the other angles without 
communicating itself. The danger of agnosticism does not arise in 
this statement; such danger would be present, however, if we said 
that the divine relations and attributes were in God virtually and 
eminently, like mixed perfections, and not eminently formally. 
This doctrine may be reduced to this simple thought: the Father is 
God, and in this proposition the verb "is" expresses the real 
identity of the subject and predicate. [238]

Second doubt. Can we safeguard the idea of God as the most pure, 
most simple, and infinite act if we admit the formal-actual 
distinction?

Reply. The Thomists reply in the negative. [239] In this 
hypothesis the divine essence is conceived as having a foundation 
in itself that is in potency to the relations, that is actuable by 
the relations, as by something extraneous, like the genus of 
animality which is actuable by an extraneous specific difference. 
But it is repugnant to the most pure act that it be conceived as 
having a basis in itself for further realization; this would be 
repugnant to the simplicity and infinity of God. In this way the 
Thomists have adhered to Cajetan's explanation; other equivalent 
expressions may be found in Billuart's exposition of this article.

Third doubt. Is the concept of the divine essence more extensive 
than the concept of paternity or of any other relation taken 
separately?

The reply is in the affirmative, because the Deity as conceived by 
us implicitly contains the idea of filiation, but the idea of 
filiation is not even implicitly contained in the concept of 
paternity, except correlatively since it is opposed to paternity.

Fourth doubt. Does Deity belong to our explicit concept of the 
person of the Father?

The reply is in the affirmative, for while paternity is only 
implicitly contained in our concept of the Deity, Deity is 
explicitly contained in the paternity because Deity is more 
extensive than paternity, including also filiation. Similarly, in 
created beings, being is explicit in the concept of substance, 
while substance is not explicitly in the concept of being because 
being is more extensive than substance.

Scotus' objection. If Deity is conceived by us as containing 
paternity in act, it follows that in begetting the Son the Father 
communicates paternity to Him. Then the Son would be the Father. 
Or if paternity is not communicated to the Son, then the Deity is 
not communicated to Him. Further, Scotus argued that if being 
implicitly contains substance and accidents, then whenever 
anything is predicated both substance and accidents are 
predicated.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: if the Deity is conceived by 
us as explicitly containing paternity, I concede; as implicitly 
containing paternity, I subdistinguish: both implicitly and 
copulatively, I concede; implicitly and disjunctively, I deny. For 
the Deity is disjunctively either in the Father, or in the Son, or 
in the Holy Ghost. A virtual distinction is enough to safeguard 
the truth of the propositions about the communicability of the 
nature without the communication of paternity, just as it suffices 
to say that God punishes by His justice but not by His mercy. In 
the same way the concept of being contains substance and accidents 
implicitly, not copulatively but disjunctively, and therefore it 
does not follow that substance is accident.

Many difficulties are solved in this manner, namely, how it is the 
Father who begets and not the essence with which the Father is 
really identified; how each divine person is really God and still 
not the other persons, which are really implicitly included in the 
Deity.

I insist. But if the Deity, as it is in itself and is clearly seen 
by the blessed, explicitly contains the paternity, it follows that 
the Father in begetting the Son communicates paternity to Him, and 
thus the Son is the Father or He is not God.

Reply. This would be true if in the eminent being of the Deity the 
absolute and the relative, the communicable and the 
incommunicable, would be identified to such an extent as to be 
destroyed, this I concede; otherwise, I deny. Indeed, the absolute 
communicable and the incommunicable relative are found in God in a 
formally pre-eminent manner, just as mercy and justice in God are 
identified without being destroyed, since they are in God not only 
virtually (like the seven colors in white light) but also formally 
and eminently. Here is the mystery of the divine pre-eminence. We 
therefore rightly conceive the divine essence as being 
communicated to the Son together with all the absolute essential 
things which it contains and which are communicable, without any 
communication of the relative (paternity) because of the 
opposition to the terminus to which the essence is communicated. 
Thus in the triangle the first angle communicates its entire 
surface to the second and third angles but not itself.

In a word, the Father communicates the divine essence to the Son 
with regard to everything except where the opposition of relation 
intervenes, because a relative cannot be communicated to its 
correlative opposite. This statement is in accord with Cajetan's 
explanation: "In God (as He is in Himself) there is but one formal 
reason, neither purely absolute, nor purely relative, nor purely 
communicable, nor purely incommunicable, but eminently and 
formally containing both whatever is of absolute perfection and 
whatever the relational Trinity demands. " [240] Cajetan declared 
also: "It remains that (God) is both communicable and 
incommunicable. " [241]

Fifth doubt. What is the foundation of the relations of paternity 
and filiation?

Reply. In created beings the foundation is active and passive 
generation; this is also true proportionately of God. It should be 
noted that the <esse in> of the relation is not the foundation of 
the relation because the <esse in> is something common to all 
accidents, expressing at the same time the existence of the 
accident, for the being of the accident is the <esse in> at last 
aptitudinally.

The foundation of paternity as a relation is active generation, 
and the foundation of the relation of filiation is passive 
generation, that is, the actual procession. Similarly, spiration 
is the foundation of the relations between the Holy Ghost and the 
Father and the Son, who spirate in one active spiration.

Sixth doubt. Whether the divine relations (or persons) have their 
own proper relative existences, or whether they exist by the one 
absolute existence of the essence.

Reply. In opposition to Scotus and Suarez, the Thomists and many 
other theologians reply in the negative. This reply is based on 
many texts of St. Thomas; for example, "Since the divine person is 
the same as the divine nature, the being of the person is not 
different from the being of the nature. Therefore the three divine 
persons have but one being; they would have a triple being if in 
them the being of the nature were other than the being of the 
persons. " [242]

In these texts St. Thomas is clearly speaking of the being of 
existence and not the being of the essence, particularly in the 
passage where he inquires whether there is one being in Christ 
although there are two natures, and answers in the affirmative. 
[243]

In explaining this answer to Scotus and Suarez we may say that the 
existence of the relation is nothing more than its <esse in.> But, 
as we have said, the <esse in> of the relations in God is 
substantial, the same as the being of the divine nature. Therefore 
the divine relations do not have their own existences. Just as in 
God there is not a triple intelligence nor a triple will, so all 
the more there is no triple being, for in God all things are one 
and the same except where there is the opposition of relation.

This teaching is confirmed by the Athanasian Creed, which 
declares, "Not three uncreated,. . . but one uncreated. " If there 
were three uncreated existences besides the absolute existence 
common to the three persons, there would be three uncreated 
beings, not only adjectively but substantively, because the form 
and the subject would be multiplied. We would then have three 
entities having three uncreated existences. Scotus and Suarez, 
therefore, are in some danger of tritheism. Fundamentally this is 
why Suarez was unable to solve the objection arising from the 
principle of identity: those things which are equal to a third are 
equal to each other. By multiplying being in God, Suarez 
multiplied the absolute in God and placed in jeopardy the 
principle that in God all things are one and the same except where 
there is the opposition of relation.

Further confirmation is had from the fact that in God essence and 
being are the same. But the essence is common to the three 
persons. Therefore being is also common to all three. Being is 
communicated together with the nature because it is completely 
identified with the nature. The divine nature is subsisting being 
itself according to the Scriptures, "I am who am. " [244] If the 
same intelligence and will are communicated, all the more the same 
existence is communicated.

Further, relative existences would be superfluous, for that which 
is already in existence does not need further existence; by the 
first existence a being is beyond nothingness and beyond its 
causes (if it has a cause). To say that what is already beyond 
nothingness and its causes is once again placed beyond causes and 
nothingness is to imply a contradiction. It would also imply a 
contradiction to have two ultimate realities of the same order, 
for neither would be the ultimate. Existence, however, is the 
ultimate reality of a thing. When the Fathers said that to be God 
was different from being the Father, they understood this being 
God with respect to Himself and the being the Father with respect 
to some one else. It does not follow from this that there are 
several existences in God.

Objection. Existence is nothing more than being in act. But the 
relations are really in act as distinct from the essence. 
Therefore they have their own existences.

Reply. The Thomists deny the major, for existence is not the thing 
itself but the actuality of the thing by which it is placed beyond 
nothingness and its causes. In God, however, essence and being are 
the same, and since the essence is common to the three persons the 
divine existence is also common to them. The relations, therefore, 
are truly in act, but they are so by the absolute existence of the 
essence.

Objection. All production terminates with existence.

Reply. I distinguish the major: the production of a contingent 
being terminates in the production of a new existence, I concede; 
but communication terminates in an existence that is not new but 
in an existence that is communicated to the person who proceeds. 
So in some way the uncreated being of the Word is communicated to 
the assumed humanity since there is only one existence in Christ; 
so also the being of the separated soul is communicated to the 
body in the resurrection because there is only one substantial 
existence in man. Scotus and Suarez, however, deny the real 
distinction between created essence and being and therefore they 
multiply substantial being in man, assigning one to the body and 
one to the soul. They also declare that there are two beings in 
Christ and three relative existences in the Trinity.

I insist. Each thing that is distinct from others has its own 
existence. But the divine persons are distinct from one another. 
Therefore they have their own existences.

Reply. Each thing has its own existence, either proper or common, 
I concede; that the existence is always proper, I deny. Thus the 
humanity of Christ does not have its own proper existence, and in 
us the body does not have its proper existence distinct from the 
existence of the soul. Our bodies exist by the existence of the 
soul, which is spiritual. It is not repugnant, therefore, that in 
God the relations, whose <esse in> is substantial, exist by the 
existence of the divine nature itself.

I insist. Therefore in God the Father refers to Himself and not to 
another and not to the Son.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the Father refers to Himself 
with regard to His <esse in>, I concede; with regard to His <esse 
ad>, I deny.

Final objection. Besides the absolute subsistence in God there are 
three relative subsistences or personalities; therefore there 
should be besides the absolute existence three relative 
existences.

Reply. I deny the consequence. The difference arises from the fact 
that the absolute subsistence confers only the perseity of 
independence but not the perseity of incommunicability; the three 
relative subsistences are not superfluous since they are required 
for incommunicability. On the other hand, the absolute existence, 
communicated with the nature, places the persons beyond 
nothingness, so that relative existences are superfluous, as was 
said above.

Seventh doubt. Whether the divine relations by reason of their 
<esse ad> add some relative perfection to the absolute perfection 
of the divine essence virtually distinct from it.

State of the question. It is most certain that the divine 
relations (which are, as we shall see below, the divine persons) 
are most perfect since they are identified with the divine 
essence, which is infinite subsisting perfection itself. Thus the 
divine relations are necessarily loved by God and must be accorded 
the adoration of latria on our part. The question is whether the 
relations by reason of their <esse ad> add some relative 
perfection, virtually distinct from the absolute perfection of the 
divine essence, which they include.

The reply is in the negative. This reply is at least the more 
probable one and is held by such Thomists as Capreolus, Cajetan, 
Ferrariensis, the Salmanticences, Gonet, and Billuart. But some 
Thomists (John of St. Thomas, Contenson, and Bancel) hold the 
contrary opinion.

1. Proof from authority. In his work on the Trinity, St. Augustine 
says: "The Father is good, the Son is good, the Holy Ghost is 
good; but there are not three good, only one is good. If goodness 
and perfection are actually multiplied in the three divine 
persons, they could be said to be three good and three perfect 
persons not only adjectively but also substantively because what 
these words signify both materially and formally would be 
multiplied inasmuch as there would be three relative perfections 
really distinct from one another. [245]

St. Thomas declared: "Paternity is a dignity of the Father as is 
the essence of the Father, for it is an absolute dignity and 
pertains to the essence. Just as, therefore, the same essence 
which in the Father is paternity and in the Son is filiation, so 
the same dignity which in the Father is paternity is filiation in 
the Son. " [246] So analogically in the triangle, the one surface 
which is the surface of the first angle is the surface of the 
second and third angles; no relative surfaces are found besides 
the absolute and common surface.

Billuart and others rightly point out that in these words St. 
Thomas not only openly asserts our conclusion but proves it, since 
the dignity or perfection of the Father is absolute and pertains 
to the essence.

2. Proof from theology. A thing is not good or perfect except 
inasmuch as it exists or implies an order to being. But the divine 
relations indeed exist according to their <esse in>, but according 
to their <esse ad> they are not anything but only in reference to 
something. [247] Therefore by reason of their <esse ad> the 
relations do not add a relative perfection virtually distinct from 
the absolute, infinite perfection of the essence. In other words, 
the existence, and the perfection too, of the predicamental 
relation, with which we are now dealing, has reference to the 
subject and not to the terminus, and therefore the <esse ad> does 
not imply an order to existence, but prescinds from existence. For 
this reason it is possible to have certain relations which are not 
real and are of the mind only, namely, those whose <esse in> is 
not real. [248]

Here it is that the divine relations differ from the divine 
attributes, which by their nature look to the essence and have an 
order, not to something else, but to themselves. Thus the 
attributes are called absolute or absolutely simple perfections, 
which it is better to have than not to have. So the divine will is 
an absolute perfection, virtually distinct from the perfection of 
God's being and from subsisting intellect itself, although all 
these are identified without being destroyed in the eminence of 
the Deity, in whom they are found not only virtually and eminently 
but formally and eminently.

Corollary. The divine relations, taken formally according to their 
<esse ad>, are not absolutely simple perfections properly so 
called because, although they do not involve imperfection, it is 
not better to have them than not to have them; their <esse ad> is 
a pure reference, prescinding from perfection and imperfection. So 
also in God the free act of creation (I am not speaking here of 
freedom but of the free act) is not an absolutely simple 
perfection, since God is not more perfect because He created the 
universe. [249] God was not improved because from eternity He 
willed to create the world; to create the world is indeed 
something befitting, but not to have created is nevertheless not 
unbefitting.

On this point there is agreement, but Cajetan offered a formula 
that was not acceptable to other Thomists: "For God to will other 
beings is a voluntary and entirely free perfection whose opposite 
would not be an imperfection. " [250] He expresses it better when 
he says: "To communicate oneself implies perfection not in him who 
communicates but in those to whom the communication is made. " 
[251]

In the formula, rejected by other Thomists, as we have noted 
elsewhere, [252] Cajetan seems to confuse a modal proposition 
referring to the saying with the modal proposition referring to 
the thing. It is correct to say that it is befitting that God 
created, in the sense that it is not unbefitting not to have 
created; but it is incorrect to say that the free volition to 
create is a new free perfection in God (virtually distinct from 
His essential perfection), even though the opposite is not an 
imperfection. Otherwise God would be more perfect because He 
willed to create the universe, as Leibnitz wrongly concluded. 
These observations should throw some light on this present 
question, namely, that the divine relations with regard to their 
<esse ad> do not add a new perfection.

Confirmation from the following incongruities.

1. Otherwise it would follow that the Father lacked one 
perfection, namely, filiation, and also passive spiration. None of 
the divine persons would therefore be perfect, none would have 
every perfection, and none would be God. For God must have all 
absolutely simple perfections, those perfections which it is 
better to have than not to have.

2. It would follow that all three persons would be more perfect, 
at least extensively, than any one person, and against this St. 
Augustine declared: "The Father is as great by Himself as are the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost together. " [253]

3. The Father and the Son would be more perfect than the Holy 
Ghost because besides their proper perfection they would have the 
perfection of active spiration, whereas the Holy Ghost would have 
but one perfection, passive spiration.

Objection. The Father does not have filiation formally but 
eminently because of the divine essence. Hence filiation is 
properly an absolutely simple perfection.

Reply. In that case the Father would not have any absolutely 
simple perfection formally, and that would be improper.

I insist. The Father has filiation compensatively and 
terminatively, if not constitutively.

Reply. In that case the Father would not be infinitely perfect; 
and the Holy Ghost would be less perfect because He would have 
only one relative perfection and not two. Hence He would not even 
be compensatively perfect.

Another objection. A relative perfection implies a subject that is 
perfectible in order to something else, as we see in the case of 
potencies or faculties and habits. Hence it is wrong to say that a 
relation with regard to its <esse ad> prescinds from perfection. 
For the perfection of our intellect arises from its relation to 
being. Such was Contenson's argument.

Reply. Contenson, as Billuart pointed out, here confuses the 
transcendental relation of a faculty to its specific object with 
the predicamental relation, namely, paternity or filiation, which 
are pure references to a pure terminus and therefore do not 
consider the subject by reason of itself but by reason of the 
terminus.

Final difficulty. The created personality implies a perfection 
really and modally distinct from the perfection of the nature. 
Therefore for an equal or stronger reason the divine 
personalities, which are constituted by subsisting relations, 
imply a perfection distinct from the nature.

Reply. In agreement with many others I distinguish the antecedent. 
The created personality is a perfection with regard to the 
perseity of independence, I concede; with regard to the perseity 
of incommunicability, I deny, because it is not a perfection not 
to be able to communicate to another. The divine personalities 
confer incommunicability but not the perseity of independence, 
which is common to all three persons. [254]

This should suffice in explanation of St. Thomas' second article, 
in which he teaches that the real relations in God are not 
distinguished really from the essence, but are only virtually 
distinct. This truth can be succinctly stated as, "The Father is 
God. " In this statement, as in every affirmative proposition, the 
verb "is" expresses the actual identity of the subject and the 
predicate. In other words: the Deity as known by us contains the 
divine relations implicitly; the Deity as it is in itself contains 
them explicitly, or formally and eminently without the formal-
actual distinction proposed by Scotus. This teaching implies no 
leaning to agnosticism; such danger would arise if we said that 
the real relations were in God not formally and eminently but only 
virtually and eminently like mixed perfections, as when we say 
that God is angry.

Indeed the divine relations are in God like the divine attributes, 
to a greater degree than colors are contained in white because the 
seven colors are contained in white only virtually and not 
formally. White is not blue; but the Deity is true, it is good, it 
is also the paternity, although the Deity is communicated by the 
Father to the Son without a communication of paternity.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THE RELATIONS IN GOD ARE REALLY 
DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER

State of the question. This question seems to have been solved if 
we correctly understand the propositions, "The Father is not the 
Son, " "The Holy Ghost is not the Father nor the Son, " for in 
these negative propositions the verb "is not" denies the identity 
of the subject and the predicate, and therefore there is a real 
distinction, one that precedes the consideration of our mind. The 
question, however, requires further examination because it is not 
sufficiently clear how the persons are constituted by the 
relations and because, as we have said in the preceding article, 
the real relations in God are not really distinct from the 
essence.

From this arise certain difficulties, which are proposed at the 
beginning of this third article.

1. Those things equal to a third are equal to each other; but the 
divine relations are equal to a third, namely, the essence; 
therefore they are equal to each other. This is the classic 
objection of the rationalists against the mystery of the Trinity, 
which is sometimes examined by Thomists in the introduction to 
this treatise.

2. Paternity and filiation are, of course, distinguished mentally 
from the essence, as are goodness and omnipotence. Therefore, like 
goodness and omnipotence, paternity and filiation are not really 
distinguished from each other.

3. In God there is no real distinction except by reason of origin. 
But one relation does not appear to originate from another. 
Therefore the relations are not really distinct.

Reply. The reply is nevertheless in the affirmative, namely, in 
God a real distinction exists between the relations opposed to 
each other.

This teaching pertains to faith, since faith teaches that there is 
a real and true Trinity in which the Father is not the Son, and 
the Holy Ghost is not the Father or the Son. The Council of 
Florence declared: "In God all things are one except where there 
is opposition of relation. " [255] At the same council, John, the 
Latins' theologian, declared: "According to both Latin and Greek 
doctors it is relation alone that multiplies persons in the divine 
productions; this relation is called relation of origin, in which 
only two are concerned: the one from whom another is and the one 
who is from another. " [256] Also at this Council, Cardinal 
Bessarion, the most learned theologian of the Greeks, averred, "No 
one is ignorant of the fact that the personal names of the Trinity 
are relative. " [257]

In his argument St. Thomas quoted Boetius. Other Fathers who might 
be quoted are St. Anselm, [258] St. Augustine, [259] St. Gregory 
Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and St. John Damascene, who said: 
"The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are distinct and yet they 
are one. " [260]

In the body of the article St. Thomas explains this doctrine of 
faith by an analysis of the concept of relative opposition as 
follows.

The nature of a real relation consists in the reference of one 
thing to another, according to which something is relatively 
opposed to another and the two are therefore really distinct.

But in God we have real relations opposed to one another, namely, 
paternity, filiation, and spiration. Below it will be explained 
that active spiration, which is opposed to passive spiration, is 
not opposed to paternity and filiation. Therefore in God there is 
real distinction according to these real relations opposed to one 
another.

The major explains something that is already admitted confusedly 
by the common sense of man and by natural reason, namely, that 
relative things, inasmuch as the Father and the Son are opposed to 
each other, are really distinct, since no one begets himself. This 
analysis of the ideas of relation, opposition, and distinction is 
found in Aristotle's Postpredicamenta, where he distinguishes the 
various kinds of opposition.

Opposition properly so called is a definite and determined 
repugnance; opposition improperly so called is between disparate 
things, as between different species of things. Thus opposition 
properly so called requires a determined extreme, to which 
something is repugnant, as heat to cold, blindness to vision. 
Proper opposition, therefore, calls for two conditions: the 
distinction between the extremes and some determined repugnance 
between these extremes.

Opposition may be of four kinds: relative, contrary, privative, 
and contradictory. Following Goudin in his work on logic, we may 
present the division of opposition as follows.

(diagram page 136)
Opposition
between being and non-being
by pure negation: contradictory opposition, e.g., man and no man, 
knowledge and nescience
by privation in a suitable subject: privative opposition, e.g. 
sight and blindness, knowledge and ignorance
between being and being
expelling each other from a subject: contrary opposition, e.g., 
virtue and vice, truth and error
based on mutual reference: relative opposition, e.g., between 
father and son

Thus, as is commonly taught, relative opposition is the weakest of 
all; in this kind of opposition one extreme does not destroy the 
other, rather one requires the other. Hence it can be attributed 
to God because it does not imply any privation of being but only 
distinction with a reference, as St. Thomas pointed out. [261] 
Thus the Father and the Son are really distinct by relative 
opposition. Relative opposition may be defined as the repugnance 
between two things arising from the fact that they refer to each 
other.

On the other hand, contradictory opposition is the strongest of 
all because one extreme completely destroys the other; not even 
the subject survives as in privative opposition, nor the genus as 
in contrary opposition, in which, for example, virtue and vice 
oppose each other in the same genus of habit. Thus contradictory 
opposition is the cause of the others and is to a certain extent 
mingled with them. In a sense we may say that the Father is not 
the Son, and virtue is not vice.

It is clear that in these four kinds of opposition, the word 
"opposition" is used not univocally but analogically, and the 
analogy is not only metaphorical but proper. The primal analogy 
contains the greatest opposition, that is, contradictory 
opposition. Hence it is not surprising that contradictory 
opposition participates in the other kinds of opposition. [262]

Reply to the first and second difficulties. "Those things which 
are equal to a third are equal to each other, " I distinguish: if 
they are equal to the third actually and mentally and there is no 
mutual opposition, I concede; if they are equal to a third 
actually and not mentally and there exists relative opposition, I 
deny.

But the divine relations are equal to a third, the divine essence, 
this I distinguish: they are equal actually but not mentally, and 
some of the relations are mutually opposed, although they are not 
opposed to the third, this I concede. Otherwise, I deny.

To put it analogically, according to St. Thomas, transitive 
action, taken at least terminatively, and passion are really the 
same as movement, but they are really distinct from each other 
because of the opposition of relation, since action is the 
movement as coming from the agent and passion is the movement as 
received in the recipient.

So also in an equilateral triangle the three equal angles are 
actually the same as a third, namely, the surface of the triangle, 
but they are really distinguished from each other because of 
relative opposition.

First doubt. Are action and passion really and modally distinct 
from movement?

Reply. According to the common opinion of Thomists they are. 
Aristotle, however, did not consider precisely this question, and 
St. Thomas makes reference to his words, which, although they are 
somewhat vague, throw some light on the present problem, as does 
the reference to the triangle. Even though the illustration of the 
triangle may be deficient, the principle enunciated by St. Thomas 
is nevertheless true. We should remember that it is not necessary 
for the theologian to show that this objection is evidently false; 
it is enough if he shows that the objection is not necessary and 
has no cogency. Thus the revealed mystery remains intact.

Second doubt. Is the principle, "Those things equal to a third are 
equal. . . " to be understood as a formal predication?

Reply. In order to understand this principle we must distinguish 
between formal predication and material predication. Thus it is 
only materially true to say that the divine mercy and the divine 
justice are the same, because they are not really distinct, and by 
reason of their subject or matter they are in a sense the same, 
just as when we say that the humanity of Peter is his 
individuality. We have here a material predication because the 
humanity and the individuality are not actually distinct, and by 
reason of the matter and the subject they are the same. But in 
these instances we are not uttering a formal predication in which 
the predicate belongs to the subject according to its formal 
nature. For example, it does not belong to the divine mercy to 
punish; the divine mercy pardons, condones, and it is the divine 
justice that punishes, although these two perfections are really 
the same, that is, materially the same but not formally.

The laws of the syllogism, however, are not verified except in 
formal predications, since the process of reasoning does not deal 
with things in themselves but through the mediation of our 
concepts. Therefore if we wish to conclude the identity of two 
things by our reasoning, we must consider these two things from 
the same formal aspect. Otherwise we do not obey the first law of 
the syllogism: the term must be threefold: middle, major, and 
minor. According to this law the middle term must be perfectly 
distributed, that is, taken in the same sense in the major and the 
minor. Hence, for example, the following argument is not valid 
because the major is only a material predication: in God mercy is 
the same as justice; but justice is the principle of punishment; 
therefore God inflicts punishment through His mercy. The argument 
is false because in God mercy and justice are not the same 
formally although they are the same materially. Again, in the 
Trinity it is conceded that the Father and the Son are actually 
the same as the divine essence, but they are not the same 
formally. Moreover the Father and the Son are relatively opposed 
to each other, but they are not opposed to the essence. It is 
clear, therefore, that the following syllogism is not valid: This 
God is the Father, but this God is the Son, therefore the Son is 
the Father. Nor is the following true: This divine essence is the 
paternity, but this divine essence is the filiation, therefore 
filiation is paternity. In these syllogisms we have merely 
material predications, and the form of the syllogism is not 
observed.

Objection. The force of this reply is invalidated when, against 
Scotus, we say that in God there is not only one being but one 
formal eminent reason, namely, the Deity, and thus in God every 
predication is not only material but formal.

Reply. It is true that in God there is but one formal reason as 
far as God Himself is concerned, but not with regard to us. [263] 
In other words, the objection would be valid if the Deity 
identified with itself the attributes and relations without 
preserving their formal reasons; but the objection has no force if 
these formal reasons are still found to be in the eminence of the 
Deity. In God, of course, the relations are not only virtually and 
eminently, as the seven colors are in white, but formally and 
eminently; for whereas blue is not white, God is true, good, 
paternity, and filiation. Formal predication, therefore, must be 
carefully distinguished from material predication. [264]

In God the formal reasons or aspects of the attributes and 
relations are identified without being destroyed; they are 
perfectly preserved in spite of their real identity with the 
essence. Indeed, they do not exist in the purest state except in 
this identification. Thus subsisting being itself must be not only 
intelligible in act but actually understood in act, and it is 
therefore identified with subsisting understanding. The proper 
reason or nature of a relation is to be opposed to its correlative 
and to be distinguished from it.

This is possible because of the eminence of the Deity. 
Analogically, the body of Christ is present to many consecrated 
hosts, but these hosts are not present to each other. At first 
sight this seems to contradict the principle that those things 
which are united to a third are united to each other, or those 
things that are present to a third are present to each other. Thus 
two bodies cannot be present in the same space without being 
present to each other.

But this is not true if there is a third member which, remaining 
the same, is in many distant places as if not being in that place. 
Thus the same body of Christ is present in the manner of substance 
in many distant hosts. So in the natural order the head and the 
foot are present to the same soul and yet they are not parts 
present to each other and close to each other.

Second objection. A real distinction is not founded on that which 
prescinds from reality. But the <esse ad> of a relation prescinds 
from reality. Therefore it does not provide a basis for the real 
distinction of relations or of the persons.

Reply. I distinguish the major: a real distinction is not founded 
on that which prescinds from reality and is not real, I concede; 
on that which is real, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor in 
the same sense and I deny the consequence and the consequent. The 
<esse ad> is said to prescind from reality inasmuch as it may be 
either in a real relation or a relation of reason; but this <esse 
ad> in a real relation is real, not formally because of itself but 
because of the real <esse in>, which is common to all accidents. 
Thus in created beings the <esse ad> of the relation of paternity 
is something real and not something of the mind; both the father 
and the son therefore are necessarily distinct, since no one 
begets himself. The real relations in God are really distinct more 
as relations than as real, because as relations they are opposed 
to each other and as real they have the same <esse in> since their 
<esse in> is not accidental but substantial. Hence in God there 
are four real relations, as we shall see below, but not four 
relative realities as if there were four actions, for example. We 
shall also see below that of these four real relations active 
spiration is not really distinguished from paternity and filiation 
because it is not opposed to them.

Third doubt. Why is not the <esse ad> of a real relation real 
because of itself, as Suarez taught?

Reply. Because, as St. Thomas says, [265] a real relation formally 
as a relation is not something but to something, and therefore 
there can be relations that are not real, whose <esse in> is not 
real. On the other hand there is no such thing as quantity or 
quality mentally. Suarez, however, held that the <esse ad> of a 
relation is real because of itself, just as he held that the 
created essence is actual because of itself and is therefore not 
really distinct from its existence. Suarez thought of being (ens) 
only as that which is and not as that by which a thing is, whereas 
for St. Thomas the essence is that by which a thing is in a 
certain species. Hence Suarez concluded that the relations of 
reason (mental relations) are not true relations. [266] From this 
he went so far as to infer that the divine relations have their 
own relative existence and perfection, virtually distinct from the 
infinite perfection of the essence. In this way Suarez to some 
extent inclined to Scotus' teaching on the formal distinction. It 
will be seen therefore that the Father is lacking some perfection, 
namely, filiation and passive spiration. Now it becomes very 
difficult to safeguard the unity and absolute simplicity of the 
divine nature, just as when the Greeks in their treatise on the 
Trinity began with the three persons rather than with a study of 
the divine nature.

Thus Suarez was not able to reply to the principal objections 
against the mystery of the Trinity as the Thomists were. [267] How 
was Suarez to solve the objection: "Those things equal to a third 
are equal to each other"? At a loss in answering this objection, 
Suarez declared that the principle of identity (or contradiction), 
if taken in complete abstraction and analogy of being, prescinding 
from created and uncreated being, from both finite and infinite, 
is false. According to Suarez this principle is true inductively 
only in created beings, and the truth of the principle arises only 
within the limits of created being. It is a law of finite being, 
not an analogical law of being itself in common. Henceforth the 
theologian could not argue about the divine perfections because 
his argument is based on the principle of identity or 
contradiction. This is pure agnosticism. According to our 
teaching, to say that the principle of identity or contradiction 
is not verified analogically in the mystery of the Trinity is to 
say that this mystery is absurd, not above reason but opposed to 
reason. This much we can say: that most eminent mode according to 
which this principle is verified in the Trinity cannot be 
positively known by us here on earth; it can be known only 
negatively and relatively.

Another difference arises between St. Thomas and Suarez from the 
fact that for St. Thomas the three persons have only one being 
since, as it is commonly expressed, the being of an accident is 
being in another. [268] But in God the <esse in> of the relations 
is substantial and is therefore identified with the divine 
essence, which is therefore unique. For Suarez, on the contrary, 
who proceeded from other principles of being, the essence, the 
being, and the relations are three relative existences in God. 
[269]

The doctrine of St. Thomas, as Del Prado shows, "perfectly 
preserves the supreme simplicity of the divine being because in 
God there is but one being; the real relations, on the one hand, 
do not make a composition with the essence, and on the other hand 
they really distinguish the persons. From this it follows that in 
the three divine persons there is one divinity, equal glory, co-
eternal majesty, and the same absolute perfection. No perfection 
is found in one person that does not exist in the other. " Del 
Prado continues: "Those who like Suarez deny the real composition 
of being and essence in creatures are forced to place three beings 
in God, and they must place in one person a perfection that is not 
in another, nor can they solve the difficulty arising from the 
principle of identity. " [270] The difference between St. Thomas 
and Suarez has its roots in their basic philosophy and in their 
positions about the real distinction between essence and being in 
creatures. Suarez, as we have said, whether he wishes to or not, 
multiplies something absolute in God, namely, being, and therefore 
the objection based on the principle of identity remains unsolved. 
[271]

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE ARE IN GOD ONLY FOUR REAL RELATIONS

State of the question. Besides paternity, filiation, active and 
passive spiration, why do we not admit the real relations of 
equality and similitude? Scotus admitted these other relations. It 
appears, however, that there are only three real relations just as 
there are only three divine persons, for the persons are 
constituted by subsisting relations.

Reply. St. Thomas replied that there are four real relations in 
God, and this is the common opinion of theologians in opposition 
to Scotus and the Scotists.

The proof in the body of the article is the following.

Real relations are founded either on quantity, which is not found 
in God, or on action and passion, and in God there are only two 
actions ad intra, intellection and love, from which the two 
processions derive. [272] But each procession is the basis for two 
relations, one of which is that of the proceeding from the 
principle and the other the principle itself. Therefore there are 
in God only four real relations: paternity, filiation, and the two 
relations founded on the procession of love, called active 
spiration and the passive procession or spiration, which is rather 
quasi-passive.

St. Thomas says below: "Although there are four relations in God, 
one of these, active spiration, is not separate or distinct from 
the persons of the Father and the Son because it is not opposed to 
them. " [273]

There are therefore not four persons but only three. The reason is 
always the same: in God all things are one and the same except 
where there is opposition of relation. But there are only three 
relations opposed to each other, since active spiration is not 
opposed to paternity and filiation. Moreover, because of the 
identity of the principle, active spiration is numerically one and 
the same in the Father and the Son. [274] We must always return to 
this principle as to the center of the circle from which all the 
radii proceed. The repetition of this principle in these articles 
is not a mere routine repetition but it is frequent recourse to 
the source of that light which illuminates this entire treatise.

It should be noted that the relations of equality and similitude 
are not real relations; they are only mental relations. St. Thomas 
explains this below and the reason he gives is valid against 
Scotus, who held the opposite opinion. [275] Equality is 
predicated after the manner of quantity, and similitude after the 
manner of quality. But in God there is no quantity of the mass but 
only of virtue, which like quality is reduced to the divine 
essence and with which it is numerically one and the same. One 
thing cannot have a real reference or relation to itself. Nor is 
there in God a real relation of equality because of the relations, 
since one relation is not referred by another relation, otherwise 
there would be an infinite process.

Objection. The divine persons are truly and really equal; 
therefore the equality between them is a real relation.

Reply. I deny the consequence and the consequent. For a real 
relation it is not required that the equality be taken formally; 
equality taken fundamentally suffices, such as the unity of an 
infinite magnitude, which by reason of the divine essence is 
numerically one. Thus God is really the lord of all creatures 
without any real relation to them; we have here only the creative 
action upon which creatures really depend. In God therefore there 
are only four relations, and these are relations of origin based 
on the two processions.

RECAPITULATION OF QUESTION TWENTY-EIGHT

In the first article it was shown that consequent on the two 
processions there are real relations in God; consequent on the 
eternal generation are the relations of paternity and filiation, 
and consequent on the other procession are the relations of active 
and passive spiration.

In the second article we saw that the relations in God are not 
really distinct from the essence since the <esse in> of the 
relations, though it is accidental in creatures, is substantial in 
God because no accident is found in God.

In the third article we saw that the relations in God are really 
distinguished from each other because they are mutually opposed. 
The principle was formulated that in God all things are one and 
the same unless there is opposition of relation. In the first 
place the objection, that those things equal to a third are equal 
to each other, was solved. In the reply the major was 
distinguished by conceding the proposition when the two things are 
not more opposed to each other than to the third and denying it if 
there is such opposition. Thus several relations were found 
mutually opposed but not opposed to the essence.

In the fourth article the four relations were determined; one of 
them, active spiration, was not opposed to paternity or filiation. 
Thus there are three relations in mutual opposition.

As Del Prado points out: "The difference between Suarez and St. 
Thomas in their explanation of the mystery of the Trinity arises 
from a difference in their view of primary philosophy. The root is 
to be found in the fact that Suarez, in the Disputationes 
metaphysicae 1. does not admit, but rejects as absurd, the real 
composition of being and essence in creatures; 2. consequently in 
real created relations he does not distinguish between the <esse 
ad>, which is the essence or the nature of the relation, and the 
esse or being which is the actuality of the essence; 3. 
consequently the three real relations in God, according to Suarez, 
cannot be defended except as three beings, which he and his 
followers call relative beings but which are in fact absolute 
because in God being is the very nature or essence of God and 
belongs to the absolute predicaments; 4. and consequently these 
three beings imply three perfections which, like the three beings 
of the three relations, are in one person in such a way as not to 
be in another. We have, therefore, three beings and three 
perfections opposed to each other, and from this follow the 
difficulties already mentioned and many others. " [276]

On the other hand, all these difficulties are removed if with St. 
Thomas we admit that the being of an accident (distinct from the 
essence) is its inesse, and that the <esse in> of the divine 
relations is not accidental but substantial and therefore one in 
the different relations and persons.

CHAPTER III: 
QUESTION 29 THE DIVINE PERSONS

IN the beginning we treat of the persons in common, then of the 
individual persons, and finally of the persons in comparison with 
the essence and each other. This is the content of the treatise.

Concerning the three persons in common there are four questions:

1. The meaning of the word "person."

2. The plurality of persons.

3. Their differences and similarities.

4. How they can be known by us.

The first question has four divisions: 1. the definition of 
person; 2. the comparison of person with essence and subsistence; 
here person is identified with the Greek <hypostasis>; 3. whether 
the word "person" is used with reference to God; 4. whether in God 
person signifies relation. The reply will be in the affirmative: 
person signifies a subsisting relation opposed and incommunicable 
to others. In the appendix we shall see what is to be said about 
the absolute subsistence common to the three persons.

In this question it will be made clear that the general idea of 
person is to be applied to God analogically, not metaphorically 
but properly, without any distinction or multiplication in the 
divine nature itself. A great deal of effort was required to make 
this point clear. In the third century the Latins, like 
Tertullian, spontaneously declared that there are three persons in 
God and one substance because the names Father and Son and Holy 
Ghost are personal. This statement, however, was the source of 
much difficulty for the Greeks, who used the words ousia and 
<hypostasis> promiscuously to designate essence, substance, and 
nature. On other occasions the term prosopon a translation of the 
Latin persona, designated the mask or theatrical costume which 
actors donned to impersonate famous personages, and this term was 
not considered definite enough to express the real distinction 
between the divine persons. At the time of Origen and St. 
Dionysius of Alexandria, however, the term <hypostasis> designated 
a divine person and ousia the divine nature. St. Athanasius also 
used these terms in this manner.

FIRST ARTICLE: THE DEFINITION OF PERSON

State of the question. In this article inquiry is made for the 
definition of person, and the definition given by Boetius and 
commonly accepted is defended. St. Thomas, following the 
Aristotelian method, goes from the nominal definition to the real 
definition by a division of the genus of substance and by an 
inductive comparison of the thing to be defined with similar and 
dissimilar things. These are the principal rules to be followed in 
the search for a real definition as proposed in the Posterior 
Analytics. [277]

In the beginning St. Thomas mentions three difficulties against 
the Boethian definition, "a person is an individual substance with 
a rational nature."

1. No individual is defined; for example, Socrates is not defined 
because a definition expresses an essence that is common to many 
individuals. The reply will be: If this individual is not 
definable, individuality can be defined, and individuality 
pertains to a person.

2. It appears that the adjective "individual" is superfluous 
because the term "substance" stands for first substance which, for 
Aristotle, is the individual substance.

3. The third and fourth difficulties are of minor importance. The 
fifth difficulty is that a separated soul is an individual 
substance with a rational nature and is not a person.

The reply of St. Thomas affirms that Boetius' definition is 
acceptable for these reasons:

1. Because of Boetius' authority and because the definition has 
been accepted generally by theologians.

2. The acceptability of the definition can be rationally 
explained. St. Thomas assumes that the nominal definition of 
"person, " although it IS etymologically derived from 
impersonation or representation of another's features or gestures, 
nevertheless designates some individual rational being distinct 
from others, for example, Socrates, Plato, anyone who is able to 
say, "I am, " or "I act, " is called a person. So also all peoples 
in their grammar commonly distinguish between the first, second, 
and third person: I, you, he. The ancient jurists added that a 
person is distinguished from things inasmuch as the person is of 
his own right, and at one time they taught that in the legal 
sphere a slave was not a person because he was not of his own 
right. At the inception of this philosophical inquiry it is 
sufficient to have a general idea of person: an individual 
rational being, a singular rational being distinct from others; in 
French un particulier, in Italian, un tale. Briefly a person is a 
free and intelligent subject. The nominal definition, which tells 
what the term signifies, contains intimations of the real 
definition, which tells what the thing really is.

The real definition is not demonstrated; it is itself the 
foundation of the demonstration of the properties of the thing 
defined. The real definition is methodically sought out by a 
division of the genus and by inductive comparison. In going from 
the nominal to the real definition of a person, therefore, we must 
consider the supreme genus of the thing to be defined and this 
genus must be correctly divided. The article should be read 
carefully.

The genus of the thing to be defined is substance. On this point 
St. Thomas notes at the beginning of the body of the article that 
in the genus of substance the individual is a special instance. 
Substance itself is individuated by itself whereas accidents are 
individuated by the subject in which they are. Hence individual 
substances have some special name; they are called hypostases or 
first substances or supposita, that is, the first subject of 
attribution of those things belonging to these substances. For 
example, this tree is a suppositum as is this dog. Aristotle calls 
individuals first substances (as Peter, Socrates); second 
substances are the genera and species, as man, animal, living 
being. Therefore this distinction is a division into individual 
and universal substances. Aristotle said that second substances 
are predicated of first substances as of subjects not because they 
inhere like accidents but because they express the nature of this 
particular subject. [278]

Aristotle said that individuals subsist per se and that genera and 
species do not subsist except in individuals. The suppositum is 
that which exists separately and acts per se. First substance 
therefore is the same as the suppositum or the subject of 
attribution of nature, existence, and accidents, for example, this 
tree and this dog. Thus the person that we are to define is 
compared with things dissimilar to it, namely, with accidents, and 
with genus and species.

In the second part of the body of the article, St. Thomas compares 
person with things similar to it, that is, with other supposita. 
"The particular and the individual in rational substances is found 
to have a special and more perfect mode because it has dominion 
over its acts and acts per se independently. Therefore the 
individual substance with a rational nature bears a special name, 
person. A person is defined, then, as an individual substance with 
a rational nature.

This real definition expresses that reality which is vaguely 
contained in the nominal definition, namely, a rational being, 
individual and distinct from others, such as Socrates, Plato, I, 
you, and he.

Confirmation. The validity of this definition is confirmed as we 
solve the objections.

1. This individual or this person, Socrates, is indeed not 
defined, but the individuality and the person abstractly 
considered are defined.

2. In Boetius' definition the adjective "individual" is not 
superfluous since it signifies that we are dealing with first 
substance, with the individual or suppositum; in other words, with 
the real subject which cannot be attributed to another subject.

3. The term "individual" is used to designate that mode of 
existence which belongs to particular substances, which alone are 
able to subsist separately per se. Hence "individual" means as 
much as incommunicable to another suppositum; the person of Peter 
cannot be predicated of another subject or attributed to another 
subject.

4. In this definition nature signifies essence.

5. A separated soul is not called a person because it is a part of 
a human species, whereas "person" signifies the complete whole 
existing separately, for example, Peter and not his soul, which is 
attributed to him. Having set up the definition of person, we must 
now examine the nature of personality.

THE NATURE OF PERSONALITY

Methodically we go from the nominal definition of personality to 
its real definition. Here again we observe the laws for 
establishing a definition laid down by Aristotle and St. Thomas. 
[279] We begin with the nominal definition not only of person but 
of personality itself. According to the common sense of men, 
personality is that by which some subject is a person, just as 
existence is that by which some subject exists. This may appear to 
be somewhat ingenuous, yet we have an intimation here that 
personality, whatever certain writers may say, is not formally 
constituted by existence. [280] Philosophically the transition to 
the real definition is made by comparative induction, by comparing 
this personality which we wish to define with similar and 
dissimilar things and by correctly dividing the genus of substance 
to which personality belongs.

Various opinions of Scholastics, who are divided into those who 
admit or do not admit the real distinction between what a thing is 
and its being, and between the created essence and being

Denying this distinction, Scotus said that personality is 
something negative, namely, the negation of the hypostatic union 
in an individual nature such as Socrates or Peter. [281] Suarez, 
likewise rejecting this real distinction between created essence 
and being, said that personality is a substantial mode 
presupposing the existence of an individual nature and rendering 
it incommunicable. [282]

Among those who with St. Thomas admit the real distinction we find 
three opinions.

Cajetan and many other Thomists say that personality is that by 
which an individual nature becomes immediately capable of existing 
separately per se. Others with Capreolus say somewhat less 
explicitly that personality is the individual nature under the 
aspect of its being. [283] Lastly, Cardinal Billot reduces 
personality to the being that actuates an individual nature. [284]

Many moderns abandon the ontological approach to this question and 
consider it from the psychological and moral viewpoint. They 
declare that personality is constituted either by the 
consciousness of oneself or by liberty. Consciousness and liberty, 
however, are only manifestations of the personality; the- subject 
that is conscious of itself must first be constituted as a subject 
capable of saying, "I. " So also the free subject is indeed 
morally of its own right by liberty, but it also must first be 
ontologically constituted as I, you, or he.

The true idea of personality. We are looking for the real 
ontological definition of personality within the genus of 
substance, because a person is an intelligent and free substance 
or subject. We proceed progressively by dividing the genus of 
substance by affirmation and negation and by comparing the 
personality which we want to define with similar and dissimilar 
things.

1. Personality, or that by which anything is a person, is not 
something negative; it is positive just as the person of which it 
is the formal constituent. If the dependence of an accident is 
something positive, a fortiori the independence of the subject or 
the person is positive, that is, that by reason of which the 
person exists separately per se. Moreover, since the personalities 
of Socrates and Peter belong to the natural order, they cannot be 
defined by a denial of the hypostatic union, which is something 
essentially supernatural and unique. If this were true, it would 
follow that the personality could not be known naturally.

2. Personality, as something positive, must be something 
substantial and not accidental because the person is a substance. 
Hence personality in the proper sense cannot be constituted by 
consciousness or liberty. Thus personality is compared with 
dissimilar things and with accidents; we now compare it with 
similar and related things in the genus of substance.

3. Personality is something substantial but it is not the nature 
of substance itself, nor this particular nature, but it is this 
individual human nature, since nature even as individuated is 
attributed to the person as an essential part. St. Thomas says: 
"The suppositum signifies the whole which has nature as a formal 
part that perfects it. " [285] We do not say, "Peter is his own 
nature, " because the whole is not the part; it is greater than 
the part and contains other things besides.

Nor is personality the nature itself under the aspect of being, 
since the individual nature, Peter for example, is not that which 
exists but that by which it is a man. That which exists is Peter 
himself, the person of Peter. We are now asking for that by which 
something is what it is. Personality therefore is not the 
individual nature under the aspect of being; otherwise, since 
there are two natures in Christ, Christ would have two persons and 
two personalities.

4. Nor is personality Peter's existence because existence is 
attributed to Peter as a constituted person after the manner of a 
contingent predicate. Indeed existence is a contingent predicate 
of every person that has been created or can be created, for no 
human or angelic person is its own being. Therefore, as St. Thomas 
says, "in every creature there is a difference between that which 
is and its being. " [286] He also says: "Being follows nature not 
as something that possesses being but as that by which a thing is; 
but it follows the person as something that has being. " [287] If, 
therefore, being follows the person constituted as a person, it 
does not formally constitute the person.

If being formally constituted the created person, the real 
distinction between the created person and being would be 
destroyed, and it would no longer be true to say that Peter is not 
his own being. In other words, that which is not its own being is 
really distinct from its being, distinct apart from the 
consideration of our minds. But the person of Peter, as well as 
his personality which formally constitutes his person, is not 
Peter's being. Therefore Peter's person and his personality are 
really distinguished from his being. We shall see this all most 
clearly in heaven when we see God, who alone is His own being and 
who alone can say, "I am who am."

5. Personality, therefore, is something positive and substantial, 
determining an individual nature of substance so that it will be 
immediately capable of existing separately per se. More briefly, 
it is that by which a rational subject is what it is. Existence, 
however, is a contingent predicate of the subject and its ultimate 
actuality and therefore existence presupposes the personality, 
which cannot be, as Suarez would have it, a substantial mode 
following on existence. Personality is, as it were, the terminal 
point where two lines meet, the line of essence and the line of 
existence. Properly it is that by which an intelligent subject is 
what it is. This ontological personality is the foundation of the 
psychological and moral personality or of the consciousness of 
self and dominion of self.

This real definition explicitly enunciates what is vaguely 
contained in the accepted nominal definition: personality is that 
by which the intelligent subject is a person just as existence is 
that by which a subject exists. Therefore personality differs from 
the essence and from the existence which it brings together.

In order to show that the quid rei is confusedly contained in the 
quid nominis and that the real definition of personality should 
preserve what is vaguely contained in the nominal definition, 
Cajetan says: "The word 'person' and similarly the demonstrative 
personal pronouns like 'I, ' 'you, ' and 'he, ' all formally 
signify the substance and not a negation or an accident or 
something extraneous. If we all admit this, why, when scrutinizing 
the quid rei, that is, when going from the nominal to the real 
definition, do we depart from the common admission?" [288] Why do 
we depart from the common sense of mankind, from natural reason, 
and forget the nominal definition of the person?

It is not surprising, then, that this opinion is accepted by a 
great many theologians, by Ferrariensis, John of St. Thomas, the 
Salmanticenses, Goudin, Gonet, Billuart, Zigliara, Del Prado, 
Sanseverino, Cardinal Mercier, Cardinal Lorenzelli, Cardinal 
Lepicier, Hugon, Gredt, Szabo, Maritain, and many others. [289]

Certain texts of Capreolus are quoted to show that the person is 
the nature under the aspect of being. [290] These texts, however, 
are not really opposed to Cajetan's stand because for Capreolus 
personality is properly that by which the individual rational 
nature becomes immediately capable of existence and it is clear 
that what exists is not the nature of Peter but his person, that 
is, Peter himself. In other words, personality is that by which 
the intelligent and free subject is constituted as a subject 
possessing its own nature, faculties, existence, operations, 
consciousness, and the actual free dominion over itself.

Finally this theory, accepted by many theologians, is based not 
only on the texts of St. Thomas cited above but on many others, 
such as, "The form designated by the word 'person' is not the 
essence or the nature but the personality. " [291] For St. Thomas, 
therefore, personality is a kind of form or formality or modality 
of the substantial order. "The name person is imposed by the form 
of personality which gives the reason for the subsistence of such 
a nature. " [292] Accordingly personality is that by which the 
rational subject has the right to being separately per se. Thus 
personality is a substantial mode, antecedent to being, not 
subsequent to being, because being is the ultimate actuality of a 
thing or of the subject.

Moreover, St. Thomas taught: " (In Christ) if the human nature had 
not been assumed by the divine person, the human nature would have 
had its own personality, and to that extent the divine person is 
said to have consumed the human nature, although this is not the 
proper expression, because the divine person by its union impeded 
the human nature from having its own personality. " [293] Thus, 
according to St. Thomas, personality is distinguished from the 
individual nature and also from existence because "being follows 
the person as something that possesses being, " and therefore 
being does not constitute the person. [294] Lastly he says, "The 
three (divine) persons have but one being, " and therefore "the 
personality is not the same as the being since there are in God 
three personalities and one being"; [295] and "being is not by 
reason of the suppositum, " for a created suppositum is its own 
being. [296]

We conclude that a person is a free and intelligent subject and 
that it is predicated analogically of men and angels, and of the 
divine persons, and that personality is that by which this subject 
is what it is, namely, that which determines an individual nature 
to be immediately capable of existing separately per se. [297]

COROLLARIES

1. Personality excludes a threefold communicability. 1. It 
formally excludes the communicability of nature to another 
suppositum because the nature already exists in a suppositum. 2. 
By presupposition and materially it excludes the communicability 
of the universal to the individual because the person is an 
individual itself and has an individuated nature. This 
incommunicability properly pertains to the individuation of nature 
which takes place in us and in corporeal beings by matter 
determined by quantity inasmuch as a specific form as received in 
this matter is no longer communicable. [298] 3. Personality 
excludes the communicability of the part to the whole because the 
person is a complete substance. [299] Thus a separated soul is not 
a person but a principal part of a person. Thus we do not say, 
"Peter is now in heaven, " but "the soul of Peter. " On the other 
hand we say, "After the Ascension, Jesus is in heaven; and after 
the Assumption, the Blessed Virgin is in heaven and not only her 
soul. " The humanity of Christ is not a person for, while it is 
individuated and singular, it is not a suppositum or a subject, 
but it pertains to the suppositum of the incarnate Word.

2. In this way we explain that there is but one person in Christ, 
that is, one intelligent and free subject, although He has two 
intellects and two wills. So also we see how in God there are 
three persons and one nature and one being. We say this because 
there are three free and intelligent subjects although they have 
the same nature, the same essential intellect, the same liberty, 
and the same essential love. Contradiction is avoided by the fact 
that the three divine persons are relative and that they are 
opposed to each other, as we shall see below.

3. Personality is quite different from that individuation whose 
principle is matter determined by quantity. Individuation properly 
excludes the communicability of the universal to the inferior and 
it takes place through something lower than the universal, that 
is, by the matter in which the form is received so that the 
received form is no longer subject to participation. [300]

On the other hand, personality properly and formally excludes the 
communicability of nature to another subject or suppositum because 
the nature is terminated and possessed by one subject existing 
separately per se, for example, by Peter, and now Peter's human 
nature cannot be attributed to Paul. St. Thomas says: "Person 
signifies that which is most perfect in all nature, namely, 
something subsistent (existing separately per se) in rational 
nature, " whereas our individuation derives from something lower 
than ourselves, namely, matter. [301]

In Christ, although individuation as in us is derived from matter, 
the personality is uncreated and differs infinitely from matter. 
The term "individual" designates that which is inferior in man, 
that which is subordinate to the species, to society, and to the 
country; person designates that which is superior in man, that by 
reason of which man is ordered directly to God Himself above 
society. Thus society, to which the individual is subordinate, is 
itself ordered to the full perfection of the human person, as 
against statism, which denies the higher rights of the human 
person. We thus arrive not only at a concept which is definite and 
distinct but at a vital concept of the person immediately subject 
to God loved above all things. Such is the definition of person. 
For a simple understanding of the dogma it is sufficient to say 
that the person is a free and intelligent subject and is 
predicated analogically of man, the angels, and the three divine 
persons, for each of these is a free and intelligent subject. 
[302]

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER PERSON IS THE SAME AS HYPOSTASIS, 
SUBSISTENCE, AND ESSENCE

State of the question. In this article we establish the 
equivalence of the Latin term persona with the Greek term 
<hypostasis>. St. Thomas, as is clear from his replies to the 
second and third difficulties, realized the difficulties arising 
on this point between the Greeks and Latins. The Greeks refused to 
accept the term "person" because for them it signified the mask 
which actors in the theater wore to represent famous personages; 
and since an actor successively wore masks to impersonate 
different heroes, they sensed the danger of Sabellianism, 
according to which the divine persons are merely different aspects 
of God acting ad extra.

On the other hand, the Latins rejected the term "<hypostasis>" 
because it often designated substance and thus implied the danger 
of Arianism, which taught that there were in God three substances, 
some of which were subordinate substances.

These difficulties were eliminated by St. Basil's clear 
distinction between the meaning of the terms ousia and 
<hypostasis>. Ousia, he said, signifies the substance which is 
numerically common to the three persons; <hypostasis> signifies 
that which is individual and real so that there is a real 
distinction between the persons. Then the Greek formula of three 
hypostases was accepted as equivalent to the Latin of three 
persons. Nevertheless the Greek formula could not be expressed in 
the Latin translation because the terms "subsistence" and 
"suppositum" were not yet in use.

These terms, the correlative abstract and concrete forms, did not 
exist in the fourth century; St. Hilary and St. Augustine did not 
know them. The term "subsistence" was invented by Rufinus about 
400. [303] Rufinus derived the term "subsistence" from subsistere 
just as "substance" came from substare. This was logical enough 
because the Latins had said that the divine persons subsist. The 
word "<hypostasis>" was finally accepted by the Latins, and the 
union of the two natures in Christ was even called the hypostatic 
union. [304]

Boethius, writing at the beginning of the sixth century, did not 
appreciate Rufinus, happy discovery and taught that if the Church 
would permit it, absolutely speaking we could say that there were 
three substances in God. In this present article, St. Thomas 
strove to place a favorable interpretation on Boethius' words, and 
out of this came the complexity of this article. Thus in 
explaining Boethius' words, in his reply to the second difficulty, 
he says: "We say that in God there are three persons and 
subsistences as the Greeks say there are three hypostases. But 
since the term 'substance' which in its proper significance 
corresponds to '<hypostasis>' is used equivocally by us, sometimes 
meaning essence and sometimes <hypostasis>, the Latins in order to 
avoid any error preferred to translate '<hypostasis>' by the term 
'subsistence, rather than the term 'substance. ' " This was 
happily done by Rufinus.

But Boethius, misunderstanding the matter, distinguished 
differently between subsistere and substare when he said that 
substare referred to accidents and therefore only individuals were 
substances with respect to their accidents, whereas only genus and 
species, which do not have accidents, could be said to subsist. 
Here was Boethius, principal error: he inverted Rufinus, formulas 
and said that in God there were three substances and one 
subsistence (or substantial nature).

Rufinus, however, had said that in God there were three 
subsistences and one substance. Thus Boethius gave a false meaning 
to the word "subsistence" invented by Rufinus. Rusticus, a deacon 
of the Roman Church, restated the true meaning of the word. From 
that time "<hypostasis>" has been translated by "subsistence" and 
later by "suppositum" for the concrete form. Indeed the concrete 
correlative of subsistentia is not subsistere but suppositum just 
as the concrete correlative of "personality" is "person."

The complexity of this present article can be attributed to these 
fluctuating translations and especially to Boethius, unfortunate 
interference. The first two difficulties proposed at the beginning 
of the article are therefore not objections, because after 
explanations are made they conclude as does the article itself. 
The two arguments in the sed contra are objections taken from 
Boethius, who misunderstood the meaning of "<hypostasis>."

Reply. In spite of these objections the conclusion of the article 
is clear: in the genus of rational substances the term "person" 
signifies what these three terms, <hypostasis>, substance, things 
in nature (res naturae) signify in the whole genus of substances, 
namely, the suppositum or the first subject of attribution. We 
recall that substance is said to be twofold: second substance, or 
ousia, and first substance, which has four names: suppositum, 
subsistence, <hypostasis>, and thing in nature.

The first name, "suppositum, " signifies the logical relation of 
the subject of attribution to the predicate; the three others 
signify the thing itself and not the logical relation. Thus 
"subsistence, " taken concretely, signifies the first substance as 
existing separately per se; "thing in nature" signifies first 
substance as it is placed under some common nature; and 
<hypostasis> as it is placed under accidents. It should be noted 
that <hypostasis> in the concrete is the same as first substance, 
and subsistence is now understood in the abstract and corresponds 
to personality and not to person.

The following should be kept clearly in mind: The concrete 
correlative of subsistence is the suppositum as personality 
corresponds to person. Certain authors, attempting to identify 
subsistence with the existence of substance, say that the concrete 
correlative of subsistence is to subsist (subsistere), just as to 
exist is the correlative to existence. This is erroneous because 
the suppositum, of which subsisting and existing are predicated as 
contingent predicates, ought to have in itself that by which it is 
a suppositum, and this is subsistence, or if it is a rational 
being, personality. Clearly the concrete correlative of 
personality is not "to subsist" but the person. Actually, the 
abstract correlative of "to subsist" is the existence of the 
substance, just as the existence of the accident corresponds to 
inhering itself. [305]

Briefly this article may be reduced to this: In the genus of 
rational substances person designates the same as <hypostasis> or 
suppositum in the whole genus of substances, namely, that which 
exists separately per se.

St. Thomas' replies to the second, fourth, and fifth difficulties 
are favorable interpretations of certain texts of Boethius, who 
wrote rather inaccurately on this question.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THE TERM PERSON CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD

The reply is in the affirmative as pertaining to faith as is clear 
from the Athanasian Creed: "For there is one person of the Father, 
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. " [306]

The body of the article gives the theological argument, which may 
be presented as follows. Every perfection is to be attributed to 
God. But "person" signifies what is most perfect in all of nature, 
namely, a free and intelligent subject, or a subsisting being with 
a rational nature. Therefore it is proper to speak of God as a 
person, and this in the most excellent manner. God is subsisting 
being itself with an intellectual nature and, therefore, whatever 
pertains to the person belongs to Him formally and eminently. For 
this reason theistic philosophers speak of a personal God in 
opposition to the pantheists, who say that God is immanent in the 
universe in which He operates not freely but necessarily.

In his reply, St. Thomas states that God is the highest and most 
intelligent being per se. To the second difficulty he replies that 
the term "person" in its formal being most properly belongs to God 
since the dignity of the divine nature exceeds every dignity. His 
third reply shows he understood the difficulty that arose between 
the Greeks and the Latins. In his reply to the fourth objection, 
he says: "Individual being cannot belong to God so far as matter 
is the principle of individuation but only so far as individual 
being denotes incommunicability. " This was also noted by Richard 
of St. Victor. Thus the person of the Father is incommunicable to 
the Son; thus also it is explained that the humanity of Christ, 
which is individuated by matter, is not a person because it is 
communicated to the suppositum of the divine Word, in which it 
exists.

From this, however, a problem arises. If the person denotes 
incommunicability in the divine nature, how can the Father 
communicate His nature to the Son? This problem will be solved in 
the following articles.

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER IN GOD THE TERM PERSON SIGNIFIES RELATION

State of the question. In this question this article is of major 
importance. In the foregoing article we saw that in God, who is 
the most simple being, there can be no plurality except that of 
real relations mutually opposed. According to revelation, however, 
there are several persons in God. We must show, therefore, that a 
divine person can be constituted by a real divine relation. All 
the difficulties mentioned at the beginning of the article are 
reduced to this: person signifies something absolute and not 
relative. This becomes evident from the following considerations. 
1. Person is predicated with reference to itself and not to 
another; 2. in God person is not really distinguished from the 
essence; 3. person is defined as an individual substance with a 
rational nature; 4. in men and angels person signifies something 
absolute and, if it signifies relation in God, it would be used 
equivocally of God and of men and angels.

Reply. The divine person signifies relation as subsisting. 
Boethius says, "Every name referring to persons signifies a 
relation. " Thus Father signifies the relation to the Son, Son 
signifies the relation to the Father, and Holy Ghost signifies the 
relation to the Spirators. "By the relative names of the persons 
the Father is referred to the Son, the Son to the Father, and the 
Holy Ghost to both, for while we speak of the three persons 
relatively we believe in only one nature or substance. . . . For 
that which is the Father is not with reference to Himself but to 
the Son,. . . but, on the other hand, when we say God, this is 
said without reference to another. " [307] "In the relation of the 
persons we discern number. . . . In this number alone do the 
persons indicate that they are referred to each other. " [308] "In 
God all things are one and the same except where there is 
opposition of relation. " [309]

In the body of the article St. Thomas presents three opinions and 
then offers the most acceptable opinion.

1. The opinion of the Master of the Sentences: even in God the 
term "person" in the singular may be taken to mean something 
absolute, but in the plural it is taken to mean something 
relative, contrary to the teaching of the heretics, especially the 
Arians, who said that the three persons are subordinate 
substances. St. Thomas replied that if the term "person" even in 
God in the singular signifies something absolute, we are not 
sufficiently removed from the error of the Arians. By affirming 
the plurality of persons we might be multiplying something 
absolute.

2. The term "person" in God signifies essence directly and 
relation indirectly, because, as it is said, the person is said to 
be one per se. This, however, is false etymology. This opinion is 
corrected by the following.

3. The term "person" in God signifies relation directly and 
essence indirectly. This opinion, St. Thomas remarks, approaches 
more closely to the truth.

Then St. Thomas offers proof for his own opinion: the divine 
person signifies relation as subsisting.

Person in general signifies an individual (or distinct) substance 
with an intellectual nature, or a <hypostasis> distinct from 
others. But in God there are no real distinctions except according 
to the relations of origin, which are subsisting. [310] Therefore 
in God person signifies a distinct relation as subsisting.

This is to say, in general there are two things in the person: the 
distinction by incommunicability (I, you, he) and subsistence in 
the intellectual nature. But these two things are not found in God 
except in the real relations mutually opposed and thus really 
distinct, whose <esse in> is substantial and entirely the same as 
subsisting being itself.

More briefly we may say that person in any nature means a 
subsisting being distinct from others. But in God there is no 
distinction except according to the real relations, which are 
subsisting. Therefore in God person signifies relation not as 
relation but as subsisting. In this way we preserve the analogy of 
person in God, namely, a subsisting being distinct from others. In 
another place St. Thomas says: "The signified relation is included 
indirectly in the meaning of divine person, which is nothing else 
than a subsisting being in the divine essence distinct by 
relation, " [311] or a subsistence distinct by relation in the 
divine nature.

Difficulty. The person renders a nature incommunicable to another 
suppositum. But the subsisting relation of paternity does not 
render the divine nature incommunicable. Therefore this subsisting 
relation of paternity does not constitute a person.

Reply. I distinguish the major: an absolute person renders a 
finite nature incommunicable, I concede; a relative person renders 
a divine nature incommunicable, this I subdistinguish: as of 
itself, I concede; in other respects, I deny. Thus the divine 
nature as terminated by paternity is incommunicable and in God 
there is only one Father and the Father alone enunciates. In an 
equilateral triangle the first angle constructed renders the 
surface incommunicable as of itself only, but this surface is 
communicated to the other opposite angles.

This reply will appear less clear than the objection because the 
objection arises from our inferior mode of knowledge, whereas the 
reply is taken from the height of the ineffable mystery and 
therefore requires profound meditation and mature thought. It is 
not necessary for theology to show that all the objections made 
against the mysteries are evidently false; it is sufficient to 
show that they are not necessary and cogent, in the words of St. 
Thomas. [312]

At the end of the body of the article several corollaries are 
presented.

First corollary. As the Deity is God, so the divine paternity is 
God the Father. [313] In God there is nothing except the Deity for 
there are no individuating notes from matter, no accidents, nor a 
being distinct from essence. Hence God and Deity are the same and 
the Father and the paternity are the same. On the other hand, 
Socrates is not his humanity, which is only an essential part; the 
whole is not the part, but it is greater than its part.

It is not perfectly true to say that Michael is his own Michaelity 
because, although the Michaelity is individuated of itself and not 
by matter, yet there are in Michael accidents and being besides 
his essence.

Second corollary. In God person signifies relation directly as 
subsisting and essence indirectly.

Third corollary. Inasmuch as the divine essence is subsisting per 
se, it is signified directly by the term person, and relation as 
relation, not as subsisting, is signified indirectly.

Reply to the first objection. The term "person" even in God refers 
to Himself inasmuch as it signifies relation, not as relation, but 
as subsisting; for example, the Father as subsisting refers to 
Himself although as a relation He refers to the Son.

Reply to the third objection. In our understanding of an 
individual substance, that is, a distinct and incommunicable 
substance, we understand a relation in God, as was said in the 
body of the article.

Reply to the fourth objection. In God the analogy of person is 
preserved, for it is something subsisting and distinct from others 
(a free and intelligent subject) which is proportionally 
predicated of the divine persons, angelic and human persons. But 
the three divine persons understand by the same essential 
intellection and they love by the same essential love.

First doubt. Are the divine persons constituted only by the 
subsisting relations opposed to each other or also by everything 
that belongs to them?

Against Praepositivus and Gregory of Rimini, the Thomists reply 
that the divine persons are constituted as persons by the fact 
that they are distinguished from each other. But they are 
distinguished from each other by nothing except the opposite 
subsisting relations, otherwise they would differ by essence and 
in essence. It has been defined, however, that they are the same 
in essence. Hence the Council of the Lateran declared: "The Most 
Holy Trinity is individual according to the common essence and 
separate according to the personal properties. " [314] The Council 
of Florence says: "The divine persons differ by their properties. 
" [315]

Confirmation. What is common to the three persons cannot 
constitute a special person distinct from the others. But all 
things that are absolute in God are common to the three persons.

Second doubt. Are the divine persons constituted by the active and 
passive origins, as St. Bonaventure thought, or according to the 
opinion attributed to him?

The reply is in the negative, for by its essential concept person 
denotes a fixed and permanent being since it is the ultimate 
terminus of nature, rendering it incommunicable and subsisting. 
But origin is essentially conceived as becoming; active origin is 
conceived as the influx and emanation from a principle, and 
passive origin is conceived as the path or tendency to a terminus. 
Active origin presupposes the person from which it issues, and 
passive generation is conceived as something supposed prior to the 
constitution of the person of the Son, according to our manner of 
thought. [316]

Third doubt. Is the person of the Father constituted by 
innascibility, as Vasquez thought?

The reply is in the negative, because innascibility taken formally 
is merely the negation of a principle and thus cannot constitute 
the person of the Father, which, since it is real, must be 
constituted by something real and positive. If, however, 
innascibility is taken fundamentally, the basis implied is either 
something absolute, and then it cannot constitute a particular 
person, or it is something relative, and then it can be nothing 
else than the relation of paternity. Vasquez had proposed this 
opinion to solve the following difficulty.

THE SPECIAL DIFFICULTY IN THE LATIN'S CONCEPT

In this present article we can examine a particular difficulty 
arising from the concept of the Latin theologians. The problem is 
as follows: The relation which follows upon active generation 
cannot constitute the person who begets. But the relation of 
paternity follows upon active generation, for it is founded on it. 
Therefore this relation of paternity cannot constitute the person 
of the begetting Father. The person must first exist before it 
begets, because operation follows being.

This objection is somewhat clearer than the reply because the 
difficulty arises from our imperfect manner of thinking, whereas 
the reply must come from the heights of this ineffable mystery.

In examining this difficulty, St. Thomas says: "The special 
property of the Father, His paternity, can be considered in two 
ways. First, as it is a relation and as such according to our 
understanding it presupposes the notional act of generation 
because the relation as such is founded on the act. Secondly, as 
it constitutes the person, and as such it is understood as prior 
to the notional act just as a person in act is understood as prior 
to the action. " [317]

This is to say that the relation, of paternity for example, as a 
relation actually referring to its terminus does indeed presuppose 
active generation and is founded on it, just as the relation of 
filiation is founded on passive generation. But the active 
generation itself presupposes the begetting person and its 
personal property, that is, paternity, as it constitutes the 
person of the Father. There is here no contradiction because this 
relation of paternity is not considered under the same aspect, but 
first as a relation actively looking toward the terminus and 
founded on active generation, and secondly as the proximate 
principle (principium quo) of active generation or as constituting 
the begetting person.

As in the equilateral triangle the first angle constructed, while 
it is alone, is itself a geometric figure, that is, an angle, but 
it does not yet refer to the other two angles not yet constructed.

In explaining St. Thomas' teaching, Thomists have offered two 
replies to this objection. Some Thomists reply by distinguishing 
the major: the relation of paternity, considered as referring to 
something, follows generation; but considered as in something, it 
precedes generation. But the difficulty remains since the <esse 
in> is something common to the divine relations and the three 
persons and therefore it cannot constitute a particular person as 
distinct from the others and as incommunicable. The <esse in> does 
not confer incommunicability; only the <esse ad> does this.

Other Thomists (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, and Billuart) reply 
as follows to this important difficulty. Even with regard to the 
<esse ad> the relation of paternity as that by which the divine 
essence is modified in actu signato precedes the active 
generation, although it follows it with regard to the <esse ad> in 
the actual exercise (in actu exercito), that is, in the actual 
exercise of that respect after the manner of the actual tendency 
and attainment of the terminus. Hence these Thomists say that the 
relation of paternity, as that by which the divine essence is 
modified in actu signato, constitutes the person of the Father; 
and the relation of paternity as that which in the exercise of the 
act (in actu exercito) is founded on active generation supposes 
the person of the Father as already constituted. Thus the doctrine 
of St. Thomas is maintained: the persons are constituted by the 
relations as subsisting and not as relations. And thus the 
notional act of active generation has its origin in the person of 
the Father as subsisting and in the relation itself as really 
incommunicable.

I insist. Relative things are the same in nature and in knowledge. 
But the Father, as has been said, is understood before generation. 
Therefore the Son also is understood before generation, which is 
absurd.

Reply. I distinguish the major: relative things are the same in 
nature and knowledge in actu exercito, I concede; in actu signato, 
I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: the Father is understood 
before generation in actu signato as a subsisting person, I 
concede; in actu exercito with regard to the Son, this I deny.

In other words, the ad as such denotes the respect to another 
either by the opposition of the terminus or by the attainment of 
the terminus. In the relation of opposition itself we may consider 
either the opposition between two persons or the exercised 
relation of one to another; for example, I refer to you, but I am 
distinct from you. So the Father refers to the Son, but the Father 
is not the Son.

I insist. The first thing in the <esse ad> is to refer in act to 
the terminus rather than being a relative incommunicable entity. 
Therefore the difficulty remains.

Reply. I deny the antecedent. Just as the first thing is for 
whiteness to be constituted in itself as that by which something 
is made white before the wall is whitened (ut quod), for the form 
precedes its formal effect not by the priority of time but of 
causality.

I insist. The opposition in a relation arises from the reference, 
since it is the opposition of one relative thing to the 
correlative. Therefore the reference in act is prior to the 
opposition to the terminus. And the difficulty remains.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the exercised opposition in 
the relation arises from the exercised reference (in actu 
exercito), I concede; the entitative opposition arises from the 
reference in actu exercito, this I deny. The entitative opposition 
arises in the actu signato. Similarly, whiteness in actu signato 
is opposed to blackness in actu signato, and whiteness as actually 
existing in a wall actively opposes blackness existing in another 
wall. In a word, the form precedes its formal effect not in time 
but by nature.

The following analogies illustrate this point. Sanctifying grace 
is thought of first as it is in itself before we think of it as 
driving out sin and making the soul pleasing to God. The rational 
soul is thought of first in itself as a nature before we think of 
it as conferring a specific being and life on the body. Similarly 
a relation first affects the subject as that by which (ut quo) and 
later it refers exercite to the terminus, for first a thing must 
be constituted in itself before it tends toward something else. We 
cannot conceive of it as attaining its terminus before it is in 
itself.

In human generation, in that indivisible instant in which the 
rational soul is created and united to the body, the ultimate 
disposition of the body in preparation for the soul precedes the 
creation of the soul in the genus of material or dispositive 
causality; but it follows the creation of the soul (as a property 
of the soul) in the genus of formal, efficient, and final 
causality. For it is the rational soul itself which in this 
instant of time gives to the body not the penultimate but the 
ultimate disposition to itself; and this disposition is then a 
property of the soul. When this property of the soul in its body 
is destroyed by death, the soul is separated from the body. Here 
there is no contradiction because the ultimate disposition 
precedes and follows the form but not in the same genus of 
causality. Thus the causes are causes of one another but in 
different classes and thus there is no vicious circle.

In the same way the phantasm precedes the idea in the line of 
material causes, but the phantasm completely assumed to express 
sensibly an idea does not exist prior to the idea. When a man 
succeeds in discovering a new idea, in the same moment he often 
discovers the appropriate phantasm for the sensible expression of 
that idea.

So also the motion of sensibility precedes and follows volition 
under a twofold aspect. Again, at the end of a period of 
deliberation the final practical judgment precedes the free 
choice, which it influenced, but at the same time it is the free 
choice which made the practical judgment final by accepting it.

In the contract of marriage the consent of the man is expressed in 
a word, but that word has no effect unless it is accepted by the 
woman. After the woman accepts, the marriage is definitively 
ratified, but not before. Here the consent of the man precedes as 
consent and, although it is pronounced relatively to the woman, it 
does not actively affect the consent of the woman unless later the 
woman consents and expresses that consent. These analogies are to 
some extent explicative of the matter.

We return to St. Thomas, teaching. The divine person is 
constituted by the relation as subsisting and not as a relation. 
Thus the generation of the Son terminates in the person of the Son 
but not as that which is the object of the relation. For, as the 
philosophers say, movement or generation does not terminate per se 
and directly in a relation. In God, therefore, generation 
terminates in the person of the Son as subsisting, or in the 
relation of filiation as it is subsisting being, but not as a 
relation. Such was St. Thomas, distinction which without too much 
complication was able to solve this difficulty as much as it could 
be solved by men.

Fourth doubt. Whether in God, prior to the consideration of 
relations and persons, there is some absolute subsistence besides 
the three relative subsistencies.

Theologians are not agreed. The Thomists commonly reply in the 
affirmative; many other theologians reply in the negative. 
Durandus taught that an absolute subsistence was sufficient 
without relative subsistences; but this is rejected by most 
theologians.

The common opinion of Thomists is that God, considered in Himself, 
prior to the persons and relations, is subsisting, that He is 
therefore not only the Deity but also God, subsisting being 
itself, and for that reason He is understood as having intellect, 
will, and the power to create ad extra. But God is not said to be 
subsisting with regard to Himself by a relative subsistence. 
Therefore He subsists by an absolute subsistence.

Confirmation. Subsistence implies the highest perfection, namely, 
the most perfect manner of being. But God, prior to our 
consideration of the persons, possesses every perfection because 
He is pure act, existing because of Himself. Therefore He derives 
no perfection from the relations, because if paternity would be a 
new perfection that perfection would be lacking in the Son and 
thus the Son would not be God.

Confirmation. Antecedently to the consideration of the persons, 
God possesses being or the existence of that which is. But such 
existence presupposes subsistence or that by which something is 
what it is. In other words, prior to the consideration of the 
persons God is that which is, indeed He is subsisting being 
itself. This seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas: "The divine 
nature exists having in itself subsistence apart from any 
consideration of the distinction of the persons. " [318] On other 
occasions St. Thomas said, "In God there are many subsisting 
beings if we consider the relations, but only one subsisting being 
if we consider the essence. " [319] This opinion seems to follow 
upon the concept of the Latins, who begin, not with the three 
persons, but with the divine nature.

First objection. If we place an absolute subsistence in God we 
have a quaternity.

Reply. This I deny because this absolute subsistence confers the 
perseity of independence from any other sustaining being but not 
the perseity of incommunicability. Thus there are not four 
persons. It is certain that, considered in Himself, God is 
singular, since He is not a universal. In Him, God and the Deity 
are one. From revelation it is certain that in itself the divine 
nature is communicable by the Father to the Son and to the Holy 
Ghost.

Second objection. According to the councils and the Fathers 
subsistence is the same as <hypostasis>. But no theologian admits 
the existence of an absolute <hypostasis>.

Reply. The councils and the Fathers did not deal with this 
scholastic question and, when they spoke of the divine persons, 
they did indeed say that subsistence is the same as the 
<hypostasis> but they did not intend to exclude the absolute 
subsistence of which we are now speaking.

Third objection. In order that the divine nature subsist 
independently and at the same time be incommunicable the 
personalities or relative subsistences are sufficient. For if in 
God there were one personality, this would be able to confer both 
kinds of perseity, of independence and incommunicability. Why 
cannot this perseity be conferred by three persons?

Reply. If in God there were one personality, this would be an 
absolute perfection and thus it would confer both the perseity of 
independence and incommunicability. This one personality would 
really be that absolute subsistence of which we are speaking and 
in addition it would confer incommunicability. But such is not the 
case because it has been revealed that in God there are three 
persons. Besides it would be incongruous that this most perfect 
manner of existence in God would depend on the relations which do 
not add any new perfection.

I insist. In rational creatures personality confers both the 
perseity of independence and incommunicability. Therefore it 
should all the more do so in God.

Reply. In rational creatures personality is an absolute 
subsistence, not relative as in God. In God perfections are 
derived only from the essence; incommunicability comes only from 
the relations.

Final objection. That which derives its existence from another 
does not exist in itself. But the divine nature, prior to the 
relations or persons, seeks its existence in them. Therefore it 
does not exist in itself.

Reply. I distinguish the major: that which seeks its existence in 
another because of its own indigence, I concede; that which seeks 
its existence in another because of its infinite fecundity, I 
deny. I contradistinguish the minor: the divine nature does not 
seek existence in the relations or persons because of any 
indigence, so that it can exist by itself. It is already able to 
exist by itself because it is subsisting being itself, but because 
of its infinite fecundity it seeks to exist in the persons as the 
precise terms of its existence and not as sustainers of its own 
being.

I insist. The divine nature cannot exist without the relations; 
therefore it is complemented by them because of its own indigence 
in existence.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the divine nature cannot 
exist without the relations because it is supremely fecund, I 
concede; because it is deficient, I deny. It is itself subsisting 
being. In the same way omnipotence cannot exist without the 
possibility of creatures, not because of its own indigence but 
because of its fecundity. So also the Father enunciates the Word 
not because of any need but because of His fecundity.

Final doubt. Why is not the absolute subsistence, modified by the 
relations, sufficient without relative subsistences, as Durandus 
taught?

Reply. 1. Because the councils and the Fathers have often stated 
that each divine person has its proper subsistence. St. Thomas 
declared: "As we say that in God there are three persons and three 
subsistences, so the Greeks say there are three hypostases. " 
[320]

2. According to the Catholic faith there are three persons in God. 
But a person is formally constituted by subsistence, which confers 
incommunicability. Therefore in God there are three relative 
subsistences.

3. Otherwise no basis would exist for incommunicability nor would 
the principle of active generation and active spiration be 
established.

Confirmation. If there were only one subsistence, modified by the 
three relations, we could not truly say that there are three 
persons in God, just as we could not say that there are three gods 
because there is one nature modified by the three relations. We 
would have to confess one person alone just as we confess one God. 
In order to multiply a substantive noun such as person we must 
also multiply the form, which is the personality. We return then 
to St. Thomas, statement that the divine persons are constituted 
by relative subsistences, as they are subsisting and opposed to 
each other. Thus we have three relative subsistences.

The Father is then the principle quod of active generation; the 
Son with the Father is the principle quod of active spiration. 
God, antecedent to any consideration of the persons, is the 
principle quod of the essential actions, which are common to the 
three persons, such as essential intellection and essential love 
as distinct from notional love (active spiration) and personal 
love (the Holy Spirit).

Confirmation. The humanity of Christ is united to the Word in His 
personal subsistence, which supplies the place of the created 
subsistence; otherwise the three divine persons would be 
incarnate.

From the foregoing we may be able better to solve a difficulty 
that often comes to mind. Personality renders a nature 
incommunicable to another suppositum; but paternity does not 
render the divine nature incommunicable to the Son, on the 
contrary it communicates it to the Son; therefore paternity cannot 
constitute the person of the Father, and, therefore, there cannot 
be three persons in God.

Reply. I distinguish the major: personality renders a nature 
incommunicable as personified, I concede; personality renders a 
nature incommunicable in itself, I subdistinguish: in created 
beings, where personality is absolute, I concede; in God, where 
personality is relative, I deny. Thus the person of the Father 
renders the divine nature incommunicable as personified (there is 
but one Father in God), but it does not render the divine nature 
incommunicable in itself. Indeed the Father, inasmuch as He 
implies the relation to the Son, communicates to the Son the 
divine nature and thus manifests the infinite fecundity of the 
divine nature.

We have sufficiently examined the questions about the processions 
of the divine persons (question 27), the divine relations 
(question 28), and the divine persons considered absolutely and in 
common (question 29). We now turn to the plurality of the persons, 
and after this lengthy explanation of the fundamental ideas we may 
now proceed more rapidly. We shall now study the corollaries that 
can be inferred from the foregoing and the correct terminology to 
be used in speaking of these truths. But we will not neglect to 
gather the precious gems of knowledge which can be found in the 
following articles.

RECAPITULATION OF QUESTION TWENTY-NINE

Article 1. A person is a free and intelligent subject or an 
individual substance with a rational nature.

Article 2. Person is the same as the <hypostasis> of an 
intellectual nature.

Article 3. Since person signifies that which is most perfect in 
all nature, namely, a subsistence with a rational or intellectual 
nature, it is proper that this term be used with reference to God 
analogically and in the most excellent manner. Thus in Sacred 
Scripture the Father and the Son, as is clear, are personal nouns 
and so also is the Holy Ghost, who is mentioned with them.

Article 4. The divine persons, distinct from one another, are 
constituted by the three divine subsisting relations opposed to 
one another, namely, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration.

The reason for this is that "there is no distinction in God except 
by the relations of origin opposed to one another. " Since these 
relations are not accidents but subsisting, we find in them two 
requisites for a person: subsistence and incommunicability, or 
distinction. Thus the three divine persons are three intelligent 
and free subjects, although they understand by the same essential 
intellection, love themselves necessarily by the same essential 
love, and freely love creatures by the same free act of love.

Therefore the paternity in God is personality, although it is 
relative, as are also filiation and passive spiration. The divine 
paternity on its part renders the divine nature incommunicable, 
although the divine nature is still communicable to the other two 
persons, just as the top angle of the triangle on its part renders 
its surface incommunicable, although this surface can still be 
communicated to the other two angles. And as God is His own deity, 
so the Father is His own paternity, the Son is His own filiation, 
and the Holy Ghost is His own (quasi-) passive spiration.

CHAPTER IV: QUESTION 30 
THE PLURALITY OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

ARTICLES one and two inquire whether there are several persons in 
God, and articles three and four inquire in what this plurality 
consists.

Article 1. In God there are several persons because there are 
several real subsisting relations opposed to one another. In the 
reply to the fourth difficulty, St. Thomas notes that each divine 
person is not a part nor is the divine reality the whole, because 
the Father is as great as the entire Trinity, as will become clear 
below, [321] when St. Thomas explains: "All the relations are one 
according to essence and being, and all the relations are not 
greater than one alone; nor are all the persons greater than one 
alone since the entire (infinite) perfection of the divine nature 
is in each of the persons. " [322]

Article 2. In God there are not more than three persons. This 
truth is revealed in the form of baptism and stated in the creeds. 
The theological explanation is that the divine persons are 
constituted by mutually opposed subsisting relations. But these 
three relations are three in number. One of the four relations, 
active spiration, is opposed neither to paternity nor to 
filiation. This active spiration, therefore, belongs to the Father 
and to the Son. Passive spiration, however, cannot be attributed 
to the Father and to the Son for then the procession of love would 
precede the procession of intellection. The reader is referred to 
the reply to the first difficulty in the text. It should be noted 
that the fact that no opposition exists between active spiration 
and filiation is an implicit affirmation of the Filioque. [323]

Article 3. Whether anything is added to God by the numeral terms.

State of the question. Is there any positive significance when we 
say that God is wise, or any negative significance when we say 
that God is incorporeal? This is Cajetan's interpretation of the 
sense of this title.

Reply. The numeral terms do not add anything positive to God since 
they express not a quantitative but a transcendental plurality, 
which is not properly speaking a number. The transcendental 
multitude refers to the many of which it is predicated in the same 
way that transcendental unity refers to transcendental being. 
Transcendental unity merely predicates the indivisibility of being 
without adding any accident. We say not only that the scholastic 
school of thought is one among many theological schools but that 
it is also perfectly one and united. So also the Summa theologica 
is not only one among many works written by St. Thomas but it is a 
work that is perfectly one because of the intimate connection 
between its parts. We refer the reader to the text.

Thus, as was explained elsewhere, [324] transcendental unity 
differs from the unity which is the principle of number, which is 
a kind of quantity. St. Thomas in concluding the body of the 
article says: "When we say that the divine persons are many, this 
signifies these persons and the indivisibility of each of them 
since it is of the nature of a multitude that it consist of 
unities. " In his reply to the third difficulty, he says: 
"Multitude does not do away with unity; it removes division from 
each of those entities which constitute the multitude. " [325]

This may be better understood when we see it verified in several 
instances. The numerical multitude of individuals does not do away 
with the unity of the species; the transcendental multitude of 
species does not do away with the unity of genus; the 
transcendental multitude of genus does not do away with the 
analogical unity of being, nor does the multitude of accidents in 
a suppositum destroy its unity. Similarly the transcendental 
plurality of persons in God does not destroy the unity of God. But 
if it were a numerical plurality in God, the divine nature would 
be multiplied in the three individuals, and there would be three 
gods.

The unity of God is a unity pure and simple, whereas the specific 
unity of many men is only a qualified unity, that is, a unity 
according to the specific likeness of these men, who together are 
a pure and simple multitude. Wherefore the plurality of the divine 
persons in the bosom of the simple unity of the divine nature is 
best compared analogically with the plurality of accidents, such 
as, for example, the plurality of faculties in one suppositum that 
is simply one rather than with the plurality of individuals in the 
same species.

Corollary. Thus there is in God a simple unity and a qualified 
plurality. The unity is the unity of the divine nature; the 
transcendental plurality is the plurality of the opposing 
relations. In a nature numerically one and the same this plurality 
arises from the opposition of relations of origin. Therefore it 
cannot be said that there are three gods, but we must say there is 
one God. Again, as we shall see in the following article, we 
cannot say that God is threefold, but we say He is triune in order 
to safeguard the simple unity which is at the same time 
substantial together with the plurality that arises from the 
opposing relations. Thus we say that God is one in three persons.

Article 4. Whether the term "person" is common to the three divine 
persons. It seems that it is not, since nothing is common to the 
three persons except the divine essence.

Reply. The term "person" is a common noun according to reason 
because that which is a person is common to the three persons, 
namely, the subsisting relation opposed to other relations. It is 
not, however, common to the three persons by a community of the 
actual thing as is the divine essence, which is one whereas there 
are three persons. If something were common to the persons 
actually, there would be but one person as there is one nature.

Even when applied to men, the term "person" is common by a 
community of reason, not indeed as are genus and species but as an 
undetermined individual, as some man, that is something subsisting 
of itself and distinct from others. Analogically this notion is 
common to the three divine persons since each divine person 
subsists in the divine nature distinct from the others. The term 
"person, " therefore, is common to the three divine persons by a 
community of reason but not actually, as St. Thomas explains in 
the reply to the third difficulty. It is common but not as genus 
is a common term, because the three divine persons have one being 
and are subsisting being itself, which is above all genus.

CHAPTER V: QUESTION 31 OF THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF THE TRINITY

We are here concerned with the manner of speaking about the 
Trinity in the following four articles. 1. The name Trinity 
itself. 2. Whether we can say, the Father is other than the Son. 
3. Whether we can say that God is alone or solitary. 4. Whether we 
can say that one person is alone, as for instance, "Thou alone art 
most high. " In the treatise on the Trinity this question 
corresponds to the thirteenth question in the treatise on the One 
God, on the names of God. [326]

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE IS A TRINITY IN GOD

The difficulty arises from the fact that everything that is triune 
is threefold, whereas God is not threefold since He possesses the 
greatest unity. Nevertheless the reply is in the affirmative as an 
article of faith. In the Athanasian Creed we read, "The Unity is 
to be worshiped in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity. " [327]

Theology offers the following explanation. In God there is a 
transcendental plurality of persons. The term "Trinity" according 
to revelation limits this plurality to the three persons. 
Therefore the term Trinity can rightly be used.

Reply to the first objection. Etymologically the term "Trinity" 
seems to signify the unity of three, but in a special way it 
signifies the transcendental number of persons of one essence. 
Thus we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity. The term 
"Trinity" signifies at the same time the number of persons and the 
unity of the essence.

Reply to the second objection. St. John declared, "And these three 
are one" (I John 5:7). Hence we have the name "Trinity."

Reply to the third objection. Nevertheless in God there is no 
triplicity because triplicity denotes a proportion of inequality 
as do duplicity and quadruplicity. Thus we cannot say that God is 
threefold. That which is threefold has in a sense been tripled, 
as, for instance, a triple crown signifies the union of three 
crowns.

If God were said to be threefold, the three persons together would 
be more than one alone, and one person would not have infinite 
perfection. But we can say that the persons are threefold and the 
processions are twofold, because by adding person and procession 
we exclude sufficiently the multiplicity of nature.

Reply to the fourth objection. Unity in Trinity signifies that 
there is one nature in three persons, and Trinity in unity 
signifies three persons in one nature.

Reply to the fifth objection. We cannot say that the Trinity is 
threefold for this would mean that there were three supposita of 
the Trinity, whereas there are only three supposita of the Deity.

First corollary. From the foregoing the Thomists, especially 
Gonet, conclude that those things that belong to the persons by 
reason of the essence alone are predicated only singly. Those 
things, however, that belong to the persons by reason of the 
persons alone are predicated only in the plural. Those things that 
belong to the persons by reason of the essence and the relations 
are predicated both in the singular and in the plural.

The reason for this rule is that in God all things are one and the 
same except where there is the opposition of relation; only the 
relations are multiplied in God, the essence is not. This was 
defined by the Council of Toledo: "Number is discovered in the 
relation of the persons; but we find nothing that is numbered in 
the substance of the divinity. Thus number is indicated only in 
this, that they are mutually related; and they lack number in 
this, that they are in themselves. " [328]

From this rule it follows that it is correct to say that there are 
three persons or three hypostases in God but not three individuals 
because the nature is multiplied in individuals. In its formal 
signification person denotes personality; in its material 
signification it denotes nature. On the other hand, the individual 
in its formal signification denotes nature; in its material 
signification it denotes personality.

Thus we do not say that there are three individuals or three gods, 
because in the three persons God is numerically one. According to 
the Fourth Lateran Council, we may say that there are three divine 
beings, three co-eternal and omnipotent beings if these terms are 
used adjectively because the multiplication of the suppositum is 
sufficient for the multiplication of the adjective term without a 
multiplication of the form. Thus "three divine beings" signifies 
three that possess the Deity.

It is wrong, however, to say three divine beings if this 
expression is taken substantively. It is in this sense that the 
Athanasian Creed declares, "And yet they are not three eternals, 
but one Eternal, " for the plural substantive requires the 
multiplication of both the form and the suppositum. We can say, 
"In God there is one thing (res) " which is the essence, and 
several relative realities inasmuch as the divine relations are 
something real and not fictitious. We can then predicate reality 
of God both in the singular and plural number according to the 
aforesaid rule because reality belongs to the persons both by 
reason of the essence and the relations.

Second corollary. As Cajetan declared: "In God according to 
actuality or in the real order there is one being, neither purely 
absolute nor purely relational, not mixed or composed or resulting 
from these two, but eminently and formally possessing both that 
which is relational (with several relational beings) and that 
which is absolute. " [329] This is generally admitted even by the 
Scotists.

Third corollary. In opposition to the Scotist formal-actual 
distinction on the part of the thing, Cajetan also declared: "Even 
in the formal order or the order of formal reasons in themselves, 
not in our manner of speaking, there is in God one formal reason, 
neither purely absolute nor purely relational, neither purely 
communicable nor purely incommunicable, but eminently and formally 
containing both whatever is of absolute perfection and whatever 
the relational Trinity demands. " In God there is no distinction 
antecedent to our consideration except between the divine 
relations that are opposed to each other. Still the divine nature 
is actually communicated to the Son without a communication of 
paternity. So also with regard to the Holy Ghost the divine nature 
is communicated without a communication of paternity, filiation, 
or active spiration, as in the triangle the entire surface of the 
first angle is communicated to the second and third angles without 
a communication of the first angle. Paternity cannot be 
communicated to the Son, because it is opposed to filiation, as 
spiration is also opposed to procession.

Fourth corollary. The unity of God is more clearly manifested 
after the revelation of the Trinity than before, because it now 
appears as that simple unity which exists notwithstanding the real 
distinction of the persons and which contains in itself eminently 
and formally whatever is absolute and relational. These are the 
lights and shadows in our view of the Trinity.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE SON IS OTHER THAN THE FATHER

The difficulty arises from Christ's words, "I and the Father are 
one. " The reply nevertheless is that the Son is other than the 
Father but not another being. This is an article of faith 
according to the Fourth Lateran Council: "That being (the divine 
nature) does not beget, nor is it begotten, nor does it proceed, 
but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the 
Holy Ghost who proceeds, because the distinctions are in the 
persons and the unity is in the nature. Although the Father is 
another, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another, each is not 
another being but that which is the Father is the Son and the Holy 
Ghost, entirely the same, " [330] that is, they are one according 
to nature and are consubstantial.

This statement of the Council was taken from the writings of St. 
Gregory Nazianzen. [331] St. Fulgentius, quoted by St. Thomas in 
his argument sed contra, used the same language. In this way the 
words of our Lord are safeguarded: "I and the Father are one. " 
The Son and the Father are one; the Son is not another being, 
although He is other than the Father because He was begotten by 
the Father.

In the body of the article St. Thomas explains this point by 
comparing the masculine pronoun, which signifies a person, with 
the neuter pronoun, which signifies the nature. The reader is 
referred to the reply to the fourth difficulty, "The neuter gender 
is unformed, and so conveniently signifies the common essence, 
whereas the masculine gender signifies a determined person. " In 
the body of the article St. Thomas determines the vocabulary to be 
used in order to avoid the dangers of Arianism and Sabellianism. 
To avoid any confusion with Arianism, in speaking of the divine 
persons we do not use the terms diversity and difference but 
distinction, because diversity implies a distinction in genus and 
difference implies a distinction in species. Thus we do not say, 
the nature is divided into three persons, the person of the Father 
is separated from the person of the Son, a disparity exists 
between the persons, nor that the Son is alien to the Father, 
because the Son is perfectly similar and united to the Father but 
distinct from Him.

To avoid Sabellianism, we do not say that God is unique, but one 
in three persons, nor do we say that God is singular or that He is 
solitary.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER WE CAN SAY THAT GOD IS ALONE

Reply. 1. We cannot say that God is alone if the word alone is 
taken categorematically or absolutely, inasmuch as the meaning of 
the word is attributed absolutely to the subject, in this case 
solitude or aloneness. This would be tantamount to saying that God 
is solitary and without any consort and would deny the society of 
the divine persons.

2. But if the word alone is taken syncategorematically, denoting 
only the order of the predicate to the subject, it would be 
correct to say that God alone is eternal, God alone is His own 
being, or to God alone belong honor and praise.

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER WE CAN SAY THAT GOD THE FATHER IS ALONE

Reply. We cannot say that the Father is alone categorematically 
because the Father is not solitary; but syncategorematically we 
can say, for instance, that in God the Father alone enunciates or 
begets.

When the Church proclaims, "Thou only, O Jesus Christ, art most 
high, " she does not wish to say that the Son alone is most high 
but that the Son alone is most high with the Holy Ghost in the 
glory of the Father. [332] When Jesus said that no one knows the 
Son except the Father, He did not wish to say that the Son and 
Holy Ghost do not know the Son, because the persons are not 
excluded unless there is relative opposition, as when we say, the 
Father alone begets.

In this brief examination of the correct mode of speaking about 
the Trinity, we see how amazing it is that human language with all 
its limitations and inadequacies is able to develop such precision 
in enunciating a mystery that is in itself ineffable.

CHAPTER VI: QUESTION 32 THE KNOWABILITY OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

AT this point St. Thomas discusses the knowability of the divine 
persons because he considers their knowability a property of the 
divine persons that has a reference to us, just as in the treatise 
on the one God he treats of the knowability of God in the twelfth 
question. This question contains four articles: 1. Whether the 
divine persons can be known by natural reason; 2. Whether certain 
notions are to be attributed to the divine persons; 3. The number 
of these notions; 4. Whether we can entertain different opinions 
about the divine persons.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THE UNITY OF DIVINE PERSONS CAN BE KNOWN BY 
NATURAL REASON

St. Thomas takes up this problem after the first five questions. 
Recent theologians generally treat of it in the beginning of the 
treatise to support the validity of their investigations into the 
divine processions. The order adopted by St. Thomas is excellent 
in itself, although from our standpoint it is useful to consider 
the indemonstrability of this mystery at least briefly in the 
beginning. We will here consider the problem at some length.

State of the question. The question is well put by St. Thomas in 
the three difficulties proposed at the beginning of the article. 
1. Many Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophers admitted a certain 
kind of Trinity with three hypostases, namely, the One, the Logos, 
and the world soul. 2. Richard of St. Victor tried to demonstrate 
the Trinity from the infinity of the divine goodness, which 
communicates itself infinitely in the procession of the three 
divine persons and from the fact that there can be no joyous 
possession of any good without some consort or association in that 
enjoyment. In a similar way, St. Augustine proceeded to show the 
Trinity of persons from the procession of the word and of love in 
our human minds. 3. If the mystery of the Trinity had no relation 
to our reason, its revelation would seem to be superfluous.

We might add that Abelard tried to demonstrate the Trinity. [333] 
St. Anselm frequently attempted to construct demonstrations to 
prove the Trinity and sometimes indulged in what were at least 
wordy extravagances. In recent times Guenther also wished to 
demonstrate this mystery, [334] as did Rosmini, who brought down 
on himself the Church's condemnation. [335] More recently Schell, 
in opposition to the rationalists and Unitarians, who said this 
mystery was openly opposed to reason, tried to prove the Trinity 
from the nexus between aseity and immanent processions. [336]

The reply, however, is in the negative: the Trinity of the divine 
persons cannot be known by natural reason, that is, it cannot be 
understood or demonstrated. This statement does not depress but 
rather pleases the theologian.

The proof is from 1. Scripture; 2. the authority of the Fathers; 
3. the definitions and declarations of the Church; [337] 4. 
theological reasoning.

1. The authority of the Scriptures. From our Lord's words, "No one 
knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the 
Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to 
reveal Him" (Matt. 11:27), it is clear that the Trinity of the 
divine persons is above created natural knowledge, even that of 
the angels. This is confirmed by our Lord's words to St. Peter, 
"Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood hath 
not revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven" (Matt. 
16:17). The second text, it is true, refers directly to the 
mystery of the Incarnation, but if the incarnation of the Son of 
God is above natural reason, the mystery of the Trinity is all the 
more above human reason. Hence Pope Hormisdas in writing to the 
Emperor Justin said: "No visible or invisible nature is able to 
investigate the secret of the Trinity. " [338]

2. The authority of the Fathers. In his argument sed contra St. 
Thomas quotes St. Hilary and St. Ambrose. He also adduces the 
authority of St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Fulgentius, and St. Jerome. 
[339] He quotes St. Gregory of Nyssa's words, "No words can 
express the ineffable depth of this mystery. " [340]

3. The authority of the Vatican Council: "The mysteries hidden in 
God are proposed for our belief and if they had not been divinely 
revealed they could not be known. . . . These divine mysteries by 
their very nature exceed the created intellect and even when they 
are handed down by revelation and received by faith remain covered 
with the veil of faith and wrapped up in obscurity for us as long 
as we are journeying in this life toward the Lord, for we walk not 
through the species of things but by faith. " [341] The same 
Council declared: "If anyone shall say that the divine revelation 
does not contain true and proper mysteries, but that all the 
dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated from natural 
principles by the efforts of reason, let him be anathema. " [342]

The Church did not in these words define that the mystery of the 
Trinity is a mystery properly so called, but it is commonly 
believed in the Church that the Trinity is supreme among all 
mysteries, since it is the mystery of God's intimate life, and if 
this mystery is not essentially supernatural, the other mysteries, 
of the incarnation of the Son of God, our redemption, the sending 
of the Holy Ghost, would not be essentially supernatural 
mysteries. Then these mysteries would not be indemonstrable except 
for their contingency, since the physical world was not created 
from eternity but in time, and they would not be indemonstrable by 
reason of their essential supernatural nature. However, the 
Council declared: "The divine mysteries are above the created 
intellect by their very nature to such a degree that even when 
they are handed down by revelation and received by faith" they 
cannot be demonstrated. This truth was affirmed against the 
semirationalists Guenther and Frohschammer.

Several declarations were made by the Church against Guenther. 
[343] The following propositions by Rosmini were condemned by the 
Church: "After the mystery of the Trinity had been revealed, its 
existence can be proved by purely speculative arguments, although 
these arguments are negative and indirect, and these arguments can 
reduce this truth to the realm of philosophy so that it becomes a 
scientific proposition like others in philosophy. If this 
proposition were denied, the theosophic doctrine of pure reason 
would not only be incomplete but it would be destroyed because of 
consequent absurdities. " [344] Rosmini's teaching that there are 
"three supreme forms of being, namely, subjectivity, objectivity, 
and holiness and, when these forms are transferred to absolute 
being, they cannot be conceived as anything else than living and 
subsisting persons, " was also condemned. [345]

Guenther taught something like this when he defined personality as 
the consciousness of oneself. "Consciousness, " he said, 
"presupposes the duality of the subject and the object and the 
knowledge of their identity. The subject is the Father, the object 
is the Son or the Word, and their substantial identity is the Holy 
Ghost. " Further he declared, "If in God there were but one 
person, God would not be conscious of Himself. " [346] This last 
statement is obviously false since God is subsisting intellect 
itself. Moreover, according to Guenther's theory, there should be 
not only three who are conscious of themselves but also three 
consciousnesses in order that there be three personalities, and 
then in God there would be three intellects. This would be 
tritheism, and something essential in God would be multiplied. 
[347]

Because of these different authoritative statements it is clear 
that the Holy Trinity cannot be known naturally, even after its 
existence is known by revelation. It is also clear that the real 
possibility of this mystery cannot be positively demonstrated even 
after revelation. If once the possibility could be proved, the 
actual existence would also be proved because in necessary things 
existence follows possibility, and the Trinity is not contingent 
as are the Incarnation and the Redemption.

4. The theological proof. In God only that can be known naturally 
which is necessarily and evidently connected with creatures.

We can know nothing about God naturally except through created 
effects, as was shown above, [348] and the natural principles 
which are known from a consideration of created being. But from 
these created effects, at least those that are natural, we cannot 
arrive at the knowledge of the Trinity because these effects 
proceed from the creative power or God's omnipotence, which is 
common to the entire Trinity and, like the divine intelligence and 
the divine will, pertains to the unity of the essence and not to 
the distinction of the persons. Therefore it is impossible to come 
to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason.

The major of this argument is philosophically and theologically 
certain. [349] The minor is of faith according to the Fourth 
Lateran Council, which said that the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Ghost are "co-omnipotent and co-eternal, one principle of all 
things. " [350] By philosophy and theology it can be shown that 
omnipotence pertains to the divine nature as it is one and not as 
it is threefold in the persons, since each person does not have 
its own proper and distinct omnipotence. Thus created effects do 
not per se proceed from God as triune but only concomitantly 
inasmuch as the creative power is one and the same in the three 
persons. The reader is referred to St. Thomas' article, in which 
he clarifies this truth more than did his predecessors.

Objection. If created effects were known more perfectly, as they 
are known, for instance, by the angels, perhaps the Trinity could 
be known from them.

Reply. An effect, no matter how perfectly it is known, will not 
lead to the knowledge of the cause except under that aspect by 
which it proceeds from the cause and according to the dependence 
of the effect on the cause. Thus a painting makes known the 
painter, but it does not tell whether the painter was large or 
small, fat or lean. Created effects, at least natural effects, do 
not depend on God as triune but only as He is one.

Confirmation. In the body of the article St. Thomas adds two 
theological arguments. "Anyone who tries to prove the Trinity of 
persons by natural reason derogates from faith in two ways. 1. He 
derogates from faith because it is concerned with things that do 
not appear and are hidden in God. . . . 2. Such an attempt arouses 
the derision of non-believers since they are led to believe that 
we depend on human reasonings and believe because of them. " The 
holy doctor concludes: "We should not try to prove the things that 
are of faith. . .; it is enough to make a defense by showing that 
what faith proclaims is not impossible. " He says "make a defense, 
" that is, by solving objections and offering reasons of 
convenience.

Reply to the first objection. The philosophers did not know a 
Trinity of persons, but the attributes which were later attributed 
to the persons. The Neoplatonists spoke of three subordinate 
hypostases which were not equal and which were quite different 
from the three equal divine persons. They spoke of 1. the one, 
which is also the supreme good (the god of Plato); 2. the first 
intelligence (the god of Aristotle); 3. and the world soul (the 
god of the Stoics).

Reply to the second objection. Concerning the Trinity, reason can 
offer non-demonstrative reasons, arguments of convenience. Thus 
from the infinite goodness of God we are persuaded by an argument 
of convenience to accept God's fecundity within Himself, but this 
is no proof. In the same way from the fact that our intellect 
produces a word we cannot prove that there is a word in God; in us 
the word is a result of need, in God the word is from 
superabundance.

Reply to the third objection. Nevertheless the revelation of the 
Trinity is not without relation to the truths of the natural 
order, which it confirms. The Trinity confirms the freedom of 
creation, for if God made all things by His Word, He did not 
create by a necessity of nature or of knowledge; since He is 
already fecund within Himself He does not need to create in order 
to be fecund. [351] The revelation of the Trinity was especially 
necessary for a correct understanding of the salvation of the 
human race, which is accomplished by the incarnate Son and by the 
gift of the Holy Ghost. These two mysteries presuppose the mystery 
of the Trinity.

First doubt. Whether after the revelation of this mystery it can 
be clearly demonstrated by reason alone. The reply is in the 
negative: 1. from the authority of the councils, according to 
which mysteries in the strict sense cannot be demonstrated even 
after they are revealed; 2. from theological reason because divine 
revelation does not indicate that creatures depend and proceed per 
se from God as triune

Second doubt. Whether the possibility of the mystery of the 
Trinity at least can be apodictically proved by reason after it 
has been revealed. The reply is in the negative: 1. because, as 
has been said, only that can be known naturally in God which 
necessarily is connected with creatures. But the possibility of 
the Trinity is no more clearly connected with creatures than its 
existence, because the creative power is common to the three 
persons. 2. Moreover, in necessary things existence follows from a 
real intrinsic possibility as, for instance, if it is true that 
God can be wise then He is indeed most wise. But the Trinity is 
not something contingent but necessary. Therefore, if by reason 
alone we can prove conclusively that the Trinity is intrinsically 
possible, we would also prove its existence. Such is the reasoning 
of many Thomists, among them Gonet and Billuart.

Objection. Whatever can be shown to involve no contradiction is 
proved to be possible. But by reason alone it can be shown that 
the Trinity involves no contradiction. Therefore it can be proved 
to be possible, for intrinsic possibility is simple non-repugnance 
to being.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if it can be shown positively and 
evidently to involve no contradiction, I concede; if only 
negatively and probably, I deny. [352] Thus St. Thomas says: 
"Theology makes use of philosophy to counter those things which 
are said against the faith by showing either that these things are 
false or that they are not necessary. " [353] This means, Billuart 
notes, when we solve the objections from reason and the 
contradictions which oppose the possibility of this mystery, we 
show that these arguments are at least not necessary or cogent. It 
suffices that this mystery be not judged to be impossible, but not 
that it is evidently possible. [354] We have shown that the 
possibility of this mystery cannot be disproved, nor can it be 
strictly proved because we have here a mystery in the strict 
sense, which has no necessary and evident connection with 
creatures that are naturally knowable. The reason given by St. 
Thomas in the body of the article is entirely formal. In order to 
understand the possibility of this mystery we must be able to see 
that if God were not triune He would not be God just as we see 
that if God were not omnipotent He would not be God. This truth is 
not manifest even in the extraordinary intellectual visions which 
are granted by means of infused species such as the angels 
possess; this truth cannot be seen except when the essence of God 
itself is seen, and God's essence cannot be known as it is in 
itself by any created species. [355]

I insist. No middle exists between the possible and the 
impossible. But the rationalists cannot prove that this mystery is 
impossible. Therefore the theologians can prove that it is 
possible.

Reply. I deny the consequence. Although no middle exists between 
the possible and impossible, a middle does exist between the 
demonstration of possibility and the demonstration of 
impossibility, for the possibility of the Trinity is plausible 
although it cannot be proved. So it is with all mysteries that 
transcend demonstration; they are not contrary to reason, they are 
above it. Their possibility cannot be positively proved or 
disproved; it is only plausible. Such is the possibility of the 
Incarnation, of eternal life, of the beatific vision, of the light 
of glory, and the possibility of grace, which is the seed of 
glory.

I insist. In the treatise on the Trinity it is at least shown that 
the Trinity implies no contradiction. Therefore it is possible.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that we see clearly that the 
Trinity implies no contradiction, this I deny; that it appears 
plausible, this I concede. We say, for instance, that in God to be 
begotten is not less perfect than to beget, that to be spirated is 
not less perfect than to spirate, but this is not evident. We 
cannot prove conclusively that passive generation imputes no 
imperfection in the Son of God; we only indicate it with some 
probability while it is revealed elsewhere.

I insist. God as one is no less supernatural than as triune. But 
God as one can be naturally known. Therefore He can be known 
naturally also as triune.

Reply. I distinguish the major: God as one is no less supernatural 
in being as He is in Himself, I concede; as a knowable object with 
regard to creatures, I deny. I distinguish the minor: God is known 
in this way by creatures, I concede; otherwise, I deny.

Third doubt. Whether reason by itself alone can find analogies to 
make known the divine processions. For example, if the Son of God 
had not been called the Word of God in St. John's Gospel, would 
St. Augustine have been able to discover the analogy of our mental 
word with the Word of God?

We reply with St. Thomas. [356]

1. St. Augustine would not have been able, before the revelation 
of the Trinity, to propose this analogy in such a way that it 
would have led him to certitude about the existence of the 
Trinity.

2. But after the Trinity was revealed he would have been able to 
propose the analogy as probable. Indeed, it is more than probable 
that the analogy was not discovered by St. Augustine, but that it 
is to some extent revealed in the prologue of St. John's Gospel.

Explanation. In his reply to the second difficulty, St. Thomas 
says concerning the arguments of fitness given by St. Augustine 
and Richard of St. Victor: "Once the Trinity has been established, 
these arguments show its congruity but not in such a way that they 
would be able to prove the Trinity of persons. . . . So, in 
astronomy, in order to explain the movement of the planets, a 
system of eccentrics and epicycles is adopted in order to explain 
the sensible appearances of heavenly movements, but these theories 
are not sufficient to prove anything, because these appearances 
could be proved by some other theory."

St. Thomas adds that this is clear in these individual instances.

1. With regard to the divine goodness being diffusive of itself. 
It is proposed as an argument of fitness that good is essentially 
diffusive of itself and the higher the good the more intimately 
and abundantly is it diffusive. Hence it is congruous that God the 
Father should beget the Son and with Him spirate the Holy Ghost in 
the unity of nature. But this is only an argument of congruity, 
for, as the Angelic Doctor says: "It is not necessary, if God is 
to communicate Himself in His infinite goodness, that some 
infinite being should proceed from God, but that some being should 
receive the divine goodness according to its own mode of being. " 
Thus it was that God created from nothing finite beings because of 
His infinite goodness. By this argument it cannot be demonstrated 
that God is infinitely fecund within Himself by that certain 
diffusion of goodness which exceeds the order of efficient and 
final causality and takes place by the communication of the divine 
nature itself to two uncreated persons.

2. Richard of St. Victor declared that there can be no joyous 
possession of any good without friendship or association, and from 
this argument of fitness he showed that there should be in God 
some association between distinct persons. This argument is not 
demonstrative because the alleged principle applies when perfect 
goodness is not found in one person and therefore this person 
requires the good of another person associated with itself in 
order to enjoy goodness fully. But God is essentially goodness 
itself and He possesses it fully and thus He differs entirely from 
a created person who needs the association of friends. If there is 
any association in God, it exists not because of a need but 
because of superabundance. Thus this argument is only an argument 
of congruity and not demonstrative.

3. Nor from the fact that our intellect enunciates a mental word 
does it follow necessarily that the Word is in God. Intellect is 
not found in God and in us univocally, and we have seen above that 
God, who is subsisting intelligence itself, does not need an 
accidental word for intellection. [357] Hence, if the Word is in 
God, it is not accidental but substantial; moreover the Word is 
not because of need but because of superabundance, and this can be 
known only by revelation.

Hence, according to St. Thomas, reason of itself alone did not 
discover these congruities, but after revelation it could propose 
such arguments. This mystery is properly speaking essentially 
supernatural, transcending the spheres of demonstration and 
demonstrability. In this essentially supernatural order we cannot 
penetrate farther than to those things that are formally or 
virtually revealed; beyond that we are in the realm of 
probability.

Fourth doubt. Whether, after revelation, these arguments of 
congruity can explain with some probability the divine processions 
as they are in themselves, or are they only convenient and useful 
representations without any foundation in the divine reality.

Reply. Perhaps many would reply by taking the stand that many 
modern critics take with regard to physical science: that these 
theories do not intend to explain how things are in reality, that 
they are only convenient representations useful in classifying 
known phenomena which are subject to change when other phenomena 
are discovered, as, for instance, in the case of radioactivity.

Following St. Thomas, we reply that these arguments of congruity 
with respect to the Trinity are not only convenient 
representations, but they explain reality with some probability, 
or rather they explain what is not in God. Such explanations are 
the more valid the more they are based on revelation. Indeed it 
appears that the formal mode of the first procession by 
intellectual diction, if not formally revealed by the fact that 
the Son of God is called the Word, is at least certain as a 
virtually revealed theological conclusion. But many of the other 
conclusions remain only probable.

Fifth doubt. Whether these arguments of congruity about the 
Trinity are simply superior or inferior to the demonstrations 
given in the treatise on the one God.

Reply. With regard to us, that is with regard to the mode and 
certitude of our knowledge, they are inferior; but in themselves 
they are superior with regard to the dignity of the object, 
because they are not beneath but above the sphere of 
demonstrability, and in the essentially supernatural order we 
cannot ascend higher than those things that are either formally or 
virtually revealed except in the sphere of probability.

Hence it is that semirationalists, like Guenther and Rosmini, who 
wish to transform these arguments of congruity into demonstrations 
really weaken rather than elevate them. This is clear from 
Rosmini's condemned proposition: "By these arguments the truth of 
the Trinity is brought within the scope of philosophy. " [358]

Against this view St. Thomas remarks: "It is useful for the human 
mind to exercise itself in arguments of this kind, however weak 
they may be, as long as there is no presumption of comprehending 
or understanding, because it is a great satisfaction to behold 
these sublime matters even if our consideration is slight and 
weak. " [359]

Thus our natural and inefficacious desire of seeing God in His 
essence is not a demonstration but it forcefully insinuates the 
possibility and congruity of eternal life, of the beatific vision, 
of the light of glory, and of inchoate and consummated grace. This 
possibility cannot be demonstrated because it is the possibility 
of something that is essentially supernatural, of a mystery in the 
strict sense, which transcends reason and demonstrability. [360]

These arguments of congruity are related to evidence and certitude 
in the same way that a polygon is related to the circumference of 
a circle. The sides of the polygon can be multiplied to infinity, 
but the polygon will never be identified with the circumference 
because it will never be as small as a point. In geometry we say 
that the polygon will be the circumference at the limit of 
multiplication, but multiplication is indefinite. Great 
theologians and the angels, by their natural cognition, can 
penetrate deeper and deeper into the arguments of congruity about 
the Trinity and never attain to evidence, because the evidence 
which-is beyond the limit of this progressive penetration is not 
the natural evidence of demonstration but the supernatural 
evidence of the beatific vision. These arguments are like the 
element of cogitation in faith, if we define the act of faith as, 
"to believe is to think with assent. " [361] Such thinking in this 
life never reaches evidence; only in heaven, where faith ceases 
because it cannot exist alongside vision. [362]

Recapitulation of the solution of the principal objections against 
the Trinity. [363]

According to the rationalists the dogma of the Trinity is a 
violation of the principles of contradiction and causality.

The first objection often proposed by the rationalists is the 
following. Those things which are the same as a third are 
identical. This is a form of the principle of contradiction or 
identity and is called the principle of comparative identity, on 
which the validity of the demonstrative syllogism is based. But 
the three persons are identified with the divine essence (since 
each one is God). Therefore the three persons cannot be really 
distinct from one another.

Reply. I distinguish the major: those things which are the same as 
a third in fact and in reason are identical, I concede; which are 
the same as a third in fact but not in reason, I deny. I 
contradistinguish the minor: but the three persons are the same as 
the divine essence in fact and in reason, I deny; the three 
persons are the same in fact but not in reason, I concede. I deny 
the consequent and the consequence.

I insist. Those things which are the same as a third in fact but 
not in reason are then identical in fact but not in reason. Thus 
the persons are distinct from each other only in reason but not in 
reality.

Reply. I distinguish the major: those things which are the same as 
a third in fact but not in reason are identical in fact but not in 
reason if they are no more opposed to each other than to the same 
third, I concede; otherwise, I deny. They are indeed opposed to 
each other by relative opposition. Just as the three angles of the 
triangle, although they have the same triangular surface, with 
which they are identified, nevertheless are really distinguished 
from each other because between them there is opposition of 
relation.

I insist. But it seems to be repugnant that the same thing (the 
essence) should in reality be identical with relations that are 
distinct from each other and opposed to each other.

Reply. An evident contradiction would exist if the extremes which 
are opposed to each other were absolutes, because each of the 
extremes would in itself imply an absolute reality which would be 
lacking in its opposite. But the contradiction does not appear 
when the extremes, as in God, are relative. We have seen that the 
divine persons are constituted by subsisting relations that are 
opposed to one another; but these relations have one <esse in> and 
are opposed only with regard to their real <esse ad>.

This reply is based on the application of that principle, admitted 
by the Greeks and the Latins, which illuminates this entire tract, 
namely, in God all things are one and the same except where there 
is opposition of relation. [364] Indeed those things that are the 
same as a third are identical if they are no more opposed to each 
other than to the third, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I 
contradistinguish the minor, as follows: but the three persons are 
the same as the essence and besides this they are opposed to each 
other by the opposition of relation, this I concede; otherwise, I 
deny. Therefore I deny the consequent and the consequence.

As in the natural order, "while transitive action is the same as 
motion and the reception of motion (passio), it does not follow 
that motion and its reception (actio and passio) are the same, " 
because they are mutually opposed by the opposition of relation, 
for transitive action, at least terminatively taken, is motion as 
from the mover, whereas passio (the reception of motion) is motion 
as in the one moved. In the words of St. Thomas, "passio and actio 
imply opposite references. " Similarly, paternity and filiation, 
although they are in reality the same as the divine essence, "by 
their proper natures imply opposite references. " [365]

A second objection frequently made is the following. The dogma of 
the Trinity is a violation of the principle of efficient 
causality, according to which nothing produces its own being. But 
in this dogma the person who produces, the Father, and the person 
produced, the Son, have the same divine essence. Otherwise the Son 
would not be God.

To put it more briefly: Nothing produces its own being. But the 
Father in begetting the Son would be producing His own being since 
it is the same as that of the Son. Therefore the Father cannot 
beget the Son. This objection is made by many rationalists, by the 
Unitarians and the Socinians.

Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: if the divine 
being were caused in the Son, I concede; if it is communicated to 
the Son, I deny. The conclusion is distinguished in the same way. 
Thus begetting in God is not a change from non-being to being, but 
implies the origin of one living being from a living principle 
conjoined to it. This principle is not a cause. [366] Aristotle 
pointed out that a principle is more general than a cause. [367] 
Thus the point is the principle of the line, but not its cause; 
the aurora is the principle of the day, but not its cause. So in 
God the principle does not signify priority, but origin, and the 
Father does not produce His own being; He communicates it only.

The term "communicate" transcends efficient and final causality. 
Thus in God to beget is not more perfect than to be begotten 
because in God begetting is not causing. That which is caused does 
not exist before in act, whereas that which is communicated exists 
before in act. For example, the first angle of the triangle 
communicates its surface, already existing in act, to the other 
two angles.

The third objection (by way of insistence) states that this dogma 
distorts the notion of person. For personality renders a nature 
incommunicable to another suppositum. But the nature which is in 
the person of the Father is communicated to the Son and to the 
Holy Ghost. Therefore this dogma distorts the very idea of 
personality.

Reply. I distinguish the major: absolute personality renders the 
nature incommunicable, I concede; relative personality renders the 
divine nature incommunicable, I subdistinguish: nature in itself, 
I deny; nature as personified, I concede. I contradistinguish the 
minor: the nature which is in the Father is communicated as nature 
in itself, I concede; as personified, namely, the divine nature in 
the mode of the Father, I deny. Thus there cannot be two Fathers 
or two Sons in the Trinity. Similarly in an equilateral triangle 
the first angle constructed renders the area of the triangle 
incommunicable inasmuch as it belongs to that first angle; 
nevertheless this same area remains communicable and is 
communicated to the other two angles.

I insist. But the person renders incommunicable a nature that is 
numerically the same even considered in itself. But this would not 
be true in God. Therefore.

Reply. A person absolutely renders a finite nature incommunicable 
which, since it is finite, is filled by the one personality. On 
the other hand, a relative personality, for example, the person of 
the Father, does not render an infinite nature incommunicable to 
other persons. The divine nature, being infinite and infinitely 
fecund, is not adequately filled by one relative personality; or, 
I say please prove the contrary. Personality in God differs from 
human personality inasmuch as it is not something absolute but 
something relative, and it is of the nature of relative things 
that they have a correlative. The Father cannot be without the 
Son, to whom He communicates His nature, not by causality but by 
the principle of origin. [368]

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE ARE NOTIONS IN GOD

In this article St. Thomas explains in opposition to Praepositivus 
of Cremona that it is necessary to express the relations in the 
abstract, and that the relations in the abstract are called 
personal properties or notions. Thus paternity is said to be a 
notion or the objective reason denoting the person of the Father, 
and filiation likewise is the notion or the proper reason denoting 
the person of the Son, and similarly procession is the notion 
denoting the third person.

The reason for having recourse to the abstract notions of 
paternity, filiation, etc., is that our intellect apprehends God 
not as He is in Himself as a most simple being, but in the mirror 
of sensible things, that is, according to our method of knowing 
sensible things. The simple forms of sensible things are signified 
by abstract terms, for example, animality, humanity, whereas the 
suppositum is signified by concrete terms, such as this animal, 
and this man.

As St. Thomas says, [369] because of their simplicity we designate 
divine things by abstract terms, and by concrete terms because of 
their subsistence. Thus we speak of God and, the Deity, of wisdom 
and a wise man, of paternity and the Father. But we add that God 
is His own Deity and the Father is His own paternity. Otherwise we 
would not be able to reply to the heretics who ask how the three 
persons are one God and how they are three. For the person of the 
Father there is a special reason since the person of the Father is 
actively referred to the two other persons by the two relations of 
paternity and active spiration. These two relations cannot be 
reduced to one, otherwise filiation and passive spiration would be 
identified and thus there would be only two persons. Thus we must 
admit two notions for the Father, namely, paternity and active 
spiration, and the latter is common to Him and to the Son.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE ARE FIVE NOTIONS IN GOD

This article justifies the accepted mode of speaking of the 
Trinity. The reply is in the affirmative: five notions are 
commonly given, namely, innascibility, paternity, filiation, 
common (active) spiration, and procession.

Such is the general usage of theologians, but Scotus added a 
sixth, the infecundity of the Holy Ghost. This notion is not 
acceptable because it does not pertain to the dignity of the Third 
Person.

In the body of the article St. Thomas shows why there are no more 
and no less than five notions. A notion is that which is the 
proper reason for knowing a divine person. But the divine persons 
are multiplied according to their origin (both active and 
passive). Therefore according to origin (active and passive) we 
derive the notions denoting the persons. Thus we have paternity, 
filiation, common active spiration, passive spiration, to which we 
add innascibility, because the person of the Father is known not 
only by paternity but also by the fact that He is from no one and 
that He is the principle without a principle. This notion is in 
conformity with the dignity of the Father, but the infecundity of 
the Holy Ghost is not an expression befitting the dignity of the 
Third Person. [370]

First corollary. Of these five notions only four are relations, 
since innascibility is not a relation but the negation of the 
relation of origin in the Father.

Second corollary. Only four of the notions are properties since 
common spiration belonging to two persons is not a property.

Third corollary. Of these five notions only three are personal 
notions, that is, notions constituting persons, since common 
spiration and innascibility are not personal. As we shall see 
below, innascibility does not properly constitute the First 
Person. [371] We shall also see that there are two notional acts, 
that is, the processions in their active sense, namely, generation 
and active spiration.

Objection. Innascibility seems to be pure negation and is 
therefore not a distinct notion because negation adds nothing to 
the dignity of the person.

Reply. Innascibility signifies that the Father is the principle 
without principle, and this is a great dignity. On the other hand, 
infecundity does not pertain to the dignity of the Third Person. 
[372]

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER WE MAY HAVE CONTRARY OPINIONS ABOUT THE 
NOTIONS

This article was written because the Greeks held other opinions 
about common spiration when they denied the Filioque.

St. Thomas replies that it is lawful to have other opinions about 
the divine notions provided that no conclusions are reached 
contrary to the faith proposed by the Church. With regard to the 
Filioque, we shall learn the doctrine of the Church when we treat 
in particular of the Holy Ghost as He proceeds from the Father and 
the Son. This doctrine was defined as early as 381 in the First 
Council of Constantinople. [373] This concludes the questions 
concerning the divine persons in common.

RECAPITULATION OF QUESTION 32

In the first question on the Trinity St. Thomas began with the 
unity of the divine nature and the revealed existence of the 
processions. He showed that the processions were immanent or ad 
intra and he explained them according to St. Augustine by analogy 
with the intellectual enunciation of the word and with love. Thus 
the processions were seen to be after the manner of intellection 
and of love. This is based on revelation since it is clear from 
the prologue of St. John's Gospel that the Son of God proceeds as 
the intellectual word of the Father.

In the second question he showed how these real processions, 
namely, generation and spiration, are the bases of real relations 
according to which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are 
denominated in Sacred Scripture. These real relations are not 
really distinguished from the essence, but they are really 
distinct from one another if relative opposition exists between 
them. For it is not repugnant that the relations be mutually 
opposed; they are indeed not opposed to each other in their <esse 
in> (for in this they are identified with the essence) but 
according to their <esse ad>, which does not properly inhere in 
the essence. If, on the contrary, that which is proper to a 
relation inhered in the subject, as the property of quality, the 
opposition of relation could not exist between the relations 
unless at the same time there should be opposition in the divine 
essence itself. We saw also how St. Thomas solved the objection 
based on the principle that those things which are the same as a 
third are identical, whereas Suarez held that the principle of 
identity does not apply to the Trinity.

In question 29 St. Thomas showed that the divine persons are 
formally constituted by subsisting relations opposed to one 
another. Thus he safeguards the analogical notion of person as 
something subsisting and incommunicable. Hence the divine essence 
is communicable but the paternity is not.

Then St. Thomas treats of plurality in God, the proper manner of 
expressing this plurality, and the knowability of this mystery.

St. Thomas thus begins with the unity of the divine nature and the 
two processions as they are revealed and proceeds to the three 
divine persons mentioned in revelation. Thus without detracting 
from the sublimity of this mystery he explains it to some extent 
by showing that, even after the unity of the divine nature is 
established, the Trinity of persons is not repugnant. The 
possibility of the Trinity is not properly and positively 
demonstrated, but congruent reasons are given to show that the 
divine nature ought to be fecund, even infinitely, after the 
manner of intellectual generation and the spiration of love. In 
this way St. Thomas retained what earlier theologians, like 
Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, had taught: that the good 
is diffusive of itself, and that it seems that the higher the good 
the more intimately it will be diffusive of itself. St. Thomas 
expressed this idea in his own words: "the higher any nature is, 
the more intimate with it will be that which proceeds from it. " 
[374]

But, as has been said, with respect to creatures the good is 
diffusive of itself primarily in the order of final causality and 
consequently in the order of efficient causality, since everything 
that acts does so because of some end. The divine processions, 
however, are above the order of causality, both final and 
efficient. The Father is not the cause of the Son; He is only the 
principle. The same is true of the Father and the Son with regard 
to the Holy Ghost. Hence St. Thomas makes little use of the 
formula, "Good is diffusive of itself, " in this treatise on the 
Trinity; and in order to express the fecundity of the divine 
nature he prefers the statement, "By how much higher a nature is 
so much more intimate will be that which proceeds from that 
nature, " and "By how much greater the understanding so much more 
intimate will be the intellectual concept with the intellect. . . 
. Hence, since the divine intellect is at the apex of perfection, 
we must say that the divine Word is perfectly one with Him from 
whom it proceeds without any diversity of nature. " [375]

The divine Word is not something accidental; it is substantial 
because intellection in God is not an accident but something 
subsisting. The first procession, then, is not the conception of 
an accidental word but the true generation of the substantial 
Word. Thus to some degree the mystery is explained notwithstanding 
its supernatural sublimity. We now turn to the divine persons in 
particular.

CHAPTER VII: QUESTION 33 THE DIVINE PERSONS IN PARTICULAR - THE 
PERSON OF THE FATHER

IN this question four things are explained in particular: 1. in 
what I sense the Father is a principle, 2. when the Father is so 
called personally, 3. when He is so called essentially, 4. the 
nature of innascibility. These questions explain the Trinity in a 
more concrete manner and in them we find an admirable application 
of the principles which were abstractly enunciated in the 
preceding questions.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THE FATHER IS A PRINCIPLE

State of the question. The difficulty arises because the Father is 
not the cause of the Son and therefore it seems that He cannot be 
the principle of the Son. It would also follow that the Son 
proceeded from a principle and would therefore be created, or at 
least that there were priority and posteriority in God. That which 
is later depends on that which is earlier, and dependence implies 
imperfection, which cannot exist in a divine person.

Reply. Nevertheless the Father is a principle. This is of faith 
since the Father is defined by the Council of Florence as "the 
principle without principle. " [376] In many earlier councils, 
especially in the Sixth Council of Toledo, the same doctrine was 
defined: "We confess the unbegotten and uncreated Father, the font 
and origin of the entire Trinity, with whom there is not only 
paternity but also the principle of paternity. " St. Augustine 
says: "The Father is the principle of the entire Deity. " [377]

St. Thomas explains the meaning of the word "principle" in the 
body of the article and in the reply to the first objection. A 
principle is nothing other than that from which something 
proceeds. For example, a line proceeds from the initial point, a 
series of numbers proceeds from unity, the light of day proceeds 
from the aurora. But the Father is He from whom the Son and the 
Holy Ghost proceed in God. Therefore the Father is a principle and 
this not in a metaphorical but the proper sense. This is a simple 
explanation of the meaning of "principle."

Reply to the first objection. This will be made clearer by 
contrast with the meaning of cause, for as Aristotle himself 
remarks, "The meaning of principle is more general than cause. " 
[378] Thus we say that the point is the principle of the line and 
not its cause. For the term "cause" (especially an extrinsic 
cause) seems to imply the diversity of substance and dependence of 
one on another, but this is not implied in the term "principle. " 
Hence, although the Greeks in speaking of God used the two terms 
'arche' and 'aitia' the Latin doctors never use the word "cause, " 
restricting themselves to the term "principle. " The reader is 
referred to the reply to the first objection.

Reply to the second objection. The Latins do not even use the 
expression "principle" of the Son and the Holy Ghost because this 
implies a certain subordination. The Son is said to be the 
principle from a principle, light from light, and the Holy Ghost 
is similar in His own way. The beautiful text of St. Hilary is 
quoted here: "The Son is not less because the one being is given 
to Him. " The Father and the Son both possess subsisting being 
itself, yet the Father communicates this being to the Son. 
Analogically, two brothers possessing something in common 
communicate to each other certain gifts.

Reply to the third objection. Here the objection that principle is 
derived from priority is solved. But in God there is no priority 
and no posteriority. I distinguish the major: principle is derived 
from priority according to the use of the word, let it pass; 
according to its formal significance, I deny; for principle does 
not denote priority but origin. In God, however, there is the 
relation of origin without priority. [379] Certainly there is no 
priority of time because the processions are eternal; nor is there 
priority of nature because the divine nature is numerically the 
same in the Father and the Son and the relation of paternity is 
not conceived without the opposing relation of filiation. Relative 
things are simultaneous in nature and in the intellect since one 
is in the definition of the other. The Father is not constituted 
by something absolute, as is the man who begets before he begets. 
In God, the Father does not become the Father, but of Himself and 
from all eternity He is the Father and He is formally so 
constituted by the subsisting relation of paternity, whose 
correlative is filiation, by which the Son is constituted. So it 
is with the three angles of an equilateral triangle.

In question 42, [380] speaking of the equality of the divine 
persons, St. Thomas says: " (In God) dignity is absolute and 
pertains to the essence. As the same essence which is paternity in 
the Father is also filiation in the Son, so the same dignity which 
is paternity in the Father is filiation in the Son. But in the 
Father this dignity is according to the relation of the giver; in 
the Son it is according to the relation of the receiver. " But to 
receive subsisting and infinite being in itself is not something 
less perfect than giving it. In the equilateral triangle the 
second angle constructed is not less perfect than the first, and 
for the second angle to receive the total area is not less perfect 
than for the first angle to communicate it. Hence the term 
principle notionally belongs to the Father. The term principle, 
however, is also used essentially with respect to creatures, and 
in this case it is common to the three persons.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NAME FATHER IS PROPERLY THE NAME OF A 
DIVINE PERSON

This is to say, whether the name "Father" is used not 
metaphorically but properly of the First Person and not of the 
others. The reply is in the affirmative for so the name is used in 
the Gospels, for example, in the formula for baptism, in the 
creeds, and by the councils.

This can be explained easily as follows. The proper name of any 
person signifies that by which that person is distinguished from 
others. But that by which the person of the Father is 
distinguished from the other persons is paternity.

Reply to the first objection. "Father" is indeed the name of a 
relation, but in God since relation is subsisting it can be the 
constitutive of a person.

Reply to the third objection. The divine Word is not 
metaphorically called the Son, because He is the mental concept, 
not accidental but substantial. Therefore the Father is so called 
not metaphorically but properly.

Reply to the fourth objection. The name "paternity" as it is used 
in its proper sense of God the Father has a prior significance 
than when it is used as designating an earthly father, at least 
with regard to the thing signified if not with regard to the 
manner of signification. For divine generation is the most perfect 
of all because it generates not only that which is similar in 
species but a Son whose nature is numerically the same as the 
nature of the Father. The earthly father, moreover, in generation 
does not produce the spiritual soul of his son, but only a 
disposition for it, nor does he produce a son in adult age. God, 
on the other hand, communicates to His Son His infinite nature, 
numerically the same as His own, so that His Son is immediately 
and eternally as perfect as the Father.

More and more it appears that the first procession is truly and 
properly generation, a generation that is spiritual in the full 
meaning of that word. It is not only conception, as when we say we 
conceive a mental concept; conception is only the initial stage of 
generation.

In God, the Father not only spiritually conceives His Son; He 
truly and properly generates Him spiritually, that is, He 
communicates to Him His nature in its entirety and numerically one 
with His own nature, which nature cannot be multiplied or divided. 
The Father communicates His nature to the Son from all eternity so 
that the only-begotten Son is from all eternity most perfect, an 
adult, if I may say so, in His divine age and entirely equal to 
the Father. From the height of his mystery light falls on the 
words of St. Paul to the Ephesians (3:15): "I bow my knees to the 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom all paternity in heaven 
and earth is named. " For from the divine paternity is derived 
that spiritual paternity by which the Supreme Pontiff is the 
Father of the Christian people, by which the founder of a 
religious order is the father of his sons, by which the bishop is 
the father of his diocese, and by which the priest is the father 
of the souls committed to his care. From this divine paternity, 
too, is derived that earthly paternity, which is something noble 
and excellent in the good Christian father, who like a patriarch 
gives his sons and daughters not only corporal life but heavenly 
blessings as did Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER IN GOD THE NAME FATHER IS PRIMARILY USED 
WITH A PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE

State of the question. In God the word "Father" has a twofold 
significance: first it is used essentially with reference to 
creatures, as when we say in the Lord's Prayer, "Our Father"; 
secondly it is used personally with reference to the only-begotten 
Son.

Reply. St. Thomas says: "In God the name 'Father' is used 
primarily in its personal meaning, rather than essentially."

The name "Father" in God refers primarily to the person because: 
1. it is used personally from all eternity and necessarily with 
relation to the only-begotten Son, and essentially with relation 
to creatures only in time, presupposing the free divine decree, 
which could not have been; 2. the perfect example of paternity and 
filiation is found in God the Father and God the Son, whose nature 
is numerically one. On the other hand, God is called essentially 
the Father of intellectual creatures, not according to the 
communication of His entire nature but according to the 
participation of the divine nature, that is, in the likeness of 
grace and glory. Thus adoptive filiation is the image of eternal 
filiation by nature, and this adoptive filiation is obviously much 
more imperfect. In a still less perfect manner God is called the 
father of irrational creatures, in which instead of His image only 
a mere trace is found.

Reply to the first objection. Common absolute terms are predicated 
prior to personal terms. But common terms which relate to 
creatures, like creator, are predicated after the personal names 
because they are predicated not from eternity but in time. In 
other words, the Son proceeds from the Father before creatures.

Hence, when we say in the Lord's Prayer, "Our Father, " "Father" 
is predicated essentially of the three persons; so also "Thy 
kingdom come" refers not to the First Person but to the three 
persons. But in St. Paul's words to the Ephesians (3:15), "I bow 
my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom all 
paternity in heaven and earth is named, " and in Christ's words, 
"My Father, " the name "Father" refers personally to the Father, 
and therefore Christ made the distinction, saying, "I ascend to My 
Father and to your Father" (John 20:17).

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER TO BE UNBEGOTTEN IS PROPER TO THE FATHER

The reply is in the affirmative: innascibility is a property of 
the Father since the Father is the principle without principle. 
Thus He is known by the fact that He is not from another. Of the 
Father it is generally said that "He was not made, nor created, 
nor begotten, nor proceeding. " [381] He is the principle without 
principle. [382]

Reply to the first objection. Primary and simple things are 
denoted by negations, as when we say that a point is that which 
has no parts.

Reply to the second objection. In another way the Holy Ghost may 
be said to be unbegotten since He does not proceed by generation. 
But the Father is properly said to be unbegotten because He does 
not proceed from any other and is the principle without principle 
whereas the Son is the principle from a principle and the Holy 
Ghost is the principle from both persons.

Reply to the third objection. In this way the relation of the Son 
is denied in the Father.

First doubt. Whether the Unbegotten is constituted as a notion by 
something positive or something negative.

Reply. Following the principle laid down in the reply to the first 
objection: the Unbegotten directly implies the negation of passive 
generation. But this negation denotes a great dignity, for from 
the fact that the Father is not from any principle it follows that 
He is the origin of the other persons, and this is something 
positive.

All these things can be illustrated by the commentaries on 
Christ's sacerdotal prayer, in which the Father is addressed 
personally. In this prayer frequently and it seems with insistence 
the Son of God says that His Father has given all things to Him: 
"Father, the hour is come, glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son may 
glorify Thee. As Thou hast given Him power over all flesh, that He 
may give eternal life to all whom Thou hast given Him. . . . And 
now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which 
I had, before the world was, with Thee" (John 17:1-5).

Second doubt. Why has not a special feast been instituted in honor 
of the Father?

The reply is found in the encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, Divinum 
illud munus [383] (namely, the Holy Ghost): "A danger might arise 
in belief and worship that the divine persons would be confused 
with each other and that the one nature would be separated. . . . 
Wherefore Innocent XII, our predecessor, refused the request of 
those who had asked for some solemnities proper to the honor of 
the Father. " The faithful might attribute to the principle of 
origin priority of dignity, which would be in opposition to the 
identity of nature.

CHAPTER VIII: QUESTION 34 THE PERSON OF THE SON

THREE names are attributed to the Son: the Son, the Word, and the 
Image. We have considered the name "Son" in connection with the 
name "Father, " hence we must still consider the names "Word" and 
"Image. " These three are entirely the same without even a virtual 
distinction, but they are distinguished in the mode of designation 
and with reference to various extrinsic connotations. We say the 
Son with reference to the Father, Word with reference to the 
enunciating intellect, and Image with reference to the principle 
which is imitated.

About the Word there are three articles: 1. Whether "the Word" is 
used essentially or personally; 2. Whether "the Word" is a proper 
name of the Son; 3. Whether in the name "Word" any reference to 
creatures is implied. These questions we will consider carefully 
in the light of the prologue of St. John's Gospel.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THE WORD IN GOD IS A PERSONAL NAME

State of the question. This article is introduced to distinguish 
"the Word" properly so called from "the word" improperly so 
called, namely, from the thing understood in the word and also 
from the intellection which is common to the three persons.

Reply. The affirmative reply is of faith as revealed in St. John's 
prologue, "the Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . And 
the Word was made flesh" (1:1, 14). In this text "the Word" 
designates the same person as "the only-begotten Son who is in the 
bosom of the Father" (1:18).

This doctrine was defined by St. Damasus I and the Fourth Council 
of Rome in these words: "If anyone shall not say that the Word of 
God, the Son of God, God even as God His Father, is able to do all 
things and know all things and is equal to the Father, let him be 
anathema. " [384] Similarly, the Second Council of Constantinople 
declared: "If anyone does not confess the two nativities of the 
Word of God. . . let him be anathema"; [385] the Lateran Council: 
"If anyone does not confess that God the Word descended from 
heaven. . . "; [386] and the Eleventh Council of Toledo, 
explaining the words, "And the Word was made flesh, " corroborated 
this doctrine. [387]

Doubt. Did these councils wish to define solemnly by these words 
that divine generation is properly by intellectual enunciation?

Reply. It does not seem that this has been properly defined, but 
it is revealed in the prologue of St. John's Gospel that the Son 
of God proceeds from the Father as an intellectual word. Therefore 
all theologians admit that it is at least theologically certain 
that the first procession is after the manner of intellection. 
Indeed, it seems that this truth is of faith according to the 
Scriptures although it is not solemnly defined.

In the body of the article it is shown that the name "Word" in God 
if used in its proper meaning is a personal and not an essential 
name. The reason is that "the Word" signifies something proceeding 
from another as a concept of the mind. But that which signifies 
something proceeding from another in God is personal since the 
divine persons are distinguished by their origin.

So that we may understand this reply, St. Thomas, in the first 
part of the body of the article, shows that the term "word" is 
used properly in three ways with reference to ourselves (the word 
of the mind, the word of the imagination, and the vocal word), and 
besides this it is also used improperly:

(diagram page 211)
word
proper
the interior concept of the mind. imagination of the sound to be 
emitted.

the sound which signifies the mental concept.

improper
that which is signified by the word, not the sign, but its 
meaning.

In God, however, "word" is used properly only in the first sense, 
as a concept of the mind; all other words in God are only 
metaphorical because they are something sensible or even corporeal 
and external. Hence St. Thomas says that the mental word in its 
proper meaning is not that which is understood but that in which 
the thing understood is known. [388] If St. Thomas sometimes says, 
"It is the word which is understood, " he is using "word" 
improperly for the thing signified by the word. For Descartes, on 
the other hand, the interior word is that which is understood, 
although he does not deny every relation of the word with the 
extramental thing.

Between these two concepts, that is, between realism and idealism, 
a great abyss exists, as we see when Descartes did not hesitate to 
write in the beginning of his Discourse on method: "For us a 
square circle is something unthinkable but perhaps it may not be 
something really impossible outside the mind. Perhaps God is able 
miraculously to make a square circle."

For realism, however, this is absolutely and evidently impossible 
outside the mind, and according to realism I in my mental word and 
you in your mental word understand the same law of extramental 
being, namely, that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. 
This law of extramental being is what is understood in my mental 
word and in your mental word.

If, however, the mental word itself is what is understood, then 
this law of extramental being is placed in jeopardy. Obviously 
there is a great abyss between realism and idealism. In this 
fundamental question of philosophy it is important that we 
preserve the proper meaning of our terms, otherwise we will always 
be talking incorrectly in our conclusions.

Some have tried to preserve their realism by conceding to the 
idealists that it is the mental word that is understood but they 
add later, as indeed the Scholastics generally hold, that the 
mental word has an essential relation with the extramental thing. 
But this qualification is not in harmony with the first statement. 
If the mental word itself is what is properly understood, how can 
we afterward pass over to the extramental thing, or to its 
essence? How shall we be able to compare the thing itself with the 
word that expresses it, when the thing itself cannot be known 
except in the word? How can we distinguish between the word that 
conforms to the extramental thing and the word that does not 
conform, as we are able to distinguish between a statue that 
represents a real man and a statue that represents an imaginary 
man? We cannot have recourse to the principle of causality because 
the validity of that very principle must be proved first.

Obviously an immense abyss stretches between Descartes, idealism 
and realism, and it would be exceedingly dangerous to concede to 
the idealists that the mental word is that which is properly 
understood. St. Thomas always says that the object of the 
intellect is being (extramental) and he does not say that the 
object of the intellect is the mental word of being. We are 
obliged always to speak so carefully about the word that it will 
be entirely clear, in opposition to Descartes, that a square 
circle is not only unthinkable but really impossible outside the 
mind. Descartes was not able to safeguard the validity of 
sensitive and intellectual knowledge except by having recourse to 
the criterion of God's veracity as the author of our faculties. 
But this implies a vicious circle because we must first prove 
God's existence by effects and by the principle of causality.

Reply to the first objection. The Arians said that the Son of God 
was a metaphysical word which was external, but, as St. Thomas 
says, an external word presupposes an internal word. Moreover, in 
St. John's Gospel we read, "The Word was God, " and God was the 
Word, and so the Word cannot be something created or produced 
outside of God.

Reply to the second objection. In God intellection is predicated 
essentially and belongs to the three persons.

Reply to the third objection. In God enunciation is predicated 
personally; only the Father enunciates, and the three persons 
understand. The Son alone is enunciated as the Word; the other 
persons are enunciated as things expressed in the Word.

Reply to the fourth objection. Sometimes "word" is used improperly 
for the thing signified by the word.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE WORD IS THE PROPER NAME OF THE SON

I reply in the affirmative, because word signifies a certain 
emanation from the intellect, and the Son alone proceeds after the 
manner of an emanation from the intellect.

Reply to the first objection. In God the Word is not accidental 
but substantial, because in God being and intellection are the 
same.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NAME WORD IMPLIES A REFERENCE TO 
CREATURES

The difficulty arises from the fact that creatures are contingent 
and not eternal, whereas the Word is necessary and eternal. But, 
as is noted in the sed contra, St. Augustine says that the name 
"Word" signifies not only the relation to the Father but also to 
creatures.

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative, because in the one act by 
which God knows Himself He also knows creatures, for in God there 
is only one intellection. Thus the one and only Word is expressive 
not only of the Father but of all creatures. Moreover, the Word 
with reference to creatures is not only expressive but also 
operative. In us, on the other hand, there are various words 
according to which by different acts of intellection we understand 
different things. An angel, however, understands all things 
interior to it by one word, as we shall see below. [389]

Doubt. Whether the name "Word" refers to possible creatures in the 
same way as it refers to future creatures.

Reply. From the body of the article and from the reply to the 
second objection the reply is that the name "Word" of itself 
implies a reference to possible creatures, and only per accidens 
and concomitantly a reference to future creatures.

Proof. The first part is proved as follows. The divine essence is 
known by God per se comprehensively, that is, to the full extent 
of its knowability. But it would not be known comprehensively if 
the divine omnipotence and the possible effects virtually 
contained in it were not known. Therefore the Word, by which the 
divine essence is expressed, has a reference per se to possible 
creatures.

The second part is proved as follows. Per se the Word does not 
contain a reference to future creatures or even to futurables, 
because the knowledge from which the Word proceeds per se is 
natural and necessary, since the Word proceeds naturally and 
necessarily. But the knowledge of futures and futurables in God is 
not natural and necessary but presupposes God's free decree. 
Hence, if the knowledge of the same nature as now.

But per accidens the Word contains a reference to future 
creatures, presupposing the eternal decree of free creation, since 
the Word in expressing the divine nature expresses it as operating 
freely ad extra.

Consequently we say that the blessed see creatures in the Word as 
in their exemplary and efficient cause; [390] but they do not see 
all possible creatures because this would imply the possession of 
comprehensive vision. Besides this vision of creatures in the 
Word, the blessed have knowledge of creatures outside the Word by 
representations and proper species, [391] and this second 
knowledge is inferior to the first, being clouded and hazy as in 
the dusk, whereas the first knowledge is clear as in the morning 
light. Hence many of St. Thomas' commentators, such as John of St. 
Thomas, point out that the theologians in heaven who while on 
earth engaged in the study of theology, not only because of a 
natural desire of learning and teaching but also for the love of 
God and souls, see the object of theology in the Word, whereas 
other theologians who studied theology only because of their 
desire for learning see the object of theology outside the Word, 
with a knowledge that is inferior and cloudy.

Many mystics, like Tauler, teach that an intellectual creature, 
elevated to grace, will not be perfect with the ultimate 
perfection unless it sees God immediately and sees itself in the 
Word. It is a higher kind of knowledge to see our soul in the Word 
than to see it in itself and through itself. The mystics often say 
that the soul must return to its principle, and that the soul will 
love itself most perfectly when, beholding itself in the Word, it 
loves itself in the Lord without any inordinate self-love. St. 
Thomas says: "So far as a thing is perfect it will attain to its 
principle. " [392] This is the return to the bosom of the Father, 
in some sense similar to what is said of the only-begotten Son, 
who is "in the bosom of the Father. " [393] Then the soul will not 
live for itself but for God.

CHAPTER IX: QUESTION 35 THE IMAGE

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER "IMAGE" IN GOD IS PREDICATED PERSONALLY

THIS article is intended to explain the words of Holy Scripture I 
about the Second Person of the Holy Trinity: "The unspotted mirror 
of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness"; [394] "that the 
light of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God, should not 
shine unto them"; [395] "who is the image of the invisible God, 
the firstborn of every creature"; [396] "who being the brightness 
of His glory, and the figure of His substance,. . . sitteth on the 
right hand of the majesty on high. " [397]

Reply. The name Image is a personal and not an essential name. The 
reason is that for something to be a true image it must proceed 
from another similar to itself in species or in the sign of the 
species. But that which implies procession or origin in God is 
personal. Therefore the name "Image" is a personal name.

To explain his reason St. Thomas shows that two conditions are 
required for an image: 1. that it be similar not only 
analogically, generically, or even specifically, but in the sign 
of the species, for example, according to the features of the 
face; 2. that this likeness have its origin from that being of 
which it is the image by virtue of some procession. Here we can 
see the validity of common sense. No one is said to be like his 
image, but we do say that the picture of this man is perfectly 
like him. Similarly, as St. Augustine says, "One sheep is not said 
to be the image of another, because it was not expressed by it. " 
In this observation we see the hidden wealth in common sense and 
in natural reason, which contain the beginnings and rudiments of 
ontology just as the earth contains metals, like gold and silver, 
and precious stones, like diamonds.

A book could be written about the riches hidden in common sense, 
particularly with regard to the verb "is, " its different tenses 
and modes, its various persons; all this is a reflection of 
metaphysics cast on the elements of grammar.

Images are of three kinds.

1. The artificial image, which is similar only in the sign of the 
species, for example, in features or figure, as a picture or 
statue. This IS an imperfect image.

2. The intentional image, which is the expressed intelligible 
species implying a likeness not only in the sign of a specific 
nature but also in the specific nature itself, not in the mode of 
natural being but in intelligible being. This image is more 
perfect than the first.

3. The natural image, which denotes likeness both in the specific 
nature and in the mode of natural being, as the son is sometimes 
the living image of his father. This is the perfect image. In God 
it is most perfect because it is likeness in a nature numerically 
the same. The first and third kinds of image are presented as the 
thing that is known; the second kind of image itself is not 
properly known but that in which another thing is known. In God 
the Word is at the same time the intentional and the natural 
image.

Reply to the first objection. That from which the image proceeds 
is properly called the exemplar and improperly the image. Thus it 
is said that man is made to the image of God, but God is properly 
the exemplar and man is the imperfect image of God.

Reply to the third objection. Imitation in God does not signify 
posterity but only assimilation. All words retain a certain amount 
of imperfection from their original human application, according 
to which they apply first to creatures.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NAME IMAGE IS PROPER TO THE SON

State of the question. The Greeks applied the name Image to the 
Holy Ghost as well, while the Latins use it only for the Son.

Reply. The name Image is proper to the Son.

1. Proof from Scripture. In Sacred Scripture the word "image" 
refers only to the Son, as for instance, "Who is the image of the 
invisible God, the firstborn of every creature"; [398] and "Who 
being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His 
substance. " [399]

2. Proof from theological reason. Only the Son by reason of His 
procession formally possesses that which is similar to the Father 
because He proceeds as the expressed Word. The Holy Ghost, on the 
other hand, proceeds as love, but love is not a likeness of that 
from which it proceeds but rather an inclination after the manner 
of a weight or an impulse.

Out of respect to the Greek Fathers it may be said that the Holy 
Ghost is like the Father and the Son in nature and thus the Holy 
Ghost may be said to be the image of the Father and the Son in a 
broad sense, but not formally by reason of His procession. [400] 
For the same reason we said above that the second procession is 
not generation because of itself it does not produce something 
similar to that from which it proceeds.

Durandus objected that the Son is not similar to the Father by 
reason of essence, because here there is identity, nor by reason 
of relation because here there is opposition. We reply that the 
Son is like the Father by reason of essence and relation at once, 
that is, by reason of person, for like things agree in some things 
and differ in others. Thus the Father and the Son agree in nature 
and differ by relation.

Note on the third objection. Man is said to be in the likeness of 
God rather than the image of God, that is, man tends toward the 
likeness of God.

Recapitulation. "The Word" is the proper name of the Son, for the 
Word in God is both substantial and incommunicable, that is, He is 
a person, something subsisting and incommunicable. The Word 
implies a reference to creatures inasmuch as He proceeds from the 
comprehensive knowledge of the divine essence, which is the cause 
of creatures. Again, the Son of God is properly the Image, an 
image that is natural and intentional at the same time, as a son 
is the living image of his father. Only the Son has this derived 
likeness of an image by reason of His procession because He 
proceeds as the expressed Word of the Father.

Therefore we read in the Scriptures, "the image of the invisible 
God, " "the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, " and "the 
brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance. " [401]

CHAPTER X: QUESTION 36 THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST

THE Holy Ghost is known by three names: the Holy Ghost, Love, and 
the Gift. Hence there are three questions about the Holy Ghost.

About the Holy Ghost four things are asked: 1. Whether this name, 
Holy Spirit, or Holy Ghost, is personal; 2. Whether the Holy Ghost 
proceeds from the Father and from the Son, 3. Whether He proceeds 
from the Father by the Son; 4. Whether the Father and the Son are 
one principle of the Holy Ghost.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THIS NAME, HOLY SPIRIT OR HOLY GHOST, IS A 
PROPER NAME OF ONE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

State of the question. Often in the Scriptures this name is common 
to the divine persons, for example, "But if I by the Spirit of God 
cast out devils. " [402] Further, the Holy Spirit does not imply a 
reference to someone else as the Father and the Son refer to 
another. Moreover, the name "Holy Spirit" appears to be a divine 
attribute, as when we speak of the spirit of this man, meaning his 
mind or his manner of judging.

In the Scriptures, however, especially in the New Testament, "the 
Holy Spirit" is used personally in many places, for example, in 
the formula of baptism, and in the instances cited in the 
introduction. [403] St. Thomas also refers to the Johannine comma, 
which is at least an expression of tradition even if its 
genuineness is not entirely clear.

In the body of the article St. Thomas concludes that although the 
name, Holy Ghost, is not in itself a proper name, it has been 
adapted by its use in the Scriptures to designate the third 
person. St. Thomas explains that those things that pertain to love 
often do not have a proper name, and some common name is adopted. 
[404] This happens because love is ineffable. The reason is that 
we give proper names to those things that we understand properly 
and distinctly, but we are not able to understand the things 
pertaining to love properly and distinctly in the abstract. Why? 
Because the elements of love are less known to us than the matters 
that pertain to the intellect, and this for the following three 
reasons.

1. The intellect knows those things that are in itself better than 
those things that belong to another faculty, as the will. [405]

2. Good, which is the object of love, is not formally in the mind 
like truth, which is the conformity of judgment with the thing, 
but the good is in things since the good is the very perfection of 
that thing that is amiable and alluring. Therefore the immanent 
term of love goes without a proper name.

3. Love as inclining to the good which is in things, like every 
tendency or inclination, contains something potential, and things 
are not intelligible except so far as they are in act and 
determined. A thing is known as an act or as a form; but love is 
rather a tendency, an impulse, or the weight by which the lover is 
drawn to that which is loved. St. Thomas said above: "The 
procession that takes place in the nature of goodness is not 
understood as being in the nature of a similitude but rather in 
the nature of something impelling and moving toward another. " 
[406] He goes on to say: "This procession remained without a 
special name, but it can be called spiration" because of its 
inclination to a terminus not properly named. Love tends to the 
good that is in things; first it inclines after the manner of 
desire before it possesses the thing. The possession takes place 
by intuitive cognition, that is, by sight and touch in the 
sensible order; as long as the possession continues, love quiesces 
by fruition in that which is loved. Therefore bliss or the 
possession of the thing is not in love but in the intuitive 
cognition of what is loved, and this is the assimilation of the 
thing. [407] This tendency of love and this fruition are known 
experimentally and it is difficult to obtain a speculative 
knowledge of them which can be expressed by a special and distinct 
name. Hence we said above that the terminus of intellectual 
enunciation has a proper name, namely, the word, but the terminus 
of the act of love has no special name. [408]

Because of this ineffability of love some say that love is 
something higher than knowledge and that knowledge is a kind of 
disposition for love. Such was the teaching of Plotinus, who 
speaks of a supreme <hypostasis> above the second <hypostasis>, 
which is intellect; the supreme <hypostasis> of Plotinus is the 
One-Good, which is not intelligible but which can be contacted by 
love. Later Scotus taught that bliss is essentially in the love of 
God. But St. Thomas showed that the intellect is simply superior 
to the will, which it directs, because the object of the 
intellect, that is, being, is more absolute and universal than the 
good. [409] Although in this life the love of God is better than 
the abstract knowledge of God, in heaven the possession of God 
takes place by intuitive vision, which is necessarily followed by 
love just as the property is derived from the essence.

The following should be noted about the ineffability of love, 
which many consider superior to the intellect. When voluntarists 
and dynamists (like Bergson) say that there is more in motion than 
in immobility, they confuse the immobility of inertia, which is 
inferior to motion, with the immobility of perfection, which is 
above motion and which is the stability as something more perfect 
opposed to the instability of mobile things. These philosophers 
never use the terms stability and instability. There is more in 
motion than in the terminus from which the motion began, but there 
is not more than in the end of the motion itself, more in esse 
than in fieri (more in being than in becoming), more in a man than 
in the embryo. If you deny the superiority of this second kind of 
immobility, the stability of perfection, you must say with Eduard 
Le Roy that God Himself is in perpetual evolution and is creative 
evolution itself. In the treatise on the One God, St. Thomas asks 
whether God has life. [410] He replies that God possesses immanent 
life of the highest degree, subsisting intelligence itself whose 
measure is the one stable instant of eternity, namely, the stable 
now, not the fluid moment of time which is ever fleeting and ever 
unstable.

When, therefore, many say that the intellect is more imperfect 
than love because it is static and immobile, they do not take into 
consideration sufficiently the distinction between the imperfect 
immobility of inertia and the perfect stability which is the goal 
of the highest contemplation of immutable truth. Absolute dynamism 
ought logically to deny the immobility of God Himself and confuse 
God with mundane evolution. And anti-intellectualism, professed by 
many voluntarists, ought to take the stand that the intellect is 
not a simply simple perfection and that God does not know Himself 
as Plotinus taught about the supreme <hypostasis> which he had 
placed above the first intelligence. This is, of course, 
absolutely inadmissible. We can concede, however, that the human 
intellect as such sometimes materializes the life of the spirit 
inasmuch as it knows the spirit in the mirror of sensible things. 
In this way the human intellect understands spiritual qualities 
according to the analogy of quantity and speaks of a high or broad 
spirit or of the height of understanding.

Because of this ineffability of love it follows, as St. Thomas 
says in this article, that the relations which arise from the 
procession of love are unnamed. Wherefore the name of the person 
proceeding in this manner is not a proper name but a name 
accommodated from the usage of the Scriptures, namely, the Holy 
Ghost (Holy Spirit) as we see it used in the formula of baptism. 
[411]

The accommodative application of this name has two advantages: 1. 
since the third person proceeds from the two first persons, who 
are spirits, this third person is, as it were, their spirit; 2. 
since the term "spirit" in corporeal things denotes a certain 
impulse and it is a property of love to move or impel the will of 
the lover to that which is loved.

Reply to the first objection. Many texts of the Old Testament use 
the term "spirit of God" as a common name rather than a personal 
name. Such is not the case, however, in the New Testament, where 
this accommodation is obvious as in the formula for baptism and in 
the promise of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to the second objection. The name "Holy Spirit" was adopted 
to signify a person distinct from the others only by relation and 
as spirated by them.

Reply to the third objection. Why can we say, "our Father, " and 
"our Spirit, " but not "our Son',? We cannot say "our Son" because 
no creature can be considered the principle with regard to any of 
the divine persons. On the other hand we depend on our heavenly 
Father, and spirit is a common name as when we say the spirit of 
Moses or of Elias. Even the Holy Spirit, dwelling within us and 
inspiring us to holy deeds, can be called our spirit in the sense 
that He is the life of our life. In this sense we say that we have 
received the Spirit of adoption of sons.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE SON

State of the question. This article contains two questions: 
whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, which is the subject 
of dispute between the Greeks and Latins, and whether the Holy 
Ghost proceeds from the Son in such a way that if He did not 
proceed from the Son He would not be distinguished personally from 
the Son. Concerning this second question Scotus opposed St. 
Thomas, who gave an affirmative reply. We shall consider first the 
prior question particularly in its speculative aspect since the 
positive aspect is treated in the history of dogma.

Various errors and the definitions of the Church. Many errors 
about the procession of the Holy Ghost have been condemned by the 
Church. In the beginning the Eunomians and the Macedonians denied 
that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father, and they were 
immediately condemned by the Council of Constantinople in 381. 
Later many others attacked the teaching that the Holy Ghost 
proceeded from the Son, namely, Theodoret (434), the Monothelites 
and Iconoclasts (eighth century), Photius (ninth century), and 
Michael Caerularius (eleventh century), whom the Greek schismatics 
follow until the present day. Photius, the impious usurper of the 
Constantinopolitan see, who aspired to the supremacy over the 
Church, found a pretext for attacking the teaching of the Latin 
Church on this point in some obscure texts of the Greek Fathers. 
Photius was condemned by Nicholas I and seceded from communion 
with the Latin Church. After his death union between the Churches 
was restored, but the schism again broke out because of the 
ambitions of Michael Caerularius. [412] For many the difficulty 
arose from the fact that many Greek Fathers said that the Holy 
Ghost proceeded from the Father through the Son. This turn of 
words provided the occasion for the Photians to write against the 
doctrine of the Latin Church. [413] In the present article St. 
Thomas presents the principal difficulties of the Greeks, adding 
that there is no basis for their stand either in Sacred Scripture 
or in the ancient councils, in which the question was not yet 
explicitly considered.

It should be said, moreover, that in the Latins, concept of the 
Trinity, which begins with the unity of nature rather than with 
the three persons, an easier approach is made to the Filioque, 
especially if the Latin doctrine is understood in the post-
Augustinian view, according to which the processions are after the 
manner of intellection and love, for love follows knowledge and 
proceeds from it inasmuch as nothing is willed unless it is known. 
This point is not so clear in the Greek concept, which starts with 
the three persons instead of with the unity of nature.

To clarify the matter in opposition to Photius, the term Filioque 
was added to the Nicene Creed, first in Spain, then in France and 
Germany, and later was accepted and approved by authority of the 
Roman Pontiffs. [414] Finally under Pius X it was declared: "It 
would be no less temerarious than erroneous to entertain the 
opinion that the dogma of the procession of the Son from the Holy 
Ghost can hardly be proved from the words of the Gospels or from 
the faith of the ancient Fathers. " [415]

The Church has indeed defined that the Holy Ghost proceeds from 
the Father and the Son "as from one principle and by one single 
spiration. " [416] The Council of Florence declared: "We define 
that this truth of faith be accepted and believed by all 
Christians and that all shall profess that the Holy Ghost is 
eternally from the Father and the Son and that He has His essence 
and subsisting being at the same time from the Father and the Son, 
and that He proceeds eternally from both as from one principle and 
by one spiration. " [417] In the same council it was defined: "The 
Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son. . . . Whatever 
the Holy Ghost is or has He has received simultaneously from the 
Father and the Son. But the Father and the Son are not two 
principles of the Holy Ghost but one principle just as the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Ghost are not three principles of creatures 
but one principle. " [418] These words, "He proceeds by one 
spiration, " were added in the Council of Florence and in the 
Council of Lyons to solve the difficulty of some Greeks who 
rejected the formula ex Patre Filioque because they erroneously 
thought that it implied two principles of the Holy Ghost.

Whether there is a clear warrant in Scripture and tradition for 
this definition of the Church.

The testimony of Scripture. No doubt exists that it is clearly 
taught by the Scriptures that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the 
Father: "But when the Paraclete cometh. . ., who proceedeth from 
the Father, " [419] "For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit 
of your Father that speaketh in you. " [420]

It is also clear from many passages of the New Testament that the 
Holy Ghost proceeds also from the Son. We prove this in three 
ways: 1. because the Holy Ghost is said to be sent by the Son; 2. 
because the Holy Ghost is said to receive something from the Son; 
3. because the Holy Ghost is called the Spirit of the Son.

In proving these three points we presuppose from the formula of 
baptism and from similar texts already cited for the three persons 
together that Holy Ghost and Spirit of the Father are names not of 
a divine attribute but of the third person. In these proofs we 
follow the chronological order in which this truth was revealed, 
beginning with the revelation of Christ Himself when He promised 
the Holy Ghost.

1. The Holy Ghost is said to have been sent by the Son as well as 
by the Father. "I will ask the Father, and He shall give you 
another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever. The Spirit 
of truth. . . shall abide with you. " [421] Here mention is made 
of another person, that is, another Paraclete, distinct from Him 
who asks and from the Father, who will send Him. "But the 
Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, 
He will teach you all things. " [422] If the Father sends the Holy 
Ghost in the name of the Son, the Son also sends Him. This thought 
is more clearly expressed in the following: "But when the 
Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit 
of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, He shall give testimony 
of Me. " [423] In the following chapter: "If I go not, the 
Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to 
you. " [424]

St. Thomas' argument [425] is built on these texts as follows: A 
mission or sending presupposes a certain influence of the sender 
on him who is sent. This influence of the sender is either in the 
nature of a command, as when a master sends a servant, or in the 
nature of counsel, as when a man sends his friend to another, or 
in the nature of origin, as when leaves are sent out by a tree. A 
divine person, however, is not sent by command or counsel because 
these imply inferiority since he who commands is greater and he 
who counsels is wiser. Hence sending in God denotes nothing except 
the procession of origin to a terminus where the person sent was 
not before. If the Holy Ghost, therefore, is said to be sent by 
the Father and the Son, He proceeds from the Father and the Son. 
"The Father. . . is not said to be sent for He does not have a 
terminus from which He is or from which He proceeds. " [426] In 
God, then, a sending cannot take place without being a procession, 
and the Holy Ghost, who was sent by the Son, must proceed from the 
Son. [427]

2. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son because He is said to 
receive something from the Son. "But when He, the Spirit of truth, 
is come, He will teach you all truth. . . . He shall glorify Me; 
because He shall receive of Mine, and shall show it to you. All 
things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine. Therefore I said, 
that He shall receive of Mine, and show it to you. " [428]

Here the Scriptures explicitly affirm that the Holy Ghost, the 
Paraclete, receives something from the Son. But in God one person 
cannot receive anything from another except to proceed from that 
person because, besides the relation of origin, all things are 
common to the three persons. "In God receiving is not understood 
in the same sense as in creatures. . . . For, since the divine 
persons are simple, that which receives is not different from that 
which is received. . . . Moreover, the person who receives was not 
at some time lacking what is received, because the Son had from 
eternity what He received from the Father, and the Holy Ghost had 
from eternity what He received from the Father and the Son. . . . 
Therefore the Holy Ghost receives from the Son as the Son receives 
from the Father. Therefore in God to receive denotes the order of 
origin. " [429]

Objection. "To receive of Mine" must be understood as referring 
only to the communication of the knowledge of the future because 
"and shall show it to you" follows immediately.

Reply. The Holy Ghost appears as a divine person from the other 
texts quoted and is therefore called the Spirit of truth. But a 
divine person who is not incarnate cannot receive the knowledge of 
futures except by receiving the divine nature because in the 
divine nature this knowledge is uncreated and identified with the 
divine nature. The text confirms this argument in the words: "All 
things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine; therefore I said that 
He shall receive of Mine. " Here the reason is assigned why the 
Holy Ghost proceeds also from the Son, namely, because the Son has 
whatever the Father has, including active spiration.

3. In several passages of the Scripture the Holy Ghost is called 
the Spirit of the Son or the Spirit of Christ Jesus: "God hath 
sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father. 
" [430] From the use of the word "sent" we see reference is made 
to the Holy Ghost, sent by the Father and the Son on Pentecost, 
who dwells in the hearts of the just, as St. Paul frequently says. 
[431] Further confirmation is found in St. Paul's words to the 
Romans: "But you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be 
that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the 
Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. " [432]

In this last text the Holy Ghost dwelling in the souls of men is 
called the Spirit not only of the Father but also of Christ, as in 
the words of Christ, "But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will 
send you from the Father. " [433] Again in the Acts of the 
Apostles, "They attempted to go into Bithynia, and the Spirit of 
Jesus suffered them not. " [434] From these texts the following 
argument is constructed: here the Holy Ghost is called the Spirit 
of the Son. But he could not be so called unless He proceeded from 
the Son just as He is called the Spirit of the Father because He 
proceeds from the Father. In other words, if the Greeks admit that 
the Spirit of the Father is the Spirit proceeding from the Father, 
why do they not admit that the Spirit of the Son is the Spirit 
proceeding from the Son? This argument is found in the writings of 
St. Augustine: "Why therefore do we not believe that the Holy 
Ghost proceeds also from the Son since He is also the Spirit of 
the Son?" [435]

The testimony of tradition. Is the procession of the Holy Ghost 
from the Son explicitly found in tradition as expressed by the 
Fathers?

Since the Greeks admit this doctrine is found in the Latin 
Fathers, it will be sufficient to refer to the Greek Fathers who 
wrote on the Trinity: St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. 
Cyril of Alexandria. [436]

St. Athanasius writing to Serapion said: "We find that the same 
property that the Son has to the Father, the Holy Ghost has to the 
Son. " [437] In another place St. Athanasius calls the Son "the 
font of the Holy Ghost. " [438] St. Gregory of Nyssa explains this 
truth by a comparison: "The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost 
are like three lights of which the second is lit by the first and 
the third by the second. " [439] St. Cyril of Alexandria is more 
explicit: "since therefore the Holy Ghost dwelling in us makes us 
comformable to the Father, He truly proceeds from the Father and 
the Son, and it is clear from the divine essence that He is 
essentially in it and proceeding from it, just as the breath comes 
from the human mouth, although this is a humble and unworthy 
illustration of such a sublime thing. " [440]

Many of the Greek Fathers explain this truth in a slightly 
different manner, declaring that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the 
Father through the Son. This expression was explained by the 
Council of Florence with the approval of the Greeks. [441]

The Church's doctrine on this point is found in the synods and 
councils held prior to the Greek schism.

In the profession of faith presented by the bishops of Africa to 
King Hunneric in the fifth century, we read: "We believe that the 
unbegotten Father and the Son begotten of the Father and the Holy 
Ghost, proceeding from the Father and the Son, are of one 
substance. " [442] The synod of Alexandria approved the letter in 
which St. Cyril wrote that the Holy Ghost "proceeded from the 
Father and the Son, " and this letter was later applauded by the 
Councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Constantinople (II).

In the ninth century the Roman Pontiffs approved the addition of 
the Filioque to the creed; later with the consent of the Greeks it 
was defined in the Fourth Lateran Council, [443] and in the 
Council of Florence. [444]

ST. THOMAS DOCTRINE ON THE FILIOQUE 
[445]

We consider first the theological reason he offers in the Summa 
[446] and later how he solves the difficulties of the Greeks. In 
the body of the article we find three reasons: the first from 
incongruity and the other two from the congruity or conformity 
with things in the natural order. From the analogy with natural 
things we can to some degree know the mystery of the Trinity 
although we cannot demonstrate it.

1. The reason or argument from incongruity is an apodictical 
argument by reduction to the impossible. It begins with the 
negation of the position to be admitted: if the Holy Ghost does 
not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from the 
Son, because the divine persons are distinguished only by the 
relation of origin, which is founded on the processions. We do not 
delay in considering this argument because it will be developed 
against the objections of Scotus after an examination of the Greek 
difficulties.

2. This argument is based on the nature of the processions. The 
Son proceeds after the manner of intellection as the Word, and the 
Holy Ghost proceeds after the manner of the will as personal love. 
But love proceeds from the word, for we do not love anything 
unless we have apprehended it by a concept of the mind. Nothing is 
willed unless first it is known. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds 
from the Son. This argument proposed by St. Thomas is sufficiently 
clear from the foregoing. It is at least a profound argument of 
congruity. Against it, however, two objections have been raised 
which are too much concerned with particulars and in this way do 
not take into consideration what St. Thomas wished to say.

Objection. In the beatific vision there is no word, and yet it is 
followed by love.

Reply. In the beatific vision there is no accidental created word, 
but the divine essence takes the place of the expressed species 
because the divine essence of itself is understood in act and 
cannot be represented in a created word as it is in itself. We are 
obliged to express ourselves in this manner because of the 
imperfect manner of our intellection although there is in our 
intellection an expressed species (when it exists) which is the 
vicar of the object and which takes the place of the object, as 
when the object is not understood of itself in act. Thus what St. 
Thomas wished to say in this argument stands: nothing is willed 
unless first known, and love follows vision and proceeds from it 
in some way. So proportionately the Holy Ghost proceeds as love 
from the Word, and this procession is understood to take place as 
intellection from the words of the prologue of St. John's Gospel.

I insist. In created beings the word does not concur effectively 
in love; it concurs only objectively and as the final object 
inasmuch as the word proposes the object that elicits love.

Reply. Granting this for the sake of argument, it is still true 
that love in some way proceeds from the knowledge of the good or 
from the good as known; it also is still true that the appetitive 
faculty comes from the essence of the soul as endowed with the 
intellectual faculty, and the essence is therefore the root of the 
other faculties. Moreover, according to revelation, the divine 
Word is a subsisting person and thus can be the principle 
(principium quod) of notional love and active spiration, whereas 
our accidental word is not the principium quod but a necessary 
condition (sine qua non) of love since love tends only to the 
known good.

We granted for the sake of argument that the word in created 
beings does not concur effectively in love, because a dispute 
exists on this point between Thomistic theologians.

Conrad Kollin, Cajetan, and others hold that the intellect moves 
the will with respect to its specification as an efficient cause 
inasmuch as the object proposed by the intellect is the cause for 
eliciting a determined act of love. The particular specification 
of the act of love, as distinguished from the exercise of the act 
of love, must have an efficient cause, and the will alone is not a 
sufficient efficient cause for this specification, otherwise all 
acts of love would be of the same species. Moreover, as Conrad 
Kollin and Cajetan point out, in God the subsisting Word 
effectively produces personal love or the Holy Ghost. Therefore 
the same thing takes place analogically in the case of the non-
subsisting word of our intellect. To support this interpretation 
they cite certain texts of St. Thomas: "The intellect is prior to 
the will as the mover is prior to what is moved and as the active 
is prior to the passive, for the good that is understood moves the 
will. " [447]

Other Thomists, among them Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Bannez, and 
Gonet hold that the intellect moves the will only as a final and 
formal extrinsic cause because the object proposed by the 
intellect to the will is not intrinsic to the will. But even if 
this second opinion is admitted, our argument still holds because 
the word in created beings produces love at least in a broad sense 
because it leads to the eliciting of a definite act of love 
inasmuch as it specifies the act, and no act can be elicited 
without being specified.

Further, the subsistence of the divine Word elevates all the 
conditions of the word to most perfect being and in this state of 
being the Word actively and properly influences love. Thus the 
Word of God spirates love.

St. Thomas' argument remains unscathed. He was disinclined, 
however, to descend to these particulars because as he said: "Our 
intellect cannot understand the essence of God as it is in itself 
in this life, but it determines and limits every mode in the 
things it understands about God and departs from the mode of God's 
being in Himself. Therefore the more certain nouns are 
unrestricted and common and absolute, the more properly they are 
predicated by us of God, as, for instance, the name "Who is, " 
which expresses the vast and infinite ocean of substance itself.

Hence we should not descend to small particulars, to excessive 
precision and delimitation; these things remove us from the 
contemplation of God and we cannot understand a free act in God or 
how the Word spirates love. This is true of many speculative and 
practical questions. For instance, a certain particular intention 
virtually lasts for several days, but we cannot say for how many 
days it lasts since there is a great difference here between a 
superficial soul and one that is profoundly recollected. Again, it 
is certainly very laudable to unite our personal offerings often 
during the day by prayer to the oblation made continually in the 
heart of the glorious Christ and to the offering of all the Masses 
celebrated throughout the world. If we wish to descend 
mechanically to particulars, we might ask how it is possible to 
unite oneself to all these Masses in particular. This does not 
mean that it is impossible to unite ourselves to the oblation 
which perdures in the heart of Christ in glory, which is, as it 
were, the soul of all these Masses.

Very often excessive and pseudo-scientific exactitude in spiritual 
things removes us from the contemplation of God. Such concern with 
particulars detracts from the beauty of St. Thomas, argument that 
love proceeds from the knowledge of good, and therefore it appears 
right to say that in God personal love proceeds from the Word. In 
the light of this argument we understand those beautiful words of 
tradition: The Word spirates love. The same is true with regard to 
our understanding of the mystery of the cross or of the 
Redemption: too much concern with details impedes us in 
contemplation of the mystery.

The third argument of congruity may be stated as follows: When 
several things proceed from one, they are distinct only by number 
and matter unless they are distinguished because of the orders of 
origin or causality. But the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from 
one and the same Father and they are distinct by more than number 
and matter, that is, by the two processions of intellect and love, 
which are more than numerically distinct. Hence there must be 
between them some order; not the order of causality or of greater 
or less perfection, but of origin. And since the Son does not 
proceed from the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost must proceed from the 
Son.

The major of the argument is based on the fact that when several 
things that are distinct by more than number and matter proceed 
from one thing they proceed according to some order, and in 
created beings according to some kind of subordination. When 
several things proceed from one thing and are distinguished only 
by number and matter, they may proceed without any definite order 
as, for instance, when a workman makes many knives distinct from 
one another only numerically and materially, they have no order to 
each other. Such is not the case, however, with the species of 
number and the figures of geometry in the order of quantity; all 
numbers proceed from unity according to a definite order. So also 
in the order of quality: for example, the different degrees of 
heat and light, the various colors of the spectrum. The various 
species of minerals, plants, and animals are subordinated 
according to their greater or lesser perfection; such 
subordination is also found among the angels.

This gives us an analogy of the divine processions. But in God 
there can be no order of greater or lesser perfection and so there 
can be no subordination or coordination, which implies 
subordination. Nor can there be an order of causality since each 
divine person is uncreated, uncaused, and entirely equal to the 
others. In the divine persons there is an order of origin as we 
know exists between the Father and the Son, and between the Holy 
Ghost and the Father, and equally between the Holy Ghost and the 
Son, otherwise there would be no more order in the divine persons 
than between those things that are distinguished only numerically 
and materially.

If there were no such order the analogy with intellect and will 
would break down, for the will, as the rational appetite, does not 
come from the essence of the soul except through the mediation of 
the intellective faculty, otherwise the appetite would not be 
properly rational in its root nor would it be under the direction 
of reason. In other words it is impossible that the intellect and 
the will should be equal (ex aequo) as Suarez thought; there must 
be some order between them as there must be order between vision 
and love.

Suarez failed to see that all coordination supposes subordination 
and that the intellect and the will cannot be coordinated on an 
equal plane (ex aequo) nor can vision and love.

Order is a disposition by way of earlier and later with respect to 
some principle, and thus order is discovered in subordination 
before it is found in coordination. Two soldiers are not 
coordinated in an army unless they are first subordinated to the 
leader of the army. [448] St. Thomas asks whether the inequality 
of things is from God, and he replies in the affirmative, saying 
that the subordination or hierarchy of things serves to manifest 
in many ways the divine goodness, which in itself is most simple 
and would not be fittingly manifested if all things were entirely 
equal. Then there would be no reason for multiplying created 
things. [449]

Thus, as Leibnitz said, no one would place in his library several 
identical copies of the same edition of Virgil. The variety of 
species necessary for the subordination of created things is a 
better manifestation of the divine goodness, which is in itself 
most simple.

In God's intimate life there is no subordination or hierarchy, but 
there is an order of origin that transcends coordination and 
subordination.

In the body of the article St. Thomas notes that the Greeks 
concede that there is an element of truth in this argument; they 
concede that the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son. 
This formula will be examined in the next article. St. Thomas also 
notes that some Greeks are said to concede that the Holy Ghost 
flows from the Son but does not proceed from Him. To which St. 
Thomas replied: everything that flows from another proceeds from 
it, as the brook from the spring and the ray of light from the 
sun. The Greeks insisted that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the 
Father as the brook from the spring and through the Son as through 
the channel in which the brook flows.

The fourth argument is taken from the general principle that in 
God all things are one and the same except where there is 
opposition of relation. But between the Father and the Son there 
is no opposition of relation in active spiration. Therefore active 
spiration is common to both. This commonly accepted principle was 
expressly formulated in the Council of Florence, [450] and as 
Denzinger notes, it was at this Council that the learned Cardinal 
Bessarion, archbishop of Nicaea, the theologian of the Greek 
party, proclaimed: "No one is ignorant of the fact that the 
personal names of the Trinity are relative. " It is on this 
accepted principle that the argument is based.

The fifth reason is drawn from the words, "All things whatsoever 
the Father hath, are Mine. Therefore I said, that He shall receive 
of Mine. " [451] If the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, 
the Son would not have whatsoever the Father has (excepting 
paternity), and the divine will would be less fecund in the Son 
for active spiration than in the Father. Nor should it be said 
that the Holy Ghost has the same will as the Father and still does 
not spirate actively because the Holy Ghost, proceeding not by 
intellection but by the will, exhausts the will as its adequate 
terminus. In other words, the Holy Ghost exhausts the entire 
fecundity of the divine will within itself (ad intra), just as the 
divine Word proceeding by intellection ad intra, exhausts the 
entire fecundity of the divine intellect as its adequate terminus.

The sixth reason is found in the Contra Gentes. [452] In God, 
since He is necessary, there is no difference between being and 
possibility, that is, being follows immediately on possibility. 
But it is not the impossibility but rather the possibility that 
appears that the Son should be the principle of the Holy Ghost, 
for that which is from a principle in the first procession can be 
the principle in the second procession. Therefore the Son is a 
principle of the second procession together with the Father.

SOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS OF THE GREEKS

First objection. This objection is stated as the first difficulty 
in St. Thomas, article, namely, Sacred Scripture states that the 
Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father but it never says He proceeds 
from the Son.

Reply. Sacred Scripture does not express this truth in so many 
words, I concede; it does not express this truth, I deny; for as 
we have seen, the Son says of the Holy Ghost, "He shall receive of 
Mine"; "All things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine. Therefore 
I said, that He shall receive of Mine. " [453]

Second objection. The First Council of Constantinople, which was 
the second ecumenical council, does not make any mention of the 
Son.

Reply. St. Thomas replies that the procession of the Holy Ghost 
from the Son was not explicitly mentioned in this council because 
the opposite error had not yet arisen. But later, when the error 
arose, the Filioque was added to the creed, first in Spain and 
later in France and Germany in the fifth, sixth, and seventh 
centuries. [454] Thereupon Benedict VIII approved the addition and 
finally it was accepted by the ecumenical councils of Lyons (II) 
and Florence by both the Greeks and Latins present at these 
councils. [455]

In the reply to the third difficulty, St. Thomas notes that St. 
John Damascene, following the Nestorian error on this point, spoke 
inaccurately in his book, [456] although some commentators say 
that he (lid not expressly deny the Filioque. [457] Petavius 
points out that St. John Damascene understood that the Holy Ghost 
did not proceed from the Son as from the first font of origin 
because among the Greeks the preposition ex and the noun 
principium denote the first font of origin. [458]

In D'Ales' words, " St. John Damascene did not deny simply that 
the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son but that He proceeded from 
the Son as from the first principle. He had evolved a physical 
theory of the Trinity, according to which the procession was like 
a breath coming from the mouth, a figure certainly less apt than 
that of St. Augustine. " [459]

St. John Damascene approaches the Latin doctrine when he compares 
the Father to the sun, the Son to the ray, and the Holy Ghost to 
the brightness, which is from the ray. Indeed, in his book, De 
fide orthodoxa, [460] he says that the Holy Ghost is the image of 
the Son as the Son is the image of the Father.

This is a sufficient defense of the Church's doctrine on the 
Filioque. In the third article we shall see that it is permissible 
to say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the 
Son, according to the Greek Fathers, and St. Hilary among the 
Latin Fathers. [461] The reason is that the Son has from the 
Father that by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Other objections. Whatever is in God is either common or proper. 
But the spiration of the Holy Ghost is not common to the entire 
Trinity. Therefore this spiration is proper to one person, namely, 
to the Father and does not belong to the Son.

Reply. I distinguish the major: whatever is in God is either 
common (to the three persons) or strictly proper, as risibility in 
man, I deny; is common or proper in a broad sense, I concede as, 
for instance, spirituality and freedom properly belong to the 
human soul and also to the angels.

I insist. But to spirate the Holy Ghost is strictly proper to the 
Father, for absolutely contrary properties cannot belong to the 
same person. But the property of the Son consists in receiving, of 
which spiration is a contrary property. Therefore the Son cannot 
actively spirate the Holy Ghost.

Reply. I distinguish the major: properties that are contrary with 
respect to the same other person cannot belong to the same person, 
I concede; with respect to distinct persons, I deny. I 
contradistinguish the minor in the same way: the Son is both 
active and passive with respect to distinct persons and not to the 
same person. This is not an impossible contrariety.

I insist. The Son is no more in agreement with the Father than the 
Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost does not concur with the Father in 
the generation of the Son. Therefore the Son does not concur with 
the Father in the spiration of the Holy Ghost.

Reply. I distinguish the major: with regard to essentials, I 
concede; with regard to the notional act of spiration, I deny.

The second article contains references to the discussion between 
the Thomists and Scotus, which we shall examine immediately.

Doubt. If the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, would He be 
distinguished from Him?

In the beginning of the body of this article St. Thomas answers 
negatively, and not only the Thomists but most other theologians 
agree with him. Scotus and his followers, however, reply in the 
affirmative, arguing that if the impossible were true and the Holy 
Ghost were not spirated by the Son, the Son would still be 
distinguished by filiation from the Holy Ghost because the Holy 
Ghost would not be the Son.

St. Thomas, position is based on that principle commonly accepted 
and explicitly formulated in the Council of Florence: "In God all 
things are one and the same except where there is opposition of 
relation"; in other words, the divine persons are really 
distinguished only by the relation of origin, which is founded on 
the processions, as was explained above. If therefore the Holy 
Ghost did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinct from 
the Son. The reader is referred to the body of the article.

It should be noted that this principle is found prior to the 
Council of Florence in the writings of the Fathers, particularly 
in St. Augustine, [462] St. Gregory of Nyssa, [463] and St. 
Anselm. [464] The Council of Florence [465] proved against the 
Greeks that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son; its principal 
reason was that otherwise the Holy Ghost would not be 
distinguished from the Son. In the eighteenth session John the 
Theologian declared: "According to both the Latin and the Greek 
doctors, it is relation alone that multiplies the divine persons 
in the divine productions, and this relation is the relation of 
origin. " None of the Greeks, not even Mark of Ephesus, the most 
prominent adversary of the Latin theologians, opposed this 
principle. While this was not a definition of the Council, this 
argument ought to have great weight because by it the Church was 
disposed to define the dogma of the procession of the Holy Ghost 
from the Son.

What is the basis for the axiom: In God all things are one and the 
same where there is no opposition of relation? Note that the axiom 
does not say merely a distinction of relation. The basis for the 
axiom is that, since God is most simple being, He admits no real 
distinction in Himself except that distinction which, according to 
revelation, is founded on the procession of origin, namely, the 
distinction between the principle and that which is of the 
principle.

Objection of the Scotists. The principle accepted and expressed in 
the Council of Florence is to be understood as referring not only 
to the relative opposition of relation but also the disparate 
opposition of relation. The first kind of opposition is that 
between two relations that have reference to each other, as 
between paternity and filiation, and between active and passive 
spiration. Disparate opposition of relation exists between two 
relations that have no reference to each other, as between 
filiation and passive spiration.

Reply. I deny the antecedent, since disparate relations are not 
impossible in the same person, as paternity and active spiration, 
and as filiation and active spiration. Therefore it is not 
sufficient that two relations, like filiation and passive 
spiration, are disparate in order to constitute two distinct 
persons.

The Scotists insist. Even though paternity and active spiration 
are not incompatible in the same person, nevertheless filiation 
and passive spiration are incompatible and require two persons, 
because that would imply that the same person was produced by two 
complete productions, which would be the case if the one person 
were at the same time the terminus of generation and spiration. 
This is the crux of the problem.

Reply. This insistence begs the question; it proves a thing by 
itself. There are not two complete, distinct productions except 
when they tend to two distinct termini or to two really distinct 
persons as on the way to the terminus, for the production of a 
person is a person in becoming (in fieri). As the two sides of the 
triangle are not two except because they tend toward constituting 
with the base the two inferior angles opposed to each other and 
therefore distinct, so two processions in God are not two except 
inasmuch as they tend to constitute two proceeding persons opposed 
to each other and therefore distinct. Thus the adversaries prove 
that there are two proceeding persons and not one because there 
are two proceeding persons and two processions, which is begging 
the question. It is incumbent on the Scotists to find another 
reason to prove that even if the Holy Ghost did not proceed from 
the Son He would be distinct from Him.

In this hypothesis generation and passive spiration would be one 
and the same total procession, -formally and eminently generative 
and spirative, just as generation and active spiration are only 
virtually distinct in the Father.

The other Scotist objections are of minor import

They say that the person of the Son is sufficiently constituted 
and distinguished by filiation. We reply that it is constituted 
but not distinguished from the Holy Ghost without the opposition 
of relation.

They insist that by filiation the Son has incommunicable being, 
otherwise He would not be a person, and this distinguishes Him 
from the Holy Ghost.

Reply. In God being is unique and it is communicated to the Son 
and to the Holy Ghost; that which is incommunicable is only the 
subsisting relation which is opposed to another. Thus the Father 
has communicable being but He is a distinct person by the 
paternity, which is opposed to filiation; similarly, active 
spiration is opposed to passive spiration.

I insist. By filiation the Son is distinguished from any other who 
is not the Son. But the Holy Ghost is not the Son. Therefore the 
Son is distinguished from the Holy Ghost by filiation alone.

Reply. I distinguish the major: the Son is thus distinguished from 
any other person who is opposed to Him, I concede; otherwise, I 
deny. I contradistinguish the minor: if the person is opposed to 
the Son, I concede; otherwise, I deny.

We must conclude that the Scotists do not safeguard the doctrine 
of the Fathers and of the Council of Florence, according to which 
all things in God are one and the same except where there is 
opposition of relation or relative opposition based on a 
procession. If therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the 
Son, He is not distinct from the Son. The fiction of disparate 
opposition is an abuse of the terms and in violation of common 
sense, or, as Billuart rightly says, a confusion of the notions of 
things. Things are disparate when they are not opposed, for 
example, white and cold. Thus St. Thomas, opinion stands.

The triangle lends confirmation to this view. If in the triangle 
the third angle constructed did not proceed from the first and 
second, it would not be distinguished from the second, and then 
there would not be two sides because they would be identified in 
their tendency to the same terminus. Similarly, if the will did 
not presuppose the intellect and did not depend on it, it would 
not be distinguished from it; there would be not two but one 
faculty. Spinoza, in his absolute intellectualism inclines to this 
view; he reduces the will to a natural appetite or the natural 
inclination of the intellect itself to truth. At most there would 
be two entirely equal faculties (ex aequo), and this is impossible 
for there would be no order between them, as was explained in the 
third argument of St. Thomas' second article. For it to be a 
rational appetite, the will must proceed from the substance of the 
soul, presupposing the emanation from the intellect; thus the will 
proceeds from the intellect and is distinguished from it; and so 
also analogically if the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son, 
He is not distinct from the Son.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE FATHER 
THROUGH THE SON

State of the question. This article was written because the Greek 
Fathers and St. Hilary used this expression. [466]

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative in the sense that the Son 
has from the Father that by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from 
Him. Analogically, a statue proceeds from the sculptor through the 
hammer or chisel, because the hammer is operated by the power of 
the sculptor. But the Son is not like an instrument of the Father 
or His assistant, but an intermediate person who, by reason of 
origin, has from the Father that by which the Son proceeds from 
Him.

Doubt. Does the Holy Ghost proceed immediately from the Father?

Reply. In his reply to the first difficulty, St. Thomas replies in 
the affirmative, namely, that the Holy Ghost proceeds directly 
from the power of the Father because the spirative power in the 
Father and the Son is the same, indeed it is one act of spiration. 
More than this: the Holy Ghost proceeds immediately from the 
Father directly from His suppositum (as Abel proceeds from Adam), 
although there is an intermediate person. Analogically, between 
Adam and Abel there is Eve, who herself proceeded from Adam and 
from whom Abel proceeded. This analogy is quite inept, of course, 
with regard to the divine processions.

In his reply to the fourth objection, St. Thomas explains why we 
cannot say conversely that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through 
the Father. The reason is that the Father does not receive from 
the Son that by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him. But the 
Father is not a more immediate principle by reason of His power 
since this power is the same in the Father and the Son.

In the triangle the third angle constructed proceeds immediately 
from the first and second, and the second angle is not less 
necessary for the construction of the third than the first.

Similarly, the will proceeds immediately from the soul, of which 
it is a faculty, although the activity of the intellective faculty 
is presupposed, without which the will would not be the rational 
appetite. The will, then, is a faculty, not of the intellect, but 
of the soul itself and immediately pertains to the soul, although 
the intellect comes from the soul prior to the will.

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON ARE ONE PRINCIPLE 
OF THE HOLY GHOST

State of the question. It is asked whether this proposition is 
true in its strict sense. We note that the Greeks considered the 
Filioque a serious objection against the Latins, understanding 
that the Latins implied that there were two principles of the Holy 
Ghost.

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative; there is but one 
principle. This is proved by the authority of St. Augustine: "We 
must confess that the Father and the Son are not two principles 
but one principle of the Holy Ghost. " [467] This doctrine is also 
supported by St. Basil [468] and St. Ambrose, [469] and was 
proclaimed in the Councils of Lyons [470] and Florence. [471]

The theological reason given in the body of the article is as 
follows: the Father and the Son are one in all things in which 
they are not distinguished by opposition of relation. But in their 
being the principle of the Holy Ghost they are not relatively 
opposed.

In explanation of this reasoning we point out that in order to 
multiply a substantive name, like God, or man, which denotes a 
form with an accompanying suppositum, both the form and the 
suppositum must be multiplied. Hence we cannot say "several gods. 
" On the other hand, for the multiplication of an adjective, like 
divine and white, which does not denote a form with the 
accompanying suppositum but only as something attached to the 
suppositum, it is not required that the form be multiplied; only 
the suppositum need be multiplied, and thus we say not "three 
gods, " but "three divine beings. " But the term, principle of the 
Holy Ghost, like spirator, is a substantive name. Therefore there 
is one principle and one spirator, but two spirating beings (the 
adjective form), as St. Thomas explains in his reply to the first 
difficulty. Thus, according to a rather remote analogy, when the 
Holy Ghost Himself "asketh for us with unspeakable groanings, " 
[472] there is but one prayer and two who ask: the inspirer and 
the other inspired. In inquiring how operating grace is 
distinguished from cooperating grace, St. Thomas explains [473] 
that under operating grace the soul is moved and not moving, no 
matter how vitally, freely, or meritoriously it consents to the 
special inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Such are the acts of the 
gifts of the Holy Ghost and here the effect is attributed to the 
one who moves, namely, God who inspires us. Thus St. Paul says, 
"The Spirit Himself asketh for us. " [474]

Doubt. What is the suppositum for the spirator or principle of the 
Holy Ghost?

Reply. This term "spirator" has for its suppositum two persons 
taken together, as when we say that the father and mother are the 
principle of the son. The adequate principle is the father and 
mother taken together, and in this sense we understand the 
proposition; man generates man. The father alone is the inadequate 
principle. Proportionally this is true in the present question.

CHAPTER XI: QUESTION 37 LOVE AS THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER LOVE IS THE PROPER NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST

State of the question. It seems that love is not the proper name 
of the Holy Ghost since the three persons love, and love therefore 
is predicated essentially. Moreover, love is the name of an 
action, not of a subsisting person, and it is predicated of the 
Holy Ghost as His operation after He is constituted a person.

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative. Love, used personally and 
not essentially or notionally, is the proper name of the Holy 
Ghost.

1. Proof from authority. St. Gregory the Great declared: "The Holy 
Ghost Himself is love. " [475] St. Augustine also frequently uses 
the name "love" to designate the Holy Ghost. This usage is plainly 
in accord with the Latin theory of the Trinity, according to which 
the Holy Ghost proceeds after the manner of love, and the term of 
such procession can be called love. But we do not have an explicit 
warrant in Sacred Scripture for the use of this appellation, while 
on the other hand the Son of God is explicitly called "the Word" 
in the Scriptures. St. Ambrose calls the Holy Ghost the charity of 
God, and this thought is also expressed in the liturgy:

Thou who art called the Paraclete,

Best Gift of God above,

The living Spring, the living Fire,

Sweet Unction, and true Love ! [476]

The Eleventh Council of Toledo (675) [477] makes reference to this 
name: "The Holy Ghost is shown to have proceeded from the Father 
and the Son because He is acknowledged to be the charity or the 
holiness of both."

In the writings of the Greek Fathers the Third Person of God has 
one proper name, the Holy Ghost, but He has various appellations: 
kleseis, that is, energeia, or vital action, the gift of God and 
certain symbolic names: living spring, chrism, anointment, and 
spiritual unction. But the Greeks do not distinguish the proper 
name from the others as the Latins do. [478]

2. Theological proof. In the body of the article St. Thomas argues 
that love is accepted in three senses: essentially, notionally, 
and personally. In all three senses it is substantial love. In the 
essential sense it denotes the condition of the lover with 
reference to the thing loved and belongs to the three persons like 
intellection. Notionally love signifies active spiration, by which 
the Holy Ghost is designated as proceeding from the spirating 
Father and Son, just as in the first procession the enunciation as 
distinct from intellection is something notional, as will be 
explained more fully below in question 41. Personally love denotes 
the condition of him who proceeds after the manner of love with 
regard to his principle, and in this sense it is a proper name of 
the Holy Ghost proceeding from the mutual love of the Father and 
the Son as a "certain impression of the thing loved in the 
affection of the lover, " as St. Thomas says. This notional love 
of the Father and the Son is unique if understood substantively, 
because there is but one spiration and indeed only one spirator; 
it is also said to be mutual when understood adjectively because 
there are two spirating.

As we have said in the first article of question 36, the 
procession of love is not as well understood by us as the 
procession after the manner of intellection, and therefore we do 
not have the proper terms to designate what pertains to love. Thus 
while the term of enunciation in the intellect has a proper name, 
the mental word, the immanent terminus of love is unnamed. Three 
reasons are given for this: 1. the intellect knows better what is 
in itself than what is in the will; 2. good, the object of love, 
is not formally in the mind as truth, that is, as the conformity 
of the judgment with the thing, but it is in things outside the 
mind. A certain terminus of love exists in the affection of the 
lover, "a certain impression of the thing loved on the affection 
of the lover" and at the same time "an impulse to the thing loved. 
" In St. Augustine's words, "My love (is) the pressure that is on 
me. " Thus love can be predicated of God not only essentially and 
notionally but also personally because, although a special name 
for the immanent terminus of love is lacking, we use the common 
name of love; [479] 3. a reason why love, the act of the will, is 
less known than the act of the intellect arises from the fact that 
a thing is not intelligible except inasmuch as it is in act or 
determined; but the act of the will or love, tending to the good 
which is in things, retains something that is potential. We do not 
understand divine love, which is determined to the highest degree, 
except from the analogy with our love, whose tending to the good 
remains somewhat potential and not fully determined. From this 
difficulty in understanding the things that pertain to love comes 
this poverty of words, and so we must have recourse to common 
terms.

Because of this limited vocabulary we often hear preachers speak 
of the Holy Ghost as if He were the active, mutual love of the 
Father and the Son, whereas this love is active spiration and if 
the Holy Ghost were identified with it there would be only two 
persons in God. Certainly the Holy Ghost is not the active 
spiration which is in the Father and the Son; He is the terminus 
of that spiration, a terminus which is opposed to the first two 
divine persons by the opposition of the relation of procession or 
of passive spiration.

THE INTIMATE NATURE OF THE TERMINUS OF THE PROCESSION OF LOVE

With regard to the immanent and unnamed terminus of love, we 
should note what St. Thomas says: "the thing loved is in the 
lover, not according to the likeness of the species as the thing 
known is in the intellect, but as that which inclines and to some 
extent intrinsically impels the lover toward the thing loved."

By analogy with the word of the intellect this unnamed and 
immanent terminus can be called, as it were, the word of love, 
keeping in mind that it is a kind of inverted word, that is, it is 
produced not by the lover as the intellectual word is produced by 
him who understands but rather the thing loved attracting the 
lover to itself. Truth is formally in the mind (as the conformity 
of the judgment with the thing); but good is in things (as the 
perfection of a lovable thing) and draws the lover to itself. 
Cajetan says: "The thing loved does not become different in the 
lover except according to the affection of the lover for the thing 
loved. . . . Thus the lover is drawn, transformed, and objectively 
impelled to the thing loved, and so the lover is in that which is 
loved. . . . To be loved is not to be drawn, but to draw the 
lover. . . . Therefore to be in the will as loved is to be in the 
will as drawing it, " or attracting the will to itself. [480] This 
is what St. Thomas remarks so often: knowledge draws the object, 
for instance, God, to us, but love draws us to the good which is 
in things. Therefore in this life "the love of God is better than 
the knowledge of God. " [481] While this terminus of the act of 
love is difficult to express, we find it expressed in various 
languages as a wound. In the Canticle of Canticles: "Thou hast 
wounded my heart, my sister, my spouse"; [482] and some of the 
mystics, St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross, often speak of 
this holy wound of love by which God enters into our hearts and 
inclines and impels us to Himself. This holy wound of divine love 
completely heals the wounds of sin. It was this truth that 
prompted the beautiful prayer of St. Nicholas of Flue: "O my Lord 
and my God, take me from myself and make me entirely Thine."

St. Paul also speaks of this drawing by our Lord: "Not as though I 
had already attained, or were already perfect: but I follow after, 
if I may by any means apprehend, wherein I am also apprehended by 
Christ Jesus. " [483] These last words signify not only that 
Christ knew St. Paul perfectly, but that He also accepted him on 
the day of his conversion [484] as His apostle and beloved 
disciple and that Christ always drew St. Paul Himself. Thus the 
Christ who is loved is in St. Paul, who loves, as drawing St. Paul 
to Himself.

Although the immanent terminus of love has no name, it finds at 
least metaphorical expression in various languages, especially in 
the metaphor of a wound. This metaphor is explained by St. Thomas 
as follows: Love causes a languishing, a sadness, because of the 
absence of the lover; it wounds, and sometimes violently draws the 
lover outside himself and thus produces ecstasy and rapture. [485] 
Hence we see that even in his intellectualism St. Thomas did not 
ignore the psychology of love even though there is such a 
penurious vocabulary about it; he intentionally makes use of 
general terms and supplies with such metaphors as that of the 
wound.

SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES

In article I, in the reply to the second objection, St. Thomas 
says that in God love can be a divine person inasmuch as it is 
subsisting and also incommunicable as the terminus of the second 
procession.

The third objection: Love is a nexus between lovers; but the nexus 
is the medium between those things which it joins and therefore it 
is not a terminus or something that proceeds.

Reply. The Holy Ghost is at the same time a nexus and a terminus, 
since He is the terminus of the mutual love of the Father and the 
Son. This mutual spirating love is notional love, and the Holy 
Ghost is personal love. The Holy Ghost is said to be the terminus 
of mutual love inasmuch as He proceeds from two spirators, but the 
love of the two spirators is unique since there is only one 
spiration.

In the reply to the fourth objection we learn that the Holy Ghost 
loves with an essential love like the Father and the Son. We 
should note how St. Thomas safeguards the proper meaning of the 
terms. "The word, " he says, "connotes the condition of the word 
with respect to the thing expressed by the word. " [486] That 
which is really understood is the thing understood in the word; 
that is, what we first understand in direct intellection is not 
the mental word of the extramental thing but the nature of the 
extramental thing expressed by the mental word. We know the 
extramental thing in the word but not in the word first seen or 
known in itself. On the other hand we know a man in his 
reflection, and the reflection is that which is first seen or 
known, and God knows all creatures in Himself and He knows and 
sees Himself first, for what is first known by the divine 
intellect is the divine essence itself and not possible or actual 
creatures.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON LOVE EACH OTHER BY 
THE HOLY GHOST

State of the question. In the sed contra St. Augustine is quoted 
as saying that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy 
Ghost. [487] But the difficulty arises because the Father and the 
Son cannot love each other by the Holy Ghost either by essential 
love or by notional love, just as we do not say that the Father 
understands the Son by the Son or begets by the Son. But the 
Father and the Son have no other love than essential and notional 
love.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is in the affirmative: the Father 
and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost with notional love 
as a tree is said to flower with flowers.

1. Proof from authority. The text of St. Augustine, quoted in the 
argument, had been explained in several ways by Scholastics prior 
to St. Thomas as is indicated in the beginning of the body of the 
article.

2. Theological proof. A distinction is made between essential and 
notional love. If love is understood essentially, the Father and 
the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost but by the divine 
essence because the Holy Ghost is not essential but personal love. 
By essential love the three divine persons love one another in one 
and the same act of the divine will, and this act of essential 
love is identified with the divine essence. But if love is 
understood notionally, that is, as denoting the third person, then 
love is nothing else than the spiration of personal love just as 
enunciation is the production of the word and flowering is the 
production of flowers. So as we say that a tree flowers with 
flowers and the Father understands Himself and creatures by the 
Word, so the Father and the Son are said to love themselves and us 
by the Holy Ghost, that is, by proceeding love. As we have said, 
this notional love is mutual although there is but one active 
spiration and one spirator with two who spirate.

St. Thomas, explanation is more satisfactory than those proposed 
by earlier Scholastics who understood the ablative "spiritu 
Sancto" (by the Holy Ghost) either as a sign of mutual love and 
thus weakened the sense of the expression; or as a formal cause, 
as if the Holy Ghost were the mutual love of the Father and the 
Son and thus identified the Holy Ghost with active spiration and 
then there would be no third person; or as the formal effect, and 
this last approaches closest to the truth.

Therefore we must say that the Father and the Holy Ghost love each 
other by notional love inasmuch as the Holy Ghost is the terminus 
of this love. Confirmation is found in a rather remote analogy: 
parents are said to love each other by their son since the son is 
the terminus of their love in the sense that we say that a tree 
flowers with flowers. We refer the reader to the third paragraph 
of the body of the article.

Reply to the second objection. "Whenever the understanding of any 
action implies a determined effect, the principle of the action 
can be denominated by the action and the effect."

Reply to the third objection. "The Father loves not only the Son 
but also Himself and us by the Holy Ghost as He enunciates Himself 
and every creature by the Word which He generates. " This is so 
"because the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the first goodness 
according to which the Father loves Himself and all creatures. " 
Hence the Holy Ghost proceeds not only from the mutual love of the 
Father and the Son but also from the love of the first goodness, 
which the Father loves in Himself and in the Son and which the Son 
loves in Himself and in the Father. In this way many difficulties 
proposed recently on this point are solved.

Doubt. From the love of which things does the Holy Ghost proceed?

Reply. The Holy Ghost proceeds per se from the love of all the 
things that are formally in God, and per accidens and 
concomitantly from the love of creatures. This is because the Holy 
Ghost proceeds from the most perfect love. By this love whatever 
is in God is necessarily loved and by it God freely loves 
creatures. But the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the love of 
possible creatures since God is not said to love possible 
creatures because He does not will for them the good of existence. 
This suffices to explain why the Holy Ghost is properly called 
love, namely, personal Love.

Corollary. The expression sometimes heard, "incarnate love, " is 
not admissible as is "incarnate Word, " because it seems to imply 
the incarnation of the Holy Ghost.

We may recall here how beautifully the liturgy makes use of 
metaphors to express this doctrine, particularly in the hymn Veni 
Creator:

Thou who art called the Paraclete,

Best gift of God above,

The living spring, the living fire,

Sweet unction, and true love!


O guide our minds with Thy blest light,

With love our hearts inflame,

And with Thy strength, which ne'er decays,

Confirm our mortal frame. [488]

Since, as St. Thomas says, those things which pertain to love are 
unnamed, the liturgy has recourse to various metaphors, some of 
them opposed to the others, as the spring of living water and 
fire, but whatever is said dividedly is finally united in 
spiritual love.

In the sequence, Veni, Sancte Spiritus, the liturgy amasses 
antithetic metaphors about the Holy Ghost:

Thou in labor rest most sweet,

Thou art shadow from the heat,

Comfort in adversity.


What is soiled, make Thou pure;

What is wounded, work its cure;

What is parched, fructify;


What is rigid, gently bend;

What is frozen, warmly tend;

Strengthen what goes erringly. [489]

In the preparation for Mass among the seven prayers to the Holy 
Ghost we read: "Inflame, O Lord, our reins and our hearts with the 
fire of the Holy Ghost; that we may serve Thee with a chaste body 
and please Thee with a pure mind. " [490] As we have a 
consecration to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus and to the Blessed 
Virgin Mary we should also consecrate ourselves to the Holy Ghost.

CHAPTER XII: QUESTION 38 THE GIFT AS THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST 

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

THIS question is the basis for the question on the missions of the 
divine persons (question 43) and it is also fundamental to the 
questions on grace. For a clear understanding of the following 
articles we must first present a few notes on the differences 
between the Latin and Greek Fathers. [491]

For the Latin Fathers the natural order, or the order of creation, 
depends efficiently and finally on the one God, the author of 
nature; the supernatural order, or the order of grace, depends 
efficiently and finally on the triune God, the author of grace. 
For the Greeks, the natural order is also produced by God ad extra 
through efficient causality and by the command whereby God in 
pronouncing the fiat produced all created things from nothing. The 
supernatural order, however, for the Greeks is rather the 
indwelling of the divine persons in the just than an effect of 
efficient causality ad extra. This indwelling is in a sense a 
prolongation of the divine processions ad extra, distinct from the 
creative action as living is distinct from commanding. Living is 
an action essentially immanent whereas the divine command is 
something that refers to things outside the divine nature. It was 
in this sense that the Greek Fathers interpreted St. Peter's 
words, "By whom He hath given us most great and precious promises: 
that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature. " 
[492] In order that the intimate life of God may come to us it is 
necessary that the divine persons themselves, without whom this 
intimate life of God cannot exist, should come to us in their 
substantial reality. It is not enough that the Father should have 
the simple will of adopting; He must operate, as it were, by His 
nature or according to His intimate life by sending us the Son and 
the Holy Ghost. Thus in the mind of the Greek Fathers the order of 
grace is rather the order of substantial indwelling than an effect 
of divine causality, and therefore the Greeks insist that we 
receive not only grace, which is a created effect, but the Holy 
Ghost, who is the gift par excellence. For Origen [493] and the 
Alexandrian Fathers, the Holy Ghost is the substantial font of all 
graces. For Didymus [494] the Holy Ghost is the seal impressed on 
the soul, and sanctifying grace is the impression of this seal in 
its passive aspect, and this seal must remain in the soul. [495]

Similarly St. Basil and St. Gregory Nazianzen call our 
sanctification a deification, and this deification is described as 
the projection of God's inner life ad extra by the divine 
missions.

For the Greek Fathers, then, the Holy Ghost is the uncreated gift 
and at the same time the enexgeia metaphorically expressed by the 
figure of the spring of living water; and this uncreated gift is 
prior, on the part of God who gives it, to the created gift of 
grace. In this sense they also understood the words, "The charity 
of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is 
given to us. " [496]

St. Thomas does not appear to recede from this position of the 
Greek Fathers, although he does insist that habitual grace is a 
previous disposition on the part of the subject, man, for the 
indwelling of the Holy Ghost. This does not preclude the idea that 
the Holy Ghost on the part of the efficient cause, which is God, 
is given prior to grace. Causes are often causes of each other; 
thus the ultimate disposition for a perfection precedes the 
perfection in the order of material cause and follows it as a 
property in the order of formal cause. In the theory of the Greek 
Fathers, although the entire Trinity dwells in the just, the Holy 
Ghost is in the just by a special presence which is more than the 
presence by appropriation of which the Latin Fathers speak. In 
other words, the theory of the Greek Fathers, which considers the 
three persons prior to the divine nature, finds it easier to 
explain the special nature of the mission of the Holy Ghost, which 
as a mission is something more than simple appropriation.

In the Greek mind the Father, in order to sanctify men and angels, 
sends them the uncreated gift, namely, the Holy Ghost, who dwells 
personally in the just and by circumincession, as it were, draws 
the Son, who is also sent, and the Father, who is not sent but who 
comes. Thus the Holy Ghost dwells in us formally as a person and 
as the uncreated gift. There is not, however, a hypostatic union 
of the soul of the just man with the Holy Ghost because the just 
man retains his own personality and the union with the Holy Ghost 
is not substantial but only accidental.

According to the theory of the Latin Fathers the Holy Ghost dwells 
in us by reason of the divine nature, because the Latins 
considered the divine nature before the three persons, and in the 
souls of the just they considered first the participation in the 
divine nature, which is created grace, before they considered the 
uncreated gift, for which grace disposes the soul. These are two 
aspects of the same mystery, and divine Providence has arranged 
that both be studied so that we might understand this mystery 
better although we shall never be able to express it adequately.

From this it is clear that the Greeks understood the absolute 
distinction between the order of nature and the order of grace; 
indeed they declare that without the uncreated gift we cannot be 
made partakers of the divine nature; that is, habitual grace 
cannot be infused except through the divine persons dwelling in 
the just, especially by the Holy Ghost, who is the uncreated gift, 
the living spring of all graces. [497]

This at all events is the interpretation of the doctrine of the 
Greek Fathers proposed by many modern authors although the 
doctrine of the Greek Fathers in other texts seems to be closer to 
St. Augustine and the Latin Fathers.

We shall now consider how St. Thomas preserved the doctrine of the 
Greek Fathers and how he reconciled it to the Latin theory of the 
two processions after the manner of intellection and of love. This 
question has two articles: 1. whether "the Gift" can be taken as a 
personal name; 2. whether it is a proper name of the Holy Ghost. 
Such is St. Thomas' procedure because the Son of God is also given 
to us, and he wished to show that the Holy Ghost is properly the 
gift.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER "THE GIFT" IS A PERSONAL NAME

State of the question. It appears that "gift" is not a personal 
name because the divine essence is the gift which the Father gives 
the Son. Moreover, a gift is something inferior to the giver. 
Finally, gift implies a reference to creatures and is predicated 
of God in time, whereas personal names are predicated of God from 
eternity.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that it belongs to a divine 
person to be given and to be a gift.

1. Proof from authority. This entire doctrine has its source in 
the words of our Lord as explained by St. John and St. Paul. Jesus 
said to the Samaritan woman: "If thou didst know the gift of God, 
and who He is that saith to you, Give Me to drink; thou perhaps 
wouldst have asked of Him, and He would have given thee living 
water. . . . But the water that I will give him, shall become in 
him a fountain of water, springing up into life everlasting. " 
[498] The living water springing up into life everlasting is 
grace, the seed of glory, but the spring of the living water or 
the font of grace is something else than grace. These words are 
explained by our Lord Himself later on: "If any man thirst, let 
him come to Me, and drink. He that believeth in Me, as the 
Scripture saith, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living 
water. Now this [the Evangelist adds] He said of the Spirit which 
they should receive, who believed in Him; for as yet the Spirit 
was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified. " [499] It 
pertains, then, to the glory of Christ to give His supreme gift, 
the uncreated gift of the Holy Ghost. The same doctrine is found 
in St. Paul's letter to the Romans: "The charity of God is poured 
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. " [500]

In the light of these texts of the New Testament many passages of 
the Old Testament, cited by the Fathers, especially Didymus, 
appear much clearer. [501] In Jeremias we read: "They have 
forsaken Me, the fountain of living water, and have digged to 
themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water. " 
[502] How true these words are of those who put aside everything 
that disposes to the contemplation of God and lose themselves in 
mere human learning and are busy with trifles! They gnaw at the 
shell and never taste the meat, as Pope Leo XIII pointed out. 
[503]

In the prophecy of Isaias we read: "For I will pour waters upon 
the thirsty ground, and streams upon the dry land: I will pour out 
My spirit upon thy seed, and My blessing upon thy stock. " [504] 
"And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him. " [505] "And the 
Lord will give thee rest continually, and will fill thy soul with 
brightness, and deliver thy bones, and thou shalt be like a 
watered garden, and like a fountain of water whose waters shall 
not fail. " [506] And in the prophecy of Joel we read: "I will 
pour out My spirit upon all flesh: and your sons and your 
daughters shall prophesy,. . . moreover upon My servants and 
handmaids in those days I will pour forth My spirit. " [507]

These words of Joel were quoted by St. Peter on Pentecost to 
explain the extraordinary events of that day: "For these are not 
drunk, as you suppose, seeing it is but the third hour of the day: 
but this is that which was spoken of by the prophet Joel: And it 
shall come to pass, in the last days (saith the Lord) I will pour 
out of My spirit upon all flesh. . . and they shall prophesy. " 
[508]

In the psalms we often read of the font of life, "For with thee is 
the fountain of life: and in thy light we shall see light"; [509] 
"His wind (spirit) shall blow, and the water shall run"; [510] 
"the stream of the river maketh the city of God joyful. " [511]

In the mirror of sensible things by this metaphor of the spring of 
living water we find a wonderful expression of the Holy Ghost, the 
font of all graces. We may add those texts of the New Testament in 
which the Holy Ghost is promised or the mystery of Pentecost is 
commemorated, "He shall give you another Paraclete, " [512] 
"Receive ye the Holy Ghost. " [513]

After these preliminary remarks it will be easy to understand the 
reply to this article: It is proper for a divine person to be 
given and to be a gift.

This is theologically explained in the body of the article. 
Obviously the syllogism is explicative and not objectively 
illative because we do not arrive at a new truth distinct from the 
truth contained in the passages quoted from revelation. The 
theological explanation is an analysis of the concept of gift. The 
word "gift" implies the aptitude to be given, an aptitude toward 
the giver and to him to whom the gift is made so that the receiver 
may really accept and enjoy the gift. But any divine person can be 
given by another inasmuch as it proceeds from that person, and a 
divine person may be possessed by a rational creature if the 
creature also is given the ability to enjoy the divine person. 
Therefore the name "gift" is a personal name, or it belongs to a 
divine person to be given and to be a gift.

The reader is referred to the article, [514] where we see that 
this presence of the Holy Ghost in the just is real and not an 
intentional, representative, or affective presence like the 
presence of the humanity of Christ or of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 
who remain physically distant.

Reply to the first objection. "The Holy Ghost gives Himself 
inasmuch as He has disposition over Himself and is able to enjoy 
Himself, just as a free man is said to have disposition over 
himself. . . . But in the case when the gift is said to be from 
the giver (by origin) it is thus distinguished personally from the 
giver and then 'gift' is a personal name."

It should be noted that as the Holy Ghost gives Himself so Christ 
gives Himself in Holy Communion, especially when He gave Himself 
to His apostles with His own hands. To give oneself is much more 
excellent than to give something external to oneself; it is a sign 
of great love. Thus in God, the Father gives Himself to the Son 
and to the Holy Ghost, communicating something of Himself, His own 
divine nature.

Reply to the third objection. "'Gift' when it is used as a 
personal name in God does not imply subjection but only origin 
with regard to the giver. In comparison to the receiver, however, 
it implies free disposition (if the gift is inferior to the giver) 
or fruition (if the gift is a divine person). " This is the basis 
of that mystical, fruition union in which the soul of the just 
man, already purified, experimentally knows the divine persons as 
really present in itself and enjoys them imperfectly in this life 
in anticipation of the perfect enjoyment in heaven. From this it 
follows that infused contemplation, which proceeds from a living 
faith illuminated by the gifts of knowledge and wisdom, and the 
mystical union that results, are not something extraordinary like 
the gifts of prophecy and tongues. They are rather something at 
once eminent and normal in perfect souls, a certain normal 
beginning of eternal life, like the acts of the gifts or virtues 
which are perfected by the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as St. Thomas 
said in speaking of the beatitudes. [515]

Reply to the fourth objection. "A divine person is called gift 
from eternity although He is given in time" for He has this 
aptitude to being given from eternity. Nor does the name "gift" 
imply a real relation to creatures but only a relation of reason.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER "GIFT" IS A PROPER NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST

State of the question. It seems that "gift" is not a proper name 
of the Holy Ghost because it is also used for the Son, "a son is 
given to us, " [516] and "God so loved the world, as to give His 
only-begotten Son. " [517] This name, moreover, does not appear to 
signify any property of the Holy Ghost since it is predicated with 
respect to creatures, which are able not to be and which are not 
from eternity.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that "gift" taken personally in 
God is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

1. Proof from authority. This is proved by the authority of St. 
Augustine: "As to be born is to be the Son from the Father, so for 
the Holy Ghost to be the gift of God is to proceed from the Father 
and the Son. " [518]

2. The theological proof. A beautiful explanation is taken from 
the fact that the Holy Ghost is personal love, as was explained 
above. [519] Here St. Thomas reconciled the theories of the Greek 
and Latin Fathers; for the Latins the Holy Ghost is personal love, 
for the Greeks He is the uncreated gift of God.

The reasoning may be summed up as follows: Since a gift implies a 
gratuitous donation based on love, the first thing that we give 
another is the love by which we will good for him. Thus love is 
the first gift and the root of all other gifts. But the Holy Ghost 
proceeds as personal love. Therefore He proceeds as the first gift 
and consequently "gift" is a name proper to Him, that is, it 
belongs to Him rather than to the Son.

If however "gift", is understood essentially, it belongs to the 
three divine persons, who are able to communicate and give 
themselves to us gratuitously. If "gift" is taken notionally, 
according to its passive origin from the giver, it refers also to 
the Son, but less properly than to the Holy Ghost, who alone 
proceeds as personal love.

The reader is referred to the article.

Thus once again is confirmed the Latin theory of the Trinity, 
according to which the Son proceeds as the intellectual word and 
the Holy Ghost as love. This doctrine admirably agrees with 
revelation and is based on the fact that the Son is called the 
Word in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, and on the fact that 
the Scriptures call the Holy Ghost the uncreated gift of God; for 
the primary gift is love, the root of all gratuitous donation. St. 
Thomas thus preserves what the Greek Fathers taught about the Holy 
Ghost, the uncreated gift, and His indwelling in the souls of the 
just. [520] The Greek theory is more concrete; it speaks of God 
the Father as the Creator, of the Son as the Savior, and of the 
Holy Ghost as the Sanctifier. The Latin theory is more abstract; 
in a more abstract way it considers the divine nature common to 
the three persons and the participation in that divine nature, 
which is habitual grace without which the indwelling of the Holy 
Ghost does not take place. The Latins had to be more abstract in 
their approach because they began with the divine nature as that 
which is common to the three persons. Gradually it became clearer 
that every divine operation ad extra, such as creation and 
sanctification, is common to the three persons because it proceeds 
from the omnipotent divine will, which as an attribute of the 
divine nature belongs to all three persons. Thus the Father cannot 
be said to be the Creator in the sense that He alone creates, nor 
is the Holy Ghost properly the Sanctifier as if He alone 
sanctified, but these terms are predicated of these persons by 
appropriation. It was necessary for the Latins in this way to 
complement the concept of the Greeks.

Those who write about love from the psychological or theological 
viewpoint ought to keep in mind that love, especially pure and 
gratuitous love, is the gift par excellence from which other gifts 
flow. The Latin theory offers an excellent explanation for the 
Greeks, frequent assertion that the Holy Ghost is the fountain of 
living water, the source of all graces, namely, because He is love 
and the first and most excellent gift. This is a legitimate 
commentary on our Lord's words to the Samaritan woman and on the 
following: "If any man thirst, let him come to Me, and drink. . . 
. Out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. Now this He 
said of the Spirit which they should receive. " [521]

Corollary. As Christians we should try to attain a more intimate 
union with the Holy Ghost, who is the most excellent of all divine 
gifts and the root of all others. This present doctrine should be 
applied to all those who are seeking to live an interior life and 
not only to those who are led by God along extraordinary paths and 
who receive graces which are not given to all. If anyone should 
ask whether our Lord's words, "If thou didst know the gift of, 
God. . . " pertain to the ascetical life or the mystical life, it 
seems to me the question smacks of pedantry. Indeed it refers to 
the spiritual life, a spirituality it is true that is profound and 
leads to eternal life, for which the mystical life is only a 
normal and preliminary disposition in perfect souls.

In the Contra Gentes St. Thomas presents a beautiful chapter on 
the other proper and appropriated names of the Holy Ghost. [522] 
The Holy Ghost is often called the nexus or bond of the Holy 
Trinity, the complacent joy of the Father and the Son, since the 
Holy Ghost is produced by the joyous love which the Father has for 
the Son. He is called the Paraclete and the consoler of the soul, 
the spiritual unction, which heals the wounds of our souls; the 
power of the Most High, because love is the greatest power; the 
finger of God, because the sending of the Son was the beginning of 
salvation, and the Holy Ghost is, as it were, the index and sign 
of sanctification. [523]

CHAPTER XIII: QUESTION 39 THE DIVINE PERSONS IN COMPARISON WITH 
THE ESSENCE

We have completed the second part of the treatise, which deals 
with the divine persons in particular, and now we begin the third 
part, which treats of the divine persons: in comparison with the 
essence; 2. in comparison with the properties; 3. in comparison 
with the notional acts, namely, generation and active spiration; 
4. and in comparison with each other.

At first sight it will appear to many readers that St. Thomas is 
again saying what he said in the first part of this treatise, when 
he treated of the persons absolutely in common and then went on to 
the two processions and the relations founded on the processions. 
St. Thomas, however, is not making a new beginning of the 
treatise. What in the first place he had considered analytically, 
first in common and then in particular, he now considers 
synthetically, that is, by comparing with each other all that has 
been determined theologically in the light of revelation. This 
treatise is a kind of circle, beginning with the processions, 
going on to the persons, and returning to the terminus a quo, that 
is, the divine processions. This "circular" contemplation may 
appear to be returning always to the same things but in reality it 
seeks always to penetrate more deeply into the matter just as the 
eagle high in sky seems to be making the same circle again and 
again, looking up into the sun and in the light of the sun above 
looking down on the vast expanse of the earth below. "This 
circular movement is the movement around the same central point. 
Dionysius ascribed to the angels a circular movement since they, 
uniformly and unceasingly, without beginning and without end, look 
upon God, just as circular movement has neither beginning nor end 
and uniformly moves about the same center. " [524]

We will understand the necessity of this synthetic part when we 
come to the theory of appropriation, which cannot be explained 
until we have determined those things which are proper to each 
person, and when we consider the notional acts, active generation 
and active spiration, which presuppose the persons from whom these 
acts proceed.

DIVISION OF QUESTION 39

In question 39, on the divine persons in comparison with the 
divine essence, St. Thomas again considers (in the first two 
articles) the distinction of the persons, but not in the same 
manner as in question 28, which dealt with the relations. Then he 
proceeded analytically because he had not yet arrived at the 
concept of a person, explained later in question 29.

Now he considers the matter synthetically, beginning with the 
concept of a person, which has now been determined. After the 
first two articles, St. Thomas determines the exact manner of 
speech to be observed in order to avoid errors about the Trinity; 
he explains the essential names, whether concrete or abstract, the 
notional adjective, notional verbs, such as generate and spirate. 
Here he also explains the difficult theory of appropriation, to 
which the Latins, more than the Greeks, recur for a clearer 
presentation of the distinction between the persons. The Greek 
Fathers had no great need of this theory because they began with 
the consideration, not of the unity of nature, but of the Trinity 
of persons, which for them obviously were distinct from the 
beginning.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER IN GOD THE ESSENCE IS THE SAME AS A PERSON

State of the question. In this title "the same" signifies real 
identity. It appears that the essence is not the same as the 
person because there are three persons and only one essence. 
Moreover, the persons are distinct and the essence is not 
distinct. Finally, the person is subject to the essence inasmuch 
as the person is the first subject of attribution and nothing is 
subject to itself.

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative: the persons are not really 
distinguished from the essence. This doctrine was defined by the 
Fourth Lateran Council: "In God there is only a Trinity, not a 
quaternity, because each of the three persons is that thing which 
is the substance, the essence, or the divine nature. " [525] We 
have treated of this matter in question 28, where we referred to 
the definition of the Council of Reims (1148) against Gilbert 
Porretanus. There we also expounded Scotus' theory, which tries to 
establish between the divine persons and the divine essence a 
distinction called formal-actual on the part of the thing.

In the sed contra St. Thomas quotes the authority of St. 
Augustine: "When we say the person of the Father we are saying 
nothing else than the substance of the Father. " [526] We should 
note that the words "nothing else" mean not really distinct. This 
point is of major importance with regard to St. Thomas, doctrine 
about the real distinction between a created essence and being. 
Although St. Thomas does not often say expressly that a real 
distinction exists between created essence and being, he often 
affirms that opinion. For example, in the Contra Gentes he says: 
"It is proper in every substance, except subsisting being itself, 
that the substance itself be one thing and the being another. " 
[527] In other words, antecedent to the consideration of our minds 
Peter is not his being; his being, which is in him as a contingent 
attribute, is something other than his essence. We are now asking 
whether a divine person is something other than the divine 
essence. St. Augustine answered in the negative.

In the body of the article St. Thomas coordinates and synthesizes 
the conceptual analysis given previously. [528] He reasons as 
follows: Relations inhere accidentally in creatures, but in God 
they are the essence itself because their <esse in> is 
substantial. But a divine person, for example, the Father, 
signifies a subsisting relation. [529] Therefore the divine 
persons are not really distinct from the divine essence although 
they are really distinct from each other because of the opposition 
of relation. Symbolically, in the triangle the three angles are 
really distinct from each other but they are not distinct from the 
common surface.

Reply to the first objection. This does not involve a 
contradiction because the relations are not distinguished from 
each other according to their <esse in> but only according to 
their <esse ad> because of their relative opposition.

Reply to the second objection. But the divine persons are 
distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are 
distinguished from one another, and this is sufficient so that 
something may be affirmed of the essence and denied of the 
persons; for example, the essence is communicable but paternity is 
not, just as mercy is the principle of forgiveness and justice is 
not.

Reply to the third objection. If it should be said that nothing is 
subject to itself, the reply is that the divine persons are 
analogically considered as the subject of the divine essence 
without any real distinction, whereas in sensible things there is 
a real distinction between the matter, by which the thing is 
individuated, and the form which is given to this subject; 
similarly in created things a real distinction exists between 
substance and the accidents.

Scotus raised certain objections against this article, but we have 
already considered them together with Cajetan's replies. [530] We 
recall here that the formal-actual distinction on the part of the 
thing which was proposed by Scotus is an impossible middle between 
a real distinction and a distinction of reason. A distinction 
either precedes the consideration of our minds and then it is 
real, however weak it may be, or it does not precede the 
consideration of our minds and follows and then it is not real but 
of reason although it may often be founded in the thing and then 
it is called virtual. In the present instance the distinction in 
question is a virtual distinction of a minor order after the 
manner of that which is implicit and explicit, that is, the 
essence of God as understood by us implicitly contains the persons 
in act and the Deity as seen by the blessed and as it is in itself 
explicitly contains the persons in act.

No middle can be found between the distinction which precedes the 
consideration of our minds and the distinction which does not so 
precede. Scotus, theory of the formal-actual distinction on the 
part of the things sins against the rules of division. A division, 
as Aristotle pointed out, must divide the whole, and in order that 
it be adequate it must be into two members opposed to each other 
by affirmation and negation and not into three members. In the 
Porphyrian tree substance is divided per se, adequately and 
progressively into members contradictorily opposed to each other: 
corporeal and incorporeal substance; animate and inanimate 
corporeal substances; sensitive and non-sensitive living 
substances; sensitive rational and sensitive non-rational. 
Distinction must be divided in the same way: real distinction or 
that which precedes the consideration of our minds and the non-
real, which does not precede the consideration of our minds; 
between these two we cannot conceive, nor can there be, a middle, 
because a thing either is or is not antecedent to the 
consideration of our minds.

Hence distinction, which is the absence of identity, must be 
divided immediately, not into three members (of reason, formal-
actual on the part of the thing, and real), but into two members 
opposed to each other by contradiction: [531]

1. Real distinction.

2. Distinction of reason, either founded on the thing, or virtual, 
or not founded on the thing.

The major virtual distinction after the manner of that which is 
excluded and excluding, for example, between genus and difference.

The minor virtual distinction after the manner of that which is 
implicit and explicit, for example, between the attributes of God.

A similar case arises in the division of divine science. [532]

We recall here Cajetan's admirable reply to Scotus on this 
question: "The Deity as it is in itself is above being and above 
unity, it is above all simply simple perfections, which it 
contains formally and eminently in their formal natures. " These 
words of Cajetan are the sublimest comment on this entire 
treatise. [533]

"We fall into error, " says Cajetan, "when we proceed from the 
absolute and the relative to God, because the distinction between 
absolute and relative is conceived by us as prior to God and 
therefore we try to place God in one or the other of these two 
members of the distinction. Whereas the matter is entirely 
different. The divine nature is prior to being and all its 
differences, it transcends all being and is above unity. . . . 
Thus in God there is but one formal nature or reason, and this is 
neither purely absolute nor purely relative, not purely 
communicable or purely incommunicable, but it contains most 
eminently and formally both that which is of absolute perfection 
and whatever the relative Trinity requires."

This formal and most eminent nature is the Deity as it is in 
itself, and when the blessed behold God they see no distinction 
between the essence and paternity although the essence is 
communicable while the paternity is not. It appears therefore, as 
it were a posteriori, that the Deity is above being, although the 
Deity formally and eminently contains being; a sign of this is the 
fact that, whereas in the natural order being is particible, as 
are also good, truth, intellect, and will, the Deity as such 
cannot be participated in naturally by even the highest angel or 
creatable angel. Participation in the Deity can take place only 
through grace, which disposes us to see God immediately as He sees 
Himself, although not comprehensively.

The Deity inasmuch as it is above being, unity, intellect, and 
will is that great darkness of the mystics because it transcends 
the limits of intelligibility in this life. [534]

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER WE MAY SAY THAT THE THREE PERSONS ARE OF 
ONE ESSENCE

State of the question. This is a question of terminology. The 
difficulty arises from the use of the genitive, "of one essence"; 
or it might be better to say, "one essence of three persons."

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative. The formula is found in 
the councils, for example, "We confess and believe that the holy 
and ineffable Trinity, the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, one 
God in nature to be of one substance, of one nature, and of one 
majesty and power. " [535]

In the preface of the Mass of the Holy Trinity we say: "One God, 
one Lord: not in the singleness of one only person, but in the 
Trinity of one substance, " that is, the three persons are of one 
essence. Thus the Church uses this genitive. As is said in the 
argument sed contra, this is a translation of the Greek 
homoousios, of one substance, that is to say, that the three 
persons are consubstantial, as was defined by the Council of 
Nicaea.

The theological argument, given in the body of the article, is the 
following. We cannot denominate divine things except in the manner 
of our own intellectual processes with the ever-present reference 
to creatures from which our concepts are derived. But in creatures 
the essence signifies the form of individuals and persons and is 
attributed to them. Thus we say the sanity of this man, or by 
means of the genitive we say, a man of perfect virtue.

Similarly in God, where the persons are multiplied and the essence 
is not, we say, the one essence of three persons, and the three 
persons are "of one essence, " and the genitive is construed as 
signifying the form.

Reply to the fifth objection. We cannot say that the three persons 
are out of the same essence, because the preposition out of does 
not express the formal cause but the efficient and material cause, 
which do not exist in God with reference to the divine persons.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THE ESSENTIAL NAMES CAN BE PREDICATED 
SINGLY OF THE THREE PERSONS

The question is whether the essential names are predicated of the 
three persons only singly or also in the plural, for example, 
whether we can say, in God there are three Gods, or at least three 
divine beings.

In reply we refer to the distinction between the substantive and 
adjective. Those things which signify the essence substantively 
are predicated of the three persons only singly and not in the 
plural; thus we do not say, three Gods. Those things, however, 
which signify the essence adjectively are predicated of the three 
persons in the plural: thus we say three wise beings.

It should be noted that what grammarians today call substantive 
and adjective were formerly called a substantive noun, as stone, 
wood; and an adjective noun, as white. It was called adjective 
because it denoted something that inhered in a subject like an 
accident.

The point is that a substance is in itself and not in another, and 
thus it has in itself its own unity or plurality. Therefore if a 
substantive noun is predicated in the plural it signifies a 
plurality of substances, for example, many men, in which the 
essence or substantial form is multiplied. Therefore we do not 
say, three Gods.

On the other hand an accident is not in itself but in another, and 
therefore the accident receives unity or plurality from its 
subject. In adjective nouns, therefore, the singularity or 
plurality follows on the subject or suppositum, and the 
multiplication of the suppositum suffices without the 
multiplication of the form, for example, if the same whiteness 
pertains to two supposita, we may say, two that are white.

Thus we do not say, three Gods, but three divine beings, three who 
exist, three who are eternal, three uncreated, if these terms are 
taken adjectively. In the Athanasian Creed we read: "The three 
persons are co-eternal together and co-equal. " If these words are 
taken substantively, we say One uncreated, as we read in the same 
Creed, "As also they are not three uncreated, nor three infinites: 
but one Uncreated, and one Infinite."

Reply to the second objection. St. Thomas notes that in the Hebrew 
"Eloim" is used in the plural. But we do not say in the plural, 
Gods or substances, lest the plurality refer to the substance.

Reply to the third objection. That which pertains to a relation is 
predicated in the plural; that which refers to the substance is 
predicated in the singular. It is better to say three real 
relations than three relative realities, because the relations in 
God are not multiplied according to their <esse in> but according 
to their <esse ad>. St. Augustine is quoted here as saying, "The 
very Trinity is the highest thing."

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER CONCRETE ESSENTIAL TERMS (GOD, NOT DEITY) 
CAN BE SUBSTITUTED FOR PERSON

The question is whether concrete essential names can be used as 
the subject of a proposition in place of the name of any person, 
for example, can we say God generates as we say the Father 
generates?

The difficulty arises from the fact that these concrete essential 
terms seem to signify the essence, since Deity and God are the 
same, and it is not the divine essence that generates, but the 
Father. Thus we could also say that God does not generate if "God" 
can be substituted for "the Son."

The reply nevertheless is in the affirmative, with some 
explanation. God in the concrete signifies Deity in the suppositum 
and therefore God may express either the principle of operation 
common to the three persons, for example, God created heaven and 
earth, or one of the three persons. The particular signification 
must be determined by the exigencies of the predicate. Thus when 
we say God created heaven and earth, "God" stands for the three 
persons who have the same nature and omnipotence. On the other 
hand when we say, God generates, "God" stands for the Father alone 
because He alone generates. But we cannot say the Deity generates, 
as will be explained in article five.

FIFTH ARTICLE: WHETHER ESSENTIAL TERMS TAKEN IN THE ABSTRACT CAN 
BE SUBSTITUTED FOR PERSON

The reply is in the negative from the Fourth Lateran Council, 
[536] which declared against the error of Abbot Joachim: "The 
divine essence does not generate, nor is it generated, but it is 
the Father who generates and the Son who is generated. " Abbot 
Joachim did not advert to the fact that the truth of a proposition 
depends not only on the thing signified but also on the manner of 
signification; the mode must also conform to the truth.

The reason for this reply is as follows: although the Deity is God 
without any real distinction, we cannot say that the Deity 
generates although we can say that God generates, because the 
formal signification is not the same. "Deity" signifies the divine 
essence in itself, but "God" signifies the divine essence in the 
suppositum or in a person that possesses the divine essence. Only 
by reason of the suppositum of the Father is this proposition 
true: God generates, that is, inasmuch as "God" is substituted for 
"the Father."

To say that the Deity generates and that the Deity is generated is 
to imply in the Deity a real distinction, which can exist only 
between the persons according to the opposition of relation, since 
no person can generate himself.

Reply to the fifth objection. But we can say that the divine 
essence is God generating or that which generates because here the 
predicate is used in place of the name of the person, and, as we 
shall see in the following article, we can say that the divine 
essence is the Father according to an identical predication.

SIXTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE PERSONS CAN BE PREDICATED OF THE 
ESSENTIAL NAMES

The question is whether, for instance, we can say, the divine 
essence is the Father, God is the Father, as we say that the 
Father is God.

The reply is in the affirmative. This proposition is true: the 
Deity is the Father. The reason is that personal substantive 
names, like Father, can be predicated of the essence because of 
the real identity of the essence and the person. Thus we can say, 
the divine essence is the Father, and the divine essence is the 
Son; but we cannot say that the divine essence generates or is 
generating or spirating, because these are adjective names, which 
are attributed to persons but not to the three persons.

Cajetan notes that this proposition, "the divine essence is the 
Father, " is true and necessary, not by formal predication but by 
identical predication, that is, solely because of the identity of 
the subject but not by reason of the thing signified. In the same 
way when we say the divine will is the divine intelligence, this 
is true identically but not formally. If it were formally true, we 
could substitute divine will for divine intelligence in every 
instance, just as we can substitute Tullius wherever we find 
Cicero. Then we could say that God knows by His will, that He 
pardons by His justice, and punishes by His mercy.

The proposition, "the divine essence is the Father, " is true 
identically, while the proposition, "the essence generates, " is 
false. It is also false to say that the divine will understands, 
for the adjective signifies the form in the subject, and in this 
last statement there can only be a formal predication and not an 
identical predication because the divine will is a form and not 
the subject of a form. The divine subject does indeed understand 
but not by the will. The willing God understands, but it is not 
God's will itself that understands.

SEVENTH ARTICLE: WHETHER ESSENTIAL TERMS ARE TO BE PROPRIATED TO 
THE PERSONS

State of the question. This is the difficult question of 
appropriation. To solve it the theologian should preserve the 
"sense of the mystery, " and he should not try to reduce the 
mystery in every instance to clear and univocal ideas. This theory 
of appropriation is found at least explicitly only among the 
Latins. The Greeks use the proper names of the persons, and 
besides this they speak only of appellations, kleseis, which are 
found in the Scriptures. As De Regnon [537] points out, the Greeks 
have but one proper name for each of the divine persons: the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Besides this they have 
especially for the Son many appellations: thus in the Scriptures 
the Son is called Logos, Wisdom, Truth, Image, Justice, 
Sanctification, Redemption, and Resurrection. According to the 
Greeks, these appellations are conducive to a better knowledge of 
a divine person, but they did not arrive at an explicit concept of 
appropriation. Indeed they had less need for this theory because 
they began their study with the three persons rather than with the 
unity of nature.

The Latin theologians, particularly the Scholastics, desired to 
perfect the doctrine of the Trinity by a precise classification of 
all terms and concepts. Thus they distinguished exactly, in the 
case of each divine person, the proper names from the other 
appellations found in Holy Scripture, and in making these 
distinctions they relied on St. Augustine's psychological theory, 
according to which the Son proceeds as the Word after the manner 
of intellection or rather enunciation, and the Holy Ghost proceeds 
after the manner of love.

Thus, as we have seen above, St. Thomas showed that the proper 
names of the Son are, the Son, Word, and Image, and the proper 
names of the Holy Ghost are Holy Ghost, Love, and Gift. The other 
appellations found in Scripture are not proper names, but they are 
appropriated to one person rather than to another because of the 
affinity they have for one person rather than for another. Thus 
Wisdom is appropriated to the Son. [538]

In presenting the question in this article, St. Thomas poses three 
difficulties against the theory of appropriation accepted by the 
Latin theologians.

1. A difficulty arises because this theory may lead to an error in 
faith since it is possible that essential terms, like wisdom, 
could be understood as belonging to one person alone, or to that 
person in a greater degree. This would be erroneous since the 
Father and the Holy Ghost are equally wise with the Son.

2. Another difficulty arises from the fact that abstract essential 
terms, like wisdom as distinct from a wise person, cannot be 
appropriated to any one person, for then the Son would be the 
wisdom of the Father or the form of the Father. But no person is 
the form of another person. Like the first difficulty, this one 
confuses an appropriation with a proper name.

3. That which is proper is prior to that which is appropriated. 
But the essential attributes are prior to the persons, at least 
according to our method of understanding, just as that which is 
common is prior to that which is proper. Therefore the essential 
attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.

This statement reveals the difficulties inherent in the theory, 
whether the appropriation is not adequately distinguished from the 
property or whether it is explicitly distinguished from it. The 
importance of this problem arises particularly from our manner of 
speaking of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul by 
appropriation, although the Father and the Son also dwell in the 
souls of the just, according to our Lord's words, "If anyone love 
Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will 
come to him, and will make Our abode with him. " [539] We shall 
see that a mission means more than an appropriation, although the 
appropriation is not merely something verbal.

Reply. St. Thomas replied: "For the manifestation of the faith it 
is fitting that essential attributes be appropriated to the 
persons. " Such is the common answer of Latin theologians.

1. The reply is proved by the authority of St. Paul, who said, 
"Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. " [540] In this 
passage wisdom, which is an attribute common to the three persons, 
is appropriated to the Son. In the following article we shall see 
other appropriations indicated by Holy Scripture.

2. The theological proof may be thus summed up. Although the 
Trinity of persons cannot be demonstrated, yet it can be fittingly 
explained by such truths as are clearer to us. But the essential 
attributes, known to us from creatures, are more clear to us than 
the properties of the three persons. Therefore it is fitting that 
the essential attributes be appropriated to the persons, 
especially when there is a similarity or affinity, as when wisdom 
is appropriated to the Son. The reader is referred to the article.

In reading the article the following difficulty comes to mind: if 
the essential attributes, known from creatures, can manifest the 
divine persons, then the divine persons can be known from 
creatures. St. Thomas replies to this difficulty in the body of 
the article. He recalls what was said earlier, that creatures are 
the effects of the creative omnipotence, which is common to the 
three persons, and from creatures therefore we cannot demonstrate 
the Trinity of persons. [541] On the other hand Scripture tells us 
that there are traces of the Trinity in creatures, indeed even an 
image of the Trinity in the human soul. [542] Hence the divine 
essential attributes, known from creatures with rational 
certitude, can in some way manifest the divine persons, although 
the Trinity cannot be demonstrated by them and can be known only 
through revelation.

This is to say, that the theory of appropriation is not something 
merely verbal, like the difference between Tullius and Cicero, nor 
is it merely a fiction in the theologians, minds, but it has 
according to the Scriptures a foundation in reality, at least a 
foundation of trace and image, although it is difficult to 
determine in what this foundation consists.

In general this appropriation is made because of likeness or 
affinity, but sometimes it is because of dissimilarity, as when 
power is appropriated to the Father, as St. Augustine said, 
because among men fathers are weak because of their age, and we 
should not insinuate anything like this about God.

Reply to the first objection. No error follows from this theory 
because a clear distinction is made between a property and an 
appropriation. At least in the tract on the Trinity appropriation 
does not signify that something becomes a property, because the 
essential attributes cannot become proper to any one person, nor 
is the Son wiser than the Father and the Holy Ghost. Appropriation 
signifies adaptation or accommodation, as the doctors of the 
Church were accustomed to do when they attributed wisdom to the 
Son because He is the Word. We have therefore no error but rather 
more light on the truth.

Properties can easily be distinguished from appropriations. 
Properties are those things which are attributed to one person and 
cannot be attributed to another; appropriations are those things 
which of themselves are common to the three persons but for 
greater clarity are attributed to one person. Such was Cajetan's 
argument.

Abelard, however, ignored this distinction and fell into error. 
According to St. Bernard, he taught that power was proper to the 
Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Ghost. [543] 
Hence the following proposition was condemned: "The Father is full 
of power, the Son is a certain power, and the Holy Ghost has no 
power. " [544]

Reply to the second objection. If wisdom when appropriated to the 
Son would become proper to Him, the Son would become the form of 
the Father. But to be appropriated does not signify becoming a 
property. Hence when St. Paul said, "Christ the power of God, and 
the wisdom of God, " he meant that the Son is the wisdom of the 
Father in the sense that the wisdom is from the wisdom of the 
Father as when we say Light of Light. Hence the Father is not wise 
by the wisdom which He generates but by the wisdom which is His 
essence.

Reply to the third objection. An essential attribute like wisdom 
is in itself prior to a person, but as appropriated it follows the 
property of a person. So color is consequent on the body but it is 
prior to a white body. Such is the solution of the difficulties 
although the idea of appropriation remains confused and we cannot 
arrive at a perfect distinction according to our manner of 
understanding. We must always retain the "sense of the mystery" 
and not attempt the clarification of every detail in this dogma.

EIGHTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE HOLY DOCTORS PROPERLY ATTRIBUTED 
ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES TO THE PERSONS

State of the question. This question is concerned with the 
application of the theory of appropriation and the solution of 
certain special difficulties.

1. St. Hilary appropriates eternity to the Father; the reason is 
not apparent, for the three persons are co-eternal.

2. St. Augustine appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the 
Son, and concord or harmony to the Holy Ghost, whereas the three 
persons are co-equal.

3. St. Augustine also appropriates power to the Father; St. Paul 
appropriates it to the Son when he says, "Christ, the power of 
God. " [545]

4. St. Augustine appropriates the following words to the three 
persons: "For of Him, and by Him, and in Him, are all things, " 
[546] in this way: of the Father, by the Son, in the Holy Ghost. 
The reason for this attribution is not apparent.

5. Truth is appropriated to the Son but it seems to be proper to 
the Son.

Reply. To solve these difficulties and to show the fitness of 
these appropriations of the doctors, St. Thomas invokes this 
principle: God as known from creatures, just as creatures 
themselves, can be. considered in four ways: 1. as He is a being; 
2. as He is one; 3. as He has the power of operation; 4. as He has 
a relationship to His effects.

This principle presents no difficulties, and St. Thomas shows that 
the appropriations made by Scripture and the Fathers were made 
according to these various considerations.

1. When God is regarded as the supreme being, eternity is 
appropriated to the Father, brightness to the Son, and use or 
fruition to the Holy Ghost. Thus St. Hilary. Why? Because the 
eternal is not from a principle, brightness or beauty belongs to 
the Son as the perfect image and splendor of the Father, and, use 
in the broad sense includes fruition and belongs to the Holy Ghost 
since the Father and the Son love each other and mutually enjoy 
the Holy Ghost. Such is the explanation of the appropriations made 
by St. Hilary.

2. When God is regarded as One, according to St. Augustine, unity 
is appropriated to the Father, equality to the Son, and concord to 
the Holy Ghost. Why? Because these three concepts imply unity in 
different ways. For unity absolutely speaking does not presuppose 
anything else and is therefore appropriated to the Father; 
equality implies unity with reference to another and thus is 
appropriated to the Son; and concord implies the unity of two 
according to the heart and is therefore appropriated to the Holy 
Ghost.

3. When God is regarded as having the power for operation, 
according to St. Augustine and others, power is appropriated to 
the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Ghost. 
Why? Because power has the nature of a principle and thus has a 
likeness to the Father, who is the principle without principle. 
Wisdom has a similarity to the heavenly Son inasmuch as the Son is 
the Word or the concept of wisdom. Goodness, finally, is the basis 
and object of love and thus has a similarity with the Holy Ghost, 
who is personal love since He proceeds after the manner of love.

This appropriation, then, more commonly accepted by the Latin 
theologians than others, is based on the concept proposed by St. 
Augustine, according to which the Son proceeds after the manner of 
intellection or enunciation, and the Holy Ghost proceeds after the 
manner of love. A second reason of lesser importance is also 
given, based on dissimilarity, for as the earthly father as an old 
man is weak, the earthly son as young is not yet wise, and the 
earthly spirit is often evil and implies violence.

First corollary. The divine operations especially marked by power, 
as the creation of the world, are appropriated to the Father. Thus 
we read in the most ancient form of the Apostles, Creed, "I 
believe in God the Father almighty, " [547] and in the Nicene 
Creed, "I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker. . . of 
all things visible and invisible. " [548]

Second corollary. The operations which are particularly marked by 
wisdom are appropriated to the Son. Thus the Nicene Creed says, 
"by whom all things were made, " since they were made according to 
God's wisdom, which orders the world. Besides this, the visible 
mission of the Son in the redemptive Incarnation is attributed to 
the Son properly and not by appropriation.

Third corollary. The operations which are especially marked by 
goodness are appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as the conferring of 
grace. Thus we read in the Constantinopolitan Creed, "And in the 
Holy Ghost, the Lord and vivifier. . . who was spoken of by the 
prophets. " [549]

The Greek Fathers had little need for this theory of appropriation 
because in their exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, as we 
have said, they began with the three persons, who are clearly 
distinguished in the New Testament, rather than with the unity of 
nature, which incidentally they had difficulty in safeguarding. On 
the other hand, the Latin Fathers, especially after the time of 
St. Augustine, since they began with the unity of nature had 
difficulty in showing the distinction between the persons. In 
order to explain this distinction between the persons they used 
the theory of appropriation, especially the appropriations of 
power, wisdom, and goodness, which have a valid foundation in the 
Apostles' Creed even in its primitive form.

It is interesting to observe that the Greek Fathers, without any 
explicit theory of appropriation, explain how the creative 
omnipotence is attributed to the Father and sanctification is 
attributed to the Holy Ghost, although they were certain that in 
the operations ad extra the three persons act as one principle 
because they act by the divine intellect, will, and omnipotence, 
which are essential attributes and common to the three persons. In 
the introduction to this treatise, comparing the two theories, we 
said that among the advantages of the Latin theory was its ability 
to explain how the three divine persons are one principle of the 
operations ad extra, namely, creation, conservation, motion, 
providence, and divine governance. One of the difficulties of the 
Greek theory is that it does not clearly explain this point. This 
is not surprising for, when this latter theory starts out with the 
three persons rather than with the unity of nature, we expect that 
the difficulties would be the opposite of those in the Latin 
theory. The Greeks had difficulty in explaining the unity of 
nature, while the Latins had difficulty in explaining the real 
distinction of the persons. The mystery is simply infinite and 
impenetrable.

Finally St. Thomas presents a fourth appropriation based on St. 
Paul's words, "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him, are all things. " 
[550] The "of" (ex) denotes the condition of an efficient cause, 
which belongs to the Father by reason of His omnipotence. The 
preposition "by" (per) designates the form by which the agent 
acts, as when the artist is said to work by his art, and this 
meaning is appropriated to the Son. The "in" denotes the condition 
of a container; God contains things inasmuch as He conserves them 
in His goodness and therefore this meaning is appropriated to the 
Holy Ghost as goodness is.

At the end of the article St. Thomas explains why truth and the 
"book of life" are appropriated to the Son, and also why the name 
"Who am. " This last is appropriated to the Son because when God 
spoke to Moses he prefigured the liberation of the human race, 
which was accomplished by the Son.

We will return again to the theory of appropriation in question 
43, when we treat of the indwelling of the Holy Trinity, which is 
appropriated to the Holy Ghost because this indwelling takes place 
by charity. By charity we are more closely assimilated to the Holy 
Ghost than we are assimilated by faith to the Son; we are not 
perfectly assimilated to the Son except by the light of glory, and 
then the Son will assimilate us to the Father. [551]

CHAPTER XIV: QUESTION 40 THE PERSONS IN COMPARISON WITH THE 
RELATIONS

Many commentators (e. g., Billuart) present the doctrine of this 
question as a commentary of question 29, article 4, namely, 
whether a divine person is constituted by a relation, to which the 
reply is in the affirmative: a divine personality is a relation as 
subsisting and incommunicable. The same doctrine is now taken up 
again to be considered synthetically and not analytically, as 
earlier.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER A RELATION IS THE SAME AS A PERSON

St. Thomas recalls that an incommunicable relation as subsisting 
is the same as a person, which is something subsisting and 
incommunicable. Moreover, in his reply to the first objection he 
shows that personal properties, like paternity and filiation, are 
not really distinct from the persons because as God and the Deity 
are the same (God is His own Deity), so the Father and paternity 
are the same. In God the abstract is not distinct from the 
concrete because there is no matter in God; on the contrary, 
humanity is only an essential part of the concrete man, who 
besides has individuating notes. God, however, is pure form 
without matter, and He is His own being and His own act. 
Properties that are not personal, such as active spiration, are 
not really distinct from the persons to whom they are attributed, 
because the simplicity of God excludes every real distinction 
except where there is opposition of relation.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE PERSONS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THE 
RELATIONS

St. Thomas replies affirmatively, as above in question 30, and 
also refutes the opinion of Alexander of Hales, attributed to St. 
Bonaventure, according to which the persons are constituted by the 
active and passive origins, for example, the Father is constituted 
by active generation and not by the relation of paternity.

To this St. Thomas replies that a person should be constituted by 
something intrinsic to the person itself that is stable and 
permanent in actual being. But the active and passive origins are 
rather extrinsic to the persons and they are conceived as in the 
state of becoming. Moreover, an active origin, like active 
generation, cannot formally constitute the person which it 
presupposes, since it is the Father who generates. Hence, 
according to our mode of conception it is better to say that the 
divine persons are constituted by the subsisting relations. Thus 
the Father signifies the First Person, and the generator is the 
property of this person.

Objection. That which presupposes a distinction cannot be the 
first principle of the distinction. But relation presupposes the 
distinction of the things that are related, since to be related 
means to have a reference to another. Therefore relation cannot be 
the first principle of distinction in God.

Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: a relation 
that is an accident presupposes the distinction of the supposita, 
I concede; a relation that is subsisting, I deny, because such a 
relation constitutes the persons and brings the distinction with 
it. So the reply to the third difficulty. Moreover, in proof of 
the minor it should be said that a relation has a reference to the 
correlative that is prior, this I deny; to the correlative that is 
simultaneous in nature, this I concede.

I insist. This was examined above. The relation which follows on 
active generation cannot constitute the person who generates. But 
the relation of paternity follows active generation since it is 
founded on active generation. Therefore the relation of paternity 
cannot constitute the person of the Father.

Reply. I distinguish the major: the relation as actually referring 
to the terminus, or that which in the exercise of the act refers 
to the Son (follows the person), this I concede; the relation 
which in the signified act modifies the divine essence (follows 
the person), this I deny. And I contradistinguish the minor.

Thus the first angle constructed in the triangle is a geometric 
figure even before it actually has a reference to the two other 
angles. So we can conceive whiteness in itself as that by which 
(ut quo) before we conceive it as modifying the wall (ut quod). 
Similarly habitual grace is conceived in itself before it is 
conceived as expelling sin; essence is conceived first in its 
formal act (in actu signato), as that which is capable of 
existence, before it is conceived as in the exercise of the act as 
having reference to a produced existence.

This distinction is not futile or without an analogy, but it must 
be said that relation, which is a predicamental in creatures, has 
a substantial <esse in> only in God and only in God can it 
constitute a person. Relation constitutes a person in God inasmuch 
as it is incommunicable and subsisting, and it constitutes a 
relative personality inasmuch as it is a relation.

In the third article of this question St. Thomas insists on the 
identity of the persons with the relations by which they are 
constituted, and he shows that the intellect cannot abstract the 
relations from the persons. This is contrary to the opinion 
attributed to St. Bonaventure. In explanation St. Thomas 
distinguishes between total abstraction, or logical abstraction, 
in which the entire universal (as genus or species) is abstracted 
from the particular, as, for example, animal from man, and formal 
abstraction, in which form is abstracted from matter, as, for 
example, when the form of the circle is abstracted from all 
sensible matter.

With respect to God we cannot use total or logical abstraction 
because God is not in any genus; hence we cannot abstract the 
relations from the persons. Nor can we by formal abstraction 
abstract the personal relations from the persons, for example, 
paternity from the Father, because there is no matter in God. The 
Father is His paternity and if we abstract the paternity nothing 
remains of the Father. On the other hand the form of the circle 
can be abstracted from all sensible matter, for example, from wood 
or stone.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS ARE UNDERSTOOD PRIOR TO 
THE PROPERTIES

St. Thomas disagrees with the opinion of Alexander of Hales, 
attributed to St. Bonaventure, according to which the notional 
acts, for example, generation, constitute the persons in such a 
way that active generation is antecedent to paternity according to 
our method of conception.

Reply. In St. Thomas' view the notional acts taken actively, such 
as to generate and to spirate, presuppose the persons from which 
they proceed as already constituted, and the persons are 
constituted by the subsisting relations, as was said above. Hence 
active generation, or enunciation, proceeds from the divine 
intellect as modified by the relation of paternity. And yet these 
notional acts are the bases of the relations inasmuch as the 
relations actually have a reference to their termini. In our 
method of conceiving these things the matter is rather obscure 
with regard to the active origins; this obscurity, however, does 
not arise with regard to the passive origins since a passive 
origin, such as passive generation, according to our method of 
conception precedes the filiation for which it is a basis.

Toward the end of the body of the article St. Thomas replies that 
a relation (for example, paternity) as a relation actually 
referring to the Son presupposes active generation; but active 
generation presupposes the person who generates and the personal 
property, paternity, as constituting the person. Here there is 
indeed a mystery but no contradiction. Similarly, in an 
equilateral triangle the first angle constructed, while it is 
alone, is a geometric figure but it does not yet refer to the 
other two angles not yet constructed.

The reader is referred to the article in the Summa.

In question 27 we have examined the difficulty presented by the 
Latin theory with regard to the proximate principle quo of the 
divine processions. We concluded that this principle is the divine 
intellect and will, not in themselves, but as they are modified by 
the relations of paternity and active spiration. [552]

Nevertheless the relation of paternity as actually and actively 
terminated in the Son presupposes active generation. In this most 
difficult expression of the mystery we find something similar to 
the principle that causes are mutually causes of each other but in 
different genera. By reason of this principle, for example, the 
ultimate disposition for a form precedes the form in the order of 
material cause and afterward follows the form as a property in the 
order of formal cause. If we have difficulty in expressing this 
mutual relationship between the material and formal disposition of 
corporeal beings, it is not surprising that we should find it 
difficult to express the mutual relationships between the divine 
relations, such as paternity, and the notional acts, such as 
active generation.

Generation presupposes the Father and is the foundation for 
paternity, but not under the same aspect. The matter is somewhat 
similar to the form which presupposes the disposition and also 
affords the basis for the disposition inasmuch as the disposition 
is also a property. An example is the ultimate disposition for the 
rational soul, whatever it may be, whether it is a movement of the 
heart or something similar. When this property is destroyed by 
death, the soul separates from the body, because this property is 
seen under two aspects at the same time: it is a property and a 
disposition for the production and conservation of the form in the 
matter. If this is a mystery in the order of sensible things, we 
do not wonder that it is difficult to express how these things are 
in God.

First corollary. As stated in the reply to the first difficulty, 
both these statements are true: because He generates He is the 
Father, and because He is the Father He generates. In the first 
statement the name "Father" is taken as designating the relation 
alone, or the simple reference to the terminus; in the second 
statement the name "Father" is taken as designating a subsisting 
person.

Second corollary. The relation of active spiration, since it does 
not constitute a person but is merely a reference to a terminus, 
is posterior in our minds to the notional act of spiration, which 
is attributed to the Father and the Son.

CHAPTER XV: QUESTION 41 THE PERSONS IN COMPARISON WITH THE 
NOTIONAL ACTS

N this question we consider expressly the notional acts, 
generation I and spiration, which are called notional because they 
denote persons. In this question six articles are proposed for our 
profound and diligent consideration: 1. whether notional acts can 
be attributed to the persons; 2. whether the notional acts are 
necessary or voluntary, and then whether God has power with regard 
to these acts.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER NOTIONAL ACTS ARE TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE 
PERSONS

State of the question. The difficulty arises 1. because, since God 
is not an accident, every act pertains to the essence and cannot 
therefore be attributed to the persons; 2. because St. Augustine 
seems to confirm this difficulty when he says: "Everything that is 
predicated of God is predicated either according to His substance 
or according to a relation, " [553] hence there is no place for 
notional acts; 3. because it is a property of an act to imply 
passivity or passion, but nothing passive is found in God, for 
example, passive generation is something imperfect and not to be 
attributed to God.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is in the affirmative, namely, 
notional acts are to be attributed to the persons; indeed it is 
necessary to do so in order to signify the order of origin in the 
different persons.

The first part of this reply is of faith according to the 
Scripture as we shall see immediately.

1. The testimony of Sacred Scripture is clear: "The Lord hath said 
to Me: Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee. " [554] 
This text, as we have said above, is given added force by the New 
Testament: [555] "the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the 
Father. " [556] Our Lord also said: "For from God I proceeded, and 
came. " [557] The first part of this text is accepted in tradition 
as referring to the eternal procession. The councils quoted these 
words of Scripture in this sense. In the argument sed contra St. 
Thomas quotes the words of St. Fulgentius, "It is a property of 
the Father that He generated the Son."

2. The theological reason is as follows: In the divine persons 
distinction is attendant on the origin. [558] But origin cannot be 
conveniently designated except by some act. Therefore generation 
is properly attributed to the Father and spiration to the Father 
and the Son. This reasoning is clear, but the difficulties posed 
in the state of the question must still be solved.

Reply to the first difficulty. How is it that an act like 
generation, which is not a relation, does not pertain to the 
divine essence? The reply is that if this were an act ad extra, 
like creation, it would pertain to the essence, but generation and 
spiration are acts ad intra belonging to the procession of a 
person from a person and therefore are attributed to the persons.

Reply to the second difficulty. It is insisted that in God there 
is nothing besides essence and relation, and therefore the 
notional acts must be reduced to the relations. But to generate is 
more than a relation. The reply is rather profound. The notional 
acts are distinguished from the persons not really but only by 
reason, because if the idea of action is purified of all created 
modes, action within God (ad intra) is nothing more than a 
relation. In the created order transitive action, like active 
generation, is a movement or mutation as coming from the agent, 
and the passion is the movement as it is in the recipient. When we 
prescind from the motion, as no matter is in God, action implies 
nothing more than the order of origin, according to which it 
proceeds from a principle to the terminus. Since, then, there is 
no motion in God, active generation is nothing else than the 
condition or reference of the Father to the Son, and active 
spiration is nothing else than the condition or reference of the 
Father and the Son to the Holy Ghost. According to our method of 
knowing, which is based on the knowledge of creatures, we 
distinguish active generation from the Father and thus we have two 
terms, but there is no real distinction. It would be better to 
speak of quasi-active generation and quasi-passive generation, and 
also quasi-spiration. With regard to our concept of creation we 
must also purify the idea of transitive action since creation is 
without becoming because there is no preexisting subject. In 
creation we have causality properly so called, but the Father is 
not the cause of the Son but only His principle. St. Thomas says: 
"Creation is not a change (mutatio) except to our way of thinking. 
. . for if we prescind from motion and the pre-existing subject we 
have only the various references (habitudines) in the Creator and 
in the creature. " [559]

So in the Trinity, if we remove the idea of motion, active 
generation implies nothing more than the order of origin.

Reply to the third difficulty. The other insistence still remains: 
How can there be in God passive generation, which implies 
imperfection? The reply is as follows: action, inasmuch as it 
implies the origin of motion, of itself results in passivity 
(passio), since action is motion as coming from the agent and 
motion as it is in a recipient. But such action is not found in 
the divine persons. When we prescind from the motion, we do not 
find that passivity (passiones) except in the grammatical sense 
and according to our method of signification, as when we say that 
the Father generates and that the Son is generated. This means 
that the Son is generated not according to a transition from 
passive potency to act as in human generation but in the sense 
that the entire uncreated divine nature and subsisting and 
unreceived being itself are communicated to the Son by the Father. 
Hence the expression, "the divine nature is communicated, " is 
more proper than, "the Father produces the Son, " since active 
production savors of causality, and passive production savors of 
the transition from potency to act.

In God, then, to be generated is not less perfect than to 
generate, and to be communicated is not less perfect than to 
communicate. Analogically, in the equilateral triangle the angle 
that is constructed first is not more perfect than the other two, 
and the three angles have a superficies which is numerically the 
same. In the beginning this superficies is the superficies of the 
angle that is first constructed and it is not communicated to this 
first angle; then this same superficies is communicated to the 
second angle and, if the second angle is equal to the first, the 
third angle is equal to the first two, and the third angle 
receives the same superficies, which is not caused in it but is 
communicated to it. It is wonderful that between things so remote 
as the Trinity and the triangle there should be an analogy so 
intelligible and so clear. In all created things we can find a 
trace of the Blessed Trinity.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS ARE VOLUNTARY

State of the question. The sense of the question is whether the 
Father voluntarily generates the Son and whether the Father and 
the Son voluntarily spirate the Holy Ghost.

As is clear from the texts cited from the Fathers at the beginning 
of this treatise, the difficulty arises because on the one hand we 
cannot say that the Father freely generates the Son, for then the 
Son would be a creature, as the Arians taught; and on the other 
hand we cannot say that the Father involuntarily generates the Son 
as if forced to do so. From the words quoted in the argument sed 
contra we see that St. Augustine was aware of this difficulty: 
"The Father generates the Son neither by His will nor by necessity 
(by force)."

Reply. St. Thomas solves the difficulty by a distinction between 
the concomitant will and the antecedent will, which latter is 
subdivided into necessary and free. It should be noted that the 
antecedent will is in opposition to the concomitant will and to 
the consequent will but not in the same way. [560] With respect to 
the consequent will, the antecedent will is inefficacious; [561] 
with respect to the concomitant will it may be efficacious. St. 
Thomas' division may be reduced to the following.

(diagram page 290)
The will
Antecedent, as an effective principle
as nature: that is, as a natural and necessary principle. Thus man 
naturally wills happiness in general
as free: as a principle acting indifferently as to judgment. Thus 
God freely wills creatures.
Concomitant, not as an effective principle
In this way I will to be a man and I am pleased to be a man, but 
the fact that I am a human being does not depend on my will

Having made this division, we draw three conclusions.

1. The notional acts, to generate and to spirate, are voluntary by 
a concomitant will. Thus the Father voluntarily generates the Son, 
just as He wills Himself to be God; the Father does not generate 
the Son involuntarily nor do the Father and the Son spirate the 
Holy Ghost unwillingly.

As we read in the reply to the first objection, St. Hilary wrote: 
"The Father does not generate the Son induced by a natural 
necessity. He is not forced to generate the Son. " [562] Such was 
also the declaration of the Council of Sardinia, and St. Augustine 
rightly says, "The Father generates the Son not by the necessity 
of force. " [563]

2. The notional acts are not voluntary by an antecedent will as 
free, because what proceeds in this way from the free will is able 
not to be, and the notional acts are not able not to be. Otherwise 
it would be possible for the Son and the Holy Ghost not to be. St. 
Thomas might have been content with this explanation, but in the 
body of the article he recalls the roots of liberty explained 
earlier [564] in the question, "Whether God freely wills things 
other than Himself. " He explains that, whereas the form by which 
a natural agent acts is one (the natural form), it follows that in 
the same circumstances such an agent always produces the same 
effect (by the principle of induction), since it is determined to 
one effect. On the other hand, the form by which the will as free 
acts is not one only but consists of many reasons in the intellect 
and many possible judgments, and therefore in the deliberation 
there is an indifferent mistress of judgments and also of choice. 
Therefore what is freely willed can be either one or another. But 
this cannot be in God or in the processions, otherwise it would be 
possible for the Son and the Holy Ghost not to be and then they 
would be creatures, as the Arians thought.

3. Active spiration is by an antecedent will as nature; 
generation, however, which, as enunciation, proceeds not from the 
will but from the intellect, proceeds prior to the will. God 
therefore understands the generation before He wills it. Spiration 
proceeds from the antecedent will because the Holy Ghost proceeds 
as love; consequently He proceeds by the will, namely, as the 
terminus of that volition by which the Father and the Son 
naturally and necessarily love each other. In this same way man 
naturally loves happiness in general, at least by a necessity of 
specification; in this way also the blessed love God by an act of 
the will which is entirely spontaneous but also necessary, an act 
of the will that is not inferior to liberty but above it, because 
the will of the blessed is invincibly drawn to God's goodness when 
they see Him clearly. [565] In this beatific love there is no 
liberty of specification or freedom of exercise and yet this love 
is most spontaneous; it is therefore an excellent example of the 
non-free and spontaneous active spiration. Thus the Holy Ghost 
proceeds not after the manner of nature, because He is not 
begotten, but from the will as nature.

Scotus, who in this question seems to follow St. Bonaventure and 
Richard of St. Victor, held that the procession of the Holy Ghost 
is an act that is free by an essential freedom. To this the 
Thomists reply that this essential liberty cannot be a liberty by 
necessity or a liberty of indifference for then it would be 
possible for the Holy Ghost not to be and then He would be a 
creature. The term, "essential liberty, " then, can be understood 
only as liberty by compulsion, which is simply the spontaneity of 
natural and necessary volition. The difference is really only 
nominal, because the Thomists readily admit such spontaneity, as 
in the beatific love, which is not in any way free yet is most 
spontaneous. Scotus found himself obliged to say that active 
spiration, although free by an essential freedom, was necessary 
inasmuch as the Holy Ghost is necessarily spirated and necessarily 
exists, but he did not wish to call the spirating will natural. 
[566]
THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER A PERSON PROCEEDS FROM SOMETHING OR FROM 
NOTHING BY THE NOTIONAL ACTS

This article explains the words of the Creed about the Son, who is 
begotten but not made from nothing, in opposition to the Arians, 
who taught that the Son was a creature. St. Thomas showed that the 
processions, generation and spiration, are emanations and not 
creations from nothing. This is the difference between being 
begotten and being made: he who is begotten is from the substance 
of the generator. For even in human generation the son is from the 
seed of the father, although here we have a multiplication of 
natures; in divine generation the Son is of the substance of the 
Father, but here the entire indivisible divine nature is 
communicated to the Son without multiplication of the nature. 
That, however, which is made, for instance by a mechanic, is not 
of the substance of the workman, but it is produced by a 
transformation of matter, or if it is made without any pre-
existing subject it is said to be made from nothing. This explains 
why the Scriptures speak of the Son of God not only in the broad 
sense, as an adopted son, but as "His own Son, " [567] and as "the 
only-begotten Son. " [568]

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER IN GOD THERE IS potentia WITH REGARD TO 
THE NOTIONAL ACTS

State of the question. It is asked whether there is a potentia of 
generating and spirating in God. Following St. Augustine, St. 
Thomas replies in the affirmative because potentia is nothing else 
than the principle of some act, and in this instance the potentia 
is active. As he says in the reply to the second difficulty, 
passive potentia cannot exist in God, nor can there be any power 
which is necessarily opposed for then the potentia would be 
passive.

A difficulty is raised in the third objection. Potentia is 
predicated of God with respect to certain effects (in this way we 
speak of God's omnipotence); but power is not predicated of God 
with respect to the divine operations, divine intellection and 
will, because God is pure act. Therefore in God there is no 
intellective faculty but only intellect subsisting per se, nor is 
there a volitional faculty. Indeed, the divine persons are not 
effects of God, and therefore we cannot speak of the potentia of 
generating or spirating in God.

Reply. According to St. Thomas' reply the potentia of generating 
is not properly the principle of active generation but the 
principle of the begotten person, just as the creative power is 
not the principle of the creative action, which is not an accident 
in God, but the principle of the created effect.

As Billuart points out, these notional powers, that is, the powers 
of generating and spirating, are not virtually distinct from the 
acts because there is no foundation in God for conceiving Him as 
being in potency to anything since He is pure act.

Thus in God the intellect is not virtually distinct from 
intellection since God's intellect is intellection subsisting per 
se, noesis noeseos Similarly God's will is not virtually distinct 
from His love, by which He loves Himself necessarily, and loves 
other things freely. This unique act of love is the indifferent 
mistress of those goods which are able not to be.

FIFTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE POWER TO GENERATE SIGNIFIES THE 
RELATION AND NOT THE ESSENCE

Reply. The power of generating signifies directly the divine 
nature and indirectly the relation of paternity. This is another 
way of saying what was said at the beginning of this treatise in 
the question on the processions, namely, the proximate principle 
quo of the processions is the divine nature itself as modified by 
the relations of paternity and spiration. In the present article 
this principle quo is called the notional power of generating or 
spirating.

St. Thomas offers proof for this for the power of generating, 
which is more easily understood than the second power: In the 
created order every agent produces what is like to itself 
according to the form by which it acts inasmuch as it determines 
its production according to its own proper determination. Thus a 
cow generates a cow, a horse generates a horse, and everything 
that generates produces something like itself according to its 
species or nature. Hence in the one who generates, the nature is 
the principle quo of generation; thus Socrates generates as a man 
and generates a man. If Socrates generated as Socrates he would 
generate Socrates. Therefore the active principle of generation is 
directly the nature of the generator and indirectly it is the 
personality of the generator, for when Socrates generates, the 
principle quo of generation is human nature as it is in Socrates; 
so also in God the principle quo of generation is the divine 
nature as it is in the Father. Similarly the superficies of the 
triangle is communicated to the second and third angles as it is 
in the first angle. Particular attention should be given to what 
St. Thomas says at the end of the body of the article: "In created 
things the individual form constitutes the person of the 
generator, but it is not that by which the generator generates, 
otherwise Socrates would generate Socrates. Hence paternity cannot 
be taken as that by which the Father generates, but it must be 
understood as the form that constitutes the person of the 
generator, otherwise the Father would generate a Father."

According to St. Thomas, then, the personality of Socrates is the 
individual form, namely, that by which something is what it is, or 
the first subject of attribution. [569] But this individual form 
of Socrates is not matter marked by quantity, or the individuating 
conditions, since it is called the individual form; nor is this 
form Socrates' existence, which is a contingent predicate in 
Socrates. [570]

SIXTH ARTICLE: WHETHER A NOTIONAL ACT CAN TERMINATE IN SEVERAL 
PERSONS

In other words, it is asked whether several persons can be 
generated or spirated in God, as one man can beget several sons.

Reply. The reply is in the negative.

1. In God being and possibility are not different. Therefore if it 
were possible to have several sons of God, there would actually be 
several sons of God; and this conclusion would be heresy.

2. Such plurality of sons could arise only from matter, which does 
not exist in God. It would also presuppose several numerically 
distinct generations. This is impossible because generation and 
spiration are acts naturally determined to one terminus and the 
terminus is, as it were, an adequate fruit (result). Thus the Son 
is the perfect Son, in whom the entire filiation and the entire 
divine nature is contained without multiplication. We should note 
what St. Thomas says in this sixth article (as everywhere else): 
"The forms of one species are not multiplied except according to 
matter, " and therefore a form that is not received in matter 
cannot be anything but one.

Recently some Thomists have said that God could miraculously make 
several angels in the same species, that is, many Michaels 
multiplied without matter. According to St. Thomas this is 
impossible because we are dealing here with a metaphysical 
principle in which there is no place for a miracle. [571] It is 
not merely a natural law but a metaphysical principle that an act 
that is not limited in itself is not limited or multiplied except 
by the potency or real capacity in which it is received. Therefore 
a form is not multiplied except by matter, or by an order to 
matter, and it is this order to matter that remains in the 
separated soul. In this metaphysical principle, if it is really 
metaphysical, that is, absolutely and not only hypothetically 
necessary, there is no exception by way of a miracle.

CHAPTER XVI: QUESTION 42 THE EQUALITY AND SIMILARITY OF THE DIVINE 
PERSONS

THIS chapter treats of the comparison of the divine persons with 
one another. Six articles are presented about their equality and 
on the order between them and on circumincession, inasmuch as one 
person is in the other.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE EQUAL

Reply. The reply is affirmative and of faith according to the 
Athanasian Creed, which professes that the divine persons are 
"coequal, " and the same doctrine is defined by many councils. 
[572] In the Scriptures it is said of the Son, "Who being in the 
form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God. " [573] 
The explanation given in the body of the article is this: things 
are said to be unequal according to a difference in quantity. But 
in God quantity is the perfection of divine nature, which is 
numerically the same in the three persons. Therefore the three 
persons are not unequal but all three are coequal.

In the reply to the first difficulty, St. Thomas explains that 
quantity is twofold: quantity of amount (molis) and quantity of 
power (virtutis). The latter is predicated according to perfection 
of nature or form. To be one in nature is to be the same; to be 
one in quantity is to be equal; and to be one in quality is to be 
similar. [574] Corollaries are presented in the following 
articles.

In the reply to the second difficulty, it is noted that the three 
persons are similar because we have here equality not of amount 
but of power, according to communication in one form.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE PROCEEDING PERSON IS COETERNAL WITH 
HIS PRINCIPAL

State of the question. The difficulty arises because no eternal 
being has a principle and that which is generated begins to be. In 
the first difficulty St. Thomas quotes the objection of the 
Arians, who enumerated twelve kinds of generation in which there 
is no consubstantiality or coeternity.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that the three persons are 
coeternal. This is of faith according to the Scriptures: "That 
which was from the beginning, which we have heard"; [575] "I am 
Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the 
end. " [576] In the Athanasian Creed we profess, "The whole three 
persons are coeternal together and coequal. " The Fourth Lateran 
Council also declared that the three persons are "consubstantial 
and coequal and co-omnipotent and coeternal. " [577]

The theological explanation throws a great deal of light on this 
somewhat obscure doctrine. The explanation is as follows: The 
proceeding persons are coeternal with their principles because 
they proceed from a principle whose active power is always perfect 
by instantaneous action in the one unique instant of eternity. The 
intellect and the will of God are, of course, always in act. 
Therefore the divine intellect is never without the Word nor is 
the divine will ever without personal love, or the Holy Ghost.

Reply to the first objection. A vestige of this coeternity is 
found in the sun inasmuch as the sun never lacks its brightness.

Reply to the second objection. Unparticipated eternity properly so 
called excludes the principle of duration but not the principle of 
origin. Thus the Son originates from the Father in the one instant 
of immobile eternity. This truth is expressed in the words, "Thou 
art My son, this day have I begotten Thee. " [578] "Today, " that 
is, in this one unique instant of eternity, which is the stable 
now (nunc stans) and which is not fluent.

Reply to the third objection. The following principle, "everything 
that is generated begins to be, " is not verified in the Son of 
God because divine generation is not a transmutation, nor is it a 
change from non-being to being, but it takes place by the 
communication of uncreated being itself. [579] Hence the Son is 
always generated and the Father always generates, since the "now" 
of eternity is not fluent but is immutably stationary.

Reply to the fourth objection. In time the perduring time is 
different from the indivisible fleeting point, which is the fluent 
instant, for time is the successive continuum which is divisible 
in infinity, whereas the instant is indivisible like the point 
that terminates a line. In eternity, however, this indivisible 
"now" is always stable or stationary and therefore there is no 
difference between the perduring eternity and this indivisible 
point. [580] Since the generation of the Son is in the "now" of 
eternity, we can say that the Son is always being born, or still 
better that the Son is always born because the "born" signifies 
the perfection of him who is begotten, whereas being born 
signifies that which is becoming and is not yet perfect.

A beautiful thesis could be written about this "now" of eternity 
in comparison with continuous time, which is the measure of the 
apparent movement of the sun, and with the discrete time of the 
angels, which is the measure of the angels' successive thoughts 
and affections. [581] Such a thesis could be combined with the 
doctrine concerning the life of God inasmuch as eternity is 
defined as "the perfect, complete, and simultaneous possession of 
interminable life."

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE IS AN ORDER OF NATURE IN THE DIVINE 
PERSONS

State of the question. The precise state of the question appears 
in the second difficulty. This difficulty is as follows: In those 
things where there is an order of nature one thing is prior to 
another, if not in time at least in nature or intellection. But in 
the divine persons nothing is earlier or later, as we learn from 
the Athanasian Creed. Moreover, in God the nature is most simple 
and numerically the same in the three persons and hence there is 
no order in the divine nature.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that there is an order of nature 
in the divine persons, an order not according to earlier and later 
but according to origin.

1. This is proved from general principles in the argument sed 
contra as follows: Wherever there is plurality without order we 
have confusion. But in God there is no confusion; therefore there 
must be order.

2. It is also proved from particular principles. Order is always 
predicated with regard to some principle, for example, with regard 
to the principle of the line, the principle of number, the 
principle of demonstration, the principle of causal influence, or 
the chief end. But in God we predicate the principle of origin 
without any priority. Therefore in God there is the order of 
origin without priority or posteriority.

The minor was explained above: [582] "Although the term 
'principle' with regard to that from which its significance is 
derived seems to come from priority, it does not signify priority 
but origin. For that which a term signifies is not the same as 
that from which the term is derived, as was explained above. " 
[583] Thus the Latin word for stone, lapis, seems to be derived 
from some action of the stone, namely, to injure the foot, laedit 
pedem.

Reply to the second objection. In created beings order is a 
disposition with regard to priority and posteriority in view of 
some principle, for example, the principle of the line or of 
motion, the principle of demonstration, or the principle of 
causality in any one of the four kinds of causes. But in God the 
concept of order is preserved analogically in view of the 
principle of origin without priority or posteriority, because 
posteriority either in duration or being would be an imperfection, 
which cannot be predicated of the Son or of the Holy Ghost. More 
briefly: whatever is posterior to another in nature must depend 
according to its own nature upon the nature of the other (as the 
nature of the ray depends on the nature of the sun). But we cannot 
speak of God in this way because there is but one nature in God. 
In this reply to the second difficulty St. Thomas shows that where 
there is no priority of time in created beings there is still a 
priority of nature, for example, the sun is prior to its 
brightness. But he adds: "If we consider not the entity of the 
cause but the relations themselves of the cause and that which is 
caused, of the principle and that which is principled, it is 
evident that the relatives are simultaneous in nature and 
intellect inasmuch as the one is contained in the definition of 
the other. But in God the relations are subsisting persons in one 
nature. Therefore one person is not prior to another either on the 
part of the nature or on the part of the relations. Nor is one 
person prior to another in intellection.

We have then an order of origin without any priority, even that of 
nature. This is, of course, quite mysterious. Cajetan notes that 
many theologians admit a "priority and posteriority of origin. " 
His reply was: "Let them have this opinion, but let them be quiet 
about it. " He probably meant that they could hold this opinion 
inasmuch as there is a kind of priority and posteriority according 
to our imperfect method of understanding but not in fact, and that 
as far as possible we ought to try to correct our imperfect method 
of knowledge. To safeguard the words of the Athanasian Creed, "in 
this Trinity there is nothing before or after, " we ought to say 
with St. Thomas, "nothing is before or after, either in time or 
nature or honor. " We preserve the analogy by noting that "between 
God and creatures there is no similarity so great that there is 
not always a greater dissimilarity. [584]

A trace of this truth is found in the equilateral triangle, in 
which the three angles are entirely similar and equal. We can say 
that the angles are without any priority in this sense, that in 
constructing the triangle we can begin with any angle, and we can 
invert the triangle so that the apex becomes the extremity of the 
base.

Reply to the third objection. "The order of nature is predicated 
not in the sense that the divine nature itself is ordered but that 
the order among the divine persons follows according to natural 
origin, " for the Father generates according to His own nature, 
and the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Ghost by the will as 
it is the divine nature.

Reply to the fourth objection. It is called the order of nature 
rather than the order of the essence because nature to a certain 
extent implies the idea of principle.

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE SON IS EQUAL TO THE FATHER IN 
GREATNESS

State of the question. We are dealing here with the equality of 
perfection for the purpose of explaining Christ's words, "the 
Father is greater than 1. " [585] The difficulty arises because 
paternity pertains to dignity and does not belong to the Son. This 
is a statement of the question on which we touched earlier, 
namely, whether paternity is a simply perfect perfection properly 
so called, although the Son does not possess it. It is the same 
question as in the first article with the special difficulty that 
arises from the fact that paternity appears to be a special 
dignity.

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative: the Son is equal to the 
Father in perfection. This doctrine is of faith from the 
Scriptures: "Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery 
to be equal with God. " [586]

The theological reason is as follows: It is of the nature of 
paternity and filiation that the Son by generation attains to the 
possession of that perfect nature which is in the Father as it is 
possessed by the Father. And the Son attains to that perfect 
nature unless the power of generation is defective. But in God the 
power of generation is not defective; it is exercised most 
perfectly from all eternity. Therefore the Son possesses the 
entire perfection of the Father from all eternity.

Reply to the first objection. Only as man did Christ say, "the 
Father is greater than 1."

Reply to the second objection. The difficulty is that the Son 
lacks the dignity of paternity. St. Thomas replied: "Paternity is 
the dignity of the Father just as the essence is the dignity of 
the Father, since the dignity is absolute and pertains to the 
essence. Just as the same essence which is the paternity in the 
Father is filiation in the Son, so the same dignity which is 
paternity in the Father is filiation in the Son. But in the Father 
this dignity is according to the relation of the giver, and in the 
Son it is according to the relation of the recipient. " But the 
divine generation is without the imperfection of the transition 
from potency to act since divine generation is not a mutation but 
the communication of uncreated being itself. Similarly, in the 
equilateral triangle the superficies is the same in the first 
angle and in the second, but in the first it is according to the 
relation of the giver and in the second according to the relation 
of the recipient. That is, as we have said above, the relations as 
such, according to their <esse ad>, prescind from perfection and 
imperfection. Hence they are not simply simple perfections 
properly so called; for, although they do not involve any 
imperfection, it is not better to have them than not to have them. 
Otherwise the Son would lack some perfection and so would not be 
God.

St. Thomas points out that "a relation, inasmuch as it is a 
relation, does not have that which makes it something but only 
that by which it has a reference to something. " [587] In this 
reply he says, "the thing in the something to which the reference 
is, is changed, " since the same dignity which in the Father is 
paternity is filiation in the Son. Thus divine filiation is not 
less perfect than divine paternity, just as in the triangle either 
angle at the base is not less perfect than the angle at the apex.

Reply to the third objection. The three persons together do not 
constitute greater perfection than one person alone, because the 
entire, infinite perfection of the divine nature is in each 
person, just as the superficies of the equilateral triangle is in 
each of the angles.

St. Thomas also points out in this article that in God relation 
and person are not something universal because all the relations 
are one according to essence and being. Humanity, however, is 
something universal, that is, it is apt to be in many through the 
multiplication of the form received in different parts of matter.

FIFTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE SON IS IN THE FATHER AND THE FATHER IS 
IN THE SON

This article deals with circumincession, which is the mutual 
coexistence of the divine persons in each other so that the Father 
is in the Son, the Son in the Father, and both in the Holy Ghost, 
and the Holy Ghost in both.

The difficulty arises because what goes out of another is not in 
the other. But the Son goes out of the Father from all eternity. 
Moreover, one of two opposites is not in the other opposite.

Reply. The affirmative reply is of faith according to the 
Scriptures, for Christ said: "Do you not believe that I am in the 
Father, and the Father in Me?" [588] Such was the interpretation 
of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine. [589]

The theological argument is in three parts: the Son is in the 
Father, and the Father is in the Son:

1. according to essence, which is numerically the same in the 
persons;

2. according to the relations, because they mutually involve each 
other, although they are opposites;

3. according to the procession, because it is immanent or ad intra 
and not ad extra.

Circumincession signifies consubstantiality, the immanence of the 
processions, and the reciprocity of opposite relations. An analogy 
can be seen in the equilateral triangle, where each angle is in 
the other two.

Objection. One of two opposites is not in the other opposite, 
because the opposites are really distinct. Therefore the Father is 
not in the Son.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: one of the opposites formally 
as an opposite is not in the other opposite, I concede; 
nevertheless by reason of the same essence the relations have the 
same <esse in> and according to the <esse ad> they mutually refer 
to each other and are inseparable, although really distinct. Thus, 
by circumincession the Father and the Holy Ghost are with the 
incarnate Son in the Holy Eucharist. [590]

SIXTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE SON IS EQUAL TO THE FATHER IN POWER

This article explains the following words of our Lord: "The Son 
cannot do anything of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing, 
" [591] and, "For whatsoever He [the Father] doth, these the Son 
also doth in like manner. " [592]

Reply. The affirmative reply is of faith. The reason is that the 
power of acting follows the perfection of the nature, which is 
numerically the same in the Father and in the Son.

Reply to the first objection. But the Son has this power as He has 
His nature from the Father.

Reply to the third objection. St. Thomas recalls what was said in 
the reply to the second objection in the fourth article.

CHAPTER XVII: 
QUESTION 43 THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

THIS last question of the treatise takes up the comparison of the 
I divine persons with one another with regard to their missions ad 
extra. We have already touched on this matter in question 38, 
where we treated of the Gift as the name of the Holy Ghost, that 
uncreated gift, personal love, which is the first of all the gifts 
that proceed from love. This question about the missions of the 
divine persons is the principal foundation for that event which is 
essentially supernatural ad extra, namely, the redemptive 
Incarnation and the life of grace within us. Under that aspect 
this question is connected with the question on the love of God, 
where the principle of predilection is enunciated: No one would be 
better than another if he were not loved more by God, [593] and 
with the question of the universal salvific will. [594]

These articles are, therefore, of great importance and should be 
studied carefully. The doctrine contained in them was the frequent 
object of contemplation for the saints and it ought to be 
effectively presented in our sermons. It would become the subject 
matter of our preaching if our preaching were preceded by diligent 
contemplation of this matter. [595]

This question is divided into two parts. The first part treats the 
matter in general and is divided into the first three articles: 1. 
whether any divine person is sent; 2. whether the mission is 
eternal or only temporal; 3. in what manner a divine person is 
sent invisibly; and the reply: according to grace gratum faciens. 
This is the principal article of the entire question.

The second part of this question consists of the special 
application of-these truths to the three divine persons: 4. the 
Father is not sent because there is no person to send Him, but He 
comes and dwells in us; 5. whether the Son as well as the Holy 
Ghost is sent invisibly, and the reply is affirmative; 6. to whom 
is the mission made? and the reply: to all the just in whom the 
divine persons become present in a new way or in a higher way; 7. 
whether it belongs to the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly, as on 
Pentecost; 8. whether it can be said that the Son is sent by the 
Holy Ghost; and the reply is affirmative with the qualification 
that the sending is improperly so called.

The basis of this doctrine of the missions of the divine persons 
is found in many places in Holy Scripture. We cite here the texts 
of the New Testament.

From the Synoptics: "Whosoever shall receive Me, receiveth not Me, 
but Him that sent Me"; [596] "And I send the promise of My Father 
upon you. " [597] The Greek for "send" is apostello, hence 
apostolos, one sent, or a legate from God.

From St. John's Gospel: "For God sent not His Son into the world, 
to judge the world, but that the world may be saved by Him"; [598] 
"And the Father Himself who hath sent Me, hath given testimony of 
Me"; [599] "because I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent 
Me. " [600] Concerning the Holy Ghost: "But the Paraclete, the 
Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach 
you all things"; [601] "But if I go, I will send Him to you. " 
[602]

In St. Paul: "But when the fullness of the time was come, God sent 
His Son. " [603]

From the councils: "The Holy Ghost is said to be the Spirit not 
only of the Father but of the Father and the Son together. This 
Holy Ghost is believed to be sent by both as the Son is sent by 
the Father; but He is not less than the Father; and the Son as the 
Son, because of the flesh He assumed, testified that He was less 
than the Father and the Holy Ghost. " [604]

In the creed of St. Epiphanius we read: "I believe in the Holy 
Ghost, who was proclaimed by the prophets, who descended on the 
Jordan (in Christ's baptism), who spoke through the apostles (on 
Pentecost), and who dwells in the saints. " [605]

The Council of Trent declared that the Holy Ghost is received with 
sanctifying grace; [606] and earlier St. John Damascene said that 
the Holy Ghost gives seven gifts. [607]

The most complete and extensive document of the Church on the 
divine missions and on the indwelling of the Holy Trinity in the 
just is Pope Leo XIII's encyclical on the Holy Ghost, which 
Denzinger should have listed. [608] In almost the same words used 
by St. Thomas it gives a beautiful presentation of the doctrine of 
the missions, the indwelling, and the seven gifts of the Holy 
Ghost. [609]

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER IT IS FITTING FOR A DIVINE PERSON TO BE 
SENT

State of the question. It seems that no divine person is sent 
because the one who is sent is less than the sender, and because 
whatever is sent is separated from the sender. Moreover, the 
divine persons are already present everywhere and hence they 
cannot be sent where they already are. The expression "mission" 
is, therefore, not proper but only metaphorical, as when we say, 
God is angry.

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative: it belongs to some persons 
to be sent, that is, analogically, not only metaphorically and 
analogically, as when we say, God is angry, but by a proper 
analogy.

This reply is of faith according to the Scriptures, which often 
use this expression. [610]

The body of the article contains a conceptual analysis of the idea 
of mission, and the argument is therefore not an illative but an 
explicative syllogism: the idea of mission implies the twofold 
reference of the one sent: to the sender and to the terminus of 
the sending.

One is sent by the sender either by command, as the servant by his 
master, or by counsel, as a king by his councilor, or by origin, 
as the flower is sent out by the plant. One is sent to the 
terminus of the sending either in the sense that the one sent 
begins to be there, or at least begins to be there in a new way.

Hence a mission can be predicated of a divine person by a proper 
analogy inasmuch as this divine person proceeds from the sender 
and begins to be in another in a new way. Thus the Son is said to 
be sent by the Father into the world inasmuch as the Son began to 
be in the world in the flesh assumed by Him, and yet the Son was 
in the world before this as the Word not yet incarnate. "That was 
the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this 
world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him. " [611] 
Obviously, this syllogism is not objectively illative because we 
do not arrive at a new truth but only explain a truth already 
revealed: "For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the 
world, but that the world may be saved by Him. " [612]

The reply is confirmed by the solution of the objections.

Reply to the first objection. The one sent is less than the sender 
if he is sent by command or even by counsel, but not if he is sent 
according to a procession that is only of origin, which takes 
place on the plane of equality.

Reply to the second objection. In a divine mission the one sent is 
not separated from the sender because the one sent does not move 
locally to a place where he was not before but only begins a new 
manner of being in one where he had not been before.

Reply to the third objection. Thus a divine person does not leave 
a place, because God in Himself is not in any place, and the 
divine person was already present by the general presence of His 
immensity where now He begins to be in a new way. This will be 
explained at greater length in the third article.

From this article we obtain the definition of a divine mission: 
essentially it implies the procession of origin of one person from 
another with a new mode of existence in another. According to his 
custom, St. Thomas thus passes from the nominal, or commonly 
accepted, definition to the real definition, dividing the various 
kinds of missions, comparing them in order to discover how they 
agree and differ analogically so that no imperfection will be 
posited in God. Indeed this idea of mission in its formal 
analogical meaning posits no imperfection in God; on the other 
hand the concept of anger does imply imperfection. Hence we say 
that God is angry only metaphorically, but that the Son of God is 
sent by the Father in the proper sense, as is also the Holy Ghost 
by the Father and the Son.

First corollary. A mission is more than simple appropriation, for 
the Son of God is said to be sent in the Incarnation; and He is 
said to be incarnate not only by appropriation but properly and 
personally so that the Father and the Holy Ghost are not 
incarnate.

Similarly the mission of the Holy Ghost is more than simple 
appropriation, although the Holy Ghost is not united personally 
with the just, and although the three persons dwell in the just. 
Mission implies a procession of origin which is more than simple 
appropriation, and it pertains to the person that proceeds. Thus, 
as we shall explain below, it cannot be said that the Father is 
sent, although He dwells in the just with the other two persons.

Second corollary. According to tradition the words, "For from God 
I proceeded and came; for I came not of Myself, but He sent Me, " 
[613] express not only the visible mission which took place in the 
Incarnation but likewise the eternal procession. Thus Jesus said, 
"I proceeded and came. " [614] Although this interpretation, 
making a distinction between "proceeded" and "came, " does not 
appear at once from the context, it does result from a comparison 
with other texts about the processions. Indeed, in this very 
place, Christ says, "I came not of Myself, but He sent Me, " while 
the Father came of Himself and was not sent, because He does not 
proceed from another person.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER A MISSION IS ETERNAL OR ONLY TEMPORAL

State of the question. The difficulty arises because, as we have 
said, a mission implies a procession, and the processions are 
eternal. Moreover, whenever anything belongs to another 
temporarily and not from eternity, that one is changed; but a 
divine person is not changed.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that mission and giving in God 
are predicated only temporarily.

1. This is proved from the Scriptures: "But when the fullness of 
the time was come, God sent His Son. " [615]

2. The theological reason is merely an explanation of the idea of 
mission: for a mission, besides the reference to the eternal 
principle, has a reference to the temporal terminus by which the 
idea of mission is completed. Therefore it must be said to be 
temporal, even though its principle is eternal, because the effect 
which it connotes and by which it is denominated is temporal.

In the same way God is said to have created not from eternity but 
in time. Similarly, the Incarnation and the sending of the Holy 
Ghost on Pentecost are not from eternity but in time.

On the other hand, generation and spiration are said to be from 
eternity, because they do not imply a reference to a temporal 
terminus. Procession and exitus in God, however, are said to be 
both eternal and temporal, since the Son proceeds eternally as God 
and temporally as man.

In his conclusion St. Thomas joins mission and giving (datio), not 
because they are entirely the same but because they are in a 
certain way in agreement. They agree in this, that both imply a 
new mode of existence in creatures. They differ inasmuch as 
mission implies that the person who is sent proceeds from another, 
whereas the giving does not imply this procession. Thus the 
Father, who cannot be sent, gives Himself, and the divine essence 
can be given to the Son and the Holy Ghost by communication.

Reply to the second objection. Why is the person who is sent not 
changed by the fact that the person becomes present in a new way 
in another? The reason is that this is solely because of the 
change in the creature, just as God is said to be the Lord of all 
things in time not because God is changed but because things 
arrive at existence. In the same way any object is said to be 
actually seen now and not before, not because there is a change in 
the object but because of the change in vision, which is now 
terminated to this object. Thus the Word is not changed by the 
visible mission of the Incarnation, that is, by the fact that the 
humanity of Christ terminates in the Word.

Reply to the third objection. Mission includes the eternal 
procession and adds a temporal effect. We have then a twofold 
procession, eternal and temporal; twofold, not with respect to a 
twofold principle but to two termini, of which one is eternal (and 
so the procession is eternal) and the other temporal (and so the 
procession is temporal, which is the mission itself).

Hence "mission" can be defined as "the procession of origin of one 
person from another with a new mode of existence in another. " 
Mission, therefore, is more than appropriation, and is 
distinguished both from creation and from eternal procession. It 
is distinct from creation because its eternal principle is the 
person that sends and not the entire Trinity, which is the one 
principle of operation ad extra. It is distinct from eternal 
procession because of its temporal terminus and also because it is 
somewhat similar to creation. Mission is, therefore, a kind of 
middle between eternal procession and creation.

Doubt. Does mission principally and directly imply the eternal 
origin of the person sent or the new effect produced in the 
creature? With John of St. Thomas [616] and Gonet, [617] it should 
be noted that there are two concepts of mission held by 
Scholastics: the one proposed by St. Bonaventure and Scotus, the 
other by St. Thomas, the Thomists, and others. This question, 
which seems to be rather subtle, is necessary to distinguish the 
divine mission from simple appropriation, inasmuch as mission is 
more than appropriation.

For St. Bonaventure and Scotus, mission is principally not the 
procession itself but the production of the temporal effect for 
which the person is said to be sent. Their reason is that the 
person pre-existed by eternal procession before the free and 
temporal procession.

The Thomists, like Gonet, say that mission is not the production 
of the temporal effect, but that it implies directly the eternal 
origin of the persons, and indirectly the new effect produced in 
the creature.

1. This is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, "To go forth 
from the Father and to come into the world is to be sent. " [618] 
St. Thomas says: "Mission includes the eternal procession but it 
adds something, namely, the temporal effect. " [619] Besides this, 
St. Thomas held in the eighth article that the Son is not as 
properly sent by the Holy Ghost as the Holy Ghost is sent by the 
Son, although the Holy Ghost together with the Father and the Son 
produces the temporal effect on account of which the Son is said 
to be sent. [620]

2. Proof from reason. The mission of a divine person essentially 
implies the going forth of the person sent. But this going forth 
can be nothing else than the eternal origin, because the mission 
of the divine person cannot take place by either command or 
counsel. Therefore the mission essentially implies such origin, 
and therefore it is not only the temporal operation of God ad 
extra, but the eternal origin of the person sent with the 
connotation of the operation ad extra and the temporal effect.

First confirmation. Otherwise the Father would also be sent, since 
sanctifying grace is produced in the just, according to which the 
Father also dwells in the just.

Second confirmation. Our view is confirmed by a comparison of the 
divine mission with a free act of God, for example, creation, for 
this free act of creating in God is nothing else than the one 
unique act of the divine will by which God necessarily loves 
Himself, with the added connotation of the good that is not 
necessarily loved.

Third confirmation. The Thomistic view seems more in conformity 
with the Scriptural language: "From God I proceeded, and came"; 
[621] and "I came forth from the Father, and am come into the 
world. " [622]

The Greek Fathers regarded the missions as prolongations of the 
processions ad extra; thus they distinguished the missions from 
creation. They said that the sending of the persons of the Son and 
the Holy Ghost differs from creation as to live differs from to 
command. And they based the communication of divine life, by which 
we are elevated to the order of grace, not on creation but on the 
divine missions. In this way they distinguished between the 
natural order and the order of grace as they distinguished between 
creation and the missions of the divine persons. Naturally they 
placed great emphasis on the invisible mission of the Holy Ghost, 
and this characteristic of the Greek theory should not surprise 
us, because the Greeks began with the three persons rather than 
with the unity of nature. St. Augustine, however, preserved the 
essential point in the doctrine of the Greeks when he said: "To go 
forth from the Father and to come into the world is to be sent. " 
[623]

The mission is said to be temporal, however, inasmuch as it 
connotes a temporal effect by which it is denominated; just as 
creation is said to be temporal by reason of its effect, although 
the free creative action is eternal.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THE INVISIBLE MISSION OF A DIVINE PERSON IS 
MERELY ACCORDING TO GRACE GRATUM FACIENS

State of the question. This is the principal article of this 
question, at least with regard to ourselves and our life of grace, 
for it treats of the principal foundation of this life. Here is 
presented matter for preaching and contemplation. We will, 
therefore, examine this truth at some length. Proceeding 
methodically, we see that there are six points that claim our 
attention. We shall note: 1. the difference between visible and 
invisible missions; 2. the crux of the difficulties proposed at 
the beginning of the article; 3. the testimony of Sacred Scripture 
and tradition; 4. the point where theologians are generally in 
agreement; 5. the body of the article; 6. three interpretations, 
namely, a) the more common interpretation of the Thomists, b) 
Vasquez's interpretation, c) Suarez' interpretation. We shall thus 
be proceeding in an orderly fashion from what is better known to 
what is less known, from the revealed foundation of the doctrine 
to its explanation. [624]

1. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE MISSIONS

They differ according to the terminus or the temporal effect 
connoted by the mission. The visible mission connotes an effect 
that is at least in some way sensible, by which the person sent is 
sensibly manifested; thus the visible mission of the Son took 
place in the Incarnation and the visible mission of the Holy Ghost 
on Pentecost took place under the species of fire and the gift of 
tongues. An invisible mission is one which connotes an effect of 
the spiritual order and which is not sensible. Thus the Holy Ghost 
is said to be sent to the soul of the just man at the moment of 
invisible justification, which is accomplished by the infusion of 
habitual grace.

In explaining these articles we shall see that because of this 
there are two differences between the two kinds of missions. By 
the visible missions of the Incarnation and of Pentecost only one 
person is sent and manifested, while in the invisible mission two 
proceeding persons are sent and the Father gives Himself. The 
second difference is that the visible mission takes place through 
some visible effect designed to manifest the divine person who is 
sent; thus the Holy Ghost is sent in the appearance of fire on 
Pentecost and in the appearance of a dove at the baptism of 
Christ, according to the words of St. Matthew, "Jesus. . . saw the 
Spirit of God descending as a dove, and coming u